Publication: Una concepción transductiva del cambio social: discapacidad, agentes, cuerpos y emociones
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Publication Date
2011
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
El pensamiento sociológico, desde sus inicios, está atrapado en las grandes dicotomías que fundaron el ideario ilustrado. Sujeto y objeto, como delimitaciones primarias de las mismas, condujeron a todas las demás. Entre ellas está la que ya inaugurara Comte: la estática y la dinámica social, la estructura y el cambio. Ahora bien, el cambio social, como ámbito de reflexión, entrecruza dicha dicotomía fundacional con otra, contradictoria e inconjugable con la misma: la del cambio como fenómeno de conjunto (o sea, estructural), frente a la agencia, a la acción social como fenómeno singular. Dicha contradicción da pie a rereflexionar sobre los parámetros epistemológicos que hemos heredado. Proponemos, frente a esta herencia racionalista y dicotómica, una regeneración epistemológica que parte de un “principio procesual”: el cambio es el “ontos” y de su permanente irresolución resulta nuestra existencia; el “ser” es una ficción filosófica; por añadidura, el “individuo” como categoría política, en primera instancia, y sociológica en segunda. El error ha supuesto la pérdida de la persona humana, en su integridad constitutiva, y en lo que socialmente (lo cual es una reducción) la conforma. Se torna necesario rescatar a la persona de entre esas categorías cosificadas (sujeto, individuo y ciudadano) y restituirla en su verdadera condición. Para ello, y en contra del “sujeto”, hay que llevar a primer plano el cuerpo (la animalidad biológica socialmente conformada y conformadora) y las emociones (el irracional catalizador de la racionalidad). Unas personas “excedentes” como tales aunque deficitarias para las categorías que las encapsulan son las personas con discapacidad. Punto de partida para una reconfiguración epistemológica: la constitutiva condición discapacitada y discapacitante del mundo en el que vivimos, yermo (en lo formal) de emociones y de cuerpos. Llegó la hora, quizá, de reavivar el inconsciente colectivo reprimido.
From its first steps, sociological thinkingi prisoner of Ilustration mape dicotomies. Subject and object as its primarly mannifestation, and Comte proposal, distinguishing “static” form “dinamic” as a first enunciation; structure against change. But social change, as an space of reflection, interchange this fundational dicotomie with another one, contradictory with it, the one which places change, as a structural thing, against agency, action, as a singular phemomenum. This contradiction provides the oportunity to re-reflect on our fundational epistemological key criteria. Whe propose a “procesual principle”: hcange is the “ontos”, and from its permanent irresolution merges our existence; the “being” is a philosofical fiction; in addition, the “individual”, as a political categorie, in a first place, and a sociologícal one, in a second plane, also. We have lost the “person” (the human one), in its whoe constitution and in its social conformation. It becomes neccesary to rescue the person from that reified categories (subject, individual and citizen) and replace it in its proper condition. To do that, the body has to be stated in a main place (our animal condition, social conformed and conformational), and, with it, our emotions (the irrational basis of our rationality). Some kind of “persons” who are in conditions to do this are persons with disability (ther are more than a person in their daily life, but are less than a person under the categories putted in cuestion —subject, individual, citizen—). We need an epistemological reconfiguration, that means to change a disabling and disbled world in another one in which body and emotions have the main plece they have to have. Perhaps is now the time to make appear our collective reppressed inconscience.
From its first steps, sociological thinkingi prisoner of Ilustration mape dicotomies. Subject and object as its primarly mannifestation, and Comte proposal, distinguishing “static” form “dinamic” as a first enunciation; structure against change. But social change, as an space of reflection, interchange this fundational dicotomie with another one, contradictory with it, the one which places change, as a structural thing, against agency, action, as a singular phemomenum. This contradiction provides the oportunity to re-reflect on our fundational epistemological key criteria. Whe propose a “procesual principle”: hcange is the “ontos”, and from its permanent irresolution merges our existence; the “being” is a philosofical fiction; in addition, the “individual”, as a political categorie, in a first place, and a sociologícal one, in a second plane, also. We have lost the “person” (the human one), in its whoe constitution and in its social conformation. It becomes neccesary to rescue the person from that reified categories (subject, individual and citizen) and replace it in its proper condition. To do that, the body has to be stated in a main place (our animal condition, social conformed and conformational), and, with it, our emotions (the irrational basis of our rationality). Some kind of “persons” who are in conditions to do this are persons with disability (ther are more than a person in their daily life, but are less than a person under the categories putted in cuestion —subject, individual, citizen—). We need an epistemological reconfiguration, that means to change a disabling and disbled world in another one in which body and emotions have the main plece they have to have. Perhaps is now the time to make appear our collective reppressed inconscience.