Publication: Racionalidad de la inducción como minimización entrópica
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Publication Date
2016
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Nicolaus Copernicus
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Abstract
En apoyo de un aspecto fundamental de la epistemología de Mariano Artigas –la intención de verdad en la teoría científica– argumento a favor de la racionalidad del proceso de inducción, tanto de la inducción de leyes generales a partir de hechos de experiencia particulares, como de la inferencia de postulados a partir de las leyes experimentales que constituyen la base empírica de la teoría. Para ello muestro que, al inducir, minimizamos la entropía de la información de que disponemos, y que por tanto hacemos lo que hace siempre la razón.
In favour of a fundamental aspect of the epistemology of Mariano Artigas –his commitment to the quest for truth on the part of the scientific theory– I argue about the rationality of the process of induction, both the induction of general laws from particular facts of experience and the inference of postulates from the experimental laws which form the empirical basis of the theory. This is argued by showing that we minimize the entropy of the information when making an induction, so that we just do what usually the reason does.
In favour of a fundamental aspect of the epistemology of Mariano Artigas –his commitment to the quest for truth on the part of the scientific theory– I argue about the rationality of the process of induction, both the induction of general laws from particular facts of experience and the inference of postulates from the experimental laws which form the empirical basis of the theory. This is argued by showing that we minimize the entropy of the information when making an induction, so that we just do what usually the reason does.