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A note on Lindahl equilibria and incentive comparatibility

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Corchón, Luis C. (1988) A note on Lindahl equilibria and incentive comparatibility. [ Documentos de Trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales; nº 03, 1988, ISSN: 2255-5471 ]

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Official URL: http://eprints.ucm.es/23117/




Abstract

We show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lindahl equilibrium (L.E) is a Nash equilibrium (N.E.) in a price-setting game, b) not all N.E. are L.E., but just those for which the production of the public good is positive and c) the set of L.E. and Strong Equilibria coincide. However if the supply function is continuously differentiable, L.E. is never a N.E. We end the paper with some general comments about the nature of the incentive problem.


Item Type:Working Paper or Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:Lindahl equilibria, Nash equilibrium
Subjects:Social sciences > Economics > Macroeconomics
Social sciences > Economics > Economics
Series Name:Documentos de Trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Volume:1988
Number:03
ID Code:23117
Deposited On:11 Oct 2013 09:50
Last Modified:22 Apr 2015 09:42

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