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An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

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Cabrales, Antonio and Lugo, Haydée (2011) An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups. [ Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE); nº 05, 2011, ] (Unpublished)

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Official URL: http://eprints.ucm.es/12474/


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Abstract

We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.


Item Type:Working Paper or Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:Lotteries, Public good, Warm glow, Eficiency
Subjects:Social sciences > Economics > Finance
Social sciences > Economics > Public economy
JEL:D64, H21, H41
Series Name:Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
Volume:2011
Number:05
ID Code:12474
Deposited On:24 Mar 2011 15:07
Last Modified:17 Jun 2016 11:31

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