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Some results on stability concepts for matching models

Camiña Centeno, Ester (2010) Some results on stability concepts for matching models. [Working Paper or Technical Report] (Unpublished)


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We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the non-existence of unsatis…ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game.

Item Type:Working Paper or Technical Report
Additional Information:JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78.
Uncontrolled Keywords:Matching, Assignment, Stability.
Subjects:Social sciences > Economics > Stock exchanges
Series Name:Documentos de trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
ID Code:11835

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Deposited On:14 Dec 2010 09:38
Last Modified:06 Feb 2014 09:11

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