Biblioteca de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid

A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks


Castro, Javier y Gómez, Daniel y Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio (2008) A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks. Computers and Operations Research, 35 (7). pp. 2376-2387. ISSN 0305-0548

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In this paper we define the weighted serial cost sharing rule for the cost allocation problem.We apply this new rule to the problem of sharing delay costs in a PERT network. This rule belongs to the Core and is the Weighted Shapley Value for a particular game. Furthermore, we present a characterization of this rule and a polynomial algorithm for its calculation.

Tipo de documento:Artículo
Palabras clave:PERT; Serial cost sharing; Delay cost; Weighted Shapley Value
Materias:Ciencias > Matemáticas > Investigación operativa
Código ID:16006

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Última Modificación:06 Feb 2014 10:36

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