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An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups


Cabrales, Antonio y Lugo, Haydée (2011) An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups. [ Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE); nº 05, 2011, ] (No publicado)

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We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.

Tipo de documento:Documento de trabajo o Informe técnico
Palabras clave:Lotteries, Public good, Warm glow, Eficiency
Materias:Ciencias Sociales > Economía > Finanzas
Ciencias Sociales > Economía > Economía pública
JEL:D64, H21, H41
Título de serie o colección:Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
Código ID:12474

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Depositado:24 Mar 2011 15:07
Última Modificación:17 Jun 2016 11:31

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