Camiña Centeno, Ester (2010) Some results on stability concepts for matching models. [Working Paper or Technical Report] (Unpublished)
Official URL: http://eprints.ucm.es/11835/
We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the non-existence of unsatis…ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game.
|Item Type:||Working Paper or Technical Report|
|Additional Information:||JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Matching, Assignment, Stability.|
|Subjects:||Social sciences > Economics > Stock exchanges|
|Series Name:||Documentos de trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)|
Blair, C., 1988, The lattice structure of the set of stable matchings with multiple partners, Mathematical of Operations Research 13, 619-628.
Camiña, E., 2006, A Generalized Assignment Game, Mathematical Social Sciences 52, 152-161.
Martínez, R., Massó, J., Neme, A., Oviedo, J., 2001, On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model, Optimization 50, 439-457.
Roth, A., 1985, Conflict and coincidence of interest in job matching: some new results and open questions, Mathematics of Operations Research 10, 379-389.
Sotomayor, M., 1992, The multiple partners game, in: M. Majumdar, Ed., Equilibrium and Dynamics: Essays in Honor to David Gale Macmillian, 322-336.
Shapley, L. and M. Shubik, 1972, The assignment game I: the core, International Journal of Game Theory 1, 111-130.
|Deposited On:||14 Dec 2010 10:38|
|Last Modified:||15 Nov 2013 11:49|
Repository Staff Only: item control page