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Naturalización de la fenomenología: idealismo fenomenológico trascendental, cambio conceptual y "cambio de mundo"

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Tort Ortiz, Bernart P. (2016) Naturalización de la fenomenología: idealismo fenomenológico trascendental, cambio conceptual y "cambio de mundo". [Thesis]

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Abstract

Con esta tesis pretendo presentar un modelo de naturalización de la fenomenología que sirva de base para establecer una epistemología y, por lo tanto, una ontología7 adecuadas para las ciencias cognitivas. Dicho esto, esta no es una tesis de, ni sobre, ciencias cognitivas, sino sobre la viabilidad, consistencia y necesidad de un proyecto de naturalización de la fenomenología trascendental. En particular, defenderé, por razones que veremos más abajo, una fenomenología trascendental naturalizada que es producto de una síntesis entre la fenomenología trascendental de Edmund Husserl y la epistemología naturalizada de la ciencia de Thomas S. Kuhn...

Resumen (otros idiomas)

In this thesis I shall present a model for a naturalized phenomenology that may well serve as a foundation for the establishment of an epistemology and, therefore, an ontology1 which is suitable for cognitive sciences. However, this is not a thesis on or about cognitive science, but about the feasibility, consistency and necessity of a project of naturalization of transcendental phenomenology. In particular, for reasons that I will develop below, I shall argue for a naturalized transcendental phenomenology that is a product of the synthesis between the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the naturalized epistemology of science of Thomas S. Kuhn. A consistent naturalized epistemology has to be able to account for the transcendental role (in Kant’s and Kuhn’s sense) that the intersubjectivity of the scientific community plays in the constitution of the universe of objectivities and causal relationships that we call "nature".2 To the extent that, according to Thomas S. Kuhn, there is no other criterion of objectivity (and therefore of nature), nor any other epistemic source of authority above or beyond the opinion of the relevant scientific community (1996, pág. 70), and assuming with Kuhn that the history of science consists of a series of conceptual changes or "world changes"3 (theoretical changes that blur and redraw the ontological categories that make up what in each historical period, in each region and in any range of objects we understand as nature), we must admit that the scientific community accomplishes a double task. On the one hand, it functions as a community of empirical and psychophysical subjects who practice science in a stable world whose ontology is determined by the scientific paradigms under which they work. This is, according to Kuhn, the role that the scientific community performs in periods of normal science. On the other hand, it functions also as a transcendental intersubjectivity that decides what constitutes the world, what laws govern it, which objects populate it, which metaphysical criteria it presupposes; ultimately: what determines the a priori4 conditions of what constitutes being in the world (in the Heideggerian ontological sense). This is the role performed by the scientific community in periods of revolutionary science...

Item Type:Thesis
Additional Information:

Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Filosofía, Departamento de Filosofía Teorética, leída el 12-01-2016

Directors:
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González-Castán, Óscar L.
Uncontrolled Keywords:Fenomenología
Palabras clave (otros idiomas):Phenomenology
Subjects:Humanities > Philosophy > Phenomenology
ID Code:36052
Deposited On:01 Mar 2016 13:19
Last Modified:01 Mar 2016 13:19

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