### Impacto

Castro, Javier and Gómez, Daniel and Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio
(2008)
*A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks.*
Computers and Operations Research, 35
(7).
pp. 2376-2387.
ISSN 0305-0548

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Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305054806002954

## Abstract

In this paper we define the weighted serial cost sharing rule for the cost allocation problem.We apply this new rule to the problem of sharing delay costs in a PERT network. This rule belongs to the Core and is the Weighted Shapley Value for a particular game. Furthermore, we present a characterization of this rule and a polynomial algorithm for its calculation.

Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | PERT; Serial cost sharing; Delay cost; Weighted Shapley Value |

Subjects: | Sciences > Mathematics > Operations research |

ID Code: | 16006 |

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Deposited On: | 19 Jul 2012 09:33 |

Last Modified: | 06 Feb 2014 10:36 |

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