Complutense University Library

Entrada y competencia en los servicios de telecomunicaciones

Muñoz Hernández, Israel J. and Huergo Orejas, Elena (2004) Entrada y competencia en los servicios de telecomunicaciones. [Working Paper or Technical Report]

[img]
Preview
PDF
482kB

Official URL: http://eprints.ucm.es/7718/

View download statistics for this eprint

==>>> Export to other formats

Abstract

Este trabajo analiza la entrada y la competencia en servicios de telecomunicaciones, en los que las empresas se diferencian por sus costes hundidos y por la valoración que reciben de los consumidores. En este marco de análisis desaparece el problema de coordinación presente en la literatura sobre entrada con costes hundidos, debido a que ahora la competencia en precios se ve modificada por el parámetro de valoración. Cuando se introduce heterogeneidad en los consumidores, la entrada queda definida por la combinación de costes y valoración, mientras los consumidores dirigen su demanda hacia la empresa que mejor se adapta a su tipo.

Item Type:Working Paper or Technical Report
Additional Information:Clasificación JEL: L1, L11, L96
Uncontrolled Keywords:Entrada, Telecomunicaciones, Costes hundidos, Elección discreta, Valoración de los consumidores
Subjects:Social sciences > Economics > Industrial organization
Series Name:Documentos de trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
Volume:2004
Number:0404
ID Code:7718
References:

-Amstrong M. y Vickers J. (2001). “Competitive price discrimination”. Rand of Journal Economics 32, 4, pp. 579-605.

- Amstrong M. (1998). “Network interconnection in telecommunications”. The Economic Journal 108, pp. 545-564.

- Carter M. y Wright J. (1999a). “Interconnection in network industries”. Review of Industrial Organization 14, pp. 1-25.

- Carter M. y Wright J. (1999b). “Local and long distance network competition”. Social Science Research Network.

- Dasgupta P. y Maskin E. (1986,a). “The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games: Theory”. Review of Economic Studies 53,1, pp. 1-26.

- Dasgupta P. y Maskin E. (1986,b). “The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games: Applications”. Review of Economic Studies 53,1, pp. 27-41.

- Dasgupta P. y Stiglitz J. (1988). “Potential competition, actual competition and economic welfare”. European Economic Review 32, pp. 569-577.

- Dessein W. (2001). “Network competition in nonlinear pricing”. Social Science Research Network.

- Elberfeld W. y Wolfstetter E. (1999). “A dynamic model of Bertrand competition with entry”. International Journal of Industrial Organization 17, pp. 513-525.

- Götz G. (2002). “Sunk costs, windows of profit opportunities, and the dynamics of entry”. International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, pp. 1409-1436.

- Hahn J.H. (2001). “Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities”. Social Science Research Network.

- Hahn J.H. (2002). “Network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers”. Social Science Research Network.

- Klepper S. y Simons K. (2000). “Dominance by birthright: Entry if prior radio producers and competitive ramifications in the U.S. television receiver industry”. Strategic Management Journal 21, pp. 997-1016.

- Klepper S. (1996). “Entry, exit, growth and innovation over the product life cycle”. American Economic Review 86(3), pp. 562-583.

- Klepper S. y Graddy E. (1990). “The evolution of new industries and the determinants of market structure”. Rand of Journal Economics 21, pp. 27-47.

- Laffont J.-J. y Tirole J. (2000). “Competition in telecommunications”. The MIT Press.

- Laffont J.-J. y Tirole J. (1994). “Access pricing and competition”. European Economic Review 38, pp. 1673-1710.

- Laffont J.-J., Rey P. y Tirole J. (1998,a). “Network competition: I Overview and non-discriminatory pricing”. Rand of Journal Economics 29, pp. 1-37.

- Laffont J.-J., Rey P. y Tirole J. (1998,b). “Network competition: II Price discrimination”. Rand of Journal Economics 29, pp. 38-56.

- Lang K. y Rosenthal R.W. (1991). “The contractors game”. Rand Journal of Economics 22(3), pp. 329-338.

- Levin D. y Smith J.L. (1994). “Equilibrium in auctions with entry”. The American Economic Review 44(3), pp. 585-599.

- Marquez R. (1997). “A note on Bertrand competition with asymmetric fixed costs”. Economic Letters 57, pp. 87-96.

- Peitz M. (2002). “The pro-competitive effect of higher entry costs”. International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, pp. 353-364.

- Poletti S. y Wright J. (2000). “Network interconnection with participation constrains”. Social Science Research Network.

- Rochet J.C. (2002). “Nonlinear pricing with random participation”. Review of Economic Studies 69, pp. 277-311.

- Sharkey W.W. y Sibley D.S. (1993). “A Bertrand model of pricing and entry”. Economic Letters 41, pp. 199-206.

- Stiglitz J. (1981). “Potential competition may reduce welfare”. European Economic Review 71, pp. 184-189.

- Thomas, C.J. (2002). “The effect of asymmetric entry costs on Bertrand competition”. International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, pp. 589-609.

- Taylor, L.D. (1994). “Telecommunications demand in theory and practice”. Boston. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

- Wright J. (2000). “Competition and termination in cellular networks”. Social Science Research Network.

Deposited On:11 Mar 2008
Last Modified:06 Feb 2014 07:55

Repository Staff Only: item control page