Publication: La propiedad intelectual como propiedad especial a lo largo de la historia
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2017-01-24
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
Tradicionalmente se ha venido admitiendo que el derecho de autor confiere a su titular un señorío absoluto sobre la propia obra creada. Éste se manifiesta en un poder inmediato y exclusivo sobre la cosa, que aquí es algo inmaterial. Esta situación se encuentra protegida frente a todos. Si bien la afirmación es verdad, no es, sin embargo, toda la verdad, ya que el referido derecho de autor se halla influenciado, desde un principio, por la naturaleza del objeto sobre el que recae, lo que hace, nuevamente, “espe-cial” la disciplina que está siendo analizada y estudiada en el presente tra-bajo. La propiedad intelectual se trata de una categoría autónoma, la cual aparece como deudora del momento social y cultural en el que surge la creación protegida y que propicia el mantenimiento de una relación pe-renne con la persona del autor, lo que provoca un régimen no unitario para las facultades que componen el contenido del derecho. La conceptualización como una “propiedad especial” o “eminente-mente excepcional” se acuñó por primera vez en el Proyecto de 1851. La incorporación a un texto legal (el Código civil) sirvió para que la doctrina se dividiese y criticase la creación de esta nueva categoría conceptual, bien por insuficiente, bien por carecer de utilidad. A la vista de los textos, de entre todos los factores de individualiza-ción posibles, fueron tres los más utilizados por la doctrina española: en primer lugar, el carácter inmaterial de las obras del ingenio; en segundo lugar, la condición económica de los objetos de los que se ocupan dichas propiedades, lo que las hace excepcionales. En tercer y último lugar, el fac-tor, si cabe más criticado, de una cierta intervención administrativa que desviaría su régimen del de la propiedad ordinaria...
It has long been held that Intellectual property confers on its holder absolute control over their work. This manifests itself as an immediate and exclusive power over the matter which, here, is something intangible. This situation is protected against all. Although this is true, it is not the whole truth since, from the outset, Intellectual property is affected by the nature of the subject matter, which once again makes the discipline under analysis here “special”. Intel is an independent category, a product of the social and cultural setting from which the protected creation arises, and it fosters a perennial relation-ship with the author, giving rise to a non-unitary system for the faculties comprising the right. Conceptualisation as a “special property”, or as “eminently exceptional”, was first coined in the draft bill of 1851. Inclusion in a legal document (the Spanish Civil Code) divided legal opinion and sparked criticism of the creation of this new conceptual category, either because it was insufficient or pointless. In Spanish legal doctrine, among all the possible differentiation factors, three were used most: first of all, the intangible nature of intellectual works; secondly, the potential economic condition of the subject matter of that prop-erty, what makes it exceptional; and thirdly and finally, the most criticised factor, administrative intervention that diverts its system away from the system governing ordinary property. Hence the statement, recalled by Baylos, that Intellectual property is actually a hybrid institution in respect of its nature. It falls under civil or private law, since it refers to private use but, in turn, falls fully under administrative law where the public interest calls for the subordination of private interests. This mixed nature concurs with the expression special property. In reality, property rights offer flexibility and a tireless potential for adaptation, both at the historical/social point in time and in respect of the relation-ship with the subject matter concerned. They can be moulded in view of the property and the ends that they pursue; they have, according to Louis Josser-and, unlimited plasticity; which can lead to the statement that “property is plural rather than singular”...
It has long been held that Intellectual property confers on its holder absolute control over their work. This manifests itself as an immediate and exclusive power over the matter which, here, is something intangible. This situation is protected against all. Although this is true, it is not the whole truth since, from the outset, Intellectual property is affected by the nature of the subject matter, which once again makes the discipline under analysis here “special”. Intel is an independent category, a product of the social and cultural setting from which the protected creation arises, and it fosters a perennial relation-ship with the author, giving rise to a non-unitary system for the faculties comprising the right. Conceptualisation as a “special property”, or as “eminently exceptional”, was first coined in the draft bill of 1851. Inclusion in a legal document (the Spanish Civil Code) divided legal opinion and sparked criticism of the creation of this new conceptual category, either because it was insufficient or pointless. In Spanish legal doctrine, among all the possible differentiation factors, three were used most: first of all, the intangible nature of intellectual works; secondly, the potential economic condition of the subject matter of that prop-erty, what makes it exceptional; and thirdly and finally, the most criticised factor, administrative intervention that diverts its system away from the system governing ordinary property. Hence the statement, recalled by Baylos, that Intellectual property is actually a hybrid institution in respect of its nature. It falls under civil or private law, since it refers to private use but, in turn, falls fully under administrative law where the public interest calls for the subordination of private interests. This mixed nature concurs with the expression special property. In reality, property rights offer flexibility and a tireless potential for adaptation, both at the historical/social point in time and in respect of the relation-ship with the subject matter concerned. They can be moulded in view of the property and the ends that they pursue; they have, according to Louis Josser-and, unlimited plasticity; which can lead to the statement that “property is plural rather than singular”...
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Derecho, Departamento de Derecho Civil, leída el 15/01/2016