Publication: Central Bank Structure and monetary policy uncertainty
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1993
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Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
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Abstract
Recent research has shown that partisanship causes monetary policy uncertainty. Since monetary policy is implemented by central banks, this paper models alternative central banks structure to analyze their effects on policy uncertainty in a two-party political system. The major result of the paper is that the length of govemors' terms plays a more important role than the number of govemors on the board. Moreover, it is shown that both postelectoral appointments and the membership of administration officials on the central bank board raise monetary policy uncertainty. The paper' results are illustrated by analyzing alternative structures of the Federal Reserve Board of Govemors
Este trabajo desarrolla un modelo de la estructura institucional de un banco central para analizar los efectos que esa estructura tiene sobre la incertidumbre del público respecto a la política monetaria futura. El principal resultado obtenido es que la duración del mandato de los gobernadores juega un papel de mucha mayor importancia que el número de éstos. Asimismo se muestra que la existencia de una estructura postelectoral de nombramientos y el derecho de la administración a sentar a alguno de sus miembros en el consejo del banco central aumentan la incertidumbre monetaria. Los resultados se ilustran mediante el análisis de estructuras alternativas del Consejo de Gobernadores de la Reserva Federal.
Este trabajo desarrolla un modelo de la estructura institucional de un banco central para analizar los efectos que esa estructura tiene sobre la incertidumbre del público respecto a la política monetaria futura. El principal resultado obtenido es que la duración del mandato de los gobernadores juega un papel de mucha mayor importancia que el número de éstos. Asimismo se muestra que la existencia de una estructura postelectoral de nombramientos y el derecho de la administración a sentar a alguno de sus miembros en el consejo del banco central aumentan la incertidumbre monetaria. Los resultados se ilustran mediante el análisis de estructuras alternativas del Consejo de Gobernadores de la Reserva Federal.
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