García Marco , Teresa and Robles Fernández, María Dolores (2005) Risk tasking behaviour and ownership in the banking industry: the Spanish evidence. [ Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE); nº 0507, 2005, ]
Official URL: http://eprints.ucm.es/7898/
This paper analyses the determinant of risk_taking in the Spanish financial intermediaries with special emphasis on the ownership structure and size of the different entities. On the one hand, the soecific legal configuration of Spanish Savings banks may lead them to differ from Commercial banks in their risk behaviour. In particular, they may make riskier investments. Nevertheless,other theories indicate that greater stockholder control in Commercial banks may induce them towards greater risk_taking in certain situations. In this paper we test these hypotheses with a dynamic pañel data model (1993_2000) for Spanish Commercial banks and Savings banks. We analyse whether differences in risk behaviour are related to different ownership structures or to other factors such as the size of the entity.
|Item Type:||Working Paper or Technical Report|
C33, G21, G32
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Commercial banks, Savings banks, Corporate control, Ownership structure, Bank risk_taking|
|Subjects:||Social sciences > Economics > Finance|
Social sciences > Economics > Stock exchanges
Social sciences > Economics > Banks and credit unions
|Series Name:||Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)|
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|Deposited On:||07 May 2008|
|Last Modified:||06 Feb 2014 07:56|
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