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Splitting graphs when calculating Myerson value for pure overhead games


González-Arangüena, Enrique y Manuel García, Conrado Miguel y Owen, Guillermo y Pozo, M. del y Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio (2004) Splitting graphs when calculating Myerson value for pure overhead games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 59 (3). pp. 479-489. ISSN 1432-2994

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A communication situation consists of a coalitional game and a graph, the nodes of the graph corresponding to the players of the game. To calculate the Myerson value for such situations, we obtain results which extend those well known for trees and cycle-complete graphs. On the other hand, in order to reduce the associated calculus for communication situations with a pure overhead game, the possibility of splitting the graph in several subgraphs is analyzed. For each fixed decomposition of the graph, a subspace of games compatible with this decomposition is given.

Tipo de documento:Artículo
Palabras clave:Communication situations, Graph-Restricted Game, Myerson value, Pure overhead games
Materias:Ciencias > Matemáticas > Investigación operativa
Código ID:15910

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Depositado:11 Jul 2012 10:54
Última Modificación:06 Feb 2014 10:34

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