Publication: Bank Runs Without Sunspots
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2010-04
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Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI)
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Abstract
The literature on bank runs reduces all coordination mechanisms triggering attacks on banks to exogenous sunspots. We present a general equilibrium version of these models where the uncertainty faced by depositors is modeled explicitly, such that bank runs arise as optimal equilibrium outcomes corresponding to Bayesian coordination games played by rational agents before depositing. Differentials in information sets between the bank and its depositors lead to rational self-contained equilibrium runs. The coexistence of different beliefs in equilibrium jointly with the self-fulfilling nature of the attacks follow from Adam Smith's invisible hand principle. The runs obtained do not violate the revelation principle.
La literatura sobre pánicos bancarios reduce todo mecanismo de coordinación que de lugar a los ataques a puntos solares exógenos. Presentamos una versión de equilibrio general de dichos modelos en la cual la incertidumbre a la que los agentes económicos se hallan sujetos es modelizada de forma explícita, de manera que los pánicos surgen como resultados óptimos de equilibrio correspondientes a juegos de coordinación Bayesianos jugados por agentes racionales antes de depositar sus fondos en el banco. Diferencias en los conjuntos de información entre el banco y sus clientes dan lugar a pánicos racionales autocontenidos en equilibrio. La coexistencia de diversas creencias probabilísticas en equilibrio, así como la naturaleza auto-contenida de los ataques, derivan del principio de la mano invisible de Adam Smith. Los pánicos obtenidos no violan el principio de revelación.
La literatura sobre pánicos bancarios reduce todo mecanismo de coordinación que de lugar a los ataques a puntos solares exógenos. Presentamos una versión de equilibrio general de dichos modelos en la cual la incertidumbre a la que los agentes económicos se hallan sujetos es modelizada de forma explícita, de manera que los pánicos surgen como resultados óptimos de equilibrio correspondientes a juegos de coordinación Bayesianos jugados por agentes racionales antes de depositar sus fondos en el banco. Diferencias en los conjuntos de información entre el banco y sus clientes dan lugar a pánicos racionales autocontenidos en equilibrio. La coexistencia de diversas creencias probabilísticas en equilibrio, así como la naturaleza auto-contenida de los ataques, derivan del principio de la mano invisible de Adam Smith. Los pánicos obtenidos no violan el principio de revelación.
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