Publication: La justicia constitucional de la democracia deliberativa
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2017-06-27
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
Esta tesis tiene como propósito proponer una teoría distinta a la prevaleciente sobre la función de los jueces constitucionales y un diseño del control judicial acorde con los postulados de la democracia deliberativa. En mi opinión, los jueces cumplen su función según la concepción que tienen de la misma, las instituciones en las que operan y teniendo en cuenta consideraciones políticas y estratégicas. De esta manera es necesario tanto una teoría como un diseño institucional que incentive la deliberación, aumente la participación y contribuya al logro de un debate racional. La tesis está dividida en cinco capítulos. En el primer capítulo explico el modelo prevaleciente de justicia constitucional conocido como de supremacía judicial, describo el contexto ideológico que lo justifica y critico los argumentos más comunes que lo sostienen. Una de las implicaciones que más me interesa destacar de la supremacía judicial es la vinculación de todos los poderes a la interpretación constitucional sustentada por los tribunales constitucionales, particularmente la vinculación del poder legislativo (supremacía interpretativa), en tanto que impide las respuestas legislativas ordinarias a las declaratorias de inconstitucionalidad. En el segundo capítulo planteo las bases del paradigma discursivo y exploro la justificación que hace Robert Alexy de la supremacía judicial sustentándose en este paradigma. Asimismo, analizo la propuesta alternativa de supremacía legislativa defendida por Jeremy Waldron. En mi opinión, ninguna de las dos propuestas es la más adecuada para acercarse al ideal de la democracia deliberativa, por lo que propongo adoptar una tercera vía, el modelo dialógico. En el tercer capítulo repaso las teorías descriptivas y normativas del diálogo. Entre las teorías descriptivas están la teoría canadiense surgida a raíz de la cláusula 33 de la Carta canadiense de derechos y libertades, así como la teoría de Barry Friedman para justificar el control judicial en los Estados Unidos. Por su parte, entre las teorías normativas distingo las teorías elitistas, entre las cuales está la teoría del diálogo judicial, y las teorías democráticas, entre las que ubico el denominado constitucionalismo popular. En el cuarto capítulo describo algunas formas institucionales de diálogo constitucional. Por un lado, analizo cómo los tribunales constitucionales pueden ser sedes de diálogo y mecanismos de participación política. En segundo lugar analizo mecanismos de diálogo entre los tribunales y el poder legislativo, por un lado, el nuevo procedimiento para la declaratoria general de inconstitucionalidad en el amparo mexicano y, por el otro, la posibilidad de respuestas legislativas ordinarias a las declaratorias de inconstitucionalidad tanto en España como en México. Finalmente, en el capítulo quinto reflexiono sobre los aportes que la justicia constitucional –sin supremacía judiecial- puede hacer a la democracia deliberativa. Estos pueden distinguirse entre aportes a la deliberación parlamentaria y aportes a la deliberación en la esfera pública no institucionalizada, y concluyo examinando los mecanismos que tiene la justicia constitucional para llevar a cabo estos cometidos.
My dissertation propose a different understanding and design of judicial review according to the ideal of deliberative democracy. In my opinion, judges are oriented by their own understanding of their functions, institutions and strategic factors. In this way, it is necessary to have a theory and design institutional mechanisms that further deliberation, increases participation and contribute to a reasoned debate. The dissertation is divided in five chapters. In the first one, I explain judicial review with judicial supremacy. According to Jeremy Waldron judicial supremacy refers to a situation in which (1) the courts settle important issues for the whole political system, (2) those settlements are treated as absolutely binding on all other actors in the political system, and (3) the courts do not defer to the positions taken on these matters in other branches (not even to the extent to which they defer to their own past decisions under a limited principle of stare decisis). One of the features that interest me more of judicial supremacy is the binding force of judicial constitutional interpretation. In the second chapter I explained the basis of dialogic model and explore Robert Alexýs justification of judicial supremacy. Likewise, I study Waldron proposal of legislative supremacy. In my view, neither of them is suitable for deliberative democracy. Instead I propose a dialogic model. In the third chapter I review normative and descriptive dialogic theories. Among descriptive theories are the Canadian notwithstanding clause and Barry Friedmańs theory related with American judicial review. Among normative theories we can distinguish between elitist and democratic theories. An elitist theory is judicial dialogue and a democratic theory is popular constitutionalism. In chapter four I describe dialogic institutions. On the one hand, I study how constitutional courts can be a deliberation forum and a mechanism of political participation. On the other hand I study dialogic institutions between courts and legislatures. The first one is new amparo procedure. The second one is ordinary legislative responses to declaration of unconstitutionality. Finally, in chapter five I explore how constitutional justice contributes to deliberative democracy. I distinguish between contributions to parliamentary deliberation and contributions to public sphere. At the end, I consider remedies judges have to make these contributions.
My dissertation propose a different understanding and design of judicial review according to the ideal of deliberative democracy. In my opinion, judges are oriented by their own understanding of their functions, institutions and strategic factors. In this way, it is necessary to have a theory and design institutional mechanisms that further deliberation, increases participation and contribute to a reasoned debate. The dissertation is divided in five chapters. In the first one, I explain judicial review with judicial supremacy. According to Jeremy Waldron judicial supremacy refers to a situation in which (1) the courts settle important issues for the whole political system, (2) those settlements are treated as absolutely binding on all other actors in the political system, and (3) the courts do not defer to the positions taken on these matters in other branches (not even to the extent to which they defer to their own past decisions under a limited principle of stare decisis). One of the features that interest me more of judicial supremacy is the binding force of judicial constitutional interpretation. In the second chapter I explained the basis of dialogic model and explore Robert Alexýs justification of judicial supremacy. Likewise, I study Waldron proposal of legislative supremacy. In my view, neither of them is suitable for deliberative democracy. Instead I propose a dialogic model. In the third chapter I review normative and descriptive dialogic theories. Among descriptive theories are the Canadian notwithstanding clause and Barry Friedmańs theory related with American judicial review. Among normative theories we can distinguish between elitist and democratic theories. An elitist theory is judicial dialogue and a democratic theory is popular constitutionalism. In chapter four I describe dialogic institutions. On the one hand, I study how constitutional courts can be a deliberation forum and a mechanism of political participation. On the other hand I study dialogic institutions between courts and legislatures. The first one is new amparo procedure. The second one is ordinary legislative responses to declaration of unconstitutionality. Finally, in chapter five I explore how constitutional justice contributes to deliberative democracy. I distinguish between contributions to parliamentary deliberation and contributions to public sphere. At the end, I consider remedies judges have to make these contributions.
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Derecho, Departamento de Derecho Constitucional, leída el 28/09/2016