The Spanish Community in the Philippines, 1935-1939

The impact of the War in Spain and the preparations for Philippine Independence in its evolution and identity.

Florentino Rodao

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The University of Tokyo

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INTRODUCTION

In the twentieth century two events in the mid-thirties transformed definitely the centuries-old Spanish community in the Philippines, the Commonwealth and the Civil War. The Commonwealth was proclaimed in the Philippines on 15 November 1935 commencing a transitional period of ten years which would lead to the independence. The Civil War broke out in Spain scarcely nine months after, on 17 July 1936, and lasted three years. The first of these events was planned and lasted the foreseen decade while the second was mostly a surprise and furthermore during the first weeks nobody thought that the conflict would last so long. Thus both events coincided, not only in their timing, but also in the numerous shocks, in the continuous changes of expectations and by impacting directly on the Spanish community of the Philippines.

In fact the coincidence of critical events in both cases, either due to their own impact or to the synergy produced, led to the greatest blow to the Spanish community in the Philippines born centuries before after the arrival of Miguel López de Legazpi to the archipelago. Its leadership, economic strength, internal composition and its influence over the rest of the society were gravely affected by the Civil War and Transition Period. The impact was devastating, surpassing even the problems following the end of Spanish sovereignty in the Islands in 1898.

1. Contents of this study

The first of April of 1939, the day the Civil War ended, the Spanish Community was very different to that existing at the outbreak of the Spanish War less than three years earlier. On the one hand it was worn out by the multitude of internal disputes, aid collections and recruitment in favour of each faction; on the another hand, its future seemed more uncertain due to the increasing difficulties for the Post-independence Philippines, with less promising economic and strategic perspectives as Independence Day got closer.

This study deals with the evolution of the Spanish community in the Philippines during that three-year period as characterized by the intense militancy and by the darkening
clouds over the future of both countries. It proceeds in three different stages; explaining the previously existing situation, detailing the events occurring during the period studied and analyzing their significance.

1.1. The Spanish Community

The community had interesting peculiarities. Following the arrival of an important number of migrants from the Peninsular during the first part of the 20th century, the community officially numbered around ten thousand people although this was progressively diminishing due especially to Filipinization. Compared to other Spanish expatriate communities, especially those in Latin America, it was small in size. The scarcity of Galicians, Andalusians, Extremadurans or those from Canary Islands (the Spanish territories with the greatest proportion of migrants) did not favour the immigrant flow neither did the difficulties at Customs nor the cost of boat tickets to such a distant destination. However, the relatively high level of education and the excellent margins provided by trade with the United States allowed a greatly superior level of income compared to the rest of Spanish communities in Latin America. This economic prosperity characterized the Spaniards in the Philippines.

By the mid 1930’s the expectations of the community were optimistic. Apart from their economic strength, the community and its businesses were witnessing the handover of power to a new generation allowing them to positively contemplate their future whilst living in a prosperous and independent country. Furthermore, their expectations in the forthcoming un-colonized Philippine Republic allowed for optimism thanks to their wide influence over the rest of the society.

The geographical concentration of its members was the main difference in relation to the communities in Latin America. Mostly due to language reasons, the Spaniards tended to be concentrated in areas together with all kind of Filipino *hispanistas* that shared an identity founded on religion, language and culture, while the formal adherence to a country or to a social class was secondary. This agglutination also favoured Spaniards as it formed a closer knit community compared to other population groups in the country, be it through the use of the Spanish language, support for the Catholic Church or attendance at certain social events such as *sarswuela* (zarzuela). Intertwined as it was with the rest of society, this fact
strengthened its participation in discussions about the future of the islands which were a red-hot issue at the time. In opposition to those that emphasized the Asian identity of the Philippines or those preferring American cultural and political ideas, the *hispanistas*, which included Spanish and Filipino citizens, endorsed closer links of the future independent Republic with the Hispanic world of Spain and Latin America. The Spanish Community, certainly, was the foreign group overlapping more deeply with the rest of the country, and whose development had a greater effect on Philippine society.

1.2. Events break loose

The events taking place in 1935 after the Commonwealth declaration of November 25 and in 1936, after the outbreak of the Civil War on July 17 were not only especially grave for the Spanish community, but also for the relations between Spain and the Filipino society.

Firstly, the consequences were significant for the Spanish community. The mobilization of volunteers as well as financial aid in favour of fellow companions in the Peninsula was continuous from the very start of the rebellion, reaching a level of contribution never seen before. The money raised, the soldiers sent to fight and the propaganda disseminated during those years were particularly significant when the small number of citizens involved is considered. Furthermore, the internal conflicts exacerbated the efforts of this mobilization as, after the initial Right-Left friction, the pro-Nationalists later added their own internal disputes.

Secondly, inside Filipino society the Civil War also affected the perspectives for independence. The conflict in Spain multiplied the fears that shadowed the future Philippine Republic since, in spite of the distance, the menace could be taken to be at a World level with Communism and Fascism threatening. Furthermore, it was the prologue to the Sino-Japanese War that started on the very doorstep of the Philippines just one year later. Although the extent of those menaces and their shadow over the future of the country may be arguable the image of Spain, certainly, was gravely damaged. The increasing penetration in China allowed both negative and positive evaluations about Japan for instance, but the Civil War led, basically, to a crucial deterioration of the perception of Spanish things in the Philippines. The coup in July 1936 gave way to news of political extremism, violence and massacres that
necessarily had to damage the image of the country, independent of the eventual winner, and precisely, when the Philippines was searching for positive references for its own future.

The three principal characteristics of the impact of the Civil War in the Philippines, can therefore be summed up as follows. Firstly, the coincidence with the Independence process in the host country. Secondly, the absolute hegemony of the Nationalists, both in people and in financial strength, that can be comparable with only some minor communities in Latin America. Thirdly, the exceedingly intense confrontation inside the Nationalist faction, the gravest of all that occurred and which was comparable to that occurring in the Peninsula among Republicans.

1.3. Long-term Changes

The stress experienced in the Philippines had irreversible consequences. In contrast to what occurred in countries in Latin America, neither the prosperity nor social influence of the community was ever recovered, neither was Spain’s image. The clashes between Nationalists and Republicans were continuous inside the worldwide expatriate Spanish communities, however, in the Philippines the Republicans loudly criticized the Spanish colonization without offering any support of the most important aspects of the Hispanic identity with which they were in agreement. They destroyed, but did not build.

The Falangist challenge to the traditional authorities, on the one hand, occurred also in Europe and in every country with totalitarian ambitions, as well as inside some communities in Latin America, however, on the other hand, the intensity of the intra-nationalist disputes were such that the whole of society could observe them. Besides the difficulties in grasping the ideological discussions with personal overtones, the Filipinos observing those disputes, were more than anything, perplexed. The views on the Spanish legacy were also damaged in all the American countries, however the reduced use of the Spanish language led Filipinos to identify less with the Spaniards and more with Americans which brought a distancing from the Spanish identity and a consequent approach to the American one.

The combination of the outbreak of war in Spain and the start of the building of a new nation, finally, triggered a number of events whose consequences greatly surpassed the events of 1939 and even Independence in 1946. With regard to the Spanish community, the
extreme degree of the disputes and the diversity of conflicts during the Civil War made its members forget their future worries and turn towards short term objectives thus diverting their energies from efforts that should have been used to prepare its future. The socio-political disputes during the war exhausted the influence of the community as a consequence insufficiently defending its real interests in the face of the forthcoming independence, the budding economic crisis and increasing competition from other businesses. In general terms Philippine society took a negative view of these changes in the image of the Spanish legacy leading it to negatively value the Hispanic contributions to its identity. Furthermore, the events occurring during the six years following the period covered by this study, such as the exaggeration of the Falangist Threat by the American government and the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, helped to definitely derail the possibility of the Spanish community recovering its former influence.

2. Bibliography

Many studies have been done on the impact of the Spanish War outside the Peninsula and about the transition of the Philippines towards independence, nevertheless there is still no study covering the Spanish War in the Philippines or, even, the Spanish community in the Archipelago before (or after) Independence. However, besides general references in various histories of the Philippines, there are some well-researched monographs about some individuals and the processes dealt with in this work. This chapter starts by overlooking the topics dealt with in other studies and continues by discussing their general deficiencies and ends with the documentation used to elaborate this research.

2.1. Previous studies

The Spanish community in the Philippines has been treated by four studies although none of them have analyzed its whole history. In the Modern period, Antonio García-Abásolo has been the only researcher to devote efforts to this topic, having published a number of articles and data using documentation from the Archivo General de Indias, in Seville. The another three works deal with the twentieth century; Moisés Llordén (1995) has written an article on its associationism at the beginning of the century, while two other works
are focused on the Japanese Occupation, one being the article by the professor of The University of Ibaraki, Fukasawa Yasuhiro (2002), and the other an informative book by Daniel Arasa, Los españoles en la guerra del Pacífico [Spaniards in the Pacific War] (2001). The global impact of the change of the Spanish regime in the economic sphere has been studied by Gervase Clarence-Smith (“The impact of 1898 on Spanish Trade and Investment in the Philippines,” 2000) and by myself (“Spanish Companies in the Philippines after the Revolution,” 1998). The various institutions have only been well researched in the book by Lourdes Brillantes, 80 años del premio Zóbel [80 years of the Zobel prize] (2000), (who in fact also received this prize), and in the previously cited article by Moisés Llordén (1995).

Sub-groups of the community have also been studied in different facets. The greatest proportion of studies, and probably those of best quality, has focused on the companies and the economic activities of the community. Focusing on individual companies, The Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, the biggest corporation in the Philippines for many years, has been analyzed by three economics historians from Catalonia. Firstly, in an excellent commemorative book on its Centenary, commissioned to Emili Giralt Raventós (1981), later on in a work by Josep María Delgado, on its evolution when changing from Spanish sovereignty to American (“Bajo dos banderas,” 1995) and finally by Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, on the difficult incorporation to and being part of one of the biggest enterprise groups during the Spanish Restoration, (Los Marqueses de Comillas. Antonio y Claudio López (1817-1925)) (2001). Other Spanish owned (or ex-Spanish) related companies that still exist have been studied by Eric V. Batalla, professor at the De La Salle University, specialized in Economics and Business, who has analyzed the Soriano family (2005) and the Zóbel de Ayala’s (1999, 2004) as family dynasties in business. The only regional group studies have been on the Basques despite the importance of Cantabrians or Catalans. Among them, the most important is the recent study by Marciano de Borja, Basques in the Philippines (2005), that covers their history from the very arrival of Legazpi as well as another informative book on this topic, by José Miguel Romaña Arteaga, Los Vascos y la II Guerra Mundial [ Basques and the II World War] (1988). Among the ideologically grouped works professor Fukasawa Yasuhiro has written a study, published in two articles, on the Spanish Republicans in the Philippines (1995) while this author has published a work on the
Falangist group (1995). The Bibliography on the missionaries is quite extensive but it is not felt necessary to delve into this area in this study.

Finally, family studies are very well covered in the Philippine historiography and a good deal of them is dedicated to high society families, some of them part of the Spanish community, and many can easily be considered as filhispanos. Among the numerous works written by Carlos Quirino, there are biographies on the Zóbel de Ayala family (The Ayala Securities Corporation), about Vicente Madrigal (Philippine Tycoon. The Biography of an industrialist) and on the sugarcane landowners (History of the Philippine Sugar Industry). Other studies, such as the one by Mina Roces on the Lopez family or the previously mentioned ones by Eric C. Batalla add information in a very wide field in which also includes some works about families without great financial resources such as the work Pere Izquierdo i Tugas wrote about his forefathers who worked in the Cagayan Valley (2005).

The comparisons with other communities, both expatriates in the Philippines and Spaniards overseas, are very useful for the quality of those studies and their methodology. In the Philippines the scant historiographical attention to the Spanish community is compensated by the ample literature on other expatriate communities since even the smallest have received specific attention. Lewis E. Gleek Jr. has researched the Jewish community (n.d.), Gervase Clarence-Smith has studied on the Middle-East communities in “Lebanese and Other Middle Eastern Migrants in the Philippines” (2005), Motoe Terami-Wada on South Asians in “Indian Communities in the Philippines under the Japanese Occupation with Special reference to Indian Independence League” (2001), and a number of researchers has written on the Japanese community, specially Shinzo Hayase (1989; 1995; 1999) and Lydia Yu-Jose in Japan views the Philippines (1992). The American community has also been covered by Gleek in various books, such as The Manila Americans, 1901-1964 (1972) or Americans in the Philippine Frontier (1974), or even through the various organizations the American community has created, such as his institutions (1976) or his companies (1975).

The Germans were the expatriate community most resembling the Spanish one both in size, cultural background and occupations. It has had important studies, starting with the commemorative book of the German Club (1986). Wigan Salazar completed a PhD Dissertation for the London School of Oriental and Asian Studies (SOAS), German
Economic Involvement in the Philippines, 1871-1918 (2000), while Rico T. Jose has written an unpublished work “The German Community in Manila during World War II” (1997) and the recent book by Frank Eprhaim, a Jewish migrant to the Philippines, includes interesting comments about this community, Escape to Manila (2003).

The most important expatriate community in the Philippines, the Chinese, has received important historiographic attention. This is a not only the result of the centuries-old contacts and the community’s size but also of the preferential attention the Chinese presence receives all around the Southeast Asia scholarship, following the trail of works such as those of G. William Skinner y Maurice Freedman. Seminal works by Edgard Wickberg, such as The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898 (1965), have been the starting point of an academic field that, until now, enjoys a wide bibliography with very varied approaches. Examples range from studies with an anthropological perspective about this community in two of the country’s most important cities, The Manila Chinese by Jacques Amyot (1973) and Chinese Merchant Families in Iloilo by John T. Omohundro (1971), to their relationship with other groups inside the Philippines, by Richard T. Chu (2002a, 2002b), or the studies focused on its economic activities, like those of Wong Kwok-Chu, The Chinese in the Philippine Economy (1999) or Andrew R. Wilson about the business community in Manila Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant Elites in Colonial Manila, 1880-1916 (2004).

Spanish communities abroad usually have received better historiographical attention than the one in the Philippines. The most obvious example is Latin America which includes numerous studies on regional sub-groups, among them specially the contribution by Jose C. Moya on The Spanish Immigrants in Argentina, 1850-1930 (1998). The impact of the Spanish War has been studied in the volume edited by Falcoff and Pike, Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives (1982). The role of the communities in the Civil War has been also the object of monographs, one being the pioneering use of oral history by Consuelo Naranjo, Cuba, otro escenario de lucha [Cuba, another place to fight] (1988), followed by Mónica Quijada on Argentina, Aires de república, aires de cruzada [Winds of Republic, winds of Crusade] (1991) or the most recent by Pablo Sapag, Chile, frente de combate de la Guerra Civil Española [Chile, Battlefront of the Spanish Civil War] (2003).

The Falange and the conflicts provoked by its foundation has been the focus of a number of publications, although with less historiographical importance. The chapter
dedicated to the Philippines in the book written by Allan Chase (1943), *Falange: The secret army of the Axis in the Americas* has popularized, together with other works published in the same period, certain ideas about the Falangists that have later been repeated by the most popular books on the History of the Philippines, such as that by Renato and Leticia R. Constantino *Philippines: The Continuing Past* (1978) and even scholarly ones, as Bacareza’s on the German-Philippine relations (1980). Counteracting the effect of this propaganda proves difficult, partly due to scant documentation and partly because the Foreign Falange during this period has been the object of little research by scholars with the exception of the book by Rosa Pardo, *¡Con Franco hacia el Imperio!* [With Franco towards the Empire] (1995) and the works of Eduardo González Calleja, probably the most important specialist on this Falangist branch. This professor has published the articles “El servicio exterior de la Falange y la política exterior del primer franquismo [The foreign service of Falange and foreign policy during the First Francoism],” (1994) and, especially, “El Servicio Exterior de Falange en Filipinas [The foreign service of Falange in the Philippines],” (1989) to which this author is indebted since it created the seed that led to the hypothesis investigated in this work. In any case, the impact of the scholarly studies in this field has been weak, for example the recent book edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse Against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism* (2001) does not even mention this section. Thus it seems proper research in this field is called for to permit a qualitative step forward in the study of the Falange in the Philippines as until now it an area that is discussed on the basis of very scant studies.

The studies on the Spanish community in the Philippines in the opinion of the author, suffer from two main shortcomings; the lack of a focus centred on its development and the insufficient attention paid to its overlapping with the rest of its contemporary society.

In general, the community is limited to being merely the backdrop of other studies without further expanding on the influence of its internal dynamics on the subject being researched. This occurs in the books on the history of the Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, those on the missionary orders or those by Daniel Arasa and Romaña about the Pacific War. The first of them was centred in the relations between both countries, the second group on the missionary’s influence over Philippine society and the last group on its fight
against the Japanese enemy, however the Spanish Community is seen by all of them as a static subject. The uniform depiction of the community reflects rather the picture that its ruling elite wanted to give, therefore to better understand its diversity it is necessary to delve into its internal diversity especially at the times of crisis. The general approach of those studies, certainly, is poorly-adjusted.

On the other hand, this begs the question of how, when and where a Spaniard and his descendants stop considering themselves as Spaniards and integrate into their adopted community, either the pure Filipina, the Chinese mestiza, the filihispanic or any other. New methodological studies appear in the PhD thesis by Wigan Salazar on the economic situation of the German community between 1871 and 1918 which do not end with the change of regime in 1898 but after World War I, when the German defeat triggered legal measures against the German companies in Asia. The most important contribution in this methodological approach comes from the research on the Chinese community in the Philippines in which studies such as those by Andrew Wilson or Robert T. Chu propose new analysis. Instead of starting from the notion of unity and cohesion of a Chinese community whose identity was defined by its business elite, Wilson and Chu prefer to start from the internal diversity inside the community and focus their research on those Chinese mestizos that shifted between an exclusive loyalty to China (essentially in the newly arrived) and one exclusive to the Philippines (mainly among those that had been in the Islands for generations). Neither Wilson nor Chu consider the year 1898 as relevant to the Chinese community’s development, whilst they prefer to also avoid identifying the original area from where most of them came, Hokkien, with the rest of China.

2.2. Documentation consulted

The main body of documents consulted for this study comes from the Spanish Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores [General Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], where an important volume of information was generated and received including references to the Falangists. Regarding the Nationalists, the resources of the unofficial diplomatic representation greatly surpassed those of their Falange adversaries and it is possible to find copies of Falange messages that can partially solve the general lack of Falange documentation in the Archivo General de la Administración [Administration’s
General Archive] Alcalá de Henares. Although political comments are infrequent, the official documentation of the Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, presently accessible at the Arxiu General de Catalunya [Catalonia General Archives], shows a contrasting point of view, especially useful to get a more specific perception of how the Spanish companies helped the rebellion during the Civil War.

The documentation generated by government of the Commonwealth still is not publicly accessible therefore the study of the Philippine responses to the Civil War awaits its completion in the future. This documentation should still be found in the archives of the Malacañang Presidential Palace which was not bombed or burned during the Battle for Manila although its present state is unknown. The personal papers of some prominent politicians can be consulted at the National Library, for example those of President Quezon or Vice-President Osmeña but their cataloguing is deficient, while some documents have disappeared altogether. This has occurred with documents from the Vargas Collection or those of Claro M. Recto (who worked for the Compañía de Tabacos de Filipinas) donated to the University of the Philippines (UP) which stored them unsecured and with no custodians. Some archives in the United States contain references to the Spanish Community and the impact of the Spanish War but the American officials of the time had no special interest in the matter until the last few months and their reports on it are partly confusing. An important number of boxes of documents related to the Spanish Community and other foreign communities in the Philippines generated during the Pacific War were located in 1994 in the military archives at Suitland (Maryland) and were saved from destruction thanks to the action taken by Professor Grant Goodman; however this documentation is still publicly inaccessible.

The magazines published in those years provide an important image of the events. It would have been very useful to be able to consult the two main newspapers published in Spanish during the time, El Debate and La Vanguardia, but it has not been possible to find a complete collection. It has only been possible to locate the odd issue or two in libraries such as the Library of Congress in Washington therefore the references consulted covering long periods are limited to newspapers in English such as the Manila Daily Bulletin. The most important periodic publications for this study are the daily bulletin Arriba España, specially its final issue, and the monthly Falange review Yugo. The problems and ambitions
inside the Spanish Community are also covered by other publications such as the monthly *Excelsior*. Newspapers published in the Iberian Peninsula contain almost no information on the Philippines.

To learn about the impact of the Civil War on the left wing in the Philippines, the magazine *Democracia Española* [Spanish Democracy] is the most important source together with the newspaper *La Unión* that was unavailable for this study. The James Allen archives conserved in New York’s Tamiment Library is crucial also to understand this impact since Allen’s arrival in the Philippines coincided with the outbreak of the conflict in Spain and he interviewed some of the leaders that most intensely felt the war such as the Independent Philippine Church’s Bishop Aglipay.

The statistics on the Spanish Community and on the trade with Spain have come from existing copies at Hitosubashi University although Tokyo University also possesses copies of the Census taken in 1903 and 1918. The Japanese documentation centres such as the *Center for Pacific and American Studies*, have also permitted the author to examine important documentation such as the review *Pacific Affairs*.

The interviews with descendants of the main characters in this study have given a much deeper insight into the context of the intra-community relations but not so much into the internal disputes. Similarly to the German community, the Spaniards preferred to forget the internal rivalries of the war-time periods or limit their memories to personal or family problems and in fact, on occasions, the research has produced cases of descendants covering up the more embarrassing episodes of the disputes.

### 3. Contributions

The most important historical contribution of the present work focuses on the account of the events and its interpretation. The Commonwealth and above all, the Civil War, mobilized the Spaniards in the Philippines intensely, especially the Nationalists who were probably the most active Spanish expatriates in the world at the time. The record of these activities is important as it shows both the intensity of the activities and the amount of aid sent to their fellow countrymen. It also corrects some of the common beliefs from this period such as the real intentions of Andres Soriano: he was not a Falangist but fought against this
group, also the oligarchy was not united in its actions because their personal rivalries surpassed ideological commitments.

The two most novel features of this study about the Spanish community are firstly, the appraisal of its progressive change towards the rest of Philippine society and secondly, the consequences of the internal disputes, both between the Republicans and Nationalists and also the latter’s internal squabbles between Falangists and Rightists. In order to study this more closely two main approaches are used, one studies the characteristics of the Falange branch in the Philippines and the other examines the behaviour of the Spanish emigrants and their descendants both while they kept their Spanish citizenship as well as later on when they obtained Filipino nationality.

Firstly, to understand the disputes inside the pro-Nationalist community during the Civil War, this study prefers comparison with the European situation. Similarly to other expatriate communities in Latin America and also to other contemporary European societies, leadership inside the community was the main object in dispute. These confrontations show that Falange in the Philippines rather than being comparable with the Japanese militarist regime or other such movements in Asia acted in a similar way to the totalitarian parties in Europe when they tried to gain greater power, both inside the Administration as in the rest of society. Its disputes are comparable with those existing in Europe between the fascist groups and the conservative right wing counterparts who were the only counterweight after the left wing parties had been violently eliminated. Therefore the conflict of the Civil War in the Philippines should be understood in a western context although located in an Asiatic background.

The second hypothesis uses the concept of *double loyalty* to understand the behaviour of the Spaniards in the Philippines and by extension, that of the filhispanics. This study considers that the community can be considered as trans-national. This implies that neither nations, borders nor in this case, the possession of one or another nationality are the bases to understand the behaviour of the hispanized population and are in fact a complication. Having one nationality or another was a secondary matter; possession of nationalization papers was rather motivated by legal or circumstantial reasons such as possessing properties, having to travel or general political interests; whereas belonging to a specific community inside the Philippines was more important and more than anything else a personal decision.
The feelings of its members can be understood better by observing how they wavered between two poles of loyalty, the Philippines and Spain, with most of them falling in intermediate positions. Thus this study avoids a bi-polar approach and relativizes the importance of delimitating a clear line of separation between the community and the rest of the society. The crucial role of the filhispanics is reiterated by this as occurs in research on the so-called Tsinoy (Philippine-Chinese) done by Richard T. Chu as well as Andrew R. Wilson and also in studies done by Wigan Salazar on the descendants of Germans with Spanish or Filipina wives.

The concept of double loyalty and the way it could vary for multiple reasons such as social condition, family background or political ideas better illustrates the behaviour of Spaniards and Filihispanics. However, the events researched in this study, such as the conflicts in the peninsula, the internal divisions and the perspective of independence, took their toll forming a progressively deeper division between both loyalties.

The working hypotheses also permit two important conclusions to be drawn about the consequences of the mobilization and the fracture of the Spanish community into three irreconcilable groups. First, that the intra-community dispute was mostly a social fight disguised by the political disparities. This recognises the fact that the Falange’s ascendancy over the community varied substantially during the Civil War becoming the bastion of those Spaniards in the Philippines in search of social recognition of their success. Their efforts to snatch leadership from the traditional families should then be understood inside the framework of the community rather than in the context of the Spanish War. The different phases, objects of dispute and arguments used were very similar to those taking place in Spain, Germany or Italy, although in a different setting.

Secondly, the period covered by this work must be understood as the turning point for the Hispanic identity in the Philippines. The Spanish ethnicity maintained relatively stable during the four first decades of American colonization as did the relationship between the Spanish community and Philippine society however after 1939 these links definitely deteriorated as occurred with the image of Spain. A PostScript concerning this has been added after the conclusion because this deterioration of links and loss of Spain’s image
carried on up to 1946 even though this study explains a good deal of the reasons for when, how and why the Hispanic identity passed to be part of the history of the Philippines.

4. Structure of the Thesis

This research deals on the evolution of the Spanish community during the Civil War and the first years of the Commonwealth. In order to analyse this evolution, the work is divided into five parts subdivided into different chapters: it starts by defining the situation of the community, follows with the reaction to the outbreak of the Civil War, with the internal conflicts that appeared when the war was already in an advanced phase, with the analysis of the impact of the war as such inside the community and ends looking into the consequences of the conflict beyond the war.

The first part, “Colonials under a different colonizer” tries to trace the context of the present dissertation, bearing in mind that there is no research on the community that could be used as a starting point. The initial chapter focuses in defining the community and its characteristics, both internally as well as viewed from the two societies to which it belonged; the Philippines on the road to independence and unstable Spain from where increasingly worrying news arrived. Its first chapter studies the role of the Spanish community in the Philippines proving that freedom from the Spanish administration in 1899 cleared the path to its economic prosperity. It analyzes the main characteristics, such as its geographical distribution, educational background, settlements throughout the country and its links, both within the community as well as with Philippine society and Spain. The community had greatly renovated itself after 1898 and maintained a highly visible influence in the country, not only due to the many Spanish missionaries but also because it was very prosperous thanks to exports to the United States. The second chapter deals on its radical conservatism and its influence in Philippine society. The last chapter deals with the new Philippine situation after 1935 since, after the transitional period to independence started, many new laws had to be approved and promulgated in preparation of the future Republic of the Philippines. The nation had to form itself; from its political model to the national language and, furthermore, had to readjust its economic system after the end of its privileged status with the United States.
The second part, “The Spanish community faced with the Civil War” spells out the impact of the outbreak of the conflict and the consecutive rebel triumphs. Its three chapters span from the initial responses inside the community to the fiasco of the Republicans and to the impact on Philippine society. The result was a community mobilized to the maximum, first by its own initiative and later, in the case of the Nationalists, organized from Spain. The Republicans in the Philippines were soon surpassed with a difference by the Nationalists and the arrival of a new Ambassador from the Peninsular did little to alleviate the imbalance. The Philippine society, finally, regarded the Spanish conflict with surprise and progressively with increasing scepticism, especially when the attitude of the militants in the Philippines became over-heated and radicalized. The conscious rejection to side with one or other of the contenders was increasingly the favoured response towards the conflict.

The third part, “Conflict between Conservatives and Falangists” deals with a very characteristic stage of the Civil War’s effect in the Philippines, namely the emergence of a Fascist party and the outbreak of intra-Nationalist community divisions.

To put these problems into perspective, the first chapter goes back to the situation in Spain with the spectacular rise of the Falange after the outbreak of the war and to how General Franco managed to dominate it. The next chapter moves back to the Philippines where the emergence and rise of the Falange had key similarities with the events occurring in the Peninsula albeit without a prominent figure able to dominate it as General Franco did in Spain. The last chapter deals with the dispute for leadership between the Falange and non-Falangists from 1938 when their confrontations became more intense that against the Republicans.

The fourth part, “The changes in the Spanish Community during the Civil War”, analyzes both the consequences of the political mobilization and the challenge to their economic capacity. The Spanish conflict was an important event that is studied, firstly, for its impact on the structure and organizations of the community and secondly, due to the internal mobilizations that took part in order to help their fellow associates in Spain. The next chapter sums up the aid whether of money, materials or military volunteers and ends analyzing the first signs of the decline in the economic strength of the community. Some of the reasons for this decline were the result of changes in the Philippines during the Commonwealth although
others were specifically related to Spanish companies directly or indirectly involved with the Spanish conflict.

Part five “The parallel conflicts” is the most analytical section. It explores the hidden reasons and the impact of events as they occurred during these years both inside the community as well as in the rest of Philippine society. The Civil War and the independence process untapped latent disputes that once mixed with the propaganda excesses and with the news on violence in the Peninsula together with criticism of the main Spanish representatives led to the erosion of Spain’s image in the Philippines. These outrages, furthermore, reverberated and affected the whole community including the same groups that participated in the disputes. This is illustrated by the Republicans who, following their military defeat in Spain soon proclaimed with increasing insistence their “Philipiness.” Thus the Civil War opened a Pandora’s Box and nothing was ever the same.

5. Terminology

This work uses two key terms, Fascism and Filhispanics. The term fascist is considered as appropriate to refer to the Falange including its branch in the Philippines despite that it is not accurate to refer to the regime existing then in Spain. The socio-cultural characteristics together with their nationalist and revolutionary discourse mixed with anti-capitalist tones clearly reflect what the Falange was. As occurred in other countries, the Spanish fascists never achieved their target of a totalitarian regime, while they refused to use this adjective mostly due to misgivings based on their reaction against foreign terms to define what they considered as essentially being purely Spanish. This fact does not exclude this denomination, among other reasons, because the Falangists themselves were aware of the similarities, at least implicitly, by not allowing anyone else in Spain to define themselves as Fascists. The regime presided by General Franco, on the other hand, was not fascist, as Juan Linz or Stanley G. Payne have already pointed out. However it is necessary to note, as Javier Tusell does, the period when the Falangist could have taken over the reins of power in opposition to other groups although this is only partially covered by this work.

The term “Filhispanic” is used to refer to the Philippine citizens sympathising with the Hispanic identity in the country and who were competitors during these years of the so-called sajonistas (anglo-saxonists) and the asianistas (asianists). It is preferred to avoid
using the term used at the time by those Filhispanics, that is, *hispanistas*, because of its wider acceptance since this study focuses on a specific segment of the population. The term *mestizo (mixed blood)*, or Spanish mestizo is also inappropriate since it emphasises the heredity characteristics rather than personal opinions: there were *mestizos* and even pure Spaniards that were *sajonistas*, or *asianists*.

It has been more difficult to unify terms in the rest of cases. To refer to the backers of the insurrection against the II Republic the term Nationalists is preferred since it was how they called themselves, although their enemies were also Spanish nationalists as José Alvarez-Junco has emphasized and Eduardo González Calleja has also noted in the propaganda disputes in Latin America. They are also referred to as rebels and, when the supreme leadership became clear, as Francoists.

The group led by Andrés Soriano confronting the Falange is difficult to define with a single term since each of them has a special nuance. Since its power was based on its dominance of the country’s resources, the terms oligarchy or wealthy families can be used as well as the term commonly used at the time *plutocrats*. The Monarchists, Carlists and the rest of the right-wing groups allied in their efforts against their common enemy can be grouped under the term *Non-Falangists* as well as one coined by Adrian Got, one of the persons in this study, the “*extreme right-wingers*.” Since these are not widely used the term *reactionaries* better defines their ideas and also, since the political past of some of them does not correspond exactly with such extreme terms, as conservatives. Tabacalera is used to refer to the *Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas*, keeping in mind the possible confusion with the Spanish company that is currently integrated in the multinational group Altadis. However that is how the Compañía General was named in the Philippines, as shown by the plaque at the entrance to their headquarters in Marques de Comillas Street.
RESUME OF THE CHAPTERS

Part I. Colonials under a different colonizer

In spite of the end of the Spanish colonization in 1898, the community adapted to the American colonial regime and throughout the first decades of the 20th century it was small but prosperous and had an important economic influence in the country. The main threat to its existence was, in any case, the increasing integration with Philippine society that gradually diminished the number of its members thus creating a reliance on new immigrant arrivals.

1.1. Resurgence

Historically, the Spanish community had been very small consisting almost exclusively of soldiers and missionaries. It began to grow only in the second half of the 19th century coinciding with the growth of exports from the archipelago and when the principle company associated with Spain was created, the General Company of Tobaccos of the Philippines, more commonly known as Tabacalera. This company later became the best example of the excellent adaptation of the Spanish companies to the new American regime.

According to the censuses its population numbering around 5,000 was stable during the first decades of the 20th century, thanks to the important migratory flows that renewed it and that the loss of its longer term members integrating with Philippine society was relatively small. The statistics show that the community was well settled in the country with the low number of acquisitions of Philippine nationality coming mainly from births or marriage with Philippine nationals, there being a significant tendency of intra-community marriages. The community’s number came somewhere between that of the Japanese and the Americans.
Geographically, half of the community lived in Manila and Rizal, with the rest residing in the cities of Tarlac, Iloilo and Cebu and five towns in Negros Island. They tended to concentrate in the so-called “mesticerías,” neighbourhoods where the Spanish *mestizos* mixed with pure-bloods and where Spanish was widely spoken, despite the fact that the population censuses show that a mere 2.7% were Spanish-speakers. In Manila, the 1938 census shows the Malate and Ermita areas as having 30% of Spanish speakers and Intramuros 20%.

The main area of origin was the north of Spain with Galicians, Asturians, Basque-Navarrese and Catalans prevailing partly due to the location of Tabacalera in the Peninsula (Barcelona and the Asturias-Santander region) and to the high number of Basque settlers in Negros Island. The 1903 census indicates a high level of education, 73% having finished school, lower than in the German community (80%) but higher than all the rest including the Americans with 64%.

Their main institution was the *Casa de España* in Manila, built at the beginning of the 1920s. It was the center of Spanish activities such as the *Casino Español*, the Consulate General and the Chamber of Commerce, as well as housing the community’s celebrations. There were another two *Casino Español* in Cebu and Iloilo. The community had also created charitable foundations such as the Spanish Santiago Hospital, the Spanish Charitable Fund or the *Hogar San Joaquín*. The institutions devoted to cultural activities were dominated by Filhispanic members.

**1.2. The conservative leadership**

Partly due to the prosperous economic outlook, the conservatism of the Hispanic-Filipino oligarchy was shared by many others in the community. A middle class based on employees prevailed while poorer members were scarce partly due to strict immigration rules at the frontier.

Leadership was held mostly by the wealthy families; the owners of the companies where many Spaniards were employed. The financial strength of these families allowed them
to influence not only the appointments made from Spain (diplomats, Tabacalera managers or religious prelates) but also to limit the appointee’s capacity of manoeuvre in the Philippines. Their funding of the Consulate General’s expenses also limited the influence of the diplomats who, for example, had a right to speak but no vote in some of the institutions’ meetings. Among the leaders of the community, Enrique Zóbel de Ayala was probably the most outstanding for being the main representative from a successful family line owning companies and properties and also for his continuous work in favour of Spanish culture. During the II Republic, Andrés Soriano gained the position as the main leader of the community after finishing studies overseas and returning to the Philippines. Soriano showed strong political interest both for the future of the community and the Philippines, as well as a capacity for leadership backed by his excellent family background (nephew of Enrique Zóbel) and his business successes. In the Catholic Church the most significant post was Rector of the University of Santo Tomas, which was held by Father Silvestre Sancho who had been appointed against certain opposition due to his radical ideas. The Irish Archbishop of Manila, O’Doherty, exercised a great influence in the community, thanks to his many years spent in Salamanca.

The community had something to offer Philippine society in general, such as an alternative concept of modernity to the American ideal and a culture profoundly rooted in the Catholic religion, its intimate bonds with Spain and the defence of the Spanish era.

The large number of associations it had shows that the Spanish community was active and did not hold back in expressing its opinions, even to the big decision-makers back in the Peninsula, as occurred during the II Republic when support for the Monarchy was widely proclaimed.

1.3. Transition to an uncertain independence

Starting from the final months of 1935, the Philippines began a transitional period towards a longly desired independence. This created a need for new legislation and changes to face the future with the obvious promotion of political and economic roles for the Filipinos while at the same time convincing neighbouring nations (namely Japan) to accept the
nation’s birth without expansionist aspirations. The period of the Commonwealth was the
time to specify what kind of country was desired. Among the various options open to the
Spanish community was the defence of proposals to preserve the Hispanicism of the islands.
It was expected to try and increase the bonds with Spain and in general with the Hispanic
world. It was also possible that the future economic policies would mirror those in Latin
American. At the cultural level it was hoped to boost Hispanism from within the archipelago,
however it remained to be seen how these goals would be achieved.

Part II. The Spanish community and the Civil War

The July 1936 coup in Spain unleashed unsuspected energies, starting with the first
demonstrations followed by the aid collections, political meetings and an increasingly visible
radicalization of the community’s members. The Philippine society, in the meantime, looked
on perplexed.

2.1. Fighting breaks out.

During the first weeks there prevailed in the Philippines, as in the rest of the world, a
tense calm in which the majority adopted a wait-and-see attitude although some individuals
proclaimed their immediate support for one or another of the sides. The main activities at
those moments were the exchange of information and the sending of aid, either in the form of
clothes or money.

After some months, following the failure of the Nationalist offensive against Madrid, it
was widely perceived that the war would last longer than originally expected and that the side
that could gather together the greatest resources would win the final victory. Thus, acting
partially on instructions from their political leaders in the Peninsula, the community
(especially, the sector supporting the Nationalists) started to undergo a process of total
mobilization in order to gather those resources that would be vital for the victory of their
fellows-in-arms. Besides the effort of sending help and money, this mobilization had
important side effects such as increasing political radicalism and the regeneration of the
leadership with new players that were more politically committed.
The imbalance between Republicans and Nationalists in the Philippines was evident from the first few months. The former’s main advantage was their diplomatic recognition as representing the official government however the Nationalists in Spain soon compensated by appointing two unofficial honorary representatives from the traditional leaders in the islands, Andrés Soriano as Consul and Enrique Zóbel as Vice-consul. Soriano and Zóbel not only fulfilled many of the functions performed by the official representatives they also used their important resources to promote new adherences to the rebel side in Spain including many of the former honorary consuls in the provinces, the Elizalde family and most of the missionaries.

The Nationalists, furthermore, managed to get the major institutions in the community on their side, including companies such as Tabacalera and the Spanish Chamber of Commerce despite the many legal difficulties involved; for example the Casino Español was forced to change its statutes. Soriano in the throes of the militant Nationalist fever fixed a target of sending 50,000 pesos to Spain every month, an amount that was half that pledged by fellow militants in Cuba where the Spanish community numbered nearly half a million members.

With respect to American policy towards the Civil War, this fervent militancy and the disproportionate imbalance of forces in the Philippines could bring negative consequences since Washington’s aim was that all countries under its influence should have a similar policy towards the war. So, after first having attempted to get the demonstrations toned down, Washington extended the policy of Non-Intervention to the Philippines in June 1937 in order to prevent that the large aid shipments to the Nationalists be so blatant. As first these efforts to moderate the propaganda had little impact: partly due to the scant interest shown by the American officials in the archipelago in enforcing the policy and partly because the Philippine Government was reluctant to take effective measures for fear of diminishing its political independence from Washington. Thus, since the objective of United States at that moment was to assure the High Commissioner's pre-eminence over the Philippine government, Washington finally gave up on the issue of the Spanish community - a minor case when compared to its general interests. The failure of this second American effort at
moderating the excessive prevalence of the Nationalists, in fact, emboldened the unofficial consul Soriano, as illustrated by the impossible conditions he demanded for an immediate end to the demonstrations: the official recognition of the Nationalists.

2.2. Republicans in a minority

The Spanish loyalists to the Republican Government started the Civil War at a clear disadvantage. Among other reasons, their opposition to the economic power of the oligarchy or to the religious orders could bring important consequences such as economic sanctions as well as other forms of pressure. Fear of reprisals influenced the way many Spaniards acted during the 20th century and the II Republic and it continued to do so during the Civil War.

The Republicans were never in a position to do anything about this disadvantage once the War broke out. From the beginning the loyalists were pessimistic about the Philippine reaction to the war and were never really prepared to make the necessary efforts to counter the rebels’ activities, both for political and other reasons. There was a preponderance of followers of Izquierda Republicana (Republican Left), a moderate leftist reform party although with extremely anticlerical views, as well as a good number of veteran soldiers that fought in the Revolution against Spain, the self-proclaimed old-timers. Their most successful initiative was the publication of the magazine Democracia by a relatively young former Tabacalera worker, Pio Brun.

Aware finally of the importance of the aid sent from the Philippines by its enemies there, and urged by the outbreak of the war in China, the Republican Government decided to take counter-measures. It cancelled the Tabacalera contract, set up a radio station to broadcast to the Philippines and lastly, appointed a so-called Minister Plenipotentiary for the Far East, Antonio Jaén Morente. These were fairly scant measures that Jaén tried to compensate for on his limited budget with propagandistic zeal. From his very arrival, he spoke at meetings in favour of the Republic, travelled to make direct contact with the populations most sympathetic to the Republic (Visayas, Pampanga and Cavite) and searched for figures from Filhispanic history that could fit in with his propaganda efforts.
Apart from Jaén Morente, the Republicans in the Philippines did not receive many other reinforcements. The only two noteworthy exiles were a Deputy (Diputado) of the Spanish Parliament, Benito Pabón who had anarchist leanings and Rafael Antón, a lawyer who had taken part in the tribunal that condemned to death the Falangist leader, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera. However they were of little help, even for propaganda purposes as the former was accused of being a Trotskyite and in fact later tried returning to Spain once the anti-POUM purges ceased, and the latter aware of the need to maintain a low profile, wrote articles under a pseudonym.

The cases of public retractions were perhaps more significant. Among those that travelled from Spain, Luis Massip, another republican Diputado, changed sides becoming the director of the Francoist newspaper, El Debate. Meanwhile others preferred to maintain a low profile, such as the former governor of León, Arturo López de Cerain. Among the Spanish community in the Philippines, many that started supporting the Republic passed over to the Francoists including even some Basque and Catalan nationalists as well as communists and anarchists. Some ex-Republicans that ended up being members of the Falange’s ruling Junta are particularly noteworthy, such as the Ferrer brothers or José Quintana García.

From the spring of 1938, the republican supporters had lost momentum and the capacity for achieving their aims. Jaén Morente soon became an annoyance as his association with opposition groups provoked a debate in the Philippine parliament that ended up with an official resolution to investigate his activities in the spread of socialism and communism. Aiming to leave the Philippines around this time, one year before the war ended, Jaén Morente had become aware of the insurmountable difficulties of the task he had accepted. His failure, in any case, was greater than expected. He had been excluded from official Philippine circles, neither being invited to official activities nor officials attending his invitations to functions. He never carried out the undertakings expected of him on his appointment, all his travel plans outside the Philippines failed and he even had to buy advertising space to publicise his point of view.
2.3. Filipinos and the Spanish War

As in many other countries, the Civil War had a profound impact in the Philippines. The conflict affected domestic politics, either because the war was perceived as an example of the growing global division into Fascist and Anti-Fascist camps or because the Spanish situation reflected the need to avoid a similar conflict in the Philippines where the existing social conditions were considered to be similar.

The pro-Nationalists predominated among Filipinos although those that held positions of power preferred to be cautious. Both President Quezón, and Vice-president Osmeña, similarly to a good deal of politicians, backed the rebels in Spain but opted to keep quiet to avoid contravening American foreign policy. President Quezón vociferously reprimanded some of the Nationalist excesses in the media but the Philippine Government never took measures against them. Public opinion also sided preferably with the Nationalists, partly because like in Latin America, many associated the political loyalties with those of the Philippines and taking sides in favour of Franco was seen by many as supporting their own government in Manila.

Domestic political clues are essential to understand the backing for the Republic. Thus Filipino support for the Spanish Republic was nurtured basically from the opposition to president Quezón. Filipinos, in fact, eclipsed Spaniards in their defence of the Republic because it also meant criticizing their government as well as the Catholic Church. In fact, the two unsuccessful candidates in the last presidential elections fervently supported the Republic: Bishop Gregorio Aglipay of the Philippine Independent Church and Emilio Aguinaldo, the first Philippine president. It was also backed by some former leaders of the 1896-98 Revolution, the Popular Front of the Philippines, by unions such as the Philippine Labour Federation and by different society groups such as the Chinese community, the freemasons and part of the American community. However they unwittingly acted as double-edged swords because their manifestoes also acted to politically isolate the Philippines.
Due to the passion that the Spanish conflict provoked in domestic Philippine politics the Communist Party never had prevalence in the support to the Republic. The members of the International Brigades were the only exception to this lack of communist hegemony partly because many came from The United States.

Part III. Conflict between conservatives and Falangists

Both Republicans and Nationalists suffered internal power struggles as the war dragged on, especially throughout 1937. Whereas in Spain these changes gave way to violent conflicts among the Republicans, in the Philippines the conflict was in the opposite party since the Nationalists suffered them with particular intensity.

3.1. Internal rearrangements

As the war dragged on the internal changes in each of the contenders followed similar paths. With the increasing political radicalization the former major parties were left with marginal roles as the political alliances were restructured. The former left-right divisions disappeared; the power of every trade union and political party varied as the political map on each side was redrawn in a search for the paramount leadership that was so badly needed to win the war.

Among the Republicans, the new political context revolved around three axes: moderation versus radicalism; priority for the war or for revolution; whether nationalism should be centralist or peripheral. Additionally, all the Prime Ministers of the Spanish Republican, including the latest, Juan Negrín, had to share power. Among the Nationalists, it was a different story. There were also important differences among its groups (corporate spirit versus liberal capitalism; monarchists versus non-monarchists; admirers of Great Britain versus pro-Fascists, etc.), however the need for leadership overshadowed all other political interests. Thus, General Francisco Franco, on being chosen by his peers to consolidate their efforts, unified all parties under the Falange, constantly increased his power base and transformed himself into the political centre of the Nationalists. Thus all the internal tensions, such as those between the Falangists and the other rebels, centred on Franco.
Franco gained more power in three years than other dictators such as Hitler or Mussolini giving the Nationalists greater unity for action than the Republicans. However, the situation in the Philippines reveals the fragility of this model of personal power because his absence (and that of the army) was the key reason that the conflicts in the expatriate community broke out.

3.2. The Steamroller Falange

The Philippine branch of the Falange was at the start of the conflict one of the many groups that the powerful families in the community created, reflecting their influence in the country and the Spanish community. Founded by Ignacio Jiménez, an aviator married into the Elizalde family, its original aims were collecting funds and promoting exchange of information and propaganda. The war-time situation, however, provoked significant changes, because as the Falange affiliated more fervent militants they soon went further than the original intentions proclaiming their patriotism in exclusion to all others and attacking the traditional leaders of the community such as Enrique Zóbel, regardless of his pro-Franco commitment. Some of its members, such as Mario Olóndriz, Ignacio Jimenez’s successor, wavered from one ideological extreme to another. At first he was an atheist, freemason and freethinker, later he reneged on his beliefs and converted to Christianity, married the mother of his children and baptized them all.

The Falange itself also suffered internal disputes including accusations of misappropriation of funds. An internal plebiscite showed that the militants were in fact in opposition to the ruling Junta when they won a censure motion against Patricio Hermoso by 30 votes to 4; in fact Hermoso, a classic right-wing militant, had been accused of borrowing funds on the pretext that they were to aid the rebels in Spain. The Junta’s officials did not accept the vote and for eight months two parallel branches of the Falange existed in the Philippines until Falange headquarters in Spain named a new Jefe (Boss): so unlike all other Spanish groups in the Philippines this decision had to be taken from Spain. This event coincided with promotion for the Falange Exterior, which was raised in status to Delegación Nacional (National Delegation) with its own offices and chief, José del Castaño, a diplomat who had recently fallen out with many other members of the diplomatic service.
Disregarding the advice received, Castaño appointed a recent arrival to the Philippines, Martin Pou with full powers to reorganize the party.

Pou, who’s right-wing background did not date much longer than the outbreak of the war, was married to a woman from the Filipino-Spanish high-society. On the 11th of October 1937 he appointed his first ruling Junta with people from all tendencies with the exception of the leaders of the previous confrontations. Following this move, Pou and the Falange received widespread support such as that of Tabacalera which obliged its employees to affiliate. The Falange then grew by leaps and bounds to the point that it set a time limit to accept new affiliates. This contrasts with the failure of the German Consul's parallel efforts to promote the Nazi party among the German colony due to opposition from the German Club.

The first individual that attempted to block the rise of Falange under the new leadership was Enrique Zóbel de Ayala, the unofficial Vice-Consul and Director of the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines. On the 1\textsuperscript{st} November 1937, a mere twenty days after the new Junta’s appointment, he asked Spain to sack Pou. Zóbel argued that Pou’s attitude caused problems to his office because, among other things, he named representatives in the provinces without consulting him. Pou emerged fortified from this attack, partly due to the vice-consul's own ineptitude, but mainly from the general support he received, especially from Tabacalera and from the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines that went as far as voting Zóbel’s dismissal.

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This conflict soon calmed down in December of 1937 due to Soriano’s return, Spain calling the officers to order and everyone promising to avoid new confrontations. Martin Pou, however, was uncomfortable with the rules imposed by Soriano, such as having to inform him of his daily activities, so he soon longed to act more freely, fed up of being monitored by the businessman’s employees. Furthermore, he had a different point of view on the role of the local Falange branch in the Philippines, because as Nationalist Spain’s only Political Party, Pou considered it part of the State and superior in rank to the diplomatic representation which,
in his opinion, merely fulfilled a bureaucratic purpose. Thus under his leadership the Falange carried out certain activities in parallel to the unofficial Consulate, such as a register of Spanish citizens or the legalization of documents. He considered that the Falange should have additional functions beyond those performed by the Consulate, such as preventing mutual competition between Spanish companies, or supporting the religious orders. His search for independence soon led to a search for new headquarters outside the Casa de España that had housed the Spanish institutions for decades, and to the appointment of a new Junta with like-minded officers, such as the former rebellious leader of one of the factions of the Centro Falange Española, Patricio Hermoso, and two members from a family in dispute with the Soriano clan, Antonio and Francisco Ferrer who had sided late with the Nationalists.

3.3. Harassment of the Falange

General Franco appointed his first government in 1938 once the victories in the north allowed him to make post-war plans. With Jordana, the new Foreign Affairs Minister in office, the monarchists in Franco’s entourage saw their prominent role in foreign affairs diminished once the Diplomatic Cabinet disappeared and its Director, José Antonio Sangróniz, Andrés Soriano’s cousin, who was hated by the Falangists and the Italian Fascists, returned to the diplomatic corps. In the Philippines, the Junta National de Manila was created, following the example of similar Juntas in Latin America, with the purpose of tutoring the Falange whose only representative was completely isolated. Soriano managed to limit the Falange’s resources within the community, on the one hand by holding new elections for the Spanish Chamber of Commerce where the Falangists were narrowly defeated and on the other by appointing Adrián Got, in substitution of his uncle Enrique Zóbel, as the new unofficial Vice-Consul. Got was the chief officer of Tabacalera, President Quezon’s personal friend and profoundly anti-Falangist. When Soriano again departed from Manila in March 1938 for a trip to the United States and Spain, he had made sure his power rested unchallenged.

However Got lacked Soriano’s diplomatic skills, openly expressing his scorn for the Falange by assuring it was “an anarchical and undisciplined mob.” He also turned down all Martin Pou’s proposals, even though they had been tacitly agreed to, such as the autonomous
use of the funds he gathered, or the creation of the Falange’s own *Hogar José Antonio* in Manila. Pou, out of frustration, described Got as cynical, slanderous, treacherous, and more, in a telegram to Castaño, his superior in Spain, and which ended up being revealed to his adversaries. Soriano, by then in Spain, and the anti-Falangist group in Manila reacted immediately by sending telegrams and negative reports against the Falange’s Manila branch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Falangists counter-attacked and the restlessness spread to the community. In consequence all activities such as the celebrations for the Civil War’s second anniversary, were either organized separately by each group or, if not, boycotted by the other.

Jordana, the Foreign Affairs Minister, considered the conflict as the gravest among the expatriate Spanish communities, so rather than talking directly to the Falange, he consulted General Franco who ordered Pou’s dismissal on 18th August 1938. From that moment, and until Pou was officially informed of his dismissal in November, new accusations of all types surfaced and President Quezon’s Malacañang office was requested to expel Pou from the Philippines. During the three and a half months until Pou’s departure from Manila in early December, the Manila Falange sent all sorts of grave accusations in an attempt to impede Franco's decision, while an exultant Got obstructed all requests from the Falange in Madrid.

It seemed that December 1938 would see a return to calm thanks to the new efforts to heal wounds and the renovation of the leadership. The Foreign Affairs Ministry reprimanded Got; Pou departed definitively from the Philippines; the most widely respected Falangist, Patricio Hermoso, was appointed as provisional *Jefe* and Soriano returned to Manila to take charge again of the unofficial consulate. But this calm was short-lived. At the end of January of 1939, after the celebration of the fall of Barcelona and being incited by Castaño, the Falangists asked Soriano to reprimand Got openly over some minor complaints. This infuriated Soriano. For the first time the unofficial Consul forgot his role as mediator and directly confronted the Falangist leaders, either by direct correspondence full of reproaches or by indirect means, such as anonymous pamphlets or formal complaints to Spain against individual Falangist leaders.
Thus, when the Civil War finished in April 1939, both groups were fed up of the disputes that had entailed the support of Francoist Spain. The Falangists considered dissolving the party while Soriano rejected the honorific position of Vice-Consul that he was offered by the first diplomat to arrive from Spain. The celebrations were perceived as the end of a troublesome period rather than the start of a brilliant new future and the successful daily Soriano had financed from the beginning of the war, ¡Arriba España!, published its last issue. Soriano had no new ambitions to share with the rest of pro-Franco Spaniards.

**Part IV. The changes in the community during the Civil War**

The aid effort had permanent effects on the Spanish community in the Philippines, due to its intensity, radicalization and length. Through the mobilization of those years, major quantities of help were sent to Spain, however these efforts altered the community’s internal structure and its image towards the rest of society was damaged in many aspects whether political, cultural or in the economic field.

**4.1. The new courses in the Nationalist mobilization**

The Civil War caused sectors of the community to change their ways, as occurred with the missionaries that neglected their evangelical work in favour of the political disputes. Many decisions were driven by non-political reasons, such as the support given to the unofficial Consulate by the Augustinian Recollects due to their shareholdings in the San Miguel Brewery, or the standing loyalty to the Republic by the Capuchins because of their Basque origins. From the beginning of the war, Spanish missionaries made propaganda in support of Franco, used their churches and spoiled the main international event occurring in the Philippines during those years, the International Eucharistic Congress. From October 1937, the Nationalists got the Archbishop of Manila, O'Doherty, and the Papal Nuncio to support the coup-d'état, attend their celebratory masses and even to bless activities such as the Falangist Hogar José Antonio. This support of Franco’s rebellion, then, was at the cost of escalating the internal divisions, not only between the propagandists and the more tranquil
members, but also between the rest of Spaniards and other Catholic groups including missionaries from other countries.

The Falange was another new adventure which produced important effects. It became a different type of institution to those that the community had been endowed with previously having with three particular characteristics: it imitated the Party in Spain having its leader being appointed from the Peninsula; it left its particular imprint in all its activities and it looked for an alternative to the traditional community leadership. It created its own separate organizations that aspired embracing every aspect of the Spaniards’ lives whether juvenile (it had a training camp in San Agustín's Church), feminine (Sección Femenina), charitable works (Auxilio Social), economic (Compañía Comercial de Oriente) and even help in the search of job opportunities. Auxilio Social was its biggest success, thanks to the level of feminine mobilization which was unknown until then. The party also had some successes, such as a high number of recruits, a certain official recognition as well as the creation of an alternative to the traditional powers controlling the community; however it never achieved prominence or obtained any significant political support outside the community. Neither did it achieve its main objective, to falangize the community.

4.2. Sending of aid

The target set by Soriano, the unofficial Consul, to send 50,000 pesos every month to Spain gives a total estimate of around 10 million pesetas in aid sent during the war, including funds, donations of goods and the interest on a loan from Tabacalera to the Francoists. To this should be added the funds that remained in Philippines to finance the Falange’s activities, such as the Auxilio Social, although it later made its own charitable collections. The aid to the Nationalists consisted of an important proportion of goods ranging from clothes, to ambulances and tobacco, but what is most remarkable is the amount of funds collected in a community that scarcely surpassed 5,000 members. The magnitude of the aid from the Philippines was increased by the high exchange rate of the Philippine Peso which was pegged to the American dollar but, in any case, the effort made by many Spaniards was impressive. They were asked from Spain for up to 40% of their incomes and, while it is difficult to believe such a level could be achieved, the aid probably reached half that figure.
The Republicans deliveries to Spain were much smaller. Partly because it was preferred to avoid them in order to compel the enforcement of the American Non-Intervention decrees so as to prohibit shipments in favour of their enemies. However they received decisive support from other communities (in this case, mostly North Americans) and there are indirect references that point to important quantities sent to the Basque government from sympathisers of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) in Negros.

The enlistment of Nationalist and Republican soldiers also shows a big difference. Around 110 young Nationalists volunteered to fight in Spain, 6 of them being killed, while there were 24 Republican volunteers. The Nationalists were mostly Spaniards and the big companies played an import role, especially Tabacalera that paid 28 employees while they fought at the front and paid the travel expenses to the Peninsula for 19 of them. Soriano and Zóbel, the honorary Consuls, themselves paid for more than ten trips. An important proportion of the soldiers came from the provinces, their death toll was relatively low and the Falange and non-Falange sympathizers were roughly similar in number. It was a high proportion for the community’s size and although volunteers from Mexico or Venezuela were more numerous, the total numbers of volunteers from the Philippines surpassed those from Argentina that fought on the Francoist side. The Republican volunteers were mostly Filipino communists that travelled from the United States as part of the International Brigades, whilst Spaniards travelling from the archipelago fought in Spanish battalions.

4.3. The declining economic power

During the years of the Civil war, the Spanish companies met with two important political problems. The Parliament was issuing new national decrees while the government was not performing its task of preparing for independence by following an unsuccessful policy of substitution of imports. As a consequence, while there was no alternative to the dependence on exports to the United States, measures were being taken such as prohibiting foreigners from acquiring lands or limiting their involvement in mining ventures to lease contracts. To this, Spanish entrepreneurs had to add the problems coming from the Peninsula,
whose impact was not only in direct trade, but also in the politicization and the loss of their corporate image that the war entailed.

Trade registered important losses that were calculated to be around 8 million dollars although this is perhaps exaggerating. The main export product to Spain, raw tobacco, was not completely affected, since Tabacalera, the monopoly holder, continued its shipments to the Nationalists by different means, for example through Gibraltar.

Politicization diverted attention for the long-term problems to more immediate issues. The most obvious example is the Spanish Chamber of Commerce. The consequences were numerous: the decline in bi-lateral trade; the loss of official status and grants; the expelling of pro-republican companies and employees; the disputes between companies owned by Falangists and Non-Falangists in the elections for the Junta and, finally, the Falangist efforts to create a parallel institution. As a consequence, it lost the objective of representing all of the associate companies and was converted into an institution that was useless to them. Its bulletin reflects this, as it became replete with articles of political content and merely listed trade statistics taken from the Censuses instead of offering useful information to the companies.

Tabacalera, the private company employing the largest number of workers, was typical of those companies suffering all type of difficulties that worsened during the Civil War. These can be summed up in four main issues 1) Adapting to the Revolution in Barcelona, which managed well to protect its interests. To avoid problems, Tabacalera formed a long extant Committee of Paris to fend off political interference, loyal workers seized the company and the United States Consulate also acted in order to protect the company’s properties. The occasional deliveries of funds to the Republican Government and support from persons like Josep Maria Massip the Izquierda Republicana member of parliament, who later passed to the Francoist cause in the Philippines, made sure that the Catalan Generalitat government always had two guards at the company entrance and never took any important reprisals against them apart from the cancellation of the monopoly for importing raw tobacco, which came in any case, when Tabacalera was no longer supplying it.
2) The cost of the war in Spain was expensive. The sums paid by Tabacalera were burdensome, due to payments made to workers while they were at the front and the substantial compensation given to all workers when the conflict ended. Besides, its business underwent many vicissitudes during the conflict and the Company lent money to the Francoists. 3) The decline in part of its business which the War simply accentuated. Increasing competition undermined Tabacalera’s market share as occurred with its famous chorrito brand cigarette, which continually lost ground to Virginia tobacco brands for which the company had no alternative. 4) Its corporate image was definitely tarnished. An article in Pacific Affairs, pointed directly to Tabacalera (and to a Church hacienda) as the great oppressors of Philippine agricultural workers. The company’s reply and the general impact of the controversy popularized the idea of an inherited Spanish feudalism as one of the ills of the Philippines, drawing attention away from the American colonial period.

**Part V. The parallel conflicts**

The Civil War shattered both the life of the community and the relationship that the Philippines had with its Hispanic legacy. Due to the language used and issues related to the conflict in Spain, the latent conflicts inside the community were unleashed. Nothing remained unchanged, neither inside the community nor the meaning of Spanish things to the rest of the Philippine society.

**5.1. The new party confronts the old fortunes**

To understand the impact of the Civil War to the Spanish community it is necessary to look into the period previous to its outbreak. The life of the community had important peculiarities, such as its geographical distribution which amalgamated it with other Filipinos that shared religion and culture. Social differences were therefore partially diluted due to this close contact as were the racial differences, especially with the Hispanic mestizos. concern

The Civil War altered their usual concerns and caused the Spaniards to turn their eyes towards the political situation in Europe. The requirements for leadership changed requiring not only an adherence to the rebel cause but also a militant fervour. Andrés Soriano,
one of the leaders of the old oligarchy was able to adapt because to his financial power he added militancy and a genuine interest in the victory of the Nationalists. Other new leaders affiliated to the Falange appeared such as Patricio Hermoso, whose fervour even led him to borrow money to place a newspaper advertisement, or Martín Pou, the leader appointed from Spain, whose efforts focused on long-term changes. The number and militancy of new affiliates together with the Falange’s new institutions was the base envisioned by Pou to turn the Falange into an alternative to the oligarchic leaders.

Ideological differences among the pro-rebel Spaniards were not significant. The recently arrived ones, less concerned about the consequences to the community of their activities and being political ideologists, were more vociferous but, in any case, Spain was too far away to outline definite program proposals. All agreed with the “spiritual rebirth” of Spain and desired that their country regain its prestige in the world based on its centuries-old ideals of religion and empire. Even the differences between Falangists and their opponents were not so great. The Falangist proclivity to the Axis led to an excellent relationship with the German Consulate (not the German Club) however the Italians preferred relations with its opponents. Perhaps the biggest ideological difference was the Falangists apparent anti-American stance which their conservative opponents did not share. But nuances abounded, many conservatives shared with the Falangists their mistrust of Great Britain, while many Falangists benefited from business with American companies. America was also the great benefactor for the middle – high classes therefore even Falangists were ambivalent towards it. Beyond this the differences are difficult to trace and if they really did exist are hidden behind many excuses. The distance from the conflict in Spain allowed political behaviour to be influenced by all sorts of topics such as, news of relatives, economic independence from the community’s power brokers, personal grudges and family rivalries.

The most original ideas outlined by the Falange during the Civil War point in a different direction than mere ideology. Asserting the concept of duty to help Franco's Spain instead of giving charity, the acceptance of the renegade leftists or even the criticism of monopolist capitalism and the discredit of the monarchy should be analyzed in the Falange’s Philippine context. The same occurs with its strategic decisions such as rejecting inscription
at the unofficial Consulate, the fight to manage its own aid funds and the build-up of an independent structure based on a strong party with a wide number of branches and a strong ideology, resulting in its independence of donations from the big families. The Falangist challenge to traditional authority, therefore, had some original ideas, but was also the medium for an aspiring social group to gain appropriate recognition of its success.

Ironically, during the three-year effort, the Nationalist community was both democratized as its leadership and internal power was dispersed and modernized by the introduction of foreign ideas. The Falange confrontation with the conservatives triggered unexpected consequences including this facet of social struggle.

5.2. The irreconcilable dialogues

The Civil War's consequences for hispanicism in the Philippines were worse than those for the community. Until then, the image of Spain had been basically uniform both because of the distance and the unchallenged leadership of the oligarchic families and was based more on cultural aspects than on politically related issues. The war progressively changed the former situation and politicized the image of Spain as a consequence of the propaganda from both contenders and the Filipino re-evaluation of its Spanish legacy.

Nationalists and Republicans coincided in some aspects of their propaganda directed at Philippine society. Both appealed to fear if their enemies triumphed and both were nationalistic. They also displayed important differences. The Nationalists pointed out well-known arguments for their cause such as the defence of religion and public order. The Republicans, on the other hand portrayed themselves as the good Spaniards with the same progressive ideology that had swept Latin America during the first part of the century and pointed out their collaboration in events such as that of Simón de Anda, and tried to appear as admirers of Rizal. Furthermore amid their frustration over their defeat and isolation in the Philippines, they attacked the common ground between the Philippines and Spain, such as the mutual history, the shared religion and the mestizos, especially the Filhispanics.
The end result of those years was devastating. In light of the recurrent news of massacres and the image of the Spanish community in the Philippines confronted over rather incomprehensible reasons, the nation reconsidered its Spanish legacy in the light of these new events. Of course, this led them to include the criticism against pro-Spanish mestizos, the fervently pro-Franco missionaries and the three centuries of colonization that had now even been criticized by the Spaniards. The Republicans’ criticism, certainly, influenced the radicalization in interpreting the Spanish legacy. Their vehemence in the propaganda battles, the only ones they won, can be blamed for that radicalization. Although they tried to reconstruct the relationship on new grounds, this proved impossible because there was no significant post-war immigration to the Philippines and they soon disappeared, contrary for instance, to Mexico where a large contingent of Spanish exiles arrived after the war. The Republicans managed to destroy but could never build anything new.

The long term effects of the Civil War were important. In the case of the Spanish community, the new balance of loyalties moved it away from the Spanish axis towards the Filipino one, a path first taken by the Republicans, and later the Nationalists themselves including the Falange as well as their opponents and above all the landowners. In the case of Philippine society the war led to the increasingly negative doubts about the benefits of the Spanish legacy.
CONCLUSION
DISPUTES OF LASTING CONSEQUENCES

Between the years 1935 and 1939, the community lived under a double challenge through the two worlds in which it hinged. In the Philippines, the country started a transitional period towards an independence in which the foreign communities would receive less favourable treatment, while Spain suffered a bloody civil war that divided the loyalties of every citizen, included those living in the archipelago. Thus for three years, while the legal situation of every foreigner in the Philippines was undermined, the Republicans and Nationalists devoted their time, rather, to help their fellow band members in the Peninsula, specially the Francoists.

The Spanish community reaped important successes in this help. It mobilized important resources for its relatively small size: an important number of soldiers were sent and the amount of money was also very high, together with important quantities of tobacco, second-hand clothes, rice, soap and even ambulances and gold. The institutions created to channel this aid were another show of the vitality of the community at these moments, from the pro-Nationalist unofficial Consulate, the local branch of Falange, the Hogar Jose Antonio to the House of the Republic. New associations sprang up devoting their efforts to specific groups inside the community, such as Auxilio Social or Ropero Español to the Falangist sub-associations specifically for women, young people and even for companies. New publications such as Democracia Española, Yugo, ¡Arriba España! and Pro-Cervantes were published thanks to the militancy and efforts of many Spaniards (and Filhispanics). The list of the Spanish activities throughout these years appears unending, from Masses to demonstrations of joy or collecting money in the most diverse ways.

Then Nationalists could even reasonably brag of being the expatriate community with the biggest proportion of assistance sent. The effort was recognised by their Republican enemies and fellow Nationalists in Spain, both during the conflict and later. General Franco himself recognized it explicitly by thanking the first Filipino president, Elpidio Quirino¹, on his visit to Spain, in 1951,

This fact could be considered as indicating a brilliant future of the Hispanic identity once independence came to the Philippines. The vitality shown by the community pointed to very optimistic perspectives, as indicated by a project in 1939 to set up an Institute of Spanish Studies in Manila.

1. **Everyone a loser**

This mobilization was not the prelude for a brilliant new era but the final outbreak of the vitality of the community. The fundraising effort was excessive, the collateral effects surpassed the benefits and the tension generated reached an extreme intensity.

Certainly, in the Philippines there was no violence. Either due to the disparity of strength between both groups, or because the most violent travelled to the Peninsula or due to being residents in a foreign country, the disputes never reached grave levels of physical violence. The High Commissary himself was surprised that, in spite of the intensity of friction, the development of violent conflicts had been scant, similar to the disputes between communities after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937.²

Apart from the lack of physical violence, however, there were plenty of harassments, verbal disputes and every kind of tension. There were multitude of anonymous threats, crossed accusations, many long-time friendships broke-up and confrontations went down even to intra-family levels, such as Juan and Vicente Sierra, from Bacolod, of Luis and Andrés Soler in Camarines, or the Pellicer brothers in Manila. The incidents were continuous and affected daily life even for the most minor reasons. Francisco Solé, in his Dagupan shop, or Fernando de Molina-Martell, in his kiosk in Amalang, Cagayan, suffered boycotts from the rest of Spaniards for selling *Democracia Española*. The halls of the *Casino Español* were also a stage for rows, in spite of its wealthy clients, from spitting at Franco’s portrait to a rowdy dispute between a Republican member, Tomás del Río and a pro-nationalist Spanish waiter. Even prominent and aged Francoists had disputes among themselves, like an acrimonious dispute on a train in Spain between the manager of the Tobacco factory *La

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Insular and president of the Hospital de Santiago, Isidoro de Mora, with the proprietor of the tobacco factory La Isabelita, Ignacio Carrión.3

When peace returned, the internal ties of solidarity that dissolved during the conflict were impossible to recover and the image of Spain in the Philippines ceased to be focused around the Casa de España or the Spanish Casinos in Cebu or Iloilo or around the same community leaders. Dispersion was the most visible consequence of these years. The Casa de España in Manila, for instance, first expelled the Republican Consul (who set up his own Casa de la República): later, for reasons of convenience, the unofficial Nationalist Consulate moved to the personal offices of its representative, Andrés Soriano, and later, due to rivalries, the Falange, with the rest of its subgroups, also moved elsewhere.

The former unity of the Spanish community was lost forever and, although the Republicans were the first to warn about the irreversible consequences, the Falangists (who had contributed the most to the disintegration), also recognized the loss. The Republican Buenaventura de Erquiaga recognized this in 1937, when they had already lost the battle in the Casino Español by saying: “The unity of the community is not only convenient but a vital necessity.”4 Similar laments were also expressed soon by his political enemies. In 1939, an article in the Falangist review Yugo, pointed to the increasing lack of internal solidarity among the Nationalists themselves. Whilst complaining about the few advertisements contracted to help with the publication of a leaflet, an article also expressed its perplexity on how wealthy Spaniards avoided going to the Hospital de Santiago, or preferred sending their sons to non-Spanish schools.5

The impact of the efforts made during the Civil War, was certainly counterproductive to the community in the Philippines. Perhaps, if the conflict in Spain had lasted one or two months (as widely forecast at the outbreak), the situation would have return to normality, the disputes would have soon been forgotten and even the winners could have bragged about their effort with varying degrees of impertinence. However the price paid in the Philippines for the Nationalist victory was excessive.

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4 Casino Español de Manila, 7/VI/1937, in DE, 15/VI/1937. The so complete overturn to his social life entailed De Erquiaga even to idealize the period previous to July 1936, maintaining that before the coup there was no discrimination between the Spanish communities, neither in the Philippines, nor Cuba nor in any other part of Latin America. DE, Nº 11, 10/XI/1938, “La Estela Trágica”
The Republicans were the big losers. They could take pride of the many Filipinos sharing their ideals and in attacks against the priests, but their defeat was especially hard, since many were no longer prepared to start a new life. After the defeat, with the exception of some of the volunteers who fought in Spain, such as the Filipino communist Pedro Penino or Demetrio Gorostiaga (alias Dimitri) from Bilbao, probably also communist, the most active republicans mentioned in this study abandoned their militancy. Buenaventura de Erquiaga, for instance, moved to Legaspi, Bicol, from where he maintained a respectful attitude towards the new Spanish regimen while he dedicated himself to promote the University.6

Andrés Soriano was on the winning side but he also finished the war with bitter-sweet feelings. He should have been officially thanked for his important contributions but he never felt that he was properly recognized. On studying the official biography appearing after his death in 1969 the absence of any reference to his efforts in helping the Nationalists, and his prominent role during the Civil War, or even his position as unofficial consul is especially remarkable. For a man so accustomed to success, recalling the Civil War must have brought unhappy memories, especially when he was continuously referred to as a “Falangist,” the group he disliked the most. The brewery entrepreneur should also have had divided feelings towards general Franco. Certainly, Soriano admired the Generalissimo but must have felt that Franco used him and later disposed of him at will. When Soriano referred of ingratitude, he not only referred to the upstart Falangists, but also to their crafty leader, so ready to receive but also to forget his contributions and furthermore, without having restored the monarchy.

The Falangists were the group with the brightest expectations when the war finished in April 1939. From a relatively small community, they had achieved targets seemingly unreachable as testifies the large number of institutions created in a mere three years. They started to be significant inside the community but this was at the expense of too many personal efforts and by gaining too many enemies; of having a multitude of arguments and of immersing themselves under continuous suspicion. For example Martín Pou returned to Spain leaving his wife and children in the Philippines and, in spite of the promises, there is no trace he was given charge again of any responsible position or important activity: he lost his

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5 The idea of funding six scholarships was rejected by the Spanish schools and then the Youth responsible in Falange, Miranda Sampedro, prepared the setting off of a “Caja de Socorro” for poor students. Paulino Miranda Sampedro, “Rumbo al Imperio. Consideraciones en torno al patriotismo,” Yugo, N. 25, 25/1/1939.
family and had to restart a new life. Foremost local leader Patricio Hermoso probably was a similar case. Alter the end of the war, his militancy diminished, and there are references only to his being appointed Treasurer of the Chamber of Commerce during the Japanese Occupation, but when the Pacific War ended his family returned to Spain and he remained.

The Spaniards lost generally, both Republicans and Nationalists; the influence of Spain in the Philippines was lost and the possibility of an Hispanicised future for the budding Republic moved further away. The Spanish community could have acted in favour of that Hispanicisation of the Philippines, looking how to make use of the future independence. They could have promoted the Spanish language, for instance,\(^7\) banking on the sure collaboration of so many Filhispanics and Filipino nationalists that perceived Hispanic identity as a way to counterbalance the American influence. However being entangled in such an internal dispute, neither Republicans nor Nationalists could even think of joint targets, even though they shared them.

For the Filhispanics, on their side, it was time to hide their sentiments, since Spain started to show its worst side and cruellest aspects of its culture at the precise time that it was important to promote the Hispanic option for the Philippines. The Civil War was a Pandora’s Box that entailed all kind of consequences: tangible, intangible and above all, those not foreseen previously. With so many day-to-day disputes, there was no time to think of the future. The experiences of those years would be difficult to forget, since the war triggered efforts and disputes with long-term consequences.

### 2. Discoveries of the Dissertation

This chapter analyzes the contributions to the knowledge of the Spanish presence in the Philippines that I consider more relevant.

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6 I thank this information to Carlos Madrid, who interviewed his son, Francis Garchitorena, before his death in 2005.

7 Extolling it for being the language of the Filipino intellectuality and for its sonority, Filipino Fidel Zarandín, in his article in *Democracia Española* asserts that “fifty per cent of the Filipino population understand perfectly the Castilian (and even that I am underestimating)”. *DE*, Nº 1, 10/I/1938. “El Lenguaje Nacional” y “Rizal y España”.
2.1. General division of the Spanish community in the Philippines

Probably, the main contribution of this work is showing the deepness of the internal division of the community. The clearest example is Andrés Soriano, who is still being considered in the Philippines as a Falangist, in spite of having harassed them as much as possible although in a more covert way than others such as Adrián Got or Enrique Zóbel. This story of the intrahispanic disputes is a shameful chapter that the community in the Philippines has tried to forget, probably with sound judgement after listening to the groundless accusations made during and after the Pacific War. This makes it more necessary to bring this to light by scientific study to, among other reasons, end definitely the legacy of the II World War propaganda, when the Falange was consciously exaggerated as an enemy. It is difficult to conceive that books such as the one by Allan Chase are still used as the main reference for the Falange overseas both in the Philippines and in Latin America. Chase offers many true facts but his book and the rest of the anti-Falange books and articles from the II World War period are wartime propaganda and have to be considered as such by historians.

This study opens important paths to future research, among other reasons because we still lack a proper study on the Spanish Community in the Philippines even during the colonial period. I consider that this research can also be an important step forward to learn about the origins of the community in the colonial period and about the internal disputes that were recurrent during these centuries both between ‘hacenderos’ and missionaries as well as among the different missionary orders or between the Galleon traders. The Spanish community in the Philippines needs more research not only due to its own importance but because during the colonial period its internal disputes had repercussions on the whole country.

This study shows also that the regional differences inside the community were diminished in relation with those existing in other Spanish expatriate groups. The Basque

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8 Studying the internal life of the Spanish community, in fact, could allow explanations to some of the crucial decisions taken during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, such as the decision by some missionary orders to teach the Christian gospel in the local dialects, or the effort to avoid trade links with the neighbouring territories. The absolute dominion of the missionaries was not a foregone conclusion, but the result of a dispute with the laymen since the very arrival to the archipelago. The missionaries ended victorious and reduced the presence of laymen to insignificant levels for the government of the Philippines. Either because of the decision of the Synod of Manila in 1582 of teaching in local languages, due to the efforts to avoid trade with southeast Asia once the evangelizing attempts failed or for lining up with the locals in their protests against hacenderos for the working conditions, the missionaries managed a complete dominion over the Philippines. The only territory where missionaries have predominant over hacenderos in the Spanish empire have been the Philippines, either by reasons related with the disputes for power inside the community or, simply, with the desires to avoid foreign interferences.
ethnicity was only one of the arguments to consider whether backing or not the Republic in the years 1936-39 or during the Japanese occupation in 1941-45. Therefore it is not certain to assert as some authors have, that the Basques backed the Republic or that they opposed the Japanese. It is possible to find more Catalans and Basques in the Philippines favouring the Republic than the rest during the first months of the war although many gave way, especially those living in Manila and big cities and very few of them continued backing the Republic to the very end. The Nationalist triumphs in North Spain forced many to change positions and in fact the Falange opened a delegation in Kabankalan, the main concentration of Basques in Negros island. Backed by their economic strength based on sugar haciendas and the distance from the Capital, some of the Basque owners were able to maintain a degree of autonomy and backed the Basque Nationalist Party at this time, proof existing that they continued to do so during the Pacific War. However they took care not to irritate excessively their business partners in Manila. Thus they benefited from their possibility to more freely express their opinion thanks to their long settlement in the islands, their relative isolation in Negros and that their business were relatively independent to the rest of the community.

2.2. Divisiveness between the Nationalists

The disputes between the Falangists and right-wingers are probable the most novel contribution to the study because of the special characteristics of the Spanish community in the Philippines. This community was the bulwark of the rebels among expatriates because although other small communities of less than 4000 members in Latin America favoured the Nationalists (as in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Honduras, Costa Rica y Nicaragua, as indicated by Rosa Pardo), it was only in the Philippines that such large fortunes and high level of income could be found amongst the population.

It was also the foreign community where the internal disputes were the gravest. To interpret them correctly it is deemed necessary to compare them with the disputes between the Fascist movements and conservatives in Europe since they had similar causes: the search for an alternative leadership or social climbing. The Philippine scenario provides clues to understand how the political fight evolved. The dirty tricks against the Falangists, either by spying on their communications or anonymous publications aimed at political targets, are an
example of the use of practices already established in the political infighting in the country at the time and which would worsen after the Pacific War.

2.3. Characteristics of Falange in the Philippines

Perhaps the more theoretical contribution of this research can be the cataloguing of the Falange in the Philippines as a Fascist party. Having become majority among the Spanish community, the Falange aimed to lead the whole community despite its geographical situation.

The Falangists practiced a new way of doing politics inside the community. They created new institutions instead of using existing ones despite dominating some of the old ones such as occurred with the Casino Español de Manila, or the Fondo Benéfico Español (Spanish Charity Fund), a moribund charity that could have revitalized for their own ends as Soriano pointed out when the Falange first mentioned the idea of setting up their Hogar José Antonio. The Falangists also tried to lay out new forms of political authoritarianism inside the community, such as their efforts to prohibit the Republican propaganda in the biggest selling newspapers. Above all, the Falange strove to Falangicize the community. Pou did his best before his departure to lay out the framework in order to cover the widest range of aspects of the life of the members of the community. From the youth, feminine or charitable organizations, to the Compañía Comercial del Oriente (Orient Commercial Company), with targets much more ambitious than the mere coordination of the Spanish companies. The life of the community, according to Pou’s plans, should revolve as closely as possible around the Falange, the party charged with leading the community towards a new society based on a new man as envisioned by Fascism.

As in the rest of the world, Fascists in the Philippines had a precise idea that the society they were fighting for would be reshaped by their ideals and be totally different to the one ambitioned by traditionalists and reactionaries. In fact, they showed their new ideals in many of their activities. Their creed was their own, imported from Spain: blue shirts, red beret, raised hand and their own chants, which they also ensured appeared in the ceremonials held at the churches where the Falangist youth had a special place in order to enhance the acts by carrying flags, forming up and singing their songs during the rituals. The same was to occur with the martyrs and saints taken from the Falangist liturgy, especially in relation to
José Antonio, declaring the day of his remembrance service in 1938 as Martyr’s day and organising a vigil gala.

The Falange in the Philippines can be considered as a fascist party, if we take into account that it was the branch of a party acting in a foreign country. It had the distinctive characteristics established by Ernst Nolte as “Fascist minimum” to be considered as such: anti-Marxism, anti-liberalism, anti-traditionalism, the principal of leadership, the army of the Party and the ultimate goal of totalitarianism. The young Falangists never acted with weapons and their totalitarian aim was focused inside the community, knowing well that they lived in a country where authoritarianism could only advance hand in hand with the Philippine parties. Looking at a more general definition made by the current main specialist in Italian fascism, Emilio Gentile, the Falange in the Philippines also fall within this the definition:

“Fascism is a modern, nationalist and revolutionary, antiliberal and antimarxist political phenomenon, organized by party militia, with a totalitarian idea of politics and state, with an activist and anti-theoretical ideology, with a mythical, virile and anti-hedonistic base, sacralised as a lay religion that asserts the absolute primacy of the nation which it understands as an organic community ethnically homogeneous and hierarchically organized in a corporative State with a bellicose calling in favour of a policy of grandeur, of power and conquest leading to the creation of a new order and a new civilization”

Since Professor Gentile is the main theorist of the concept of political religions, it is convenient to also discuss the Falange’s relation with the Catholic Church, since one of the main characteristics of the totalitarian movements is the creation of their own religious movement rather than using the existing religious structures. During the years of the Civil War, the Falangists never thought of dominating the Catholic Church and preferred, in any case, using the existing organizations for their own political aims. The symbiosis was not perfect, but there was a tendency to cooperate between the Falange and the Catholic Church with some religious orders more favourable than others: father Octavio Cubría, an Augustinian friar, was the cultural delegate of the Junta de Mando (Steering Committee) in

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charge of a “Fray Luis de León” School. The highest Church officials also collaborated with the Falange, both Archbishop O’Doherty and the diplomatic representative of the Pope or Papal Nuncio, monsignor Guillermo Piani being good examples. That excellent relationship between Falange and the missionary orders, certainly, was the only cause of salvation that prevented the isolation of the Falange. Therefore, during the Civil War, the term that better applies to the church is of a fascisticized Catholic church.

After the Civil War, and especially after the conquering German victories in Europe, the Falange’s attitude in the Philippines changed since they tried to enforce their influence over the community, even to the point of attempting to surpass the influence of the Catholic Church. This fact indicates that the Falangists idyll with the Church during the Civil War was merely a strategy and that Pou, probably planned the *falangicization of* the Catholic Church in a second step. Even though there is no supporting evidence of this there was no excess of piety inside the Falange: Pou was denounced to his superiors in the Peninsula of not attending church but this was expressly denied by the Falange. ……

The most typical characteristics of the Fascist movements were shown by the Spanish Falangists in the Philippines, both in the socio-political level as well as in the ideological level. More influenced probably by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, the Falange Branch in the Philippines followed the Spanish trail of events, passing in a year from being a minority movement to a mass party, although the lack of necessary resources was important. The Falange felt itself vital, portraying modernity and being revolutionary. It was ultranationalist and made efforts to transcend the division between left and right not only admitting and inviting former leftists into its ranks but also to its Ruling Committee. However the Falange cannot be considered a secular party due to its intense relation with the Catholic Church with which, when it was being continuously harassed, it could not show a relation between equals. The Falange in the Philippines was a secular organization and not National-Catholic one, but the high hand was always on the Church side the rather than in the hands of Falange. The Augustinians for instance, allowed the Falangist Youth’s *Flechas* to freely use some free land behind the San Agustín Church, but when it caused problems the Augustinians merely cancelled their compromise.

Furthermore, The Falange in the Philippines was able to maintain its radicalism of the first period after the increase in its members and in spite of Franco’s leadership loosening
some of its original ideals. Martín Pou’s first Ruling Committee, full of Soriano’s cronies, resembled the first years of the Falange before the Unification Decree but the Falangist chief soon got rid of them and acted following the principles imported from Europe. General Franco, in time, vanquished the Fascist aims of the Falange by placing loyal followers his so-called Franco-Falangists, in the key posts of the Falange. In the Philippines, the process was different, the Falange acted almost independently and its main problems were its adversaries in the Spanish community in the Philippines rather than orders from Spain. The same occurred with Martin Pou’s economic proposals and his criticism of capitalism together with his efforts to gather the Spanish companies in a joint organization which shows the effort, as pointed out by George L. Mosse to “discover a “third way” between capitalism and Marxism but which however, avoided specific social and economic change by falling back into the economy.”11 Finally, again following on from Mosse’s writings and his analysis of Fascism as a cultural phenomenon, the dispute between the Falange and the conservatives can be understood as two ways of understanding politics: “Fascism everywhere was an “attitude towards life” based on a national mystique that could vary from one nation to another.”12

The most interesting aspects of the conflict are, certainly, the different backgrounds of each group. Although both reaffirmed their ethnicity continuously, Martín Pou’s Falange was the most European, since it acted like its mother party but transplanted to a different location. The ideology of the Philippine branch didn’t suffer change due to this different Asian context; the ideological affinities tended to be above the personal or family interest and the leadership change meant modifications in detail, but not in the general working. Pou took the decisions that were in the program of so many other provincial or area chiefs and acted as any other Falange leader in the Peninsula. His main difference was the remoteness of his geographical setting. His conservative opponents, however, acted under very different patterns, adapting their way of acting to the Philippine setting. The dispute, therefore also reflected the desire of influence from Spain versus autoctonous influence, either with peninsular style or the Filipino ways. Bearing in mind that a similar problem occurred

12 Ibid.
between the Nazi Party and the German Club in Manila, the disputes between Falangists and conservatives could equate with those between national resistance, represented by the conservative groups, versus the foreign influence, represented on this occasion by the totalitarian ideologies.

Lastly, this study offers a different perspective about the de-hispanization of the Philippines. It considers the year 1898 as an important date, from when Hispanicism in the Philippines declined progressively due to basically endogenous reasons: the physical disappearance of those that lived under the Spanish period and the end of the personal recollections of this period. This study hopes to demonstrate, however, that this decline was not so gradual and that more than the internal evolution, the foreign events external to the community were more determinant in its future. The Spanish Civil War was a crucial factor in this decline of Hispanicism together with the steps towards Independence. This is a topic that deserves additional research but the notes about the strength and wealth of the community before the outbreak of the War show that Hispanism in the Philippines survived relatively well the four decades of American colonization.
3. Postscript

On April 1, 1939, with the definite triumph of the Nationalist side over the Republicans, Spain started a new phase of reconstruction under General Franco. The same occurred with the Pro-Nationalist community in the Philippines, celebrating their triumph with a Te Deum mass and parties. They had additional reasons to celebrate as apart from the end of the fundraising efforts and the passions aroused by the battles in the Peninsular the arrival in Manila of the first francoist diplomat to be officially recognised by the American authorities presaged the end of their internal disputes. Furthermore, Álvaro de Maldonado y Liñán, apart from being a diplomat, was also a Falangist and he would therefore also be the Head of the Falange branch in the Philippines. He had a very appropriate Curriculum Vitae, was to hold a power none had before and furthermore, since his very arrival, he showed the desire to unify the community.

It was the most appropriate moment for hope. The Republicans were definitely defeated while the Nationalist groups were disorientated and without leadership. Soriano ended definitely his official leadership over the community, first by closing the unofficial consulate and second by rejecting the possibility of holding the position of honorary vice-consul, the post that had been occupied before the war by his uncle Enrique Zóbel de Ayala. The Falange in the Philippines on the other hand, was undergoing difficult moments, scarcely encouraged by Jose del Castaño informing it about having briefed Maldonado on who were the Falange’s friends and enemies. After Pou’s dismissal, his Committee in the Philippines came under attack in anonymous leaflets that affected them gravely to the point that they weighed up whether to dissolve the party definitely. In conclusion, both Conservatives and Falangists were ready to obey the orders from the Consul Maldonado. A new phase was about to commence.

In fact, during his first months, the new consul Maldonado helped to pacify the community. In spite of his Falangist affiliation he soon drew closer to Soriano and his group and with the backing of the religious orders, he achieved some sort of unity and peace amongst the Spaniards during the second half of 1939.

The Falange however renewed its efforts to achieve control over the community. Encouraged by international events, since the Axis Powers appeared increasingly as the sure
winners in the II World War and by the Falange’s increasing power in Spain, they again considered their chances of benefiting from the situation to achieve more power in the islands. Accordingly, in December 1939 Madrid appointed a new Chief of the Falange who travelled to Manila in order to devote his time specifically to this task: Felipe García Albéniz a 27 year old journalist. He was as uncompromising as his predecessor Pou, although not as intelligent and having weaker leadership. García Albéniz, in fact, did not show even any temporary complacency towards the oligarchic families and underlined his distance from them upon his very arrival at Manila Port dressed in the Falangist uniform and raising his hand in the fascist salute. It was not merely a show of his own ideas as García Albéniz represented the intentions of the Falange and of significant sectors of the Spanish regimen at this time, as reflected by the most important foreign policy magazine at this time, Mundo (World) where he was soon praised for ending the power of the plutocrats, as they were called at the time: “The Manila Directorate has finally won after four years of intense internal vicissitudes, overcoming the resistance of certain groups associated to ‘capriciousness’ and ‘despotism’ that were against political purification”. The reference to the followers of Soriano and the desire to destroy his power was implicit.

The arrival of García Albéniz to the Philippines gave way to the reigniting of the internal conflicts in the community. The multi-sided attacks returned but with a renovated radicalization that this time sided against the Falange some of the groups that had been neutral until then. Consul Maldonado himself and the most pro-Francoist missionary orders, in fact, were horrified at the extremism of the group, to the point that the extremist Chancellor of the University of Santo Tomás, father Silvestre Sancho, asserted that it would be best to suppress the Falange in the Philippines.

The American government reached the same conclusion, although with opposite aims. The development of the II World War was simplifying their vision of the World cataloguing the countries simply as friends or foes, and Washington listed the Spanish Fascists on the opposing side. This had its consequences, especially in Latin America and the Philippines where the Spanish influence stopped being considered as complementary to the American and was progressively seen as antagonist. Being grouped together with the Nazi menace, knowingly or not, the Falange was observed with special concern as the spearhead
of Nazism and secondarily, of anti-Americanism and consciously or not in the need to clearly define targets, the Falange was magnified as an enemy.

The Falange threat bore its share of suspicions in the Philippines. Following the initial reports in 1939 about the Spanish community that showed Washington’s increasing concern, the radicalization of the Falange under García Albéniz and his collaboration with the Nazis in the Philippines was the signal to supervise and harass its activities. Felipe García Albéniz was expelled from the Philippines due to his having entered without a passport and the colonial government also emitted clear signals that they would not allow militant activities and demonstrations. From then on the Falange stopped making noise and behaved itself as it recognized later, assuring it was a due to an internal decision rather than external pressure, although probably it was in search of greater aims.

In November 1940 a new decision from Madrid reignited tensions in the Philippine community. Following the appointment of Ramón Serrano Suñer as the new Spanish Foreign Minister and when the perspectives of a triumphant Axis were at their peak the Ministry decided to unify the post of Consul and Leader of Falange in two crucial posts for Spanish diplomacy, Cuba and the Philippines. ¡Arriba!, the Falangist mouthpiece announced on its front page that “The Falange […] has begun to direct the destiny of Spain in the world.” The new appointment to Manila was probably the most inappropriate Spanish diplomat for the post: José del Castaño y Cardona, Martín Pou’s former boss who suffered a certain ostracism among his fellow diplomats was waiting to get a good post after leaving Falange Exterior. Appointed Consul in Manila and Chief of the Falange in the archipelago, Castaño prematurely ended Maldonado’s service and caused his transfer to Shanghai, where he arrived with mental problems, as he later assured.

The following year 1941 brought crucial changes for the Spanish community in the Philippines. The new consul in Manila indicated that the Falangist victory was definite in Spain from where news arrived suggesting clearly that Spain was about to enter the II World War. Meanwhile Washington increased its confrontation against all Hitler’s follow travellers, including of course the Falangists. In Southeast Asia, Italians and Germans started to be dispossessed of their properties in the Dutch East Indies and in the British Straits Settlements.
Reaction of the Spaniards came soon. After most of the community had lost its hopes that Spain would remain out of the World conflict -even among the pro-Francoists Spaniards-, there was a wave of petitions for Filipino nationality. This is a crucial point, since it shows a radical change of expectations about the future of Hispanicity in the Philippines. The defence of properties, the increasing anti-Francoist atmosphere, the anti-American attacks, the disagreements with how Madrid reacted to the war - and the welcome from the Philippine government, happy with the perspective of widening the upper class of the coming new nation, to those desiring Philippine nationality- led to many Spaniards, whether Republicans, conservatives or Falangists asking for another nationality. A significant portion of the Spanish community in the Philippines, especially among landowners, switched to Philippine nationality and in some cases to American, like Andrés Soriano, who would later be promoted to Colonel of the American Army under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. Soriano, although having a certain admiration of General Franco and who, after the war, set up San Miguel beer factories in Spain, had already lost any hope in the evolution of the regime and did not even bother meeting Castaño as Spanish Consul on his arrival in Manila.

Pearl Harbour and the Japanese military occupation, at the end of that same year, was the penultimate act in the disputes among the Spaniards. By then, the conservatives were no position to dispute the leadership of Castaño and his Falange that had finally managed to completely dominate the community and had placed his followers on the Boards of the *Casino Español* and the rest of the Community institutions such as the Spanish Chamber of Commerce although he kept the Falange’s headquarters at a different location to the *Casa de España*. Castaño used the Japanese occupation to gain his dominance over the community achieving the detention of some leftists but by then the activities of the Falange were reduced to being merely a meeting club with no political significance outside of the community.

Later 1945 was a new blow for the community. After the difficulties during the previous years motivated by the war’s interruption of trade with the United States and the difficult economic conditions caused by the occupation and the war, the Spanish community was decimated in the battle for Manila. The parts of Manila most severely damaged by the fighting such as the Ermita and Malate barrios were the preferred living areas of the Spaniards and the Filhispanics, as well as the Intramuros area where the Spanish churches
and historical buildings were concentrated. During the battle, more than 200 Spanish citizens died and many of those that survived lost their properties. From 1945 the country returned to peace and in 1946 Independence was proclaimed ten years after starting the transition period. But even then the expectations of a bright future were slim: the armed uprising of the Hukbalahap guerrillas was to prove that the country had suffered too much and that the inequalities inside society were an obstacle to any attempt to recover.

If three years were to prove excessive for the mobilization of the Spanish community backing its fellow Nationalists in the Peninsula, the next seven were the final blow to the fate of the community. The expectations of again buying and selling to Spain the former products or of returning to the life before the war or taking up again former activities proved illusory after a decade of violence. It is noteworthy that ‘Auxilio Social’ was the only Spanish institution that continued working after 1945 being responsible for providing emergency aid to the community until around three hundred people were able to embark on two ships, Plus Ultra and Halekala and return definitely to Spain. A good part of them arrived back to Spain with no belongings or job in contrast to the riches many of them had enjoyed in the past. Times had changed abruptly as with the rest of the world during these years.