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The Determinants of Institutional Quality. More on the Debate

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Alonso Rodríguez, José Antonio and Garcimartín, Carlos (2009) The Determinants of Institutional Quality. More on the Debate. [ Working Papers; nº 03, 2009, ]

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Official URL: http://www.ucm.es/eprints/9665/




Abstract

This paper provides new evidences about the determinants of institutional quality. Prior to implementing our empirical research, we discuss the criteria that should be used to judge the quality of institutions. Then, we identify the factors that, according to these criteria, determine institutional quality. The results obtained in the estimated model enable to draw some interesting conclusions. First of all, development level determines institutional quality: the highest the former, the highest the latter. Secondly, income distribution seems to condition institutional quality. A certain degree of social cohesion is needed to provide institutional predictability and legitimacy. Thirdly, a sound tax system is positively asso-ciated with institutional quality improvement. Taxes provide the necessary revenue to ge-nerate quality institutions, while creating a narrower and more demanding relation between State and citizens. Finally, education improves institutional quality. On the contrary, some of the variables identified in the literature either they do not seem to determine institutional quality or their effects are indirect, through the aforementioned variables.

Resumen (otros idiomas)

Este trabajo aporta nuevos argumentos sobre los determinantes de la calidad institucional. De forma previa a la exposición del trabajo empírico, se discuten los criterios que deberían valorar la calidad de las instituciones. Posteriormente, se identifican los factores que conforme a estos criterios, determinan la calidad institucional. Los resultados obtenidos en el modelo estimado permiten inferir algunas conclusiones interesantes. La primera, que el nivel de desarrollo determina la calidad institucional: cuanto mayor es la primera, más alta es la segunda. En segundo lugar, la distribución del ingreso parece condicionar la calidad de las instituciones. Se requiere cierto grado de cohesión social para dotar de legitimidad y predictibilidad a las instituciones. En tercer lugar, un sistema impositivo adecuado se asocia positivamente con la mejora de la calidad institucional. Los impuestos proporcionan las rentas necesarias para generar calidad institucional, al mismo tiempo que crean una relación más estrecha y exigente entre el Estado y los ciudadanos. Finalmente, la educación mejora la calidad institucional. Por el contrario, algunas de las variables identificadas en la literatura, bien parecen no identificar la calidad institucional o bien tienen efectos indirectos, a través de las variables mencionadas.

Item Type:Working Paper or Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:Institutional quality, Income distribution, Taxes, Education.
Palabras clave (otros idiomas):Calidad institucional, Distribución de ingresos, Impuestos, educación.
Subjects:Social sciences > Economics > World economy
Social sciences > Economics > Economic development
Series Name:Working Papers
Volume:2009
Number:03
ID Code:9665
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Deposited On:30 Nov 2009 08:35
Last Modified:26 Apr 2016 11:20

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