Publication: Essays in popperian epistemology, rationality and macroeconomics
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2016-04-26
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
Este conjunto de ensayos tiene como principal objetivo proporcionar una base epistemológica a las ciencias sociales y en especial, a la economía. Nuestro punto de partida y principal premisa es la Teoría Evolucionista Popperiana del Conocimiento y del Aprendizaje (PTKL). No obstante, existe una segunda rama en la obra de Popper que está directamente relacionada con la metodología de las ciencias sociales: el Análisis Situacional (SA) y el Principio de Racionalidad (RP). De estas dos ramas se derivan dos nociones distintas de "racionalidad" en la obra de Popper. El objetivo del presente estudio, por tanto, es doble: (i) estudiar la relación entre PTKL y SA y (ii) estudiar los fundamentos epistemológicos de dos enfoques macroeconómicos rivales a la luz de la PTKL y el RP, a saber, la teoría keynesiana y la llamada "Nueva Síntesis Neoclásica". El primer ensayo es un análisis crítico de la relación entre PTKL y el SA y las implicaciones que se derivan para las ciencias sociales. Nuestra primera hipótesis es que existe cierta tensión entre el PTKL y el SA cuando su relación se analiza desde el punto de vista de la “racionalidad de los agentes” cuyo comportamiento es recogido en el modelo, aunque la tensión desaparece en gran medida cuando dicha relación se analiza desde el punto de vista de la “racionalidad del modelizador”. Nuestra segunda hipótesis es que el tipo de tensión entre el PTKL y el SA depende de si el modelizador adopta la versión “objetivista” (RPo) o “subjetivista” (RPs) del RP. Nuestra tercera hipótesis se apoya en las ideas de Hayek (1943) sobre los “hechos” de las ciencias sociales, y argumentamos que tal y como Popper y otros autores definen el RPo, éste representa un caso extremo pues presupone que el P-S es completamente independiente de las expectativas de los agentes. Nuestra cuarta y última hipótesis está estrechamente relacionada con la anterior, y consiste en la idea de que, si aceptamos las ideas de Hayek sobre la naturaleza de los hechos en las ciencias sociales, la estrategia natural para los científicos sociales es la reconstrucción del P-S tal y como los agentes la perciben, más que la reconstrucción de acuerdo a cómo el científico la percibe. Por último, y a diferencia de lo que Popper y otros autores sugieren, la diferencia entre el RPo y el RPs no consiste en que en el primero el modelizador reconstruye el P-S como realmente es y, que en el segundo, se reconstruye como los agentes lo ven, sino que en el primero el modelizador reconstruye el P-S como él percibe que el P-S es mientras que en el segundo lo reconstruye como él cree que los agentes creen que P-S es...
These essays represent an attempt to provide an epistemological basis for the social sciences and, especially, for economics. Our departure point is Popper’s Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge and Learning (PTKL). However, there is a second strand in Poppeŕs philosophy that is directly related to the methodology of the social sciences: Poppeŕs Situational Analysis (SA) and the `Rationality Principlé (RP) that lies at its core. It follows that there are two notions of rationality in Poppeŕs work: (i) the notion that stems from (PTKL) according to which human behaviour is `rationaĺ if it exhibits `corrigibilitý (i.e., if individuals are willing to eliminate their errors), and (ii) the notion that stems from Poppeŕs RP according to which human behaviour is `rationaĺ if it is appropriate or adequate the Problem-Situation (P-S) in which actors find themselves. Therefore, the purpose of this study is two-fold: (i) to analyze the relation between PTKL and RP, and (ii) to analyze the epistemological foundations of two different (and rival) macro-theories (the so-called New Neoclassical Synthesis and Keyneśs macro-theory) in the light of both PTKL and SA. The first essay provides a critical analysis of the relationship between PTKL and SA and its implications for the social sciences. Our first claim is that there is a certain tension between PTKL and SA when their relation is analyzed from the standpoint of the `rationality of the agentś whose behaviour the theoretical model seeks to capture albeit the tension disappears when the relation is analyzed from the standpoint of the `rationality of the theoreticiań. Our second claim is that the nature of the tension between PTKL and SA depends upon whether the theoretician adopts the `objectivist́ (RPo) or the `subjectivist́ (RPs) version of RP. Our third claim builds upon the ideas of Hayek (1943) about the `factś of the social sciences and is that, as presented by Popper and his commentators, RPo represents an extreme case based on the presupposition that P-S is (fully) independent of agentś beliefs. Our fourth claim is closely related to the previous one and consists of the idea that, if Hayeḱs ideas are taken on board, it follows that the natural strategy for social scientists is to seek to reconstruct P-S as agentś see it rather than to reconstruct it as the scientist sees it. Our last claim is that, unlike what Popper suggests, the difference between RPo and RPs is not that in the former the theoretician reconstructs P-S as it actually is whereas in the latter she does it as agents see it but, rather, that in the former she reconstructs P-S as she sees it herself whereas in the latter she does it as she believes that agents actually see it...
These essays represent an attempt to provide an epistemological basis for the social sciences and, especially, for economics. Our departure point is Popper’s Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge and Learning (PTKL). However, there is a second strand in Poppeŕs philosophy that is directly related to the methodology of the social sciences: Poppeŕs Situational Analysis (SA) and the `Rationality Principlé (RP) that lies at its core. It follows that there are two notions of rationality in Poppeŕs work: (i) the notion that stems from (PTKL) according to which human behaviour is `rationaĺ if it exhibits `corrigibilitý (i.e., if individuals are willing to eliminate their errors), and (ii) the notion that stems from Poppeŕs RP according to which human behaviour is `rationaĺ if it is appropriate or adequate the Problem-Situation (P-S) in which actors find themselves. Therefore, the purpose of this study is two-fold: (i) to analyze the relation between PTKL and RP, and (ii) to analyze the epistemological foundations of two different (and rival) macro-theories (the so-called New Neoclassical Synthesis and Keyneśs macro-theory) in the light of both PTKL and SA. The first essay provides a critical analysis of the relationship between PTKL and SA and its implications for the social sciences. Our first claim is that there is a certain tension between PTKL and SA when their relation is analyzed from the standpoint of the `rationality of the agentś whose behaviour the theoretical model seeks to capture albeit the tension disappears when the relation is analyzed from the standpoint of the `rationality of the theoreticiań. Our second claim is that the nature of the tension between PTKL and SA depends upon whether the theoretician adopts the `objectivist́ (RPo) or the `subjectivist́ (RPs) version of RP. Our third claim builds upon the ideas of Hayek (1943) about the `factś of the social sciences and is that, as presented by Popper and his commentators, RPo represents an extreme case based on the presupposition that P-S is (fully) independent of agentś beliefs. Our fourth claim is closely related to the previous one and consists of the idea that, if Hayeḱs ideas are taken on board, it follows that the natural strategy for social scientists is to seek to reconstruct P-S as agentś see it rather than to reconstruct it as the scientist sees it. Our last claim is that, unlike what Popper suggests, the difference between RPo and RPs is not that in the former the theoretician reconstructs P-S as it actually is whereas in the latter she does it as agents see it but, rather, that in the former she reconstructs P-S as she sees it herself whereas in the latter she does it as she believes that agents actually see it...
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Política Económica), leída el 16-12-2015