Complutense University Library

A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks

Castro, Javier and Gómez, Daniel and Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio (2008) A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks. Computers and Operations Research, 35 (7). pp. 2376-2387. ISSN 0305-0548

[img] PDF
Restringido a Repository staff only hasta 2020.


Official URL:

View download statistics for this eprint

==>>> Export to other formats


In this paper we define the weighted serial cost sharing rule for the cost allocation problem.We apply this new rule to the problem of sharing delay costs in a PERT network. This rule belongs to the Core and is the Weighted Shapley Value for a particular game. Furthermore, we present a characterization of this rule and a polynomial algorithm for its calculation.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:PERT; Serial cost sharing; Delay cost; Weighted Shapley Value
Subjects:Sciences > Mathematics > Operations research
ID Code:16006

Bergantiños G, Sánchez E. How to distribute costs associated with a delayed project. Annals of Operations Research 2002;109:159–74.

Brânzei R, Ferrari G, FragnelliV, Tijs S. Two approaches to the problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects. Annals of Operations Research 2002;109:359–74.

Moulin H, Shenker S. Serial cost sharing. Econometrica 1992;60:1009–37.

Shapley LS. A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn HW, Tucker AW, editors, Contributions to the theory of games II. Annals of mathematics studies, vol. 28. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 1957. p. 307–17.

Tijs S, Koster M. General aggregation of demand and cost sharing methods. Annals of Operations Research 1998;84:137–64.

Potters J, Sudhölter P. Airport problems and consistent allocation rules. Mathematical Social Sciences 1999;38:83–102.

Moulin H. On additive methods to share joint costs. Japanese Economic Review 1995;46:303–32.

Albizuri MJ, Santos JC, Zarzuelo JM. On the serial cost sharing rule. International Journal of Game Theory 2002;31:437–46.

Estévez-Fernandez A, Born P, Hamers H. Project games. Center discussion paper series, Tilburg University; 2005.

De Frutos MA. Coalitional manipulation in a bankruptcy problem. Review of Economic Design 1999;4:255–72.

Castro J, Gómez D, Tejada J. The use of proportional rule applied to durations for slack distribution in a PERT network. Technical Report,2005.

Deposited On:19 Jul 2012 09:33
Last Modified:06 Feb 2014 10:36

Repository Staff Only: item control page