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Central Bank independence: Taylor rule and fiscal policy

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Alonso González, Luis Alberto y García Martínez, Pilar (2004) Central Bank independence: Taylor rule and fiscal policy. [ Documentos de Trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales; nº 01, 2004, ISSN: 2255-5471 ]

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URL Oficial: http://eprints.ucm.es/6817/




Resumen

In this article we will show that independence is not enough to impose a given inflation target when the Central Bank is following a Taylor rule, moreover in such a case, the fiscal authority will be able to set a different objective from the one sought by the monetary authority. On the other hand, if the fiscal authority is acting in accordance with a rule in which there is a estimated equilibrium expenditure G* similar to the estimated real interest rate r* in the Taylor rule, neither the government will be able to establish its inflation target value. In this sense, the type of rule that the economic authorities implement is essential for stabilization purposes. The different periods of implementation in fiscal and monetary policy are taken into account although they did not change the main conclusions.


Tipo de documento:Documento de trabajo o Informe técnico
Palabras clave:Banco Central, Reglas de Taylor
Materias:Ciencias Sociales > Economía > Dinero
Título de serie o colección:Documentos de Trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Volumen:2004
Número:01
Código ID:6817
Depositado:30 Nov 2007
Última Modificación:12 Nov 2015 13:47

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