Publication: La fundamentación kantiana de la física: el concepto de "Fuerza"
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2016-04-18
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
Esta investigación titulada La fundamentación kantiana de la Física: el concepto de fuerza, empieza con uno de los dos grandes problemas kantianos, lo que es la naturaleza en sí misma, y su conocimiento sometido a la legislación de la razón. Para su justificación Kant considera que fundamentación es sinónimo de principios de la razón, Física sinónimo de ciencia de la naturaleza y, el principio último racional de lo que puede considerarse naturaleza y ciencia de la naturaleza es la fuerza. Este veredicto de la noción de fuerza nunca lo abandonó Kant. Desde sus primeros ensayos en 1755 hasta los manuscritos posteriores a 1787 se preocupó por desarrollar una filosofía natural que otorgase referencia objetual, sentido y significación a su sistema filosófico utilizando para ello la noción de fuerza. El conocimiento de las afirmaciones kantianas autoriza y permite probar la tesis central argumentativa de la investigación, la fuerza como principio de la unidad sistemática de la naturaleza. Afirmar esto no significa que Kant sea el primer o único filósofo en adoptar esta posición (principios ontológicos dinámicos se encuentran en Spinoza y Schelling, en Leibniz y Locke), pero mientras que la fuerza se ha reconocido como parte integral de metafísicas o de física y no es algo nuevo para los comentaristas de la naturaleza (Adickes, Paton, Vuillemin) o de la metafísica de la ciencia (Tuschling, Martin, Butts, Buchdahl) mucho se ha escrito exclusivamente desde la filosofía trascendental de KRV. En los Principios Metafísicos de la Ciencia de la Naturaleza (MAN) Kant sostiene que la fuerza primitiva es el principio de la naturaleza y de la posibilidad de su conocimiento, fundamentando así, metafísicamente, su filosofía trascendental o crítica de la razón pura en un concepto estructural, la naturaleza, cuyo principio justificativo es la fuerza. A pesar de que su proyectado plan le pareció ulteriormente incompleto e inacabado, el trabajo y la dedicación al concepto de fuerza con el que Kant abre y cierra una indagación que le ocupará toda su vida, fructificó en una investigación que lega a la filosofía manifiestos y singulares hallazgos filosóficos. En la línea de Adickes y Paton, quienes desde los años veinte inician la discusión sobre la filosofía natural kantiana, un destacado y prominente número de filósofos contemporáneos han visto en esta defensa kantiana de una naturaleza dinámica en MAN más un lastre, heredado de Newton y Leibniz, o un desajuste del plan crítico kantiano, que una excelente y sutil tesis explicativa del proyecto crítico trascendental. Por esta razón, se ha desconsiderado MAN, la obra no se ha estudiado debidamente, e incluso y mayoritariamente se la ha omitido como objeto de exploración...
This investigation, titled ‘Kantian Foundations of Physics: the Concept of Force’, begins with one of the two main Kantian problems: what is nature in itself, and its knowledge under the laws of reason. In order to justify this, Kant considers that these foundations can be equated with the principles of reason, Physics equated with science of nature, and that the ultimate rational principle of nature and the science of nature is force. Kant never abandoned this statement regarding the notion of force. From his first essays in 1755 through to his works published after 1787, he was concerned with developing a natural philosophy that gave objectual reference and meaning to his philosophical system using the notion of force. The knowledge of Kantian affirmations allows to prove the central argumentative thesis of this investigation, that force is the systematic unit of nature. This is not, however, to state that Kant was the first or only philosopher to adopt this point of view (dynamic ontological principles can be found in Spinoza and Schelling, Leibniz and Locke). Nevertheless, although force has been recognised as an integral part of metaphysics and physics, and is not new for experts on nature (such as, Adickes, Paton or Vuillemin) or the metaphysics of science (Tuschling, Martin, Butts, Buchdahl), most has been written exclusively parting from the transcendental philosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason (KRV). In Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAN), Kant argues that primitive force is the principle of nature and the possibility of knowledge. Thus he metaphysically lays the foundation of his transcendental philosophy or critique of reason, following a structural concept, nature, with force as its justifying principle. Although Kant later deemed this plan incomplete and unfinished, his work and dedication concerning the concept of force, which opened and closed a lifelong project, led to an investigation that has bestowed evident and unique discoveries upon philosophy. Prompted by Adickes and Paton, who in the 1920s initiated the academic discourse surrounding Kantian natural philosophy, a number of distinguished contemporary philosophers have found Kant’s defence of a dynamic nature in MAN more of a line of thought inherited from Newton and Leibniz than an excellent yet subtle explanation of the transcendental and critical project...
This investigation, titled ‘Kantian Foundations of Physics: the Concept of Force’, begins with one of the two main Kantian problems: what is nature in itself, and its knowledge under the laws of reason. In order to justify this, Kant considers that these foundations can be equated with the principles of reason, Physics equated with science of nature, and that the ultimate rational principle of nature and the science of nature is force. Kant never abandoned this statement regarding the notion of force. From his first essays in 1755 through to his works published after 1787, he was concerned with developing a natural philosophy that gave objectual reference and meaning to his philosophical system using the notion of force. The knowledge of Kantian affirmations allows to prove the central argumentative thesis of this investigation, that force is the systematic unit of nature. This is not, however, to state that Kant was the first or only philosopher to adopt this point of view (dynamic ontological principles can be found in Spinoza and Schelling, Leibniz and Locke). Nevertheless, although force has been recognised as an integral part of metaphysics and physics, and is not new for experts on nature (such as, Adickes, Paton or Vuillemin) or the metaphysics of science (Tuschling, Martin, Butts, Buchdahl), most has been written exclusively parting from the transcendental philosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason (KRV). In Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAN), Kant argues that primitive force is the principle of nature and the possibility of knowledge. Thus he metaphysically lays the foundation of his transcendental philosophy or critique of reason, following a structural concept, nature, with force as its justifying principle. Although Kant later deemed this plan incomplete and unfinished, his work and dedication concerning the concept of force, which opened and closed a lifelong project, led to an investigation that has bestowed evident and unique discoveries upon philosophy. Prompted by Adickes and Paton, who in the 1920s initiated the academic discourse surrounding Kantian natural philosophy, a number of distinguished contemporary philosophers have found Kant’s defence of a dynamic nature in MAN more of a line of thought inherited from Newton and Leibniz than an excellent yet subtle explanation of the transcendental and critical project...
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Filosofía, Departamento de Filosofía I (Metafísica y Teoría del Conocimiento), leída el 19-01-2016