Transnationalism: Issues and Perspectives

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TRANSNATIONALISM: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES

Edited by
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In memory of José B. Monleón,
body and soul of the joint venture that have brought together
the University of California and the Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

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1. From Madrid to Los Angeles: From Postmodernity to Transnationalism

The long journey leading up to this book began in Madrid the spring of 1997, when the first joint University of California / Universidad Complutense de Madrid conference took place. Its purpose was to address some of the challenges that postmodernity has posed for the social sciences and the humanities. While we were not as bold as to attempt to define new socio-historical coordinates, we rather ventured to indicate and assess what seemed to be their most visible elements. We discussed the polyphony and hegemony of information and knowledge systems, multiculturalism and globalization, etc., all of which were reflected upon in a first joint volume (García Selgas and Monleón, 1999).

Identifying characteristic aspects of the new (postmodern) space provided reference points, but ones that were still too uncertain. Our approach was to select a part of the territory, narrow the focus and concentrate on a specific topic. The decision to concentrate on the issue of transnationalism was directly influenced by the content and experience of the first conference. In terms of content, the essays by Dan Schiller, Carlos A. Torres, and Carlos Berzosa on some of the components and effects of globalization –such as the new political and economic structures–, already pointed in the direction of transnationalism, as did Luis E. Guarnizo’s exceptional analysis of the richness and complexity of transnational identity formations. The experience of the Madrid conference, on the other hand, embodied and gave form to the current transnational triangle of people, information and other flows circulating between Latin America, the Iberian Peninsula and the southern United States. Content and form, message and medium, knowledge and experience, always interdependent, enabled us to observe –as well as to live– transnationalism, and led us to question its imaginary and material processes, institutions, and constructs.

After September 11th, 2001 in New York, March 11th, 2002 in Madrid, and other global terrorist events; after the imperial and non-legal responses in
guantanamo and in the war in iraq; after currency crises brought about by global financial movements, and so on, it now seems quite common to speak of the declining power of national-states and new transnational forces.

however, those processes that came to question nation-states’ role in current history were a collection of truly urgent problems that required our undivided attention and now overshadow the question itself. we need to go back, to investigate and to address some of the emerging issues related to national-states' declining position. we wanted to explore the many levels, aspects, and implications of transnationalism. however, for us it was a long-term historical issue, related to the awakening of modern dreams or nightmares, rather than the result of a chain of events over a few years.

our perspective can be better grasped recalling that in the late 1990s some intellectuals –as jeffrey alexander (1995: 35-47)– claimed that we were witnessing the triumph of modernization and the values of democracy and universalism, as expressed in the free market, individualism, and human rights. the only element he considered to be strong enough to invert this tendency and make a move towards the local and the traditional –that is, in the opposite direction of the universal and even the democratic– was an intrinsic element of modernization: nationalism. on the basis of this view, processes that break with the nationalist tendency, or go beyond it –such as transnationalism– would then be just another element in “mondialisation”, capitalist worldwide expansion or globalization. transnationalism would therefore be the political and identitarian component of a triumphant (late) modernization.

but things are not that simple or linear. on the one hand, in political theory at least, we still find voices –such as david miller's (1997)– who defend nationalism as a bulwark of democracy and other socio-liberal values, and whose positions, while coherent (in line with its emotional content), up-to-date (internationalist), and sober (the lesser evil), are firm. on the other hand, globalization is not an exclusively universalizing mechanism. in many cases it also generates fragmentation, localization and even torture. it is possible that transnationalism’s primary action is to collect the cultural (language, identity), emotional (feelings and aspirations), and territorial (spaces, land) elements that have nourished nationalism in order to re-signify them, reshape them, and create new possibilities. but, as we shall see, it also promotes localization
processes and anti-democratic mechanisms: sometimes it is emancipatory and it is sometimes repressive. Transnationalism seems in fact a slippery object of study characterized by its own interests and strategies, and teases us like a coyote. It has been both character and actor in studies about it, in the conference held by the two universities in Los Angeles (May 1999) in order to discuss it, and in this book, which follows and condenses the latter.

Behind most confusions and qualifications about, and the transitions to, transnationalism, lies the shadow of nationalism. It is therefore advisable to offer some initial clarifications. In the first place, a distinction is usually made between the nation as a physical and imaginary entity shaped by political, administrative, and legal processes, whose dominant form is the nation-state; and nationalism as an ideology that is more or less put in motion to drive and legitimize the nation. It would be difficult to give a complete, closed definition or theory of either one, since there are different types of nations and nationalisms: state, liberation, anti- and pro-colonization, xenophobic, etc. However, there are some common elements, such as both their origin in the doctrines of national self-determination and the mythology of “the people” arising in the Enlightenment (Kant) and the Romantic period (Fichte and Herder), which make nations the subjects of history; as well as in the rebuilding of a shared feeling and will legitimizing state centralization of power and violence, which traditional social ties having been dismantled, was an element that modernization sorely needed.

Different historical factors and situations, such as industrialization, (de)colonization and the development of social sciences have generated different forms of nationalism and the nation, which likewise have served different functions. What has usually made them possible is that nationalism and the nation promote a common will, a common strength, and a common power on the basis of shared feelings and emotions that give identity and meaning to individual lives. This is why it is plausible for some to argue that one of the most important defining attributes of nationalism is the centralization of ideological, territorial, and police-military power
upon foundations that are more emotional than rational\textsuperscript{1}. The same idea is suggested when racism, populism, and fascism are described as ideological relatives of nationalism\textsuperscript{2}.

We can now reframe the question raised by Alexander’s claims. Nationalism and the nation thus appear to be modern phenomena, particularly insofar as they are linked to the legitimization of the State. Would transnationalism then be a postmodern or an ultramodern phenomenon?

The prevalence of the post-revolutionary, almost Napoleonic, concept of nation, which has been a constituent axis of modernity for the past two hundred years, conditions transnationalism’s contents and forms. The processes, actions, and institutions transcending, exceeding, traversing, and going beyond the modern nation-state entity answer to, and are a part of, the renewal of socio-historical coordinates and conditions that many generically term postmodernity, but which at the same time are forced to rearticulate most of the elements bound to the nation-state. It may appear that the existing renewal and the resulting re-articulation are contradictory and a great break is required in order to go from one to the other, but this is only if we hold on to a simple and essentialist view of the phenomena involved (for instance, ethnic identity and cultural community).

Against this view, one could argue that our society’s very driving forces, which according to M. Castells’ much celebrated description, are the network society (globalization of capital, information technologies, and virtual culture), and social movements seeking to affirm their singularity and self-control,\textsuperscript{3} lead to a weakening of nation-states\textsuperscript{1} and the emergence of transnational phenomena that correspond to a different socio-cultural context and a different period in world political economy: continuity and change.

\textsuperscript{1} It is this emotional background, together with the protagonism granted to the undifferentiated entity of the nation, that provokes rationalist classic liberals’ and marxists’ tenacious opposition to nationalism, since for them the dominant social agency is, respectively, the individual and the social class.

\textsuperscript{2} This we can see in liberal (Smith, 1971) and in marxist (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1988) theories.

\textsuperscript{3} Caught between these two forces, nation-states see their representation and sovereignty mechanisms questioned and their decision and intervention capacity slipping from their hands, even when it comes to the legitimate control of violence in their territory, as a result of the constant rise in private security, armed gangs, and transnational armies (NATO, UN). Do not forget, however, that nation-states have been active agents in these transformations, by accelerating (USA) or delaying (USSR) technological revolution and reducing their own welfare-states (Castells, 1996).
The fact that we have arrived at transnationalism from an analysis of the challenges of postmodernity makes it appear not as something that has fallen from heaven, or that has risen from hell, but rather as a phenomenon that has precursors in modern migratory phenomena, such as those experienced by Spain with the Republican diaspora and the departure and subsequent return of working emigrants; and even more remote precedents, such as the various commercial enclaves Venice and Genoa established throughout most of the “world” in the Middle Ages. But, in the end, current driving forces' convergence with processes such as decolonization, the struggle for the universalization of human rights, the discrediting of totalizing and utopian discourses and the consolidation of networks channeling the flow of different transnational processes, makes transnationalism much more complex than its predecessors and a phenomenon that has had new and unexpected effects upon more general social structures. Proof of this, and an integral part thereof, is the fact that its study is being headed by the new and somewhat postmodern Cultural Studies, which have come to stress—rather excessively—its symbolic-cultural aspects, its hybrid identity, and its potential for opposition to, resistance against, and emancipation from, the prevailing neoliberalism (Smith and Guarnizo, 1999: 3-6).

2. Approaching Transnationalism

In order to explore transnationalism’s new elements and implications, we need to revise our conceptual and methodological tools, albeit with a certain initial theoretical candor. Let us begin by viewing transnationalism as a social space, sphere, or field—a community of relations and communications—that links people, networks, and organizations across the boundaries and borders of different nations; a phenomenon which is particularly evident in the double-edged lives of migrants who have two languages and two homes, as well as in political and economic institutions such as the so-called multinational companies.

Given the broad range of transnational phenomena—from the life of Dominican immigrants in New York or Madrid to NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders—, we must ask whether transnationalism is a mere appendix to the globalization of capital, a reaction from below, or a combination of both. As far as transnational networks incorporate the survival of traditional structures such as
religion or kinship, and even the smallest of these networks are crossed by class, gender, and racial differences, –we must differentiate them from analogous phenomena or processes before we can conceptualize transnationalism's internal structure. Keeping in mind that nowadays distinctions between the local, the national, and the global are mostly analytical, that external differentiation can be placed within a geopolitical framework that goes beyond the national space, where internationalization, globalization, mondialisation, and transnationalization must also be differentiated.

Internationalization is, in one very specific meaning, a process linked to the expansion of capitalism during the first two-thirds of the last century, when communications and exchanges were established between national cultures, goods and individuals whose origin and belonging remained nonetheless distinct. National customs, diplomacies, and economies were dominant and well-defined, even while multinational companies like Nestlé and international organizations like the United Nations emerged and developed. International style in architecture and modernist aesthetics were also part of that process. In contrast, globalization, transnationalization, and mondialisation correspond to a subsequent stage in the expansion, mobility, and accumulation of capital. In the last third of the 20th century it has been more and more difficult to determine where, and in which nation, products and cultural goods originate. In all spheres the very connections, affinities, and networks are themselves increasingly more important in the constitution of social agents and events, than the location and relationships among states and individuals. One example is the production of the “global popular” by the new media, such as music videos (MTV).

At the risk of oversimplification, we could say that in their initial uses, the concept of globalization was to a (liberal) view of market and technological developments what that of mondialisation was to the (historical materialist) view of the world-system economy. Whereas the former stressed circulation and time-space compression, the latter emphasized spatial systemic organization (center-periphery).

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4 Let us recall, with N. García Canclini (1995:16), that a Ford automobile made in Valencia (Spain) has Canadian glass, an Italian carburetor, an Austrian radiator, English cylinders, and an Italian transmission. Where is this automobile from? The fluidity and interconnection between the parts has become more important than their location in a financially, technologically, and media-defined space.
and its continuity. On the other hand, both contributed to an extended form of rationalism and economic determinism, according to which nationalism, the State, and transnationalism are mere products of the globalization or mondialisation of capitalist accumulation; both also entailed some sort of world-society.

Nowadays these concepts have a rather confusing set of uses, but it allows us to differentiate the concept of transnationalism by saying that it highlights the socio-cultural and political components of the social spaces and spheres that traverse and transcend nations. This would explain the desire to limit its implications to political, cultural, and economic activities that require constant, regular connections beyond or within national borders (Portes, 1999:464). It would also explain why, although distinctions are made between an upper level (from above) and a lower level (from below) of institutionalization and power within transnationalism, and between economic, political, and cultural activities or sectors, the center of attention sometimes has been located in the activities of migrants and their effect upon geopolitical and identitarian redistribution (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, 1999).

The fact that the current migratory phenomenon is addressed in the first place does not merely indicate that we are stressing one issue over others. To a large extent, phenomena such as diasporic citizenship, masses of refugees and new communication mechanisms suggest the need to break with unidirectional analyses that establish clear distinctions between departure and receiving country and impose normative narratives of assimilation. They also suggest the need to recognize that we are witnessing a deep transformation of migratory social spatialization, which has significant consequences both for the countries involved and the social sciences that study them.

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5 We should not forget that there are halfway positions (Jameson and Miyoshi, 1998), where we can find visions of globalization stressing its cultural dimension (Featherstone, 1990), or where there is no English translation of “mondialisation” better than “worldwide expansion/extension”, which is not a good one. After the initial connection of “mondialization” with the critical, French perspective of the Annals School, its current use (Touraine, Morin, Bourdieu) is more like a weapon in the cultural and academic wars between French-continental and Anglo-American intellectuals (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999).

6 For instance, the huge sums of money and the economic activity that revert back to the country of origin, and the increased social peace and wealth the host country owes to the fact that those who could end up being marginalized have a greater sense of self-esteem and of being able to regularly contribute to their environment (Portes, 1999: 469-75).

7 As regards the social sciences, many claim that studying migrations as transnational phenomena represents a theoretical and even epistemological shock for essentialist and unidirectional conceptions of ethnicity, identity, citizenship, etc. See S. Pedraza (1999) and D.N. Winland (1998). J. Clifford
At this point, we cannot deny that in migratory spaces we are still dealing with a trend rather than a consolidated reality. But we cannot conclude from this that it is an evanescent phenomenon. Instead, studies have demonstrated that new political-economic conditions, (such as production mobility in all sectors), the new technological possibilities (for example, the ease of instantaneous and constant communication with the places of origin), as well as the everyday practices of migrants make transnationalism a persistent social reality (Smith and Guarnizo, 1999:15-9). These studies also remind us that migratory transnationalism is linked to general cultural, economic and political processes.

Many of the new characteristics taken on by migratory phenomena, such as dual identities or the creation of transnational communities and cultures, may be seen as part of a more global transformation that is also manifested in the constant rise of identity politics and in the almost excessive debate over identity, whereby the latter becomes fragmentary, problematic, situated, and variable, while not easily chosen or changed. All these transformations are part of the worldwide reorganization of policies, decision centers, and solidarities.

Transnationalism is more than just a migratory phenomenon, since it deploys and echoes already well-known processes that transcend national borders, such as the expansion of capitalism (in its globalization phase), military interventionism (now by means of multinational forces), and even religious expansion (Christian Evangelists or Muslim Shiites).

Increased poverty in the Third World is a major driving force for emigration, which –by means of displacement, settlement, and relocation–, opens up roads and networks for transit and articulation, oftentimes with clear, explicit class and gender markers. These new roads and networks, albeit related, follow a different direction than the ones created and used by large movements of capital and multinational.

(1997) argues that current diasporic events and discourses might serve as analytical models for the construction of collective identities at the end of the twentieth century. Such a model would be based on identifications and practices, rather than identities and determinations: it would be a model for a persistent entity that is nonetheless subject to an endless process of hybridization; a model that goes beyond the dichotomy between (humanist) universalism and (tribal or nationalist) localism.

8 See J.Friedman (1998) and M. Shapiro (1992: Chapters 1, 5, 8). It may be appropriate to recall that these cultural and identitarian transformations are traversed by de-, post-, and neo-colonization processes such as those taking place in media culture –i.e., pop music, which since the end of the sixties has been an important source for youth identity formation– and in the mechanisms, organization centers and hierarchies in scientific activity, such as the symposium that gave rise to this book.
companies. The so-called global cities and the generalization of tourism are a visible, significant part of these processes.

Transnational political spaces unfold at various levels and in different locations. On the one hand, they are the result of the uneven and conflictive convergence of agents—local (migrant survival strategies), national (diplomacy), and transnational (NGOs); and on the other—-the attempt to distinguish between transnationalism from above and from below notwithstanding—, we must recall that these categories are not essential or immutable, but rather depend on context and specific mutual relations. They also do not guarantee whether ensuing actions will be repressive or emancipatory. Do transnational powers oppose a “free”-market economy—as classic liberals might think—, or—as post-liberal thought would suggest—, do they entail a redefinition of political and economic spheres (territory, citizenship, consumption)?

An example of the complexity of these policies is that the promotion of an alleged “global civil society” (that might be able to prevent market setbacks and to govern and distribute justice beyond national borders), rather than a proposal that matches up to the current transformations, can be interpreted as a recovery of the elegant Western form of colonialism called cosmopolitanism, or a comfortable recourse to an old and problematic certainty⁹. Hence the appeal of complex, theoretical and practical strategies that is able to recognize processes of hybridization, marginalization, and diversity within transnationalism while placing them in their specific context and acknowledging their relation to processes of translation, connection, and articulation.

In summary, in addition to migrant practices and networks—which include attributes such as the simultaneous awareness of diaspora and imaginary community, and a shared feeling or will—, transnationalism encompasses at least the following elements: processes of cultural, ideological and emotional hybridization that nourish new identities and even new ethnicities; the technological revolution, which facilitates transportation and communication while simultaneously giving rise to a worldwide media consumerism that in turn facilitates cultural syncretism; the networks that allow for the flow of capital and the movement of large world corporations; transnational

⁹ See Drainville (1999), and Pasha and Blaney (1998).
activities and agencies, such as certain NGOs that create and explore a new space for political intervention, primarily regarding decolonization; and the process whereby the breakup of the alliance between subjectivity, territory and community makes it imperative to reconstruct the feeling and experience of place (Vertovec, 1999: 448-456).

Transnationalism makes possible a new social ontology wherein the technological compression of time-space is allied with, on the one hand, hegemonic capitalist practices, and, on the other, the will to escape from subordination on the part of the displaced. Not in order to melt all that is solid into air—as Marx used to say—but to grant a fluid and reticulated nature to the multiple social realities. The shattering of the material and political limits of territory is a complex, provisional, and undefined phenomenon that one might attempt to capture by means of conceptual strategies. But it is also possible that the “in-process” character, the contextuality and discontinuity that are typical of transnational identities are not provisional. In that case we would have to seek alternative cartographies to the dominant ones, where instead of territories we will have territorializations.

This is where proposals such as Katharyne Mitchell’s (1997) take on full meaning. She sees transnationalism not only as a literal or material transgression of borders, but also as an epistemological one. She seeks to focus on the convergence of, and the balance between, both transgressions. Indeed, the drawing on tools from geopolitics enhanced by Cultural Studies in order to link the nomad and “third space” epistemologies proposed by J. Clifford, R. Braidotti, H. Bhabha, and E. Soja with empirical analyses of transnational economic and migratory networks might allow for the deconstruction of the old concepts used in the latter, while contextualizing and making specific the former.

It is a promising but challenging task. In our approach, we attempt to distance ourselves both from the views that praise transnationalism and those that consider it catastrophic. Yet, we have not sought any kind of Aristotelian middle way that would

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10 Smith and Guarnizo (1999: 27), for instance, propose the term “transnational social formations”.

11 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) refer to maps that are in the process of being made and deal with a territory that is not entirely defined. These maps do not favour any a priori point or dimension, but are built along the way, in order for things to be expressed. There are no territories conceived as nouns or substance, but only as territorialization or mapping, that is, in the gerund, as action.
lead us to consider what simply is. Perhaps because nothing ever “simply is”. For the most part the essays herein collected therefore approach transnationalism with an uneven mixture of fear towards what we do not see but anticipate, and the hope that what we desire and believe we perceive beyond the canvas of normality will come true. Therefore, rather than present an X-ray of what is, they offer an outline of what may be starting to form. Still, most of the essays largely manage to overcome some of the problems that threaten the study of transnational phenomena: they integrate micro and macro levels of analysis and they do not reject or ignore empirical research in favor of general theorizations that cannot be verified. The research addresses the various spaces where mobile –but always localized– transnational activities are articulated, and the essays take into account the need for comparative studies and contrasting perspectives, which the book as a whole exemplifies.

Located in diverse geopolitical situations –Mexico, Spain, and the United States– and using alternative theoretical and analytical configurations, our authors display a variety of different perspectives to address three main transnational issues: the interplay between the global and the local; the political mapping of transnational spaces; and the merging of identities, memories and representations into transnational events.


The conditions and opportunities leading beyond the limits of the nation-state sometimes seem antithetical because, while they sometimes transcend them outwards –for instance through the circulation of capital–, at other times they seem to shatter them from within, as can be seen in the voices of, and the frictions between, conflicting intra-national identities –the Basque Country, Quebec, the zapatista revolt, etc. Two facts highlight this tension. First, while information technologies –which are one of the driving forces behind the current social transformations– have contributed to the creation of the global village (satellite TV, Internet, etc.), they have also broken down common culture into niches of information and consumption-identity groupings, giving rise to the most fragmented culture ever experienced in any nation-state (Schenk, 1997: Chapters 9, 10). And second, this tension is most influential in social space, specifically urban space, where the incorporation of globalizing and
homogenizing rules and flows is not only linked to certain specific historical, cultural, and political conditions, but also to the emergence and the recovery of difference and particularity.

This double tension or, rather, this doubly tense relationship between the de-territorialization brought on by universalization and homogenization, on the one hand, and the re-territorialization brought on by fragmentation and the separation into niches on the other—that is, between globalization and localization—, is perhaps transnationalism’s most visible feature. This is why it may be advisable to adopt it as a starting-point, especially if we consider that it redefines the rules and elements of the game. For instance, as a social construct, the local has no immutable or essential attributes, and finds itself intrinsically altered by the forces of transnationalism, as many studies on migrants and their transnational networks have demonstrated. The emerging conditions have also caused states, nationalisms, and their borders to lose their alleged homogeneity. Thus, for instance, in addition to being sites of control, borders may now be seen as spaces of opportunity that can, and must, be re-signified and animated12.

In this sense, one could say that the tension between the global and the local that characterizes transnationalism is not only an empirical and historical phenomenon, but a theoretical and methodological one as well, as reflected by the fact that almost all the essays in the first part of the book reexamine conceptual and methodological questions and that they all offer open and exploratory—rather than closed and firm—proposals. And even though they address the time-space unity, the emphasis is clearly on the spatial factor—over or against the prevalence of temporality in modernity’s ideology of progress—, which has significant implications. Among them, we want to recall the following ones: i) we are dealing with a geopolitical issue that forces us to go through the situation, the coordinates and the mobility of hegemonies; ii) it is necessary to redefine the relations between territoriality and social institutionalization; iii) the city emerges as a space with diffuse limits, removed from the vicissitudes of the nation-state and essential to processes of both

12 In Mitchell’s words (1997: 106): “In contrast with homogenizing analyses of territorial containment, in which borders are depicted merely as places through which goods and people pass, border zones must be theorized as highly contested and dynamic areas of ideological, cultural and physical turmoil”.

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globalization and localization; iv) multiculturalism in the world’s major metropolises is the symbolic and bodily expression of the choreographically opposed movement of capital and masses of migrants; and v) laying out cartographies has become a priority issue.

Practically all these features are exemplified in S. Sassen’s text, which elaborates two complementary theses that restore balance to the interrelationship between the global and the local. The first maintains that the spatial, economic, and political localization of globalization – albeit partly the result of negotiations between the nation-state and the new agents of financial mediation – entails the reorganization of political spaces and business cultures, and therefore involves a certain degree of “de-nationalization”. The second thesis states that the “hyper-mobility” of globalization rests upon specific, concrete production, commercial, and localization processes, generally based in global cities. It so happens, and this takes us full circle, that localization leads once again to globalization, since global cities form a kind of transnational urban system or network that constitutes a spatial economy whose coordinates are not national/international, but center/periphery (within this network), and where new and old institutions are redefined.

M. Barañano helps us name such a complex interaction by applying, clarifying, and linking the concepts of “glocalization”, “post-metropolis”, and “socioscapes” in order to articulate an integrative perspective. Her specific intention is to concretely analyze the interrelations between the re-signifying of the local (those close and primary places), and the restructuring of social time-space brought on by globalization. She does so by focusing on the urban development of Madrid, from its designation as capital of the kingdom in the 16th century to its current status as metropolitan region. Using it as an example, she manages to show the threefold physical, symbolic, and imagined nature (perceived, conceived, and lived) of those re-signifying and restructuring processes, and to stress their open, diverse, and multidimensional character.

The exceptional combination of theoretical work and empirical research carried out by Barañano is complemented by N. Garcia Canclini’s analysis of the huge transformations Mexico City underwent in the second half of the 20th century. The essay brings the cultural or, rather, multicultural and lived nature of the city to the
foreground in order to show that, simultaneously with economic and urban dualization and Mexico City’s entry into the network of (quasi) global cities, significant relocalization processes are taking place, such as those generated by shopping centers and their new cultural and social role. The picture he presents is one of a very complex social reality that combines internal disorder and regional integration; a picture that can only be seen in its entirety from high above.

M. P. Smith begins directly from the constituent interrelationship between the global and the local. He reexamines the dominant concept of the local (Harvey, Castells), which defines it as the space of primary social ties (meaning and identity) growing at the margins of, or against, globalization. Smith’s extensively argued and illustrated hypothesis is that by transcending national limits, transnational networks and circuits also penetrate them and, thanks to their power and their configuration of meaning, reach the local. This fact, together with the emergence of various sets of resistance and contestatory forces, makes it difficult to continue holding a romantic view of the local and the “underdogs”, or to remain stuck in nostalgia over the struggles that once were.

Finally, with the emphatic prose that characterizes his works, C. Monsiváis perceives the relations between the global and the local as revolving around the symbolic-imaginary or –as he calls it– the mythical facet of Mexican nationalism. He describes this nationalism as more demagogic and sentimental than coherent. Consequently, external homogenization –with the rest of Latin America, with the end of anti-imperialism, etc.– and internal development –which makes it difficult to continue marginalizing women and making the indigenous invisible– have displaced that kind of nationalism in favor of a new attitude which he prefers to term post-national, whereby traditional values such as faith in the Virgin of Guadalupe are blending with communication technologies that make identititarian processes fluid and diversified.

Whereas C. Monsiváis ends with a "¡Viva Post-Mexico!", intended as a celebration of liberation from patriarchal, standardizing and intolerant nationalism, and an invitation to the liberating reconfiguration of the local and the global, M.P. Smith shows us the transnational character of urban opposition movements, and N. García Canclini proposes and demands democratizing and participatory measures with
which to confront the panoptic disciplining strategies hovering over metropolises. It is therefore neither possible, nor desirable, to keep transnationalism’s political components and implications at a second level and they are thus the focus of the second part of the book.

4. Sovereignty and Hegemony: Transnational Political Spaces.

The complexity of transnational political spaces stems from the fact that they unfold at various levels (above, below), in different locations (local, national, and transnational agents), and in opposite directions (resistance, accommodation). As a result, and given that we cannot continue transferring the same old political concepts and cartographies from one space to another without taking into consideration their specific historical dynamics, political culture, and social institutionalization, it is almost impossible to provide a general theory that will explain transnational political spaces, or even pinpoint and analyze their smallest common elements. We are still in an exploratory phase in theory, in research and in political practice.

All this notwithstanding, if we consider that this is one of the spaces where transnationalism’s disruptive continuity with respect to nationalism and the nation-state is most clearly displayed, we may have a starting point. So let us take the threads leading from one to the other. The view of the nation-state as “monopoly of organized violence” (M. Weber) or “national-popular will” (A. Gramsci), and of nationalism as their legitimation, gravitates in large measure around the reproduction of national communities (the people, the ethnic group, the culture) molded by the collective unconscious and a common identity, which work as long as they serve as frameworks and premises for individual identities and actions. Although, in turn, the latter are only possible in concrete historical, social and material contexts. Thus, the process of nationality construction requires a type of *homo nationalis*, the constant interpellation of which (by the media, the educational system, disciplinary structures, etc.) establishes feelings and identifications that make individuals *a priori* members of a community (i.e., “citizens”), enables interactions between them, and contributes to

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the binding strength of nationalism\textsuperscript{14}.

This constituent interpellation may help us find the threads that weave the analyses of transnational political space here included. It is sufficient to recall that this interpellation belongs, as L. Althusser already noted, to the ideological field of discourse, which in this case is an ethical-political discourse that endlessly speaks about rights, the public sphere, sovereignty, solidarity, reciprocity and integration. These are the topics that are addressed here. But, because they are addressed from a critical perspective and within the context of the new situation, significant cracks are opened in the uniform and one-dimensional interpellating discourse typical of modernity and the nation-state. Possibly as a result of the complexity of this new political sphere, most of the authors have addressed an intermediate moment of transition to transnationalism rather than the latter’s intrinsic processes.

The first text does not hesitate to deal with the slippery subject of human rights in relation to ideas of justice. F. Serra’s essay revolves precisely around a critical assessment of the canonic form of human rights – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – in the light of the new transnational situation. His analysis is somewhat reflective and philosophical, and, perhaps for this reason, not very optimistic. Without ignoring the significant contribution the Declaration made to international order, he reminds us that the formulation of successive generations of rights has been tied to specific social groups or classes with specific interests. We should not be surprised then that, in the current new situation, we find some rights to be absent and some classic foundations, such as the idea of “citizenship”, state sovereignty, and the implementation of Rights by international institutions, to be weak, and that there has even been talk, in the latter case, of an “imperialism of rights”.

A. Brysk gives a general survey of the threats and opportunities that transnationalism brings to social change and civil politics. In a kind of reflexive move around her own uses of different perspectives on transnationalism, she maps the assumptions, uses, and limitations of different concepts that make it possible to think about what she calls “transnational civic society”. Following what she considers to be

\textsuperscript{14} At this stage, it has become commonplace to define nationalism as the (civil, lay) religion of modernity, but this is a very problematic analogy.
one of the main political elements in our global world, that is, following the concept of “global civil society”, she stresses how ambivalent and multifaceted transnational flows and institutions can be. Her short but compelling essay shows that we must stop giving general answers to questions that should remain open in order to suspend assumptions about a common nature of transnational actors, or their political bias. Hers is a plea for a multiple approach to transnationalism and for an open mind to see the different pathways of transnational politics.

The idea of a “global civil society” is also the focus of M.P. Lara’s political-moral reflection, which attempts to construct a normative narrative of globalization that prioritizes its moral problematic and mythical-symbolic content and seeks to promote a new type of social integration. Keeping liberal democracy and enlightened utopia as reference points for evaluation, she builds three conceptual pillars. She begins by reviewing the narratives of the nation-state in order to defend the idea of “nations without borders”; she supports the concept of “world citizenship” by enumerating the advantages of cultural hybridization and political cosmopolitanism; and she glimpses the final proclamation of a “worldwide public sphere”, which for her represents the only possible legal foundation for the defense of individual rights in certain international institutions (The Hague International Court of Justice) and NGOs (Amnesty International).

The contribution by Rocco addresses the increasingly complex nature of membership and community in the context of transnational tendencies, particularly focusing on the challenges that multicultural societies confront in developing more democratic, inclusive forms of political association. He argues that such a task will require the development of a concept of citizenship that is grounded on a particular understanding of the type of social bonds or solidarity required to legitimate a truly pluralistic, democratic form of governance: a type of solidarity that is based on institutional practices that promote and facilitate what he calls “strong tolerance”. He advances his argument by problematizing the notion of alterity as incorporated in leading theories of multicultural democracy, and demonstrating their limitations in providing parameters for the institutional configurations required to transform difference into a democratic resource.
In the final essay of this section, Nieto Solís argues that this disjunction between society and institutions is also one of the major characteristics defining and circumscribing the European integration process. The particular focus is on demonstrating the ways that specific asymmetries have affected the political positionality of member states. The author illustrates how tensions that have arisen at different levels of governmental, economic, and societal relations have limited some issues and positions, and facilitated the emergence of others. Using the European Union as a case study, this work thus reveals the complex and multilayered dynamics that shape the contours of the transnational political spaces that the member states aim to create.

5. Transnational Figures and Memories.

In addition to the flows of capital, resources and people, advances in communication technology have promoted an exponential increase in the circulation of ideas, images, and representations on an unprecedented global scale. However, the processes of cultural formation and dissemination are neither neutral nor benign, and resonate with the complexity and variability of the unequal relations of power that characterize inter-nation relations. Nevertheless, the figurations of identity, memory, representation, and the collective imaginary of different communities transcend and belie the notion of discrete boundaries claimed by the nation-state. In fact, the claim of an authentic national identity has always been a myth. Instead, we need to recall that the development of the contemporary form of the nation-state is the result of a nation-building process that began more than three centuries ago. The basic parameters and principles of that process were articulated by the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648. Notions of sovereignty, territoriality, autonomy and legality established a form of political regime that assumed the coincidence of the nation, essentially a cultural category, and the state, a jurisdictional unit (McGrew 1997). It is precisely this isomorphic relationship between identity and state form that is being undermined by the cultural disjunctions between the traditions and values of the Euro center and those of populations that are now an integral and organic part of these societies. As a result, the boundaries of identity and its relationship to the state have become blurred, problematized. Identity can no longer be thought of in the same
way nor can it be contained or imagined within the territorial limits of the state. And thus a host of assumptions that have long been part of the myth of the nation-state are increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of the reconfigured cultural, racial and ethnic landscapes of the western states. This has given rise to a fundamental rethinking of a broad range of issues related to connections between the state and identity, collective memory, historical representation and their political positioning and significance. The papers in this section address some of these more general theoretical concerns and dimensions by focusing on particular modalities through which these phenomena are expressed, and specifically on the global-local nexus of transnational cultural formations, social identity and political positionality.

Bergero traces the effects of globalization on local socio-cultural spaces by exploring and charting the connection between neoliberalism and democratization through her analysis of several literary works that focus on the historical transitions of the Latin American Southern Cone. As she indicates, her concern is to demonstrate how traditional assumptions of a symmetrical link between space, place, identity and community –so central to the ideology underlying the political project of nation-building–, can no longer be sustained in the context of contemporary Latin American change. The works she examines instead provide an alternative way of understanding the shifting, porous nature of these linkages and articulate new forms and notions of community.

The relationship between identity, memory and alterity is the central focus of Peñamarín’s essay. Her analysis develops and signal these as processes rather than static, discrete entities with essential characteristics, linked to and embedded in specific territorial sites and spaces. She illustrates the dynamic and complex nature of the relations between these phenomena by tracing their manifestation in the concrete political circumstances of Franco’s Spain, and by showing the tension between the state’s effort to define the spaces of memory and the multiple ways in which these strategies were undermined and transformed within specific realms of popular culture. Despite the disciplinarian harshness of Franco’s regime and its goal of dictating conditions and forms of societal belonging –a part of its particular strategy of nation-building–, Peñamarin illuminates the spaces of creative resistance that arose as an affirmation of a more humane sense of community.
Trigo’s wide-ranging essay is an exploration of the different and complex dimensions of migration, another defining characteristic of transnationalism. He does so by drawing on, addressing and applying a wide range of concepts that form an essential part of the discourse on transnationalism. Trigo’s analysis exposes the pain of detachment, the uncertainty of discontinuities, the loneliness of exile and the emancipatory possibilities of the in-between spaces of migration. Like the previous essay, the exploration is grounded within the realm of the connection and tension of ideologies and strategies between the state and popular culture – in this case the game of soccer, with particular reference to Uruguayan society.

A more empirically based approach to understanding the nature and role of migration in transnational context is found in Cachón’s study of immigration to Spain. He delineates the specific dimensions of this process and focuses in particular on the role and impact of immigrants in the Spanish economy. Cachón shows that there were several factors and some fundamental changes in the Spanish political economy that facilitated its emergence as a destination for transnational immigrants. The rise of welfare state institutions, strong familial networks, changes in the level of human capital in the national labor force and rising social expectations all played a role in creating the spaces of migration that have begun to transform Spanish society and have given rise to the challenge of new and different peoples' societal incorporation.

The final essay by Rodríguez Ibáñez suggests that the flows of migration in and out of the country are one of the key elements to understanding the trajectory of Spain’s development during the 20th century. He provides a periodization scheme to help situate the recent transformations of Spain from a country of primarily emigration to one that now hosts a considerable and visible immigrant population, concentrated in the large urban areas. Each of the designated periods is characterized by particular modal cultural representations of migration and its meaning within the larger societal context. The author also describes how each of these figures within the popular culture mediums of literature and film. The basic claim and conclusion here is that popular culture captures the ideological tensions and conflicts that characterize the nature of the relationships between Spaniards, strangers and foreign lands.

All these studies provide an excellent example of the type of careful, detailed analysis of the modes of articulation and forms of connections called for in the area of
transnational studies; linkages that must be discovered through a clear delineation of the specific historical trajectory of the economic, political and cultural relations between transnational regions.

6. The Politics of Transnational Perspectives and Issues.

The specific issues we have addressed in these essays clearly reflect the fact that transnationalism is a deeply political process. Therefore we would like to conclude with some clarifications regarding how this political dimension is incorporated into our perspective.

Despite the differing emphases in the analyses and interpretations of the various dimensions of transnationalism, a common element is that they problematize the nature of political community. As we have previously argued in our discussion of the linkage between transnationalism and nationalism, it is precisely the parameters, extension and institutional foundations through which “national” identity has been forged by the post-Westphalian “nation-state” that is at issue in the various efforts to reconsider its role in contemporary global political configurations. Although implicit in some of this literature, the effects of transnationalist processes on the changing dimensions of political community have been a central theme and an extremely important dimension of the emerging discourse on the political significance of transnationalism. The most promising analyses directly focus on carefully delineating the specific ways in which the parameters of the nation-state are being altered by the growing interdependence resulting from the increase in the speed, extensiveness and quantity of the flows of goods, capital, communication, people, images, etc. The point of departure for these studies is the view that contemporary forms of political association and the boundaries of the notion of political community are “clearly shaped by multiple cross-border interaction networks and power systems” (Held 1999: 100). Rather than accepting the state-centric perspectives that typically define the discourse of inter-nation relations by casting the issue in terms of whether the nation-state is in decline or not, these analyses instead focus on the changing parameters of both the empirical and normative dimensions of these processes and the implications and consequences for the configuration of derivative concepts such as sovereignty, autonomy, and territoriality, as well as for the future of democratic
governance\textsuperscript{15}. The goal is to address the growing disjunction between existing political institutions and the reality of transnational economic and cultural relations, and to understand the forms of political association that are emerging in response to and as part of the deepening patterns of inter-societal practices and linkages. Held, for example, aims to develop a model of transnational democracy which he argues “is more appropriate to the developing structure of political associations today” (\textit{Ibid: 84}).

While the discussions relating transnationalism to political community vary greatly in terms of emphasis, specific positions and arguments, they nevertheless converge around the following three premises\textsuperscript{16}. First, the locus of political power can no longer be assumed to be solely national governments. Because it is increasingly difficult for national governments to control the effects of international action within its borders, power will more likely have to be shared with extra-national political units so that a much more complex notion of sovereignty, perhaps even arrangements of “shared” sovereignty, will have to be developed. Second, the nation-state can no longer provide the sole parameters for collective identity and solidarity but must instead develop institutional structures that allow for and accommodate a complex structure of multiple, overlapping loyalties and identities. Third, the conceptual limits of the essential elements of democratic governance –particularly the notions of constituency, representation and participation– will need to be reformulated to account for the new pattern of societal networks' demographic, economic, and cultural characteristics.

These considerations have been extended to address as well a nature of citizenship that would more appropriately respond to the various levels of political association and notions of political community constitutive of the emerging pattern of

\textsuperscript{15} For representative works, in addition to Held, see Linklater (1998), Shapiro and Alker (1996), Walker and Mendlovitz (1990), Brown (1994), Edkins, Persram and Pin-Fat (1999). For an alternative position on the relationship between democratic forms of governance and transnational concerns that is critical of these type of arguments, see Fierlbeck (1998). And for a defense of the nation-state centric position, see Miller (2000).

\textsuperscript{16} Although these premises are listed and addressed by several authors, we rely on Held’s concise summary. See Held (1999:103-104). For similar elaborations with different emphases, however, see Walker and Mendlovitz (1990); Linkater (1998), particularly the Introduction and Chapter 1, “Anarchy, Community and Critical International Theory;” and for still a different summary organized in terms of the linkage to global migration, see Chapters 4 (“Globalization and Migration) and 5 (“The Deterioralization of Culture”) in Papastergiadis (2000).
transnational relations. Again, there is little consensus in the various arguments and interpretations that have been advanced, except on the premise that transnational trends have problematized citizenship. While there is some overlap between the two, studies of the relationships between political community and transnationalism tend to emphasize a more general set of issues, whereas the works on citizenship focus more directly on the contested nature of the dimensions of inclusion and exclusion as the boundaries of political community become blurred. Despite a wide variety of formulations, there is a convergence in this discourse around the following questions: i) whether the institutions, practices and norms that govern state borders must be reconfigured so that they are no longer construed as rigid and distinct, but rather establish and promote a regime of porous borders that could accommodate the more mobile forms of societal membership characteristic of transnational tendencies; ii) whether the growing significance of migrants and ethnic groupings in political communities require new formulations of citizenship that account for cultural belonging as well as their rights as individuals; and iii) whether there can be developed political institutions and forms of association that ground societal membership in a form of democratic public law based on a structure of rights and obligations not linked directly to the territorial basis of the nation-state.

While we cautioned earlier about the tendency in some formulations of cosmopolitanism to gloss over the particularities of structural and institutional differentiations and to instantiate a form of colonialism, it is important not to dismiss the notion without considering in more detail its emancipatory potential. Indeed, some scholars of transnationalism argue for the increasing relevance of the notion of cosmopolitanism and the related doctrines of human rights as a possible constructs for rethinking the parameters of the issues outlined above, and for proposing a set of both normative and institutional criteria to establish a form of political community based on transnational linkages, rights, and obligations. While specific formulations and models vary, the common thread defining the cosmopolitan perspective is a radical conception of equality: the premise that every human being is entitled to live within a set of political institutions that provide at least minimal standards of justice and well-being secured via a body of rights that are inviolable. These standards are not fundamentally relative to cultural or geographical factors or location, and thus the
boundaries of the nation-state are not, nor can be, the essential limiting or determining factor in determining the form of political association that provides the institutional foundation for these universalistic principles. However, most versions of cosmopolitan theory do not prescribe a particular model of institutional arrangements, but rather seek to establish the minimal conditions that such configurations must satisfy. Nor do these necessarily reject out of hand the notion that these institutional arrangements can be accommodated within a nation-state structure, arguing instead for a system that recognizes and incorporates overlapping levels of authority and obligations. But if the cosmopolitan perspective is not to become a way to avoid the difficult problems of governance within a global order where the enforcement of transnational legal and political principles still rely primarily on enforcement by the nation-state, then the analysis on which it rests must incorporate and delineate the specific forms of articulation between the various institutional levels of power and authority.

By its very nature, transnationalism presents a challenge to established modes of conceptualizing the political. Bounded for nearly three centuries by the normative model of singular and monolithic sovereignty –assuming the coincidence of cultural and political identities–, the dominant form of political association promoted through the nation-building strategies of the global powers from the 17th century can no longer accommodate, contain, nor facilitate the system of interdependencies that defines the global nature of contemporary relations between societies. While the nation-state will clearly continue to be one of the basic organizational units of global power for the foreseeable future, it is, however, likely to constitute only one component of the emerging forms of political community that must consolidate the fluid, multiple, and overlapping networks and practices that characterize and define the horizon of societal relations in the contemporary world.

Our work on transnationalism has forced us to confront the challenge of capturing the inherently political nature of the involved processes while at the same time maintaining a rigorous theoretical and critical perspective. And we want to emphasize our view that transnational phenomena represent only one dimension of the extraordinary complexity of the new global realities that represent both a challenge and an opportunity for the social sciences and the humanities. Our hope is that this
introduction and the essays that follow will provide some insights and serve to initiate an extensive conversation on the broad spectrum of issues addressed here. We see this as a modest but important step in illuminating the journey that awaits all of us inhabitants of an increasingly interdependent world.

Los Angeles – Madrid, 2005

WORKS CITED


PART ONE

Transnationalism:

Globalization and Localization
CHAPTER 1

The De-Nationalizing of Time and Space

Saskia Sassen

The experience of economic globalization and its impact on places and institutions is partial. It is not an all-encompassing umbrella. The multiple processes that constitute economic globalization inhabit and shape specific structurations of the economic, the political, the cultural, and the subjective. In doing so, new spatialities and temporalities are produced. In this regard, Arjun Appadurai’s compelling characterization of globalization as a “new regime for the production of space and time” captures what I have found to be indeed a constitutive architecture of one particular form of globalization, economic.

These new spatialities and temporalities of the global-economic do not stand outside the national. They are partly inserted in the national. This insertion in an overwhelmingly nationalized institutional world engenders specific dynamics of resistance and accommodation, both of which entail partial reconfigurings of the particular national settings or institutional orders within which they occur. One way of thinking about this dynamic is a “denationalization”. This allows me to capture the particular trajectories through which this insertion materializes in different institutional orders, within different national states, and the particular forms it assumes. Out of this insertion comes a partial unbundling of national space. It is partial because the geography of economic globalization is strategic, it is not diffuse nor is it a universal.

Yet, complex as these dynamics of newly produced and newly unbundled spatialities are, they are not enough to specify the processes that constitute economic globalization. Its strategic economic projects have emerged in the play between two master/monster temporalities, within which we exist and transact (and enact all kinds of micro temporalities). One of these is a collapsing temporarily –that of the national state as a historic institution, a master temporality often thought of as historic time.
The other is a new temporality, that of economic globalization. In the intersection of these two coexisting temporalities we see the formation of new economic dynamics/opportunities that drive and constitute economic globalization and can be though of as partly denationalized temporalities.

Thinking about the global as entailing the partial denationalizing of space and time has been a major research heuristic in my work on global cities and on immigration. And it is also guiding my current research on the state and economic globalization.

There are particular sites where these intersecting temporalities and spatialities assume especially thick and consequential forms. Among these are, from the perspective of my own research experience, global cities, the new legal regimes, and the cross-border migration of people. The global city, to take just one of these, is a border zone where the different spatialities and temporalities of the national and the global get engaged. Out of their juxtaposition a whole series of new economies emerge.

Here I will explore two distinct, though overlapping aspects of this conceptual landscape. In the first half, I argue that understanding the spatiality of economic globalization only in terms of hyper-mobility and space/time compression—the dominant markers in today’s conceptualization—is inadequate. Hyper-mobility and space/time compression need to be produced, and this requires vast concentrations of very material and not so mobile facilities and infrastructures. And they need to be managed and serviced, and this requires mostly place-bound labor markets for talent and for low-wage workers. Thus the spatiality/temporality of economic globalization itself contains what could easily, and erroneously, be classified as two distinct types. But they are in fact not distinct. One presupposes the other and this raises a whole series of empirical, theoretical and political questions about the spatiality of economic globalization. Again, the global city is emblematic here, with its vast concentrations of hyper-mobile dematerialized financial instruments and the enormous concentrations of material and place-bound resources that it takes to have the former circulating around the globe in a second.

In the second half, my argument is that the tension between a) the necessary, though partial, location of globalization in national territories and institutions, and b)
an elaborate system of law and administration that has constructed the authority of sovereign states in terms of an exclusive national spatiality, has c) been partly negotiated through i) processes of institutional denationalization inside the national state and national economy, and ii) the formation of privatized intermediary institutional arrangements that are only partly encompassed by the interstate system, and are, in fact, evolving in to a parallel institutional space for the handling of cross-border operations\(^1\). This means that we need to decode what is national today in what has historically been constructed as national, and to specify what are the new territorial and institutional conditionalities of national states.

Both these contain as a key dynamic what I would call incipient “denationalizing” of national time and space.

**1. Juxtaposed Temporalities and New Economies**

The question of duration and temporality in the economy brings up the familiar notion of how technology has altered the duration of a whole variety of economic practices. This is of course a very long history; and it is an accelerating history over the last few decades because of the features of these technologies. Telecommunications is the typical referent here.

But it is not only the capacity to neutralize distance that matters in telecommunications. It is, I would argue, also an organizational capacity. Today’s globally integrated markets are not a necessary outcome of these technologies. The latter are necessary, but in fact, market integration in commodities and especially in finance and specialized services required a separate and distinct effort, dynamic, will –in short, agency. The agency that leads to the integration of markets is to be distinguished from whatever agency is de facto incorporated in the technology. Technology by itself would not have created these integrated markets. I think this is a very important aspect for understanding aspect for understanding economic globalization today because it introduces questions of power, the will to new forms of power.

\(^1\) I have developed this argument in Sassen 1996, chapter one. See also “Territory and Territoriality”, paper prepared for the Social Science Research Council Committee on Sovereignty (Sassen, 1998a).
The dematerializing of a growing number of economic activities is one concrete outcome of the interaction of new technological capacities and the will to new forms of power. The project of dematerializing entities/goods/processes we have thought of as being material, e.g. real estate, cannot simply be attributed to the technology. There is plenty of agency in all of the economic processes involved.

Of course, these transformations have taken place with every new technology. It is, again, the acceleration of the impact which marks our contemporary experience, partly because of globalization, partly because of some of the features of the new technologies (e.g. connectivity and simultaneity), making this perhaps a particularly dramatic instantiation of how technology affects the economy.

But it is not only acceleration. It is indeed, I argue, the sharply different rates of acceleration in different economic activities that are decisive. It is not a homogenous or homogenizing process of overall acceleration. The differences engender the possibility of differing temporalities. It is this that matters. The changes in duration for economic transactions have today reached a scale that allows one, or at least allows me, to think of the production of new temporalities. This is one window through which you can look at the economy. It is not the theorists of the economy who would look at it in terms of the juxtaposition of different temporalities embedded in different sectors of capital. It is, rather, the practitioners, who engage in practices and develop business opportunities which negotiate the different temporalities and extract new types of profits from their coexistence and their sharpened difference. This is, of course, not the language the practitioners would use to describe what they do.

The ascendance of finance and the dematerialization of many economic activities assume their full meaning in this juxtaposition of different temporalities and are an enactment in the economy of this sharpened differentiation: between their temporality as dematerialized/digitalized activities and other sectors of the economy that still deal with the material and which are hence are going to be slower.

Let me illustrate this with a particular case. A few years ago I had a chance to speak at length with the Head of Engineering of Volkswagen. One particular item in our conversation is of interest here: “Yes, we produce cars. But 45% of our profits
come from auto parts manufacturing; half come from our financial services operations; and only about 4% come from making cars”.

One might ask, “why, then, are you bothering to manufacture cars?” The answer revolves around the fact – in my terms – of the different temporalities of each of these three types of investments. The strategic difference is between the form of capital mobilized in, respectively the manufacturing of a car and the financial services: the temporality of the first is about nine months, that of the second, significantly shorter, i.e. it could be a day or less. In the exchange, in the trade-off between these two lies a world of business opportunities. The sharper the differentiation between these two temporalities has grown (with dematerialization/digitalization) the more intense this world of new business opportunities will be. This is one way in which economic globalization today is constituted: the particular features of finance enable it to subject other sectors of the economy to its rhythms.

One question that interest me here is whether the emergence of this whole new world of business activities at the interface of the distinct temporalities of different economic sectors in advanced economies brings with it questions/ agendas for cities and urban theory. It does so for urban economies, particularly insofar as many of these new activities tend to locate themselves in cities and create new sources of growth and new hierarchies of profitability. It also does so for theory, in my view: analytically this new world of business activities is a sort of border zone, it does not belong to either of the two or more sectors among which it negotiates its own existence and sources for profit.

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2 I should note that the other element in the explanation is the fact that through the manufacturing of produce such as cars or airplanes, etc., an enormous amount of capital gets concentrated under one management, so to speak. Market economies always face the challenge of securing the concentration of sufficiently large piles of money that may function as investment capital. For the financial services division of Volkswagen, the manufacturing of cars secured vast amounts of capital that was not continuously used at a similar level of intensity over a cycle of nine months, and hence allowed financial uses at various points for shorter term operations.

3 I have used the notion of “analytic borderlands”: opening up a line that is represented or experienced as dividing two mutually exclusive zones into a borderzone that demands its own theorization and empirical specification, that demands its own theorization and empirical specification, and that can accommodate its own distinct practices. My notion of the global city is one instantiation, clearly one on a rather macrolevel. And the work I am doing currently on the state is another one, particularly the notion of incipiently denationalized (highly specialized) institutional orders that negotiate between a)
There is a specific kind of materiality underlying this world of new business activities, even if they take place partly in electronic space. Even the most digitalized, globalized and dematerialized sector, notably global finance, hits the ground at some point in its operations. And when it does, it does so in vast concentrations of very material structures. These activities inhabit physical spaces, and they inhabit digital spaces. There are material and digital structures to be built, with very specific requirements: the need to incorporate the fact that a firm’s activities are simultaneously partly de-territorialized and partly deeply territorialized that they span the globe and that they are highly concentrated in very specific places. This produces a strategic geography that cuts across borders and across spaces yet also installs itself in specific cities. It is a geography that explored the boundaries of contextuality and the traditional hierarchies of scale.

One question I would have is whether the specific kind of materiality underlying this interface economy carries implications for the production of new spatialities. There would seem to be three issues here. One is the particular type of sub-economy this is: internally networked, partly digital, mostly oriented to global markets and to a large extent operating out of multiple sites around the world. The second is a more elusive, and perhaps purely theoretical issue –though I do not think so– which has to do with the point of intersection between the physical and the digital spaces within which a firm or, more generally, this sub-economy operates. The third is the matter of contextuality in architectural practice. The particular characteristics of this networked sub-economy (partly deeply centered in particular sites, partly de-territorialized and operating on a global digital span) would seem to unbundle established concepts of context, the local setting for building, etc.

A Networked Sub-economy.

To a large extent this sector is constituted through a large number of relatively small, highly specialized firms. Even if some of the financial services firms, especially given recent mergers, can mobilize enormous amounts of capital and

the world of the exclusive sovereign authority of national states over their national territories and b) the implantation of global operations in those same territories.

4 This is something I have written about at length in my work on global cities and do not want to dwell on here (See Sassen, 1998a).
control enormous assets, they are small firms in terms of employment and the actual physical space they occupy compared, for example, with the large manufacturing firms. The latter are far more labor intensive, no matter how automated their production process might be, and require vastly larger amounts of physical space. Secondly, specialized service firms need and benefit from proximity to kindred specialized firms—financial services, legal services, accounting, economic forecasting, credit rating and other advisory services, computer specialists, public relations, and several other types of expertise in a broad range of fields. The production of a financial instrument requires a multiplicity of highly specialize inputs from this broad range of firms.

Physical proximity has emerged as an advantage insofar as time is of the essence and the complexity is such that direct transactions are often more efficient and cheaper than telecommunications (it would take enormous bandwidth and you would still not have the full array of acts of communication—the shorthand way in which enormous amounts of information can be exchanged). But, at the same time, this networked sector has global span and definitely operates partly in digital space, so it is networked also in a de-territorialized way, one not pivoting on physical proximity.5

The Intersection between Actual and Digital Space.

There is a new topography of economic activity, sharply evident in this sub-economy. This topography weaves in and out between actual and digital space. There is today no fully virtualized firm or economic sector. Even finance, the most digitalized, dematerialized and globalized of all activities has a topography that weaves back and forth between actual and digital space.6 To different extents in different types of sectors and different types of firms, a firm’s tasks are now distributed across these two kinds of spaces; further the actual configurations are

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5 I examine some of these issues, particularly the future of financial centers given electronic trading and the new strategic alliances between the major financial centers, in Foreign Affairs January 1999—in a non-specialist version.

6 Another angle into these issues came out of last year’s Aspen Roundtable on Electronic Commerce (Aspen, Colorado, August 21-23, 1997), an annual event that brings together the CEO’s of the main software and hardware firms as well as the key venture capitalists in the sector. The overall sense of these insiders was one of considerable limits to the medium and that it will not replace other types of markets. See Aspen Institute (1998).
subject to considerable transformation as tasks are computerized or standardized, markets are further globalized, etc.

More generally, telematics and globalization have engaged as fundamental forces reshaping the organization of economic space. This reshaping ranges from the spatial virtualization of a growing number of economic activities to the reconfiguration of the geography of the built environment for economic activity. Whether in electronic space or in the geography of the built environment, this relationship involves organizational and structural changes.

One question about this type of spatiality is whether the point of intersection between these two kinds of spaces in a firm’s or a dynamic’s topography of activity, is one worth thinking about, theorizing, exploring. This intersection is perhaps unwittingly thought of as a line that divides two mutually exclusive zones. I would propose, again, to open this line up into an “analytic borderland” which demands its own empirical specification and theorization, and contains its own possibilities for making events or outcomes. The space of the computer screen, which one might posit is one version of the intersection, will not do, or it is at most a partial enactment of this intersection.\(^7\)

Admittedly, the question of this intersection is one that I have been somewhat obsessed with, and not gotten very far on. It is for me one instantiation of a border condition that I see as pervasive in the social sciences: the dividing line as the unproblematic way of relating/separating two different zones (whatever they might be –conceptual, theoretical, analytic, empirical, of meaning, of practice). What operations are brought in and what operations are evicted, of meaning, of practice). What operations are brought in and what operations are evicted by putting a line there\(^8\)? It is quite possible that these are analytic operations linked to the type of work I do and that they have little meaning in other fields of inquiry. They are certainly not an issue in conventional social thinking.

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\(^7\) The work by John Seely Brown at Xerox Parc (Palo Alto, California) on the space of the screen is among the most sophisticated and promising.

\(^8\) Here I find Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s thinking on the hyphen compelling (Spivak, 1990).
What does Contextuality or the Local Mean in this Setting?

A networked sub-economy that operates partly in actual space and partly in globe spanning digital space cannot easily be contextualized in terms of its surroundings. Nor can the individual firms. The orientation is simultaneously towards itself and towards the global. The intensity of its internal transactions is such that it overrides all considerations of the broader locality or region within which it exists. On another, larger scale, in my research on global cities I found rather clearly that these cities develop a stronger orientation towards the global markets than to their hinterlands. They thereby override a key proposition of urban systems literature, to wit, that cities and urban systems integrate and articulate national territory. This may have been the case during the period when mass manufacturing and mass consumption were the dominant growth machines in developed economies and thrived on the possibility of a national scale.

But it is not so today with the ascendance of digitalized, globalized, dematerialized sectors such as finance. The connections with zones and sectors in its “context” or “locality” are of a special sort—one that connects worlds that we think of as radically distinct. For instance, the informal economy in several immigrant communities in New York provides some of the low-wage workers for the “other” jobs on Wall Street, the capital of global finance. The same is happening in Paris, London, Frankfurt, Zurich. Yet these other workers are not considered to be part of the context, the locality, of the networked sub-economy I have been speaking of—even if, in my reading, they are.

What then is the “context”, the local, here? The new networked sub-economy occupies a strategic geography, partly de-territorialized, that cuts borders and connects a variety of points on the globe. It occupies only a fraction of its “local” setting, its boundaries are not those of the city where it is partly located, nor those of the “neighborhood”. This sub-economy interfaces the intensity of the vast concentration of the very material resources it needs when it hits the ground and the fact of its global span or cross-border geography. Its interlocutor is not the surroundings, the context, but the fact of the global.

In this tearing away of the context and its replacement with the fact of the global, the strategic operation is not the search for a connection with the
“surroundings”, the context. It is, rather, an installation in a strategic cross-border geography constituted through multiple “locals”. In the case of the economy I see a re-scaling: old hierarchies –local, regional, national, global– do not hold. Going to the next scale in terms of size is no longer how integration is achieved. The local now transacts directly with the global –the global installs itself in locals and the global is itself constituted through a multiplicity of locals⁹.

2. Necessary Instrumentalities: State and Non-State Centered Mechanisms

Implementing today’s global economic system in the context of national territorial sovereignty requires multiple policy negotiations. One of the roles of the state vis-à-vis today’s global economy, unlike earlier forms of the world economy, has been to negotiate the intersection of national law and foreign actors –whether firms, markets or supranational organizations. What makes the current phase distinctive is, on the one hand, the existence of an enormously elaborate body of law which secures the exclusive territoriality of national states to an extent not seen in the 19th century (e.g. Ruggie, 1993; Kratochwil, 1986), and on the other, the considerable institutionalizing of the “right” of non-national firms, the “legalizing” of a growing array of cross-border transactions, and the growing, and increasingly institutionalized, participation by supranational organizations in national matters (e.g. Rosen and McFadyen, 1995; Kennedy, 1992)¹⁰. This sets up the conditions for a necessary engagement of national states in the process of globalization.

We generally use terms such as “deregulation”, financial and trade liberalization, and privatization, to describe the outcome of this negotiation. The problem with such terms is that they only capture the withdrawal of the state from regulating its economy. They do not register all the ways in which the state participates in setting up new frameworks through which globalization is furthered (e.g. Mittelman, 1996; Shapiro, 1993); nor do they capture the associated

⁹ I also see this in the political realm, particularly the kind of “global” politics attributed to the Internet. I think of it rather as a multiplicity of localized operations, but with a difference: they are part of the global network that is the Internet. This produces a “knowing” that re-marks the local. See the chapter “Electronic Space and Power” (Sassen, 1998a).

¹⁰ There is a parallel here between the institutionalizing of the rights of non-national economic actors with that of immigrants who have also gained rights –even though now they experience an attempt to shrink those rights. See, e.g., Heisler (1986), Sassen (1998a: Chapter 2).
transformations inside the state. One way of putting it then would be to say that certain components of the national state operate as necessary instrumentalities for the implementation of a global economic system.

The starting point for my argument is that there is much more going on in these negotiations than the concept “deregulation” captures. “Deregulation” actually refers to an extremely complex set of intersections and negotiations which, while they may preserve the integrity of national territory as a geographic condition, do transform exclusive territoriality, i.e. the national and international frameworks through which national territory has assumed an institutional form over the last seventy years (Sassen, 1998b). National territory and exclusive territoriality have corresponded tightly for much of the recent history of the developed nation-states. Today, globalization may be contributing to an incipient slippage in that correspondence. Much deregulation has had the effect of promising that slippage and giving it a legitimate form in national legal frameworks. The reconfiguration of the institutional encasement of national territory also brings with it the ascendance of sub-national spaces.

Recognizing the importance of place and of production—in this case the production of a system of power—helps us refocus our thinking about the global economy along these lines. The global economy needs to be implemented, reproduced, serviced, financed. It cannot be taken simply as a given, or a set of markets, or merely as a function of the power of multinational corporations and financial markets. There is a vast array of highly specialized functions that need to be executed and infrastructures that need to be secured.

11 For critical accounts see, for example, Walker (1993). There is a historically produced presumption of a unitary spatio-temporal concept of sovereignty and its exclusive institutional location in the national state. It leads to an analysis of economic globalization that rests on standard theories about sovereignty and national states, and hence sees globalization as simply taking away from national states. If we recognize the historical specificity of this experience of sovereignty it may be easier to allow for the possibility that certain components of sovereignty have under current conditions been relocated to supra- and subnational institutions, both governmental and nongovernmental institutions, and both old and newly formed institutions. The proposition that I draw out of this analysis is that we are seeing processes of an incipient de-nationalization of sovereignty—the partial detachment of sovereignty from the national state. (See Sassen 1996, Chapter One).

12 See Jessop in this volume. See also Sassen’s concept of global cities (1998a).
It means, in turn, that various instantiations of the national state are inevitably involved\textsuperscript{13}. The result is a particular set of negotiations which have the effect of leaving the geographic condition of the nation-state’s territory unaltered, but do transform the institutional encasements of that geographic fact, that is, the state’s territorial jurisdiction or, more abstractly, the state’s exclusive territoriality.

On a fairly abstract level we can see the ambiguity of the distinction between “national” and “global” in the normative weight gained by the logic of the global capital market in setting criteria for key national economic policies\textsuperscript{14}. The multiple negotiations between national states and global economic actors signal that the logic of the global capital market is succeeding in imposing itself on important aspects of national economic policy making. Autonomy of the central bank, anti-inflation policies, exchange rate parity and the variety of items usually referred to as “IMF conditionality”—all of these have become a set of norms. This new normativity can be seen at work in the design of the “solution” to the Mexican economic crisis of December 1994; this crisis was described as a consequence of the global financial markets having “lost confidence” in the government’s leadership of the Mexican economy and the “solution” was explicitly aimed at restoring that confidence\textsuperscript{15}.

In this context I read the financial crisis as a dynamic that has the effect of destabilizing national monopoly control of these economies and IMF conditionality as facilitating a massive transfer to foreign ownership. The outcome is further globalization and further imposition of the new normativity attached to the logic of the global capital market. However the actual materialization of these conditions will go through specific institutional channels and assume distinct forms in each country, with various levels of resistance and consent: whence my notion of this dynamic as having the features of a frontier zone.

\textsuperscript{13} There is an interesting parallel here with critical accounts that seek to establish the role of the government in autonomous markets. See, for example, Paul (1994/5).

\textsuperscript{14} See Sassen (1996, Chapter 2) for a fuller discussion.

\textsuperscript{15} The fact that this “solution” brought with it the bankruptcy of middle sectors of the economy and of households, who suddenly confronted interest rates that guaranteed their bankruptcy, was not factored in the equation. The key was to secure the confidence of “investors”, that is, to guarantee them a profitable return—and today “profitable” has come to mean a very high return.
3. The New Intermediaries

While central, the role of the state in producing the legal encasements for economic activity is no longer what it was in earlier periods. Economic globalization has also been accompanied by the creation of new legal regimes and legal practices, and the expansion and renovation of some older forms that have the effect of replacing public regulation and law with private mechanisms and sometimes even bypass national legal systems. The importance of private oversight institutions, such as credit rating agencies, has increased with the deregulation and globalization of the financial markets. These agencies are now key institutions in the creation of order and transparency in the global capital market and have considerable power over sovereign states through their authority in rating government debt. Also the rise of international commercial arbitration as the main mechanism for resolving cross-border business disputes entails a declining importance of national courts in these matters—a privatizing of this kind of justice (e.g. Salacuse, 1991). Further, the new international rules for financial reporting and accounting to be implemented in 1998 and 1999 also relocate some national functions to a privatized international system.

All of these begin to amount to a privatized system of governance ensuring order, respect for contracts, transparency, and accountability in the world of cross-border business transactions. To some extent this privatized world of governance has replaced various functions of national states in ensuring the protection of the rights of firms. This privatization contributes to changing the dynamics and to fueling new dynamics in the zone of interaction between national institutions and global actors. The state continues to play a crucial, but no longer exclusive, role in the production of “legality” around new forms of economic activity.

There is a new intermediary world of strategic agents that contribute to the management and coordination of the global economy. These agents are largely, though not exclusively, private. And they have absorbed some of the international functions carried out by states in the recent past, as was the case, for instance, with international trade under predominantly protectionist regimes in the post-World War II decades. Their role is dramatically illustrated by the case of China: When the Chinese government in 1996 issued a 100 year bond to be sold, not in Shanghai, but
mostly in New York, it did not have to deal with Washington, it dealt with J.P. Morgan. This example can be repeated over and over for a broad range of countries.

Private firms in international finance, accounting and law, the new private standards for international accounting and financial reporting, and supranational organization such as WTO, all play strategic non-government centered governance functions. But they do so in good part inside the territory of national states.

For instance, international finance became an immensely creative practice in the 1980s, with many new, often daring instruments invented and the creation of several new markets. For this to succeed required not only state-of-the-art technological infrastructure and new types of expertise; it also required a very specific transnational subculture within which these innovations could circulate, be acceptable and be successful –that is, actually sold. We simply cannot take for granted the vast increase in the orders of magnitude of the financial markets and the variety of mechanisms through which forms of capital hitherto considered fixed (such as real estate) were made liquid (and hence could circulate globally). These massive innovations entailed a very significant set of negotiations in view of what had been the dominant banking culture. And they entailed a rather dramatic increase in the number of very young and very smart professionals who had command over both the math and the computer/software knowledge required, and who, at a far younger age than had been the norm in the industry, gained significant control over vast amounts of capital. There is a bundle of sociological issues here: insider communities, trust, generational shifts, networks, or the social construction of such conditions as expertise and technical outputs. These are part of the explanation, beyond narrowly economic and technical factors.

Another important instantiation is the ascendance of a certain type of legal and accounting model as the “correct” one in global business transactions, basically Anglo-American in origin. This also entails a series of negotiations, some conceptual, some operational, e.g. locating Anglo-American firms in Paris or in Beijing, as is now happening, to handle cross-border business into and out of countries with very different legal and accounting systems. Again, there is a need here for detailed research on such operations –the need to recover the anthropology and the sociology of these aspects of economic globalization.
In brief, many of the negotiations necessary for the implementation of a global economy have to do with the creation of new business cultures and new consumer cultures. And they have to do with distinct ways of representing what is the “economy” and what is “culture”. In my reading of the evidence, economic globalization is encased in a broad range of cultural forms, typically not recognized in general commentaries (by the media) or in expert accounts as cultural but rather seen as belonging to the world of techne and expertise.

4. De-nationalization

The encounter of a global actor firm with one or another instantiation of the national state can be thought of as a new frontier. It is not merely a dividing line between the national economy and the global economy. It is a zone of politico-economic interactions that produce new institutional forms and alter some of the old ones.

Nor is it just a matter of reducing regulations. For instance, in many countries, that the necessity for autonomous central banks in the current global economic system has required a thickening of regulations in order to de-link central banks also illustrates another key aspect in the process whereby national economies accommodate a global economic system: “national” institutions become home to some of the operational rules of the global economic system.

New legalities had to be produced in order to encase the new global operations that cut across borders. I use the notion “legalities” to distinguish them from higher orders of the legal (jurisprudence, law), bring them down, so to speak. These new legalities encase the cross-border topography of economic activities that I was speaking of earlier. Along with the operations of the new global actors, such new legalities constitute this topography as a strategic geography for globalization.

The strategic spaces where many global processes are embedded are often national; the mechanisms, through which new legal forms, necessary for globalization, are implemented, are often part of state institutions; the infrastructure that makes possible the hyper-mobility of financial capital at the global scale is embedded in various national territories. Each country, more precisely, particular
institutional orders within each country have had or are having theirs own specific trajectory of implementation of the new global rules of the game.

It is this specific set of processes which I am thinking of as entailing denationalization –of a highly specialized, partial and incipient kind\(^\text{16}\). This process of (partial) denationalization of national orders cannot be reduced to a geographic conception as was the notion in the heads of the general who fought the wars for nationalizing territory in earlier centuries.

Further, these trajectories of denationalization will vary from country to country, they will vary for different institutional orders, and they will have different temporalities\(^\text{17}\). Emphasizing these trajectories towards globalization is, heuristically and methodologically, a rather different project than emphasizing globalization in that the latter signals the condition to be attained\(^\text{18}\). There are conditions and new institutional orders which are best described in terms of globalization. I am using denationalization as a heuristic –it allows me to see, detect, represent processes and temporalities that are lost when using “globalization”.

**WORKS CITED**


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\(^{16}\) I examine these issues in *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization.* (Sassen, 1996). An extraordinary account of some of these issues in historical perspective is Peter Taylor’s “World Cities and Territorial States: the Rise and Fall of their Mutuality” (in Knox and Taylor, 1995: 48-62).

\(^{17}\) A key issue in this regard that I cannot touch on here is the relation between digital space and national jurisdiction. See, e.g. Indiana University (1999).

\(^{18}\) Studying, naming, conceptualizing these conditions is not easy, whether I am dealing with globalization or de-nationalization. The social sciences suffer from a severe case of embedded statism. The categories for analysis, data sets, and methods, all presuppose the national-state as container, as unitary condition, as providing meaning. This embedded statism is a significant obstacle insofar as the new developments we are confronting signal a transformation in the particular form of the articulation of national state sovereignty and territory that has marked the history of the modern state and inter-state system until quite recently.


CHAPTER 2

Glocalization, Postmetropolises and Places:
New Socioscapes

Margarita Barañano Cid

“Il n’y a donc pas d’un côté l’espace global (conçu) et de l’autre l’espace fragmenté (vécu) comme il peut y avoir ici un verre intact et là un verre ou un miroir brisé. L’espace «est» à la fois total et cassé, global et fracturé. De même qu’il est à la fois conçu, perçu, vécu”

Lefebvre (1974: 411)

1. Introduction

We live in times and spaces in the process of change. As we approach the new century, it has become commonplace to speak of a final shift, a new episode of crisis and restructuring whose roots go back to the 1970s and whose fruits translate into a new global model. Many interpretations have been offered for the current course of events and many of them have referred to the central role that time-space transformations in general, and urban-related ones in particular, have in this process. Very frequently, these propositions have been accompanied by new theorizations, elaborated from different perspectives, on the relations between sociality, spatiality, and/or temporality. The ongoing time-space restructuring has thus stimulated a vigorous re-conceptualization effort, whose deep scope may be compared to that of the transformation in the “culture of space and time” taking place in the last turn of the century and masterfully portrayed by Kern (1983).

The contemporary revitalization of interest in time and space has therefore not been only a mechanic consequence of the new turn in the wheel of history –and geography–, but has also found support in the proliferation of new approaches to these crucial dimensions in the formation of social life. These new approaches, which in turn are indebted to the ongoing changes, have in some cases emphasized the present protagonism of one of these dimensions –generally the spatial–, while defending in
others their inseparability and consequently the inevitable, and more pertinent, joint treatment of both. In any case, many have coincided in understanding that space and time, far from constituting a sort of immutable undercurrent of social evolution, shift as profoundly as society does and present its same plurality and complexity. And, instead of being considered mere pillars, effects, or expressions of the social, they are now seen as part of its decisive structuring elements. Albeit under very different versions, the recognition of sociality’s spatio-temporal contextuality has thus become emphatically enthroned in the social sciences and humanities of the current turn of the century.

In the following exposition, which is inspired by the latter conception of spatio-temporality, we will study its materialization in the urban processes taking place in the last thirty years in advanced societies such as Spain. The tension between these processes and the social configuration of the city will be addressed in the context of a broader question regarding places and de-territorialization and re-territorialization processes. Are we witnessing an inexorable territorial disembodiment in favor of new, more intangible and dematerialized time-space modalities such as those embodied in financial and information flows? What protagonism is left to proximity and locality in the configuration of social life? Is it pertinent to approach the study of the present spatio-temporality from the notion of place, or are we facing the latter’s final exhaustion, promoted by the rise of the undifferentiated hyperspace of the non-place? Regarding cities, is their continuity as places viable? And, if so, what are their manifestations in the midst of this complex turn-of-the-century time-space restructuring?

These and other questions form the core of a broader ongoing research, from which some considerations have been taken for the present paper. This research includes the study of the metropolitan region of Madrid, an area that has been subject to an intense transformation process in the past few decades and is increasingly represented, together with Barcelona, as one of the country’s two regional centers closely linked to the network of “global cities”. The study is carried out from a theoretical and conceptual approach that takes into account the multidimensionality, multidirectionality, and reflexivity of the ongoing restructuring processes, while at the
same time striving to reach an integrated understanding of the city, one which considers it as an environment that is at once physical, symbolic, and imagined.

In the first section we will present the perspective guiding our examination of the ongoing urban processes, which will be illustrated in the second section with the case of Madrid. Our study is supported by the three notions that make up the title of the essay—glocalization, postmetropolis, and socioscapes, three widespread notions that have been borrowed, respectively, from Robertson and Beck, Soja, and Albrow—, as well as the recent reflections by a large group of social scientists on the rise of transnational and trans-local identities and places. Based on them, in the first section we will propose that the recovery of the concept of place in a glocal context must be accompanied by a reformulation of its content, which can in no case be understood as a sort of “islet” of traditional spatio-temporality. In the second section, we will trace the development of these new processes in the region of Madrid and outline the hypothesis of their multidirectionality, since, if on the one hand they may appear to give impetus to the unfolding of the non-city, that is, the placeless global flow, on the other they open up the possibility for a post-metropolitan revival of the city’s socioscapes. The new trends are therefore not a simple inversion of those that presided over the urban developments of classical modernity, nor do they lend themselves to a quick simplification under new inexorable “iron laws” equally applicable to any territory or city. Quite on the contrary, the current urban restructuring is characterized by the complex conjunction of opportunity and risk, with the plurality of its various local versions providing the counterpoint to the global impact. Its future unfolding, unpredictable beforehand, will be indebted to its reflexive character, that is, the reconstruction of its fluid structures on the part of social actors, including in a prominent position the time-space representations and imaginaries of the latter. The appropriate point of departure for their investigation is the reconstruction of these multiple global processes in a concrete locality, together with broader theoretical reference to the diversity of spatialities and temporalities coexisting and overlapping in its social unfolding. From a point of view partly inspired by what has recently been termed “transnational urbanism” (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998), we will attempt to elaborate a perspective capable of integrating the “macro” and the “micro”, structures and action, the objective and the subjective, the
global and the local, within a multidimensional consideration of the urban restructuring processes centered on the socioscapes of the rising “glocal” postmetropolises.

2. Theoretical Perspective and Conceptual Tools

Glocalization, Reflexivity, and Multidirectionality in Urban Processes

At the doors of the new century, many of the approaches to the time-space restructuring and its materialization in urban processes of the last three decades have coincided in pointing to globalization as one of the most relevant constituent phenomena. “Hypo-globalizing” positions, which question the presumed novelty of globalization (Hirst and Thompson, 1996) and the restructuring process itself, have not been lacking, but the majority of the discrepancies have centered not so much around the acceptance or non-acceptance of globalization or its relevance to urban studies, as around its genealogy, dimensions, and consequences, its relation to the national or local spheres, and the proposals for action pertinent in this new context. Hence the attention this paper grants it, focused on the new territorial tensions that accompany it and its relation to the local and to the flux of cities and places.

The approaches to globalization most pertinent for understanding the complexity of the ongoing urban processes are those that, under very different versions, have stressed the multidimensionality of this phenomenon. Thus, Giddens (1990), who has conceptualized globalization as the radicalization of modern institutions, has included in his analysis not only the establishment of a capitalist world economy, but also the new system of nation-states, the military world order, and the international division of labor, the latter being a product of the worldwide intensification of industrialism. The desire to attain a multidimensional conception makes it advisable to distinguish between the various structuring axes which, despite sharing some common effects, have their own specificities. This distinction also allows to more appropriately theorize the relations between them, without completely subsuming ones into the others or ignoring the tensions and conflicts between their respective developments. Other approaches have also attempted to distance themselves from reconstructions based on a single dimension, by developing distinctions such as those proposed by Beck (2000) between globalization and
globalism, or proclaiming their rejection of any determinism, be it technological or social.\(^1\)

The multidimensional conception of globalization has in turn facilitated considering the multidirectionality of its constituent processes and trends. Thus, despite resorting to different conceptualizations, this type of focuses have coincided in stressing the relevance of the ongoing de-territorializing tendencies, but adding that they develop parallel to re-territorializing tendencies that are just as significant and intense. One of the best-known formulations of this approach has been, once again, Giddens’, whose references to disembedding, also defined as the reconfiguration of local entities on account of distant influences, has enjoyed considerable diffusion. Despite the differences in their work, Jameson has found a close analogy between his concept of abstraction and Giddens’ concept of disembedding.\(^2\) However, by contrast with the first concept, what the latter suggests is that in a distance today globalized not only is the possibility of maintaining an interaction without co-presence extraordinarily increased, but at the same time near and local relations change as they intermingle with distant and trans-local ones. The ties that make up the social life of the different localities don’t lose their peculiarity or become atopic, but instead reconfigure their content and spatial references in a new global framework. Disembedding and global distantiation therefore don’t exhaust the repertoire of ongoing changes. Simultaneously, a local embedding of social life can be seen to be taking place under new configurations.

The remaining relevant spatio-temporal processes, such as delocalization, dispersion, or decentralization, have also been subject to an integrative reconstruction by those focuses that are relevant to the present study. Thus, Sassen (1991, 1998) has aptly demonstrated that the dispersal of economic activities made possible by the

\(^1\) See, among many others, Castells (1989; 1996), Sassen (1991; 1998), Lash and Urry (1994). This, however, has not prevented a good part of these theorizations from granting crucial protagonism to capitalism, whose 1970s crisis they consider the main trigger for the ongoing restructuring. The majority have placed the emphasis on the rise of the informational development mode, disorganized capitalism, flexible specialization, postfordist regulation, or transnational capitalism, all of which are seen as having been favored by the crisis of the preceding capitalist accumulation model. However, in addition to recognizing the central role of capitalism, these focuses have generally taken into account the mediation of other, also relevant institutions.

\(^2\) Jameson expresses it thus: “abstraction is, to be sure, precisely my topic, and still one very much with us, sometimes under different names (Anthony Giddens’ key term disembedding, for example, says very much the same thing while directing us to other features of the process)” (1998: 165-66).
spatio-temporal compression has combined in the past few decades with a parallel tendency to large-scale spatial concentration of high-level service activities, mostly located in global cities. These two developments are but two sides of the same coin, since dispersal occurs by means of the concentration of management action and control in these central places. In sum, economic globalization, far from promoting the triumph of de-territorialization, requires embedding within new strategic nodes. The result is the establishment of a new spatial and temporal logic, supported by a simultaneous movement in both directions and the ensuing redefinition of relations between the local, the national, and the global. In a similar direction, Beck (2000) has noted the convergence, in “translocal places”, of tendencies towards delocalization and re-localization. As for Castells (1989, 1996), he has explained how the information age has encouraged both the enthroning of de-territorialized global flows and the rise of strongly rooted regional and local identities. It is true that, without denying the relation between them and their simultaneous expansion –since the protagonism of identities results in large part from resistance to these flows–, this author has mostly insisted on the dichotomous opposition and the juxtaposition of the two types of spaces and times characteristic of these parallel processes. That is, the “space of flows”, which dominates “atemporal time” and molds the logic of informationalism, and the “space of places”, which is defended and recreated by the emerging “power of identity”. The “variable geometry” of the “network society” is sustained by the tensions linked to this opposition and the one between the global and the local. His approach is therefore removed from the integrative approach we are defending, which attempts to understand both the shift in places and local space in the context of globalization and the penetration –however asymmetric– of local and particular influences in global flows. But this does not detract from the value in Castells’ reconstruction of the current urban logic, which, far from being reduced to a sort of single and inexorable expression of de-territorialization, is conceived as a product of the tension and juxtaposition between the latter and equally present re-territorializing resistances, even if the final theoretical integration of both aspects is lacking. Most noteworthy is his study of the convergence of these processes in the evolution of cities, which are located at the meeting-point of the tendencies towards, on the one hand, the blurring of identity and, on the other, its revitalization, reinforced
by similarly-oriented social and political proposals. All of these are processes whose crucial political dimensions, both in the local and global spheres, and the new and challenging inequalities they create, have been aptly shown by Castells (Borja and Castells, 1997).

The acknowledgment by many of these conceptions of the multidirectionality of the ongoing spatio-temporal processes has rested on the recognition of either the reflexive character of the present global restructuring, or the contribution of the practices, representations, and imaginaries of social actors thereto. Thus, Lash and Urry (1994) have stated that this restructuring is not exhausted in the network of abstract flows, but one should also take into account how the latter are imbricated with the growing reflexivity these very changes make possible. Other theoreticians of the so-called reflexive modernity have elaborated parallel formulations, despite defending views not wholly in agreement. The past few years have also witnessed the proliferation of suggestive works emphasizing the discursive construction of the city, that is, its consideration as “text”, representation, or, in Donald’s words, an “imagined environment” (1992). The most interesting of these theories, rather than establishing an opposition with the theories aimed at understanding the structuring processes of the city, have managed to transcend both focuses by elaborating a new type of unified comprehension. By distancing themselves from the distinctions between a presumed “real” city and another that is “imagined” or “conceived”, they have reminded us that the city is at once a physical environment and a symbolic, discursive, and imagined representation.3

A similar integrative objective has been pursued by other approximations. One should highlight in this respect the efforts of Soja (1996b: 10), author of a suggestive proposition intended to complement what has been termed “Firstspace” geography (centered on the perceived space) and “Secondspace” geography (mostly attentive to the ways of conceiving it), by constructing a “Thirdspace” geography that dissolves the classical dichotomy between the other two through a simultaneous treatment of “the perceived”, “the conceived”, and “the lived”. By means of this triple approximation, he intends to expand the modern imagination to account for the

3Without intending to be exhaustive, see, among others, the papers collected in King (1995; 1996), Barnes and Duncan (1992), Duncan and Ley (1993), and Duncan (1990).
complexity and simultaneity of a spatiality and temporality that are at once lived, thought and perceived, abstract and concrete, objective and subjective. The same can be said of the global and the local, since the current spatiality and temporality are simultaneously global, fragmented, and hierarchical, homogenizing and differentiating. Their final embodiment is then not translated only, or even mainly, into an expansion of de-territorialization, since re-territorialization processes are taking place simultaneously, as feminist and postcolonial literary criticism studies have shown. The space of places, far from being condemned to dissolution, thus appears as a problematic space, but one that is living and viable, and capable of being recreated by the spatial imagination and spatial practices and discourses.

Thus far, we have presented the broad features of our integrative theoretical approximation to the complex phenomenon of the ongoing global restructuring. Inspiring itself in the valuable above-mentioned contributions, this approximation aspires to integrate objective determinations and subjective mediations; macro sociological and micro sociological considerations; as well as the processes’ structural dimensions and their molding by social actors. The tension between the global and the local is moreover understood in terms of reciprocal interrelationship, “inclusive differentiation”, interweaving, or interpenetration. Neither the global cancels the local, nor does the latter remain impervious to the former. On the contrary, trans-local factors intervene in the configuration of the local just like, in the opposite direction, de-territorialized flows intermingle with multiple influences from very different localities within the global. We are therefore not dealing with an opposition between two unrelated poles, one –the global– dynamic and atopic, the other –the local– static and sheltered in its identity roots, but with two aspects that are increasingly interwoven in the present world. Both can be seen as part of a unified reality that should be addressed from an integrative perspective.

Roberston (1997) has proposed the term “glocalization” to account for this way of understanding relations between the global and the local. It is true that thereby the author also intends to explain other issues not discussed here, such as the cause or consequence relation between globalization and modernity, or the existing dialectics between cultural universalism and particularism. Without engaging in these debates, what’s relevant is the integrative content he assigns to the concept, which although
present in many other formulations, has only reached a mature version with him. This integrative content has been the subject of numerous commentaries, among which Beck’s (2000) is also of interest, since he has connected the concept to an original analysis of places in the present world, according to which these have become “topopolygamic” as a result of the “glocal” framework they are now inserted in. This is the type of investigation that has inspired the objectives of theoretical inquiry presented in these pages, hence its inclusion in the title of the paper.

Places and Socioscapes

The convulsion brought about by globalization has not only situated social and urban life within new time-space coordinates, but has also revived interest (nostalgia?) for place (“our home”?). Are we facing the final exhaustion of places, first undermined by national spaces and later annihilated by the scourge of atopic global flows? Is it possible to reactivate the sense of place in our present cities? And, forgive the repetition, is there any sense in attempting to do so? Finally, is it pertinent to resort to this notion under conditions of glocalization? And, if so, what is the meaning that should be attributed to it? The questions that can be raised are more numerous than the answers it is possible to offer here. But it is possible to undertake a brief presentation of the main ideas guiding the view of places sustained in this work; this is necessary in order to subsequently inquire about their survival in today’s large post-metropolitan cities.

Already in 1980, in their presentation of the chrono-geographic perspective, Parkes and Thrift (1980) recommended a clarification of the concept of place, which they felt was being used in too vague a manner. More recently, Beck (2000) has referred to the term’s polyvalence. In between, Agnew and Duncan (1989: 2), starting from a similar assessment, have summarized the various meanings into three: “location”, linked to spatial position; “locale”, which refers to the “setting” of routine interactions; and “sense of place”, which alludes to the issue of identity and identification with this lived space. Straddling these different meanings, the term, which is borrowed from geography, has served as a sort of wild card for very different approaches, which in turn has contributed to every now and then raising questions about its validity.
The concept has most frequently been applied in the context of comparisons such as those between traditional and modern society, the rural and urban world, or the mechanic order of primary ties and the organic order of secondary relationships. *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, the founding dichotomy of classical sociology, thus constitutes the starting point for theoretical disquisitions and empirical research on places. These then refer us, explicitly or implicitly, to the local community and the local culture, hegemonic in traditional societies and later relegated or even, according to some versions, undermined by modernity. This type of approach has been informed by various attitudes, some nostalgic of the world that was, others optimistic about the triumph of reason and the banishing of irrational ties. But beyond these evocations, these two positions, together with many others, have usually shared a series of common premises on the meaning of places derived from the above-mentioned types of dichotomies. The first and most important has already been stated and entails viewing place as the almost “natural” territory where, from time immemorial, the life of a community strongly cohered around a local culture has been rooted. This notion is supported by a relatively static and harmonious conception of the community and the culture defining the place, which are seen as locked behind closed doors and resting on a clear delimiting of borders, thus making it easy to distinguish what is their own from what is external to them, that is, originating in other localities, as for example immigration. As the third premise, these interpretations of place usually emphasize unification over conflict, stressing shared common values over internal cultural and social differences. Finally, in this type of approach the world of places is also frequently inserted into a strict opposition between the empty space and time of modernity, which have become abstract and objectified dimensions of social life, and the rooted and heterogeneous space and time of pre-modernity.

This view of places underlies numerous research works that attempt to compare the new spatial and social relations at the heart of the modern world with those still prevailing in territories more distant from its transforming impact. Many of these anthropological or sociological studies have drawn on the contrast between town and country, a contrast that, as Jameson has appropriately noted (1991), had its high point in modernism, which utterly exacerbated the appreciation for innovation and avant-gardism in the face of a declining tradition. The speed of the boulevard, the
nervous wandering of the \textit{flâneur}, and North American skyscrapers were the emblematic images of the modernist metropolitan environment, which was represented as the stage and laboratory \textit{par excellence} of fashion and innovation, avant-gardes and creation. Meanwhile, despite its growing colonization by capitalism, the rural environment was considered for the most part remote from the sparkling urban life and, consequently, the main living witness to the retreating communal and local world. More recently, the traces of these types of places have been sought in the territories occupied by recently-arrived immigrants, which are imagined as localities integrated around a strongly unified local culture, inspired by the one prevailing in the generally rural original setting and equally distant from that of the host metropolis.

With globalization, the old modernist dichotomies between the metropolitan and the rural, community and society, place and abstract space, have become the object of renewed interest, but in most cases the former attention to the national territory –explicitly or implicitly identified with abstract space– has simply been replaced by references to global space. In this context, the question about the meaning of places is once again brought to the fore, and is once again addressed from different positions. Thus, some focuses revive the polarity between places and the now global abstract spatial flows. This type of opposition rests on a representation of places comparable to the one described above, that is, places understood as localities that are charged with meaning for the traditional communities that inhabit them and as the setting of some form of autarchonous culture –or subculture– primarily fashioned by local influences. Trans-local or global influences are not so much denied as relegated or seen as purely external impacts, clearly separable from internal ones. In the context of these clashes between places and global flows, the evolution of the former may follow opposite courses. On the one hand, just like localities, places could succumb, replaced by the new de-territorialized spaces of “non-places”. On the other, they could reaffirm their traditional identity, mobilizing against global impacts. The third possibility, namely, the transformation of places along the glocal road, is much less taken into account due to the exclusionary polarity some of these positions defend.

Precisely, this last possibility has been considered in recent years by a good number of formulations that, starting from geography, anthropology, or sociology, have advocated an integrative comprehension of the ongoing spatio-temporal
processes, in consonance with those outlined in the previous heading. Most of them have coincided in highlighting, with various nuances and terminological instruments, the reactivation of places under conditions of globalization. Thus, Lash and Urry (1994: 17) have spoken of the emergence of the “globalized localization”, correlative to the replacement of the “nationalized time-space convergence” by a global one. These authors have also stressed the temporal dimension of places in the global world, viewing them as an expression of memory, of the so-called evolutionary or glacial time that, together with ungraspable instantaneity, is one of the essential characteristics of disorganized capitalism. As for Thrift and Amin (1994), they have investigated the revitalization of the diversity of places and the significance of the local dimension in the context of the global division of labor using the very interesting concept of “institutional thickness”. They have also referred to something mentioned by most scholars approaching the issue from this position, namely, the need to leave behind the notion of a static, unified, and homogeneous place, and substitute it by a conception that acknowledges its growing heterogeneity, conflict, diversity, and connection with other distant places. A similar reflection is found in Massey (1994; 1995), who has not only pointed to the obsolescence of the old idealized view of place, but has also questioned its historical validity in explaining past societies. This geographer has supported her questioning with a study of several places that are seen as the setting of very unified cultures, such as mining communities, by recalling the strong gender differentiation they were based on. Massey has furthermore extended a suggestive invitation to rethink the present-day “global sense of place” in terms of the above-mentioned interpenetration between the local and the global.

Among the remaining proposals that have influenced this position, one can cite Albrow’s (1997) and Beck’s (2000). Both are framed in the glocal conception we’re defending, but with different nuances. Albrow has insisted on the inadequacy of the traditional notion of place to account for the new realities. As an alternative, given that the term is based on an unjustified identification between locality, community, and local culture, he has proposed relegating it and resorting instead to the term “socioscape” (1997: 6), inspired by Appadurai’s well-known use of the suffix *scape* (1990; 1996). According to him, this new concept, which is an integral part of his theory of globalization, avoids the assumptions of a community that inexorably
corresponds to the place and of an almost universal sense of place, two premises he has not been able to confirm by empirical research in the global city of London. On the other hand, the term is more sensitive to the “participants’ perspective”, since this is precisely its point of departure. Hence its greater adaptation to present living conditions, which are all characterized by a greater “fluidity”. These are the advantages Albrow has attributed to his new notion. One should also stress the fact that it acknowledges the integration of the global and the local and pays attention to its crystallization in certain social relations, which are what in the end define the different socioscapes. Albrow’s proposition has the advantage, moreover, of making the very existence of a sense of place an object of investigation, instead of taking its survival for granted, even under new formulas. Inserting the study of socioscapes in the broader context of concern for spatio-temporal inequalities renders the concept even more interesting. Its main disadvantage is possibly the exact opposite of one of its main advantages, namely, making the concept of place an object of inquiry that is nonetheless shrouded in a certain pessimism regarding its present survival, at least in global cities.

Beck’s approach, on the other hand, continues to make use of the notion of place, but adds a series of adjectives intended to adapt its meaning to the new glocal realities. The resulting redefinition is very appealing, since it simultaneously stresses the reactivation in today’s world of the importance of feeling “connected to the land” (Beck, 2000), to the locality, and the plurilocality or transnationalization of places, that is, the fact that this re-territorialization frequently includes several places at once or rests on a hybridization of inevitably trans-local influences. What glocalization has left behind are places conceived as uni-local, which Beck expressively terms “topomonogamic”. This last concept refers not only to traditional societies but also those of early modernity, which were infused with a view of nation-states as relatively “unilocal” places endowed with singular identities and spaces that defined clearly separate national societies. Reflexive modernization undermined the last remaining traces of “topomonogamy”, which has now been replaced not so much by a spatiality without territorial embedding as by new “topopolygamic” places, simultaneously configured by influences from here and there and supported by localities closely linked amongst one another. Beck connects this conceptual proposition on the
ongoing spatial shift with one on cultural transformations, regarding which he advocates a “contextual universalism”, seeking with this term a similar integrative operation that will accomplish the difficult union of universalism and particularism. In both areas he furthermore proposes replacing the former logic of “exclusive differentiations” by one open to the “inclusive differentiations” predominant in our glocal world.

Thus, Albrow’s and Beck’s formulations offer not only a framework for approaching places from a glocalization perspective, but also a series of conceptual tools useful in the empirical investigation of the new time-space transformations. Both allow freeing the concept of its former evocations of a traditional, unified, and univocal community or identity, and of a locality conceived behind closed doors and sealed borders. Translocal or topopolygamic places and socioscapes, thus redefined, recognize the existence of multiple identities, while taking into account the “power geometry” (Massey, 1994: 149) or “time-space social stratification” (Albrow, 1997: 52) within them, as well as the conflicts and contradictions that traverse them. Finally, both propositions aim to take into account the multidirectionality of the ongoing changes, which tend to revitalize the sense of the local while at the same time reinforcing the hybridization of symbols and signs from multiple places, which can less and less be exclusively attributed to a concrete locality. In what follows we will see how these concepts can be applied to the study of the present post-metropolitan transformations.

Postmetropolises in a Glocal Context

Among many other contributions to the study of the current urbanization processes, Soja has referred to the development of postmetropolises and his thesis is used in this paper in connection to the type of broad approximation to the ongoing time-space changes we’ve defended. This California professor understands the present changes as part of the shift from the “crisis-generated restructuring” to the “restructuring-generated crisis” (1996b; 1996c) which since the mid-1960s has favored a postmodern urbanization that in one of his texts he defines by the
convergence of six distinctive “geographies” (1996a)\(^4\) and, in another, links to the enthroning of the postmetropolis (1996b)\(^5\). Using these terminological contributions, Soja defends an inquiry into urbanization that combines the perspective “from above”, which is macro spatial and mindful of a restructuring that is now global and visible in almost any place in the planet, and the micro spatial focus, developed “from below” at an everyday and local scale. These two aspects, macro geographies and micro spaces, are but two sides of the same unified and plural reality and should be jointly studied if one is to avoid a partial analysis. Neither of the two dimensions, the “macro” or the “micro”, is solely a product of what’s perceived or of spatial practices, but their formation is also influenced by held conceptions and lived experiences, as well as the imaginaries fashioned on the basis of the latter. The “macro” and the “micro”, the subjective and the “objective” thus join hands in the model for the study of space proposed by this author, who defends conducting such a study by examining the specific integration of all these aspects in a concrete locality, as he does with the Los Angeles postmetropolis.

In addition to inviting the integration of aspects all too often treated separately, Soja’s focus has other advantages. In the first place, it facilitates recognizing the plurality and diversity of concrete spatial materializations without failing to frame them in a now global restructuring process. And in the second place, he effectively takes into account the presence of opposed and even contradictory simultaneous trends, such as those leading towards, on the one hand, a decentralization and dispersal hardly imaginable until a few years ago and, on the other, spatial recentralization and concentration. In turn, considering not only de-territorialization...
but also re-territorialization, the “politics of place” together with the macro processes of change, allows for a complete examination of spatial restructuring.

Soja’s desire to unify different dimensions is therefore very suggestive, as is its application to the concrete inquiry into the case of Los Angeles. This inquiry is elaborated throughout several works, but probably the most appealing is *Thirdspace* (1996b), where the evolution of the Los Angeles region is contrasted with what he considers a very different materialization of the postmodern city model, namely, Amsterdam. It is true that in this comparative task, the author alludes to factors of mediation between the local and the global that, given their great significance, should have been theorized in more detail, such as public, national, regional, and local policies, the associative and communal features present in each locality, or the preceding cultural and territorial crystallizings, which are very different in the two cases. But this does not invalidate the interest generated by this type of comparison, which no doubt opens valuable paths for the study of the case of Madrid, which is very different from both Los Angeles and Amsterdam.

The foregoing considerations justify the adoption in this paper of the term “postmetropolis”, which is used here in the integrative sense Soja seems to give it. However, this notion is included in a “hybrid” analytical scheme that has sought additional inspiration in contributions such as some of the above-cited ones and has borrowed from them terms that are equally relevant in attempting to account for the ongoing urban restructuring. We will conclude this work with a quick examination of this restructuring in the case of Madrid, which will be based on the perspective we’ve presented and the questions formulated in the introduction regarding the evolution of cities and places in post-metropolitan regions undergoing intense de-territorialization and re-territorialization processes, that is, dispersion and concentration processes that not only affect their physical territory but also their social, economic, and cultural configuration and even their symbolic and imaginary construction.


The first thing that must be noted upon comparing Madrid with other postmetropolises is its nucleation around a central city that is clearly dominant both
within its territory and the nation-state’s. Madrid is a city whose centrality has a long history, stemming not only from its condition as geometric center of the Iberian Peninsula, but also from the political event of its selection as capital of the Spanish empire by royal decree in the mid-16th century (García Delgado, 1992; 1999). Capital status has thus reinforced the centrality of the original Arab town, the political-administrative factor building on the geographic. Under its influence, a service-centered economy, stimulated first by the Court and later by the demands of the modern nation-state, has unfolded. This double function, on the one hand as a capital-city and on the other as a service-oriented setting, has remained in force throughout its entire trajectory, with the former still being the subject of lively discussions regarding its appropriate legal translation. On the basis of both conditions, Madrid has consolidated a reputation as “capital of Spanish capital” since the first decades of the 20th century (Bahamonde and Otero, 1999: 23). More recently, it has also used them to support its “candidacy” to the “select” group of global cities. In between, it has slowly advanced on the road to modernization, somewhat hesitantly after the beginning of last century and more confidently since the thriving decades that opened the present one. The process has been aided by its becoming the epicenter of the radial transportation and communications systems –particularly railroads– and by its industrial development (García Delgado, 1992; 1999). However, the Civil War and the somber post-war period abruptly interrupted this advance, which didn’t take off again until the mid-1950s. Postponed and delayed, the great economic expansion that has since taken place has in less than twenty years transformed the city into a new metropolitan area as well as the country’s second industrial nucleus, while reinforcing its condition as the primary strategic area for the decision-making tertiary sector. More recently, in step with the restructuring initiated after the 1970s crisis and despite its geographic distance from the so-called “European spine”, it has become enthroned as a great urban agglomeration –the largest in the Iberian Peninsula– and a strategic region with international connections (Martín and Sáez, 1999).

However, the transformation of this second-rate city into imperial capital, then capital of the liberal state, and more recently a strongly internationalized, strategic urban setting, hasn’t rested only on its political protagonism or subsequent economic remodeling, but has sought from very early on a shift in its symbolic and imaginary
representation necessary to “rise to the new occasion”. This task has found various obstacles, stemming from among other factors the city’s humble origins and its limited dynamism throughout very long periods. The representation of the city has been made up from the beginning of different and even contradictory images, notable among which is the variously recreated opposition between the powerful and expanding Madrid and the Madrid “guilty” of profiting from the energy of those located in the periphery –of the city, the country, or its social status (Salcedo, 1977). The original image of a medieval city with vast outskirts and scant luxuries gave way to new imaginary reconstructions, in which the vindication of Madrid as the only city that is the Court found its counterpoint in a humorous play on words that ridiculed its deficiencies, reducing it to the city that could only be the Court. Later on, in the 19th century, the efforts to make a “worthy capital” out of the “Modern Madrid” were confronted by talk about its lazy and courtly character (Juliá, 1992; Juliá et al., 1995). The aspiration to be the “Great Madrid” has made its way during this century in step with the city’s deep structural transformation, but has been subject to very different re-readings which have been partly indebted to the century’s political ups and downs (Juliá, 1992; Juliá et al., 1995). Thus, the expansion of the region of Madrid in the image of modernist Paris or London sought by various groups of enlightened professionals, contrasts with the subsequent post-war authoritarian regime’s attempt to revive the “imperial Madrid”. But “the force of things” and the different projects that have accompanied its evolution have ended up driving the municipality to expansion into, first, a metropolitan area and later a metropolitan region, in a still ongoing process.

Furthermore, the regional consideration has received strong backing with the transformation of the province into Autonomous Community in 1983. Since then, and especially after Spain’s entry in the European Union, the representations of the Community as metropolitan region, and even global city, have multiplied in official reports, political speeches or professional writings. After decades of unprecedented ferment, the old shadow of the courtly city suspected of idleness has finally been discarded. But new dead weight has appeared, born from the new cesspool of inequality and exclusion generated, first, by its accelerated metropolitanization and later its global restructuring. It is true that the specter of a “dual city” hasn’t taken root
with as much force as in Los Angeles (Soja, 1996b) or 1980s New York (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991), where change was attended by a strong socioeconomic and cultural polarization and a distancing from existing social welfare policies. But it is also true that, in addition to certain trends towards convergence (Leal, 1999), in the last few decades the territory of Madrid has experienced a revival of the centuries-old division between the prestigious and expanding North, and the South, which is afflicted by numerous social drawbacks. This has taken place in a new fashion, with a suburban and exurban west being added to the Northern area, and the location of industry, which was previously concentrated in the South, being extended towards the East. In the meantime, the city, which continues to expand, has further blurred its borders due to a new disperse urbanization and its fragmentation has thereby increased. Its residents have difficulty conceiving the whole of the territory in a unified manner (Rodríguez Villasante, 1992) and, at the same time, the city’s capacity to sustain places with their own marks of identity has become a big issue and an object of study for scientists and professionals. According to some versions, Madrid’s new de-territorialized geography has definitely ruined its representability as city. Other versions, such as the one herein maintained, insist, on the contrary, on the ensuing opportunity, not free of uncertainty, to recreate the city image under a new glocal and post-metropolitan profile.

The successive remodeling of the representation of Madrid have been accompanied by a parallel transformation of its urban fabric, first within the central municipality and, only much later, in an ever-vaster hinterland. The imaginary construction of the Ancien Régime Madrid as Villa y Corte [Town and Court] rested on the presence of a whole series of emblematic public spaces and prominent buildings, erected thanks to its capital status and its being home to the Crown and its aristocratic entourage. The core of this imaginary city shared its grounds with the economic and political heart, and thus Madrid has exhibited from early on a marked concentration of its social life around a vital center. This space comprises the historic district of today’s Madrid, which, though aged and displaced by other subsequent centers, continues to symbolically reactivate centrality in the urban conglomerate. The protagonism of centrality is vividly exemplified by the Puerta del Sol, which was already the focal point of the “city’s ceremonial axis” and a strategic node for urban
traffic in imperial Madrid (Juliá et al., 1995: 226); later became, thanks to its condition as “kilometer zero”, the starting-point for the 19th century national radial transportation and communications systems; and more recently has become the seat of the Regional Government.
Thanks to the renewed dynamism in the final stages of the 19th century, the city aspiring to be a “worthy capital” undertook a significant remodeling of its physical structure, directed inwards and especially outwards. Following in the steps of other European and Spanish cities, Castro’s Enlargement Plan projected a rational and orderly expansion of the city and in turn became an important revitalizing factor in its incipient modernization. Initially conceived with the modernist criteria of leaving behind the old city’s narrow and irregular layout by opening large boulevards and a new set of large blocks cut at right angles, little by little it became the predominant setting for middle- and high-level activities and population, in a slow gentrification process that extends to our days (Juliá et al., 1995). The buildings and small palaces that, with their Paris-inspired balconies, friezes, and iron-wrought railings, exhibit their condition as property of the wealthy strata, still survive (Ariès and Duby, 1989). The expansion of the “business district” has also gradually unfolded towards this renovated center, advancing northward on the Castellana axis. This avenue, which has undergone successive subsequent extensions, is the primary symbol of the business Madrid. Its growth reflects one of the constants in the new spatial segregation of the city, namely, the one separating its residential and tertiary sector space from that reserved for the emerging industry.
However, the main spatial differentiation of the turn-of-the-century Modern Madrid, which was established even administratively, was the distinction between the historic district and the Enlargement, and the outskirts. The latter area, made up of numerous urbanizations that grew both inside and outside the municipality in disorderly fashion, when not without any planning whatsoever, covered a territory that, according to a 1929 count, was twice as large as the other two. Its deepest roots probably drew on the notion of arrabal [outskirts] that has been omnipresent in the representation of a city that, starting with its Islamic past, has made a distinction between a wall-protected central space—particularly important given the city’s original condition as defensive enclave—and a periphery growing outside of it without any protection (Juliá et al., 1995). Its more immediate origin lay in the inability of many of the expanding Madrid’s new residents to afford real estate in the other two areas. This center-periphery segregation, in which the first term is identified with privileged location in the historic district or the Enlargement, and the second with the outer territory where many of the industrial activities and popular sectors find refuge, was maintained until the 1970s. Even today, despite its having been partially superseded as a result of new disperse suburbanization and exurbanization processes, one can find its traces behind some of the metropolitan region’s distinctive features, such as its centralization, its difficulty in becoming multipolar, and the more popular character of the southern and eastern zones.

In the meantime, the great mid-1950s to mid-1970s urbanizing wave which, thanks to industrial expansion, occurred at a very fast pace, revived the above-mentioned segregation, but on decidedly metropolitan foundations. Already in previous decades, albeit at a slower pace, several outer municipalities had been repopulated, and many had been absorbed by the municipality of Madrid between 1948 and 1954 (Martín, 1991). But it was after this last date that Madrid became rapidly configured as a metropolitan area made up, in addition to its territory, of an outer Crown of over 20 municipalities. The metropolitan representation of the new geography was given legal recognition in 1964. Its metropolitanization thus took place in a short period of time and rested on a vertiginous peripheral urbanization that has substantially shortened the demographic distance between the central municipality and its Crown, despite the undeniable still-prevailing dominance of the former.
This process didn’t correspond to the North American expansion model of middle-class residential suburbs. On the contrary, it was primarily based on intensive construction aimed at the low purchasing-power strata made up of immigrants from the heavy rural exodus and those urban sectors who couldn’t afford the city. In the outermost municipal districts and the *hinterland*, which was successively enlarged to the South and East, new high-rise low-quality block constructions were built by the big private developers who controlled the developmentalist urbanism of the period. Many of these urbanizations were later extended into sectors with a higher symbolic and material value, such as Moratalaz and the Barrio del Pilar. Public initiative, on the other hand, responded to dwelling needs with various types of social housing that were even more modest, with some of them being described as “official shanty-towns” on account of their precariousness. Furthermore, shanty-towns like Palomeras had been growing for years on the verge of legality, built literally from one day to the next by residents who’d bought or rented a small plot in a land that was usually not zoned for construction. On the whole, these actions configured an improvised periphery, built in spurts and initially deprived not only of infrastructure and services, but also an identity of its own. The old representations of the outskirts and, further back, the *arrabales*, were thus dramatically and exponentially reactivated in this no-man’s land under accelerated construction. At the same time, management activities continued to be located in a “central almond” that not only expanded its business district but remained a residential space. However, the central area also underwent a
profound reconfiguration comprising opposite processes (gentrification-degradation) in the historic district and, more significantly, the expansion and consolidation of the Enlargements as high purchasing-power spaces. These processes are another expression of the strong speculative movement affecting the emerging metropolitan area. In the districts we are considering, its impact was reflected in the activation of a cycle of resident expulsion-and-renewal and a generous expedient to the pickaxe, which in some cases led to the demolition of entire neighborhoods, such as the Barrio de Pozas.

The metropolitanization of Madrid has therefore rested on a strong de-territorialization process, occurring in the context of the greatest urbanizing and migratory wave in the country’s recent history. Several million people abandoned localities and places where in many cases they had resided for generations, in order to usually inhabit an urban periphery such as Madrid’s. The big cities’ urban fabric underwent a similar restructuring, with the marks of identity and emblematic places that had formerly accompanied them radically changing or even vanishing. This shift coincided with one of the most intense periods of change in Spanish society, during which it not only secured its condition as urban and consumer society, but also concluded its first demographic transition, carried out its political transition, and began to open up to the world. In the sphere herein addressed, this translated into a significant development of urban social movements, which have been studied primarily by Castells (1983), and also by Rodríguez Villasante (1989; 1992) and Urrutia (1992).

Indeed, a large number of immigrants, together with other host city residents, reacted by promoting very different re-territorialization processes, activated in many cases by the strong urban movement taking shape in this period. According to Castells’ exhaustive investigation (1983), in the years of expansion the movement practically covered the entire area of Madrid and was present in the most remote “dormitory towns” as well as the inner district and the few colonies of “garden-cities”. It was thus fashioned as an interclass movement, although it had greater weight in urbanizations with lower-income blue-collar workers and in the shanty-towns, where the situation was particularly difficult. Without failing to address more general political goals, connected to the establishment of a democratic system, these
movements focused on the re-appropriation of the city, through the strengthening of communal and associative ties and of the territorial marks of identity of the spaces they inhabited. These objectives, together with broader ones related to the reconstruction of the shanty-towns, the rehabilitation of some deteriorated inner areas, and participation in planning and local administrative organizations, garnered considerable support and were in large measure subsequently adopted by the new local governments. As a result, historical buildings like La Corrala and popular central city neighborhoods like Malasaña avoided demolition and were revived as emblematic places; destitute districts like El Pozo del Tío Raimundo, Palomeras, or Orcasitas, which were the setting of bitter struggles for city change, remained as places of memory even after being remodeled, and other urbanizations scraped some services and public spaces they would otherwise have lacked. An active re-territorialization process thus managed to revive some of the characteristic spaces in the city, while those located in the periphery succeeded in fashioning a new discourse and a new representation of their territory by creating places until then non-existent.
The convergence of these double processes of de-territorialization and re-territorialization was accompanied by a hybridization of emerging or previously existing places, supported on a not always conflict-free blending of traditional and modern elements, both in terms of ways of life and construction of typologies. Metropolitanization doesn’t necessarily involve the evaporation of the identity of places, but neither does it imply a survival of identity that is impervious to the impact of accelerated modernization and the growing interaction with distant localities. Thus, from the minute they were born, many of the remodeled neighborhoods began to shape their marks of identity, revitalizing lost traditions or creating new ones, which usually included festivities, processions, and even the advocacy to a saint and the composing of a local anthem. Yet, instead of closing themselves off to the outside in their search for a local culture, they blended these traditions with practices as “modern” as active participation in the complex technical remodeling of the urban fabric, the struggle to attain democratic elections and, when necessary, recourse to legal action. In order to accomplish these goals they came into contact with many relevant national institutions, from religious communities to political parties and labor unions, and sought technical advice from professionals and technicians who helped them elaborate a different view of the city. In step with this determination to transform the urban space, a whole series of changes erupted, such as the beginning of a slow and complex transformation of intergenerational and gender relations, which had until then been marked by the strong traditionalism of the dominant family model. The final result was in many cases the construction of a physical environment with higher standards than those usual in the periphery and, in line with the period’s urbanism, in the form of high-rises. These areas usually had headquarters for neighborhood associations or other community groups, whose names, like those of some of the streets, relived their turbulent genealogy. Their achievements ratified the representation of the city as a communal space of good fellowship, fostered by the years of fighting to overcome their initial condition as territories of deprivation and hostility. But it was also then that urban movements began to retreat towards their own neighborhoods, often becoming associative movements such as exist today, almost exclusively devoted to revitalizing social ties by offering non-commercialized
services for specific social groups and organizing sports, cultural, and festive activities.

Since the mid-1970s, the urban model thus consolidated has given way to a new restructuring, now glocal and closer in time to that of other neighboring countries. Despite retaining important peculiarities, Spain’s transformation in this period, especially after joining the European Union, has roughly followed in their footsteps. We have thus witnessed a similar process of uneven spatial development, which in the case of Spain has been accompanied, among other changes, by reinforcement of the large economically diversified metropolitan areas, such as Madrid and Barcelona, which have also become increasingly internationalized metropolitan regions. This last process has taken place in the past two decades, not so much as a result of the previous stage’s peripheral urbanization as by a new disperse urbanization that has for the first time gained momentum in our large urban agglomerations (González et al., 1997). This recent formation of metropolitan regions hasn’t shattered the high-concentration model prevailing in the Spanish territory and within these regions, but has entailed a significant transformation of the centuries-old segregation in terms of center and periphery.

Despite not losing the demographic and economic predominance of the central city, Madrid has witnessed the rapid growth of new outer spaces very different from the urban model until then prevalent. As regards residence, from the mid-1970s on, the Northwestern area of the region has been repopulated by middle and high-status sectors, particularly the so-called new functional middle classes. In less than twenty years, a formerly non-existent suburbanization has consolidated, thereby shaping one of the newest and most dynamic spaces in the ensemble. Moreover, centrifugal residential trends have gone beyond the limits of the suburban Crown and have penetrated into even more remote peri-urban areas. This development has primarily taken place in the areas with the highest environmental value, which in previous decades were reserved for second homes, and has likewise extended into other suburban spaces in the region. This new disperse urbanization is characterized by greater land consumption and less dense and more individualized residential typologies, such as single-family housing or townhouses, which are scarce within the Madrid Municipality. These spaces are also the setting for a good number of neo-
technological centers since, as Tobío has explained (1989), high-profile technological and scientific economic activities generally seek locations different from those that hosted the growth of the industrial periphery in the 1960s. But the commercial tertiary sector large department stores are those that have multiplied their presence to a greater extent both in the municipalities of the metropolitan Crown and the region’s peri-urban areas. Other services have also registered a relative spread of their facilities, such as education—which has received a balancing effect thanks to the public university centers opened in the South and East—, leisure and other types of multifunctional complexes. However, all this hasn’t prevented a good part of the tertiary sector, both public and private, and especially the upper-level, from maintaining its preference for Madrid’s “central almond”.

Suburban Town Houses – Disperse Urbanization
Source: José Javier Grau Pérez

The central city is indeed experiencing multidirectional processes that have modified, but haven’t eliminated, its centrality. As in other metropolises, the triple combined impact of glocalization, gentrification, and ghettoization (Donald, 1992), to which we must add the –as yet unfinished– expansion of urbanization towards the municipal boundaries, summarizes the ongoing changes. Their most relevant manifestation is the tertiarization that extends to all the central districts, and not just the business district. As for the latter, during the boom of the second half of the 1980s it reinforced its significance with emblematic buildings, such as the singular Kio
Towers. And despite subsequent ups and downs, its territory has continued to grow in a still-expanding process that includes part of the city’s most ambitious urbanistic project, the so-called Operation Chamartín, that is, a further northward extension of the Castellana axis. Other areas of the city are also undergoing important renovation processes, among which we can highlight the construction of quality residential space in the so-called Pasillo Verde [Green Corridor], formerly a southern industrial area developed around the railroad tracks.

The Enlargement and the historic district have also received the impact of new processes, which exhibit greater contrast in the latter, more aged area. In this older area, middle-level population and activities established in the gentrified zones coexist with pockets of degradation, which have witnessed the appearance of a new type of resident, the foreign immigrant without means, also present in larger numbers in the southern areas of the region (Puyol, 1999). The former protagonism of the newly-arrived rural immigrant has given way to this new figure, which is a faithful representative of the emerging glocal city’s diversity and the overlapping of very different life spaces and times within it. As regards the vitality of the inner district, the
passing of a plan intended to protect its historical patrimony constitutes an important step in the revival of its symbolic and ceremonial value. On the other hand, the Enlargement, despite the relative stagnation stemming from its aging and the more traditional character of its middle strata, has retained its condition as privileged space, as reflected in the high prices, among the highest in the region, of a good part of its urban fabric (Leal, 1999).

Finally, the periphery of the *desarrollismo* [developmentalism] years has been intensely affected by the restructuring of production and has lost part of its employment and many of its workplaces, with some areas becoming poverty and marginality enclaves. This decline is also a consequence of the premature decay of its hastily built real estate, the aging of its original residents, and the increase in precarious contracts, which are particularly abundant in the new disperse territories beyond the periphery, where many “shady factories” have settled. At the same time, a phenomenon of great interest for the purposes of this paper has taken root in this very area: the emergence of middle-strata suburbanization enclaves, led in many cases by the sons and daughters of the workers who arrived in the area after 1950. This is relevant both because of its impact on the real and imaginary reconfiguration of the periphery and because it reflects the importance of local rooting and the value assigned to proximity. The result is what we could consider a new type of “topopolygamic” places, which are the product of the interpenetration of global trends –professionalization of the work force and preference for less congested residential complexes– and local roots. Other no less important consequences of these enclaves (Leal, 1999) are their contribution to shortening the distance with respect to other more prestigious peripheries and the stimulus they provide for improving the area’s services, transportation, and infrastructure. Such improvement, incidentally, had already begun –as shown by the above-mentioned creation of university positions–and the suburbanizing phenomenon is in turn a consequence thereof, which ratifies the strategic intervention of public policies in urban processes. In any case, even though the center-periphery segregation has changed pattern in this last period, mostly as a result of the disperse suburbanization repopulating the northern and western parts of the metropolitan region, and despite a relative reduction in social differences, the gap
between this richer part of the region and the one located in the east, and particularly
the south, continues to exist.

The glocal restructuring of Madrid has thus been accompanied by a new de-
territorializing wave, now taking place in a new migratory and population context,
characterized by a rise in intraregional displacements, an inrush of foreign
immigration, and limited vegetative growth. The earlier large demographic processes
have given way to movements that are less numerous and of a predominantly inverse
sign—exit rather than entry movements if we consider the whole region or the central
city and its immediate Crown, and immigration rather than emigration if we consider
the whole country. But their novelty and speed have not for this been smaller, since
they have contributed to the emergence of a new urban model in only two decades.
The impact of international participation in economic activities has also been relevant
and has taken place together with a transformation in the latter’s time-space
organization that has also affected the ongoing urbanization. The novelty is
particularly significant regarding the growth of the so-called non-metropolitan
municipalities, which for the first time have been incorporated into the region’s
dynamics, on account of the disperse suburbanization and exurbanization, and
everything seems to point to their continuing expansion in the immediate future. The
result has been a profound shift that, as has been the case in other urban
agglomerations, brings to the fore the issue of its adequate conceptualization and
representation.

The question marks opened by the new phenomena and the debates over the
future of the urban and the possibility of recreating the notion of city in the current
glocal conditions come to the foreground. From very different conceptions, equally
diverse answers have been offered, though most have as common denominator the
attention given to events taking place in other contexts and the search for new
conceptual tools better adapted to the new processes. Thus, some authors have
interpreted the ongoing changes as leaning towards the type of diffuse or edge city
attributed to some North American agglomerations or, more broadly, to the end of the
city as a unified social configuration. With sometimes an optimistic and sometimes a
pessimistic emphasis, they have stressed aspects such as the more individualized and
fragmented character of the new urban forms, correlative to the preference for single-
family housing, which vividly contrasts with the priority given in the 1960s and 1970s to high-rise apartments; the expansion of “fortress urbanizations”, which according to some are “clones” of those in the United States; or the blurring of the notion of centrality in suburban and particularly exurban zones, which are too remote from the nuclear metropolis and yet lack a centrality of their own, due to the region’s difficulty in becoming multipolar. The definitive agony of the emblems of urban life, such as the boulevard, the square, or the promenade, which have been pushed aside by the empire of velocity and vehicular traffic; the decline in communal ties, including those generated in other periods by the once vigorous and now wilted neighborhood movements; or the exacerbation of hostility, segregation, and fragmentation all point in the same direction. All these developments can be seen to endorse, in sum, the decline of the city and its replacement by a new set of unconnected urban nuclei, which are very difficult or almost impossible to fit within the real and imagined notion of the city. In the metropolitan region of Madrid, as in so many others in our country, we may be advancing towards the landscape of the non-city, which in turn is an expression of the non-place enthroned by the triumph of de-territorialization.

At the doors of the new millennium, one can barely deny the pertinence of asking once again about the future of such an ancient and relevant social construction as the city. The impact that the current time-space restructuring, some of whose most characteristic processes we’ve examined in the case of Madrid, is having on its configuration is indisputable. But, as precisely this last example allows maintaining, and in line with what was noted in the previous section, it doesn’t seem that alluding to de-territorialization or other similar processes, such as dispersion, decentralization, disembedding, or fragmentation, exhausts the explanations for the present changes. Their rich complexity, as well as their multidirectionality and reflexivity, require an integrative consideration that also takes into account the opposite trends towards re-territorialization, concentration, centralization, embedding, or the establishment of new forms of (network?) connections among the rising urban forms.

Many are the manifestations of these other processes that can be traced in the region of Madrid. One of them has to do with the survival in the perception of a good part of its residents of “shared-living shelters” and “citizenship spaces”, as Rodriguez Villasante’s research has pointed out (1992: 43). The former, consisting of the home
and other places of “immediate neighborhood”, are the main setting for the unfolding of primary and informal ties. The latter refer to a broader notion of neighborhood, which seems to endure in the mental maps of its members. The persistence of an associationism directed at reinforcing communal ties; the limited residential mobility (Leal, 1999); the concentration of the majority of residence changes within the same district (Roch, 1999); or, as Durán has recalled (1998), the weight of local identification among Spaniards—it being the main identification mark for two-thirds of them according to CIRES data—, seem to also corroborate the territorial rooting of Madrid residents. Other data, such as the recreation of a lively and lived-in centrality, with even a recuperation of pedestrian zones, despite the advance of tertiarization and depopulation; the importance granted to proximity—particularly to the family of origin—, which has been studied in some of the region’s areas; the configuration of nuclei of sociality in new “citizenship spaces”; and the political and social projects aimed at the revival of city life and the convergence of the metropolitan region are additional examples of the complexity of the processes at stake, which don’t seem to be leaning towards an inexorable disintegration of the urban.

In summary, in the past two decades Madrid has undergone intense restructuring, which, as has also been the case in other large agglomerations, has transformed it into an urban region. This change cannot be interpreted through a unidirectional approximation to the ongoing processes, nor can it be reduced to a loss of its territorial rooting, its places, and its very configuration as city. Its adequate comprehension requires, on the contrary, a unified treatment capable of taking into account, first of all, the glocal condition of this shift; in the second place, its reflexive nature and the contribution of urban conceptions and imaginaries thereto; in the third place, the singularity of the case under study and, finally, the double processes of opportunity and risk it opens, as well as the uncertainty regarding its future course. It was the attempt to reach this type of unified analysis that advised us to approach the case of Madrid from its representation as a postmetropolis with socioscapes configuring places in the process of glocalization. The study of the region has thus been conducted from a “macro” perspective, in the broader context of the global time-space transformation, which is compatible with the reconstruction of the notion of city and the rise of places under new forms. This approximation has been accompanied by
a “micro” approach attentive to the peculiarities of the concrete locality, without
which the former would be incomplete. Regarding the objective and subjective
aspects, a similar synthesis has been pursued. This integrative purpose has advised
resorting to the notion of postmetropolis, one of the many concepts proposed in the
current context of terminological uncertainty regarding the complex ongoing urban
changes. This concept, as Soja has shown⁶, allows us to study the differences between
postmetropolises without losing sight of the ensemble of a restructuring that is today
planetary.

The possibility to continue reactivating city life, even in what could be
considered one of our most recent postmetropolises, is therefore still open. This
requires understanding postmetropolises from the optic of “topopolygamic” places
and cityscapes, as well as taking their peculiarities into account. It doesn’t seem
justified to continue thinking the city in the unilocal, mostly “topomonogamic” terms
of the past, assuming this description ever fit the cities of modernity. Glocalization
has once again brought up for discussion, this time in an inexorable way, the trans-
local configuration of cities that, while not completely relinquishing their identity,
increasingly avoid univocal formulations. Cities, made up of increasingly plural
spaces, residents, and activities, are struggling between decline and revival, with the
latter being built on the multiplicity of their identities. The revitalization of the
perceived and imagined space of the city therefore requires a reformulation of its
representation that will acknowledge the multidirectional processes it is subject to. It
is moreover advisable not to forget that, as Castells reminds us (Borja and Castells,

⁶ The case of Madrid exhibits peculiar features that distinguish it from the postmetropolises examined
by Soja (1996b). One must note, in the first place, its smaller population, which is slightly above five
million, that is, three times smaller than what this author attributes to the Los Angeles and Amsterdam
postmetropolises. The same might be said of its disperse urban spaces, which, although growing, are
still hardly comparable to the numerous “exopolises” of the North American postmetropolis. The
predominance that the city of Madrid and its immediate metropolitan Crowns continue to have in the
ensemble of the region, since in them reside, respectively, 50% and 37% of the latter’s total population,
is the third important difference. All of these are related to the highly concentrated model that is
characteristic of Spanish urbanization and is still present in Madrid and other Spanish urban nuclei.
However, together with these differences, one must also take into account the existence of converging
features, which are linked to the glocal character of the restructuring taking place in Madrid and the
other postmetropolises. The convergence is even more marked with respect to Amsterdam since both of
them, in addition to having evolved from cities with a long history, contain, among other common
features, places charged with memory and lively and inhabited central spaces. In any case, the main
interest in the concept of postmetropolis, beyond its usefulness in establishing a comparative
framework for urban processes occurring in different contexts, lies in the integrative aim Soja attributes
to it, which is in tune with the type of approximation pursued in this paper.
1997), its future unfolding may follow very different courses, depending not so much on blind impersonal forces as on their daily structuring and restructuring on account of the actions, conceptions, and imaginary representations by the involved social subjects. Postmetropolises, as other types of urban agglomerations in this end of the century, may continue to recreate places and socioscapes of city life but this, like other issues, presently constitutes a challenge with an uncertain outcome.

WORKS CITED


**APPENDIX**

**Table 1.** Evolution of the population of the Community of Madrid by large areas (absolute numbers)

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<td>3,761</td>
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<td>4,687</td>
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<td>413</td>
<td>847</td>
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<td>197</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>506</td>
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<td>808</td>
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<td>512</td>
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Note: Population as of January 1. Figures in thousands of people.

*Source:* Projection of population and households in the Community of Madrid, 1996-2011
Table 2. Evolution of the population of the Community of Madrid by large areas (percentage variation)

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<td>Non-metropolitan municipalities</td>
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<td>7.08</td>
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Note: Population as of January 1. Figures in thousands of people.

Source: Projection of population and households in the Community of Madrid, 1996-2011

Figure 1. Evolution of the population of the Community of Madrid (thousands of people)
CHAPTER 3

From Nation’s Capital to Global City
(Transnationalizations in Mexico)

Néstor García Canclini

In the social sciences it has become commonplace during the 1990s to talk about global cities. As studies devoted to them multiply, several types of integration within globalization have been defined for megalopolises and other cities. In this paper I want to outline some conceptual and empirical distinctions that emerge from studies on Mexico City performed in recent years, which may be useful in developing the theory of globalization and the theory of the urban.

This discussion is related to another classical issue in urban studies, namely, the scales of analysis, or how globalized currents are articulated with local movements. We will begin by examining how Mexico City has gradually realigned in order to participate in the different stages of transnationalization. We will find that the transition from an international to a global model is linked to the restructuring of economic and cultural dependence: from preferential ties with Europe to association with the United States.

1. National Capital and Transnational Capital

During the colonial period Mexico City was connected to vast economic and cultural movements that went beyond what we now call Mexico. In the same way as Buenos Aires, Lima and other colonial cities, it served both as regional capital and articulator of ties with Spain. These supranational interactions remained in force after the independence process and during the modern nation-building period. However, until the mid-20th century, the urban structure and the meaning of life in these cities was primarily conditioned by their role as political, economic, and cultural centers within their nation.
Even though between the mid-19th century and 1940 the population of Mexico City grew from 185,000 to 3,410,000, the urban structure retained the checkerboard pattern imposed by the Spanish conquerors in the 16th century. Until fifty years ago, the life of the city unfolded within a clearly delimited territory, whose geographic, political, and cultural core was located at the Historic Center made up of colonial and 19th century buildings and archaeological sites evoking the pre-Hispanic past.

During this whole period the State was the main actor in national society and urban life. It attempted to integrate 56 indigenous ethnic groups within a national project and to overcome interregional divisions by means of a railroad system, a nationwide economic market, an educational system based on Castilianization, and political unity within a single party and a single labor union. Symbolic goods also contributed to this unification, and a cultural heritage that offered iconographic syntheses of the nation was shaped using crafts, modern plastic arts, and film. This repertoire of imaginaries circulated in national museums and international fairs, in the gigantic public murals and films that linked peasant memory to the new urban sentimental education (Monsiváis 1984). As the population increasingly concentrated in the cities (10% of Mexicans lived in cities at the turn of the century, while 70% did seven decades later), educational centers and museums displaying archaeological and historical pieces from around the country began to assemble in them, particularly in the capital.

Traveling through the city meant becoming familiar with a repertoire of goods that condensed the national patrimony. What was brought from each region and collected in Mexico City was, as is the case with any patrimony, the metaphor of a social alliance. In every period, the hegemonic groups established a national patrimony by selecting a set of common goods, monuments, heroes and traditions, and then combined them and staged them according to the play of forces contending for power. Insofar as the historical patrimony contributes to configuring the public sphere, the latter was shaped by inequitable policies towards ethnic and Creole cultures, noble and popular districts, arts and crafts. But following the Revolution these differences became subordinate to an experience of national unity, of Mexicanness, represented by the capital city.
How have the public space and the ways in which Mexico City residents meet and interact changed in the past fifty years? In 1950, when the capital basically covered the Delegaciones [districts] that are now most central –Benito Juárez, Cuauhtémoc, and Coyoacán–, life was largely structured around neighborhoods, and there were streetcars, 22,000 horse carriages, 60,000 automobiles, and about 1,700 buses transporting a million passengers a day (Hoy, 1943). Any resident could get to the Historic Center on foot or after a journey less than five kilometers long. A small percentage of the population received the news through the press, a few more through the radio, which was then becoming mass-oriented, and people often went to movie theaters, dance halls, and parks. There was no television or video. The university, bookstores, and theaters were located in the city center.

As explained above, the city was organized as public space on account of its role as political and cultural capital of the nation but, as industrial development increased its contribution to the national product (from 32.1% in 1940 to 48% in 1980), it also progressively became the country’s economic center. During this period the city attracted large masses: migrants from various regions in the country expanded the city from the above-mentioned central Delegaciones to the 16 that now make up the Federal District and, finally, to the present conurbation with 27 municipalities in the State of Mexico. The 9.1 square kilometers the city covered at the beginning of the century have stretched to the 1,500 of the present megalopolis.

What in the urban space has been redistributed during the past twenty years? First of all, communications networks (press, radio, TV, video, computers). Media circuits have acquired greater weight than traditional places in the transmission of news and imaginaries about urban life, and in some cases they offer new modalities of encounter and recognition, such as radio and television communication in “participatory” or open-phone-line programs, and get-togethers in shopping centers that have partially replaced the former meeting and strolling spaces. Moreover, many of these cultural activities have the capability to connect large population sectors with macro urban and foreign experiences. As a result, the sense of the city as public space has also changed. Not only have these activities favored a more fluid interaction of the capital with national life, but also with transnational goods and messages, and thus the megalopolis emerges as a place where international news and performances, foreign
Localized cultural and recreational events attracting large sectors are still held in Mexico City. The three million pilgrims who arrive at the Villa on December 12 to honor the Virgin of Guadalupe, the two million who visit Iztapalapa during Holy Week, the crowds that congregate for political meetings at the Zócalo and for sporting events at the stadiums are unavoidable examples. Patron saint festivities, dances in dance-halls and popular colony streets also survive, as do other local practices that have not let them be absorbed by the industrialization of culture. The big city still contains towns of pre-Columbian or colonial origin whose names synthesize the Hispanic and indigenous components by linking a Catholic saint to a náhuatl name and which preserve rural-origin residential customs and festivities, but whose residents are connected to the modern city at work and in consumption places. Some neighborhoods founded in the 17th and 18th centuries also continue to operate with a relatively autonomous profile, reproducing practices and festivities from that epoch that are of course not incompatible with the rapid-transit highways that cross them or the presence of advanced buildings and technology transmitting postmodern imaginaries. Upon comparing the residential modes and imaginaries aroused by different areas of the city, some recent anthropological studies have found that, while residents of the towns and neighborhoods describe themselves as “belonging to”, those in the modern areas (condominiums, housing estates) do so as “living in” (Portal Ariosa, 1997).

This small-scale territorial culture cannot be disregarded as a basis for group identification and popular organizations. The places intended for eating, walking, and dancing, where a large part of purchases are made and the urban space enjoyed, continue to give meaning and allow the residents to experience the local environment as their own. As I have explained more extensively elsewhere, the megalopolis manifests its multiculturality not only as multiethnicity, but also by the co-presence of local, national, and transnational cultural forms, as well as the existence of practices and rituals that have originated in different stages of urban development (García Canclini, 1998a). In this way, the megalopolis becomes the place where the local micro public is connected to the global macro public (Keane, 1995).
2. Who Can See the Megalopolis as a Whole?

The expansion of the urban mass hinders interaction between its parts and dissolves the overall image. Mass media now deliver images that attempt to reconnect the disseminated parts. Just as in the modern city visuality was structured by the flâneur’s stroll and the literary chronicle, the best emblem of the aspiration to provide totalizing narrations in the megalopolis is the helicopter flying over it, which offers the simulacrum of an overall view every morning on radio and TV. Run by police who patrol and journalists who inform, this new panopticon power that tells us where there’s been a car accident or which streets are jammed and recommends the best routes, exhibits the alliance between police and television control, between discipline and service to the population.

Furthermore, the media connect the city to international circuits. The same economic modernization policy that disjointed the city has also promoted audiovisual networks that structure news and entertainment practices and reorganize urban sociability. The dispersal of the majority of residents, who now concentrate in the periphery, discourages them from attending the theaters, concerts, and dance-halls located in the center, but radio and television carry news and performances into most homes. The communicational city is superimposed on the spatial city. For this reason, the socio-spatial characterization of the megalopolis must be completed by a socio-communicational study that accounts for the restructuring role the media have had in the city’s definition and development.

In order to analyze the present cultural development of a mega-city such as Mexico City one must address the patron saint festivities of the founding towns as well as the daily foreign television shows; neighborhood stores as well as shopping macro centers and telephone purchases; the 30 million daily commuters as well as the pilgrims, the demonstrators, and those who watch it all from the millions of telehomes in the metropolitan area.

The re-composition of public space hasn’t occurred only because of the advance of the electronic communications media. The city has transformed the ways of communicating and consuming by changing the ways of residing: from the dominance of neighborhoods to vertical apartment buildings and privatized housing
estates. Several authors have studied the consequences of this urban realignment (Ballent, Giglia), together with the increased time and distance required to reach cultural facilities and the lack of safety in public spaces (García Canclini, Nivón, Ramirez Kuri). Neighborly interactions have grown weaker and become anonymous or instrumental, as happens in condominiums, and news and entertainment are for the most part received at home sitting in front of the TV screen or by the radio.

However, new forms of local sociability tied to globalized urbanization have appeared. Noteworthy in this respect is the cultural role played by the 27 shopping macro centers in Mexico City. In addition to expanding real estate and commercial capital, restructuring investments into more concentrated forms, and creating new jobs while destroying old ones in retail trade, they offer new spaces for the staging of consumption where architectural monumentality is associated with strolling and recreation. They configure new signs of symbolic distinction and differentiation, and extend the role of transnational products and brands in the satisfaction of needs. Many shopping centers include specifically cultural opportunities, such as cinema multiplexes, bookstores, music stores, videogames, musical performances, art exhibitions, and entertainment centers. Through their appealing design and the security and hygiene they offer, they contribute to transcend the commercial purpose of these types of spaces, such that they may serve as places where city residents, particularly the young, can meet and socialize. The combination of these ingredients renders them more seductive than strictly cultural centers and more reliable than other places intended only for shopping or strolling. One of the cultural keys to their success is that they allow the convergence of symbolic differentiation and freedom of behavior. Interviews conducted with visitors have shown that they perceive them as places where the consumption of clothing and other objects generates greater distinction and, at the same time, access to the most “modern” cultural entertainment and goods, those with the highest exhibition quality, can be had informally, dressed in jeans, while walking and talking (Ramírez Kuri, 1998).

3. How Globalization Integrates and Segregates the City

Thus far I have assumed that it is pertinent to consider Mexico City a global city. It meets, indeed, several of the requirements indicated in the literature on the
subject: a) significant role of transnational companies, particularly management, research, and consulting agencies; b) multicultural blend of national and foreign residents; c) prestige attained by the concentration of artistic and scientific elites; d) high presence of international tourism (Borja and Castells, 1997; Hannerz, 1996; Sassen, 1991).

Even though the hasty growth of Mexico City in the past half-century was due to industrialization and the resulting attraction of national migrants, after the country’s outward economic opening in the early 1980s, the city areas with the most dynamic development have been those linked to the establishment of transnational investments and the transnationalization of Mexican companies. The Federal District and its metropolitan surroundings have become one of the twenty urban mega centers where world-scale management, innovation, and commercialization mechanisms are articulated. This change is particularly evident in the 650 hectares in the Santa Fe area reserved for Hewlett Packard, Mercedes Benz, Chubb Insurance, Televisa, and other company buildings, shopping centers, and upscale residential zones (Mercado Moraga, 1997). It can also be seen in the architectural remodeling of the Paseo de la Reforma and parts of Polanco, Insurgentes, and Periférico Sur; in the proliferation of shopping macro centers and new transnational hotels; the modernization of telecommunications and their satellite connections; and the spread of computer services, cable and satellite television, and cinema multiplexes. Several of these activities have brought about direct changes in cultural and communications opportunities; others have helped to restructure the sense of urban life and the traditional modes of space appropriation. In both cases, the State has relinquished its role as leading actor in favor of private entrepreneurs and transnational corporations.

Some experts on global cities (Borja and Castells, 1997; Hall, 1996; Sassen, 1991) have been noting these transformations in Mexico City since the early 1990s, and recently a few Mexican authors have taken them into account in their re-conceptualization of the capital (Delgado, Ramírez, Salgado and Camarena, 1997; Mercado Moraga, 1997). They’ve distinguished between cities like New York, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Berlin, Frankfurt, Tokyo, or Hong Kong, which serve as advanced settings for financial, insurance, consulting, advertising, design, and public relations activities, and audiovisual and computer industry management; and the
emerging “regional centers”, such as Barcelona, São Paulo, Mexico City, Chicago, Taipei, and Moscow, where the establishment of management nodes for globalized services coexists with traditional sectors, informal or marginalized economic activities, deficient urban services, poverty, unemployment, and crime.

How can Mexico City negotiate the conflicts between these two developmental directions? Many of our problems of inequality and economic and cultural exclusion must be solved using local resources, with decisions made by the city and national governments. But it is necessary to ask ourselves how the articulation of strategic parts of the city with the development of North America (via NAFTA), with European and Latin American countries (by means of other free trade agreements), and with the global economy and globalized culture is restructuring its differences and conflicts. In the past the Mexican historical patrimony and other modern infrastructure and cultural resources have been well used to attract tourists, investors, and sports tournaments, and allow the city to be the setting for multinational interest films. All this can be promoted even further if, as some of the above-mentioned cities have done, in addition to museums, stadiums, and traditional festivities, glocal communications systems –those where the global can station itself on the local and the local can find avenues to expand globally– are made available.

Some of us studying recent transformations in Mexico City and other Latin American cities, such as São Paulo and Buenos Aires (Caldeira, 1996; García Canclini, 1998b; Nivón, 1998), believe that in order for the globalization of urban life to take hold and become more than just real estate, financial, and media business, it would be necessary to rethink the relations between cultural policy and the public sphere and the citizenry. If artistic and craft traditions, museums and historic districts, were to take part in a project of urban (and national) development together with advanced communications and computer systems, the possibilities of acting on the problems of disintegration and inequality would greatly increase, and the overseas image and competitiveness of the city (and the country) would change.

Disintegration and inequality, that is, the dualization between the global city and the marginalized and unsafe local city, may be the main obstacle for Mexico City to reposition itself in this new stage of development. As Borja and Castells have noted, a serious risk of globalization is that it will only benefit an elite: “a part of the
city is sold; the rest is hidden and abandoned” (1997: 185). In the past, cities like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles have had problems of crime and violence that affected their image, but they confronted them with specific policies for profound (and not always democratic) realignment and through the development of artistic and cultural opportunities and highly appealing urban spaces. These mega city experiences suggest that the conflicts and dangers that have in recent years afflicted Mexico City require, in addition to better security services, mobilizing new economic and cultural resources with a view to renovating and expanding its urban life and outward projection.

These new challenges point us to the need for improving the quality of cultural facilities, decentralizing them and democratizing cultural supply by tying it to local creative developments and initiatives. We are not only speaking about government responsibilities, but also territorial social movements and the practically non-existent consumer and media user movements.

Why is citizen participation so weak? There are some reasons that stem from the Mexican political system. But one must also consider the citizens’ public culture. Five years ago we conducted an investigation into photographic archives that was intended to understand the urban imaginaries of average city space consumers by documenting how the ways of traveling through the city had changed in the past half-century (García Canclini et al., 1997). Then we gathered ten groups of people who travel intensively through the city –food delivery people, street vendors, taxi drivers, students, traffic cops– and showed them 50 pictures among which they had to choose the most representative. The images unleashed stories of what people suspect when moving through unfamiliar areas. One of the conclusions of the study was that the majority finds it difficult to imagine what city they live in, where it begins and ends, and how the places they cross everyday really are. In the face of enigmas and threats, they elaborate assumptions, myths, and short-term tactics that help them to avoid traffic jams or make occasional arrangements with strangers. No one has a clear global map of the megalopolis, nor aspires to encompass it. People survive by imagining small environments within their reach. Given the difficulty to understand macro social transformations and the structural causes for disasters, they put the blame on specific groups: migrants unprepared to live in the big city, political
demonstrations that hinder traffic, an excessive number of cars (though no one indicated who was responsible for this), police corruption, or the irresponsibility of car owners who triple-park. Urban culture understood as casuistry engenders a pre-political culture where, rather than systemic causes, isolated culprits are identified. In this pre-political culture, little can we expect that the articulations between city and globalization be understood.

If we follow news reports about the big Latin American cities, we will observe a proliferation of news about crime and violence, the breakdown of the social fabric, and the privatization of public space with a view to protection. Studies such as Miguel Angel Aguilar’s (1998) on Mexico City and Teresa P.R. de Caldeira’s (1996) on São Paulo have shown how these megalopolises’ imaginaries are being modified by new forms of segregation and violence. During the modernization period, segregation in Latin American cities was carried out by separating the various social groups into different neighborhoods. After the middle of this century, and so as to put some order in the urban expansion resulting from migrations and industrialization, people were divided according to a center/periphery opposition: middle and upper classes in the best-equipped central zones, and the poor crowded in underprivileged suburbs. And while the latter model is still operative, as Caldeira (1996) has demonstrated in her São Paulo study, when the different groups got too close in many of the city areas, walls, large doors, and guard posts were erected, residential neighborhoods were sealed off through the restriction of access to their streets, and large buildings with the construction of electronic code-protected entrances.

Three processes underlie this spatial realignment: a) recession in Latin American societies since the early 1980s, which has led to increased unemployment and poverty, and certain socio-cultural consequences: weakening of identity cohesion, loss of expectations and confidence in progress and social mobility, and uncertainty regarding the future; b) the fall in industrial production and the growth of a tertiary sector with a large percentage of informal activities, which entails the predominance of the financial over the productive, and the irregular and even illegal over clearly regulated economic and social practices; c) the increase in violence and crime, and the inclination –on the part of certain social sectors and some governments– to confront social conflict with violent practices.
As a consequence, the citizens have adopted new protection strategies that have modified the urban landscape, travels through the city, and everyday habits and imaginaries. In popular neighborhoods –Brazilian *favelas*, Buenos Aires *villas miserias*, and their equivalents in Bogotá, Lima, and Mexico City–, residents have organized in order to take care of security and in some cases even prevent the police from entering. The powerful economic sectors have established residential complexes and workplaces that are closed to circulation or have severely restricted access. Some have placed equally strict controls in shopping centers and other public buildings. In recent years, the creation of closed neighborhoods has become the main stimulus for the big cities’ upper and middle sectors, who traditionally haven’t taken part in social movements, to organize: their peculiar way of exercising citizenship lies in insulating themselves from urban conflict by privatizing over-privileged spaces and limiting sociability and random encounters.

However, parallel to the progressive decay of public spaces, the uncontrolled growth, and the segregating violence, new modes and focal points for socio-cultural development have appeared in the 1990s. Parallel to economic and urbanistic dualization, the disorderly advance of informal trade, and the rise in crime, some Latin American capitals have for the first time elected their rulers (Buenos Aires, Mexico City) and others have found in the post-dictatorial period the stage to rehearse more democratic forms of participation and reactivate their cultural development (Santiago de Chile, Montevideo, Bogotá, São Paulo). Noteworthy in this respect are the experimental projects undertaken by the Workers’ Party in Porto Alegre, Brazil, since the early 1990s to confront the imbalance between accumulated social vindications and budgetary stringency through the active participation of citizens from all districts in setting priorities for the use of resources (Jelin, 1998). Another example is the city of Barcelona, where the democratization of city management is linked to participatory aesthetic improvement projects that promote a more intensive use of public spaces and thus contribute to their security (Borja and Castells, 1997).

It is not a mere play on words to ask what cultural capital the Latin American capitals face these tasks with. To what extent is the present mobilization based on a patrimony of their own (the historical heritage or local music, film, and video production) and to what extent is it dependent on imports, on commercially-oriented
tours that involve the movement of hard delocalized capital and are generally ruled by a “decaffeinated” aesthetic, quick profit, and ephemeral character? Is there any possibility of speaking in the name of the city and communicating with other cities when so many categories of local production have shrunk: publishers gone bankrupt or bought up by transnational companies, scant filming capacity and subordination of the little that is done in film to the commercial criteria of international co-productions?

All this is also related to regional integration processes (NAFTA, Mercosur) and the shift from European to North American references in Latin America. This hasn’t happened to the same extent in all countries or all economic and educational sectors. But the prevailing trend is that what Paris, Madrid, or London signified in an earlier period is now represented by New York in the case of the elites, and Miami and Los Angeles in the case of the middle sectors. The large number of Latin American artists and intellectuals, as well as members of the middle and popular sectors—and consequently the existence of Spanish-speaking audiences and markets—in those cities, and the fluid communication between Latin American communities in the first world and those in Latin American cities, make it necessary to think of those United States cities as Latin American cultural capitals (and not only prestigious foreign references). What does it mean that, because of its population, Los Angeles is the third largest Mexican city, Miami the second largest Cuban city, and Buenos Aires the third largest Bolivian city? How can trans-urban cultural policies contribute to intercultural knowledge and understanding? Several recent programs, such as the Buenos Aires-Porto Alegre art weeks and the Mexico-United States Culture Trust, or the proclamation of Mexico City as “shelter city” for persecuted artists, are initiatives that stimulate this line of work.

4. Appendix: Methodological Issues

Several problems in the study of globalization and in urban studies should be reformulated so that they may take into account the coexistence of different stages, from internationalization to globalization, as well as their integrating and segregating or degrading effects. The issue is to be able to simultaneously address the different
scales of urban development, both traditional towns and neighborhoods and those areas intended for articulation with the transnational economy and culture.

In accordance with the current reformulation of cultural spaces and circuits, one should consider: a) cities as differentiated spaces within each nation and the multicultural complexity of each; b) the dominant role of culture industries in production, circulation, and consumption, and their ensuing importance as agents of social integration and communication, disintegration and segregation; c) the new cultural forms, largely linked to youth cultures, that represent those sectors excluded from high-culture institutions and culture industries (including manifestations of the urban underground, such as graffiti, as well as musical products that only circulate within places that are “non-consecrated” nor accepted by the media). Some of these unorthodox cultural forms have been adopted by the media with a view to expanding their audiences and connoting ideological renovation and openness. But state cultural policies, which are focused on the fine arts and traditional culture, generally exclude them, thus reinforcing their marginality.

It is a question, therefore, of paying attention to the many ways of being multicultural that exist within the city and developing democratization and participation policies that may articulate local, national, and global citizenship. If we manage to use the social and communications resources creatively within each of these scales, perhaps the city of media will stop being only the city of fear.

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CHAPTER 4

Transnational Urbanism:
Re-Imagining the "Local" in Urban Studies

Michael Peter Smith

It seems obvious that Urban Studies is a domain whose object of study is “local” social, economic, political, and cultural processes. But in the past two decades the growing interest in globalization in general and the global-local interplay in particular has significantly disrupted this relatively straightforward equation of the urban with the local. Many urban theorists have cast their net widely to encompass processes of transnational and even global socio-spatial scale, insisting that the urban cannot be clearly understood unless it is considered as an element in a wider socio-spatial matrix. Yet even the most global of these urban theories remain committed to conceptualizations of the “local” as an empirically and even ontologically discernible space that exists as a purified “inside”, understood as clearly distinct from the transnational flows of ideas, information, financial transactions, religious and cultural movements, media images, migrants, exiles, and refugees that cut across and penetrate localities from the “outside”, disrupting preexisting local modes of culture and social organization.

Two themes in particular have informed this construction of the local in urban studies. The local has been frequently represented as the cultural space of embedded communities and, inversely, as an inexorable space of collective resistance to disruptive processes of globalization. In this chapter I will discuss the limits of this two-sided understanding of the local as a preface to framing a more dynamic conception of the local, one more likely to capture the connections linking people and places to the complex and spatially dispersed transnational communication circuits.

1 This chapter is based upon theoretical arguments developed more fully in Smith, 2001.
now intimately affecting they ways in which everyday urban life is experienced and
lived.

1. Beyond the Capital vs. Community Binary

In writings ranging from the traditional anthropology of villages, tribes, and
urban ethnic communities to current discourses on globalization, the “locality” has
been used to signify an embedded community. “Community” in turn is represented as
a static, bounded cultural space of “being” where personal meanings are produced, a
cohesive set of cultural values is articulated, social trust is generated, and traditional
ways of life are enunciated and lived. One way or another, this view of the local as the
site of “authentic community” has been treated as the binary opposite of the capitalist
marketplace. In classical urban sociological thought the “urban” served as a surrogate
for the rational instrumentalism of the capitalist market and the bureaucratization of
the life world –the transformation of Gemeinschaft-like social relations into the
mediated impersonal ties of a Gesseltshaft-like urban society. In the contemporary
period the “urban” has been replaced by the “global” as a metaphor for the central
“outside” threat to the primary social ties binding local communities. “Globalization”
in turn is represented as a process inherently antagonistic to the sustainability of local
forms of social organization and meaning-making.

This representation of the local as a once firmly situated cultural space of
community-based social organization now rendered unstable by the global dynamism
of capitalist modernity is well captured in David Harvey’s The Condition of
Postmodernity (1989: 238-239).Harvey’s narration of the waning power of local
cultural formations in the face of capitalist globalization takes many complex turns
but his central argument is clear enough. Capital is the author of social change. Its
superior global command over resources to reorganize time and space is opposed to
the disorientation of defensive “local” social movements representing the interests of
home, community, place, region, and even nation. The latter are represented as static
forms of social organization, efforts to organize social life around “being” rather than
“becoming”. Defensive place-based movements are represented as cultural totalities
expressing entirely place-bound identities in a world in which the dynamic flows of
globalization exist entirely outside their purview. Oppositional movements
representing “locality” confront a restless adversary, whose processes of accumulation thrive on constantly disrupting the spatial and temporal arrangements upon which stable forms of local social organization might be constructed. Thus, in this grand narrative, capitalist economic dynamics continue to dominate localities whose specific histories are relegated to the dustbin, rendering them fit only for periodic bouts of reactionary nostalgia.

Manuel Castells is another major urban theorist who has represented the local as a political space of social movements defending threatened cultural and political meanings placed under siege by global economic and technological restructuring. At first glance his view of locality appears to be quite different from Harvey’s theorization. In Castells’ work, late-modernity is represented as an informational mode of development, a “space of flows” which accelerates global financial and informational linkages, converts places into spaces, and threatens to dominate local processes of cultural meaning. While the space of flows is a global space of economic and technological power, the space of cultural meaning and experience remains local (Castells, 1984). The global networks of wealth and power accumulate and exchange instantaneous information as a source of institutional power. This boundary-penetrating process disrupts the sovereignty of the nation-state and threatens to marginalize the life worlds of local cultural “tribes” (Castells, 1997).

Following from this logic is a kind of structural dialectic of domination and resistance. Global domination produces local resistance. Resistance to globalization is tied not to the agency of specific actors confronting unique historical conjunctures but to the very structural dynamic of the technological revolution which threatens to render the local “tribes” irrelevant to the new informational world that has come into being at the end of the millennium. Castells argues that, in the new network society, localities, as communal forms of identity formation, are actually growing in significance precisely because “the subject” in the informational age is no longer constructed on the basis of the representational power of coherent national civil societies. In his view, the nation-state is disintegrating as a space of internalized identity formation. Rather, for Castells two modes of identity formation now give rise to different types of communal resistance to globalization. Taken together, these sources of cultural meaning give rise to the primacy of identity politics in the network.
society (1997: 11). Castells views “project based” communal identities as encompassing such bases of social identity as religious fundamentalism and ethnic nationalism. It is the structural connection of vastly different cultural formations as “bypassed” cultural spaces, forged in the context of disintegrating national civil societies, that allows Castells (1997) to lump together social movements as diverse and historically distinct as the Zapatistas in Mexico, the militia and patriot movements in the United States, and the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, treating them as functionally equivalent “social movements against the new global order”, despite their differences in goals, ideologies, national and local contexts, and specific histories.

Castells distinguishes these project-based modes of identity formation from the purely local and micro territorial defensive community formations that he terms “resistance identities”. His analysis of this latter type of “local” social movement is also framed by using a structural logic that leaves little room for local processes of identity formation that might emerge out of social practices of appropriation and accommodation as well as resistance to various aspects of globalization or transnationalism. Nor does he consider the possibility that a multiplicity of local identities might be selectively internalized by variously positioned local social actors operating in the context of historically variable local and national civil societies experiencing processes of globalization or transnationalism. Instead, he inscribes the “local” dimension of urban social movements as precisely something that produces meaning entirely against the dynamics of global processes.

Castells’ argument is radically different in tone from David Harvey’s. Where Harvey sees social disorganization emerging from economic and technological globalization, Castells sees communal resistance; while Harvey rejects identity politics a priori, Castells judges identity politics by its consequences; while Harvey sees localism as a dead-end, Castells thinks local identities still constitute a viable space of resistance to global capitalist hegemony. Yet in one fundamental respect Harvey and Castells converge –namely, both represent the local as a cultural space of communal understandings, a space where meaning is produced entirely outside the global flows of money, power, and information. People in these narrow social worlds make sense of their world and form the political identities in a culturally bounded micro territory, the locality. These local cultural meanings, in turn, are represented as
generating identities inherently oppositional to the global restructuring of society and space. For both, then, “place” is understood as the site of cohesive community formations existing outside the logic of globalization. While Harvey and Castells differ in their assessments of whether globalization will annihilate or defensively energize these community formations, they both maintain a systemic disjunction between local and global social processes.

In this essay I will take strong issue with this binary formulation. I argue first of all that the operation of social networks is central to the social construction of the politics of place and identity. However, in today’s world of accelerated transnational economic, migratory, and cultural connections, we must move beyond views of local associational life that fail to fully account for the transnational networks of meaning and power that now regularly cut across the territorial boundaries of local and national political space. These transnational networks do not operate in a pure space of flows. They locate on the ground in particular localities at particular times. When they do so, they intersect with more purely local networks of meaning and power, significantly shaping the character of the local politics of place making. How can we best make senses of these criss-crossings of scales of social practice in which the local and the trans-local have become mutually constitutive?

2. Rethinking Locality and Translocality

In an effort to unbind the conceptualization “place” from the conflation of locality and community, critical urban geographer Doreen Massey has advanced an imaginative response to the question of the interplay of the global and the local. Massey’s view of place is more fluid than that of Harvey or Castells. On the one hand, her critique of David Harvey’s conception of “time-space” compression warns against the tendency to view the implosion of time and space that Harvey terms "the condition of postmodernity" as equally accessible to all. In her view, different individuals and social groups are differently positioned vis-à-vis the flows and interconnections that constitute the “globalization” of capital and culture (Massey, 1993: 61). On the other hand, these flows and interconnections intersect in particular places at particular times, giving each place its own unique dynamism and making it possible for us to envision a “global” or “progressive” sense of place.
Theoretically, Massey depicts localities as acquiring their particularity not from some long internalized history or sedimented character but from the specific interactions and articulations of contemporary “social relations, social processes, experiences, and understandings” that come together in situations of co-presence, “but where a large portion of those relations […] are constructed on a far larger scale than what we happen to define for that moment as the place itself” (1993:66) When understood as articulated moments among crisscrossing networks of social relations and understandings (1993:67), places do not possess singular but multiple and contested identities. Place-making is shaped by conflict, difference, and social negotiation among differently situated, and at times antagonistically related, social actors, some of whose networks are locally-bound others whose social relations and understandings span entire regions and transcend national boundaries. Massey, in short, provides key theoretical ingredients for conceptualizing the transnational urbanism I am seeking to inscribe in this work.

In two of her essays, Massey (1991a, 1993) gives concrete resonance to this theoretical formulation by taking a brief walk down Kilburn High Road, her local shopping center, and describing in detail the crisscrossing social worlds that she sees. In addition to the many signs of an Irish presence and IRA political activity, she gazes upon saris on Indian models in shop windows, chats with a Muslim about the Gulf War, watches airplanes pass overhead, and confronts a traffic jam of cars leaving London. This simple exercise in participant-observation ethnography is a useful way to “map” places while avoiding the placing of fixed boundaries around them.

Massey’s approach would trace the trajectories of both residents’ and non-residents’ routes through a place as well as identify “their favorite haunts within it, the connections they make (physically, or by phone or post, or in memory and imagination) between here and the rest of the world”. This is a good way to grasp the fluidity, diversity, and multiplicity of any place and the ways in which social relations affecting that place are stretched out over space and memory (i.e., time). It is also a good way to avoid an essentialist construction of localities as closed communities, as ontological “insides”, constructed against a societal or global “outside” by tracing connections between the locality and what Arjun Appadurai (1991) has called the “global ethnoscape”.

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It is the same mode of ethnographic practice that cultural anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (1996: 150-151) has used imaginatively to trace the connections entailed in the Turkish and Finnish newspapers, Vietnamese and Middle-Eastern baby walkers, and the billboard for an Argentinian play that he encounters in a walking tour of his own “creolized” city of Stockholm. It is the same mode of field observation I employed on a trip to Copenhagen where, within the space of a single hour, I walked past small groups of Turkish, African, and Middle Eastern transmigrants, observed several veiled and unveiled Arab women, read signs in various non-European languages, and had an interesting conversation with an Irish bartender, in an English pub, across from Tivoli Garden. The bartender had once lived in Balboa Beach, California and worked as a stockbroker in New York City. While maintaining relations with people in both of these places, he now preferred to live in Copenhagen, which he characterized as a less violence prone-place. These field experiences were to prove helpful following a talk I gave on transnational connections in Copenhagen later that week when a questioner insisted that transnationalism was a phenomenon that might apply to “global cities” like New York or London, but had little relevance to more insular places like Copenhagen.

It should be obvious at this point that I am indebted to Doreen Massey’s theory of locality (1991a, 1991b, 1993, 1994) in framing my conceptualization of transnational urbanism and developing research methods suitable for investigating transnational connections. In one respect, however, my approach differs sharply from Massey’s. By my reading there is a tendency in her work to essentialize social actors “from below” by portraying them as disconnected victims of global processes, entirely lacking in the dynamic connections to the transnational flows that she assigns to place. Thus, for example, in making her case that people have differential access to processes of globalization, Massey distinguishes between those who have the power to initiate global flows and be “in charge of” time-space compression, and other actors she sees as altogether excluded from this compression, including poor migrants, immobile receivers of the consequences of globalization, and those “imprisoned in” time-space compression, like people in the favelas of Rio. (1993:62) Her own global gaze depicts those connected to mobile networks by satellites, airplanes, faxes, e-mail, films, and other cultural and financial flows only to contrast them with a woman on
foot somewhere in sub-Saharan Africa “who spends all of her day collecting water” (1993:61).

This way of representing reality assumes that those at the bottom of national systems of social regulation and control will automatically reside at the bottom of hierarchically structured systems of transnational mobility. To give two counterexamples, however, it is precisely to escape from national constraints on upward social mobility that many transnational migrants have entered transmigrant streams and constructed trans-local social relations; and it is precisely to resist unjust national systems of socioeconomic and political stratification that relatively marginal indigenous peoples organizations have coalesced to engage in collective action on a transnational scale. Jumping scales may be an economic, political, or cultural strategy for transforming local or national power relations. Access to transnational flows cannot be read off directly from people’s “original” economic class or social status position. Remote villages in Mexico and Central America now have satellite dishes (Kearney, 1991) and an African woman who gathers water from a remote well may be tied to an African street vendor in New York City in a transnational household engaged in active social practices.

Indeed it is precisely Massey’s anecdote about the sub-Saharan African woman that serves as a counterpoint to Coombe and Stoller’s (1994) recent ethnography of the social relations and cultural productions of transnational African street traders in reconfiguring a “black public sphere” in New York City. Coombe and Stoller introduce their study of the strained interactions between West African street vendors in New York City and their African-American customers by advancing a pointed critique of Massey’s agency-less view of the prototypical African peasant woman. They state that:

“There are other ways to imagine the African woman drawing water, recognizing her unique positioning without romanticizing her purported isolation or denying her agency. This woman might be receiving remittances from her husband who sells hats on the streets in New York City. This in turn might enable her to hire others to draw her water and engage in her own marketing of dry goods. Early this year, due to World Bank and IMF structural adjustment policies, the value of the African franc was cut in half
overnight. Abruptly, the woman’s cost of doing business doubled. Compared
to her neighbours, whose incomes are generated solely from local livelihoods,
the woman is still relatively well-to do [...]. West African vendors in New
York tell us that migration is the most viable form of accommodation to
devaluation: more and more women are left to cope with the needs of
children and relatives alone”.

My point is not that Coombe and Stoller’s way of imagining a particular
woman in Africa is necessarily empirically true in this instance, but merely that it
captures more effectively than does Massey the possibilities for new forms of agency
“from below” that transnational migration, investment, communication, exchange,
and travel have made possible in these times, for better or worse. Their narration
resonates well with the transnational connections and interdependencies now being
actively maintained with people in their places of origin by social actors as diverse as
transnational Nigerian taxi drivers at the San Francisco Airport; transnational
Mexican flower sellers in New York City (Smith, 1998); and transnational remittance
senders (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Vetrovec, 1999) from various localities of origin
now working in cities as diverse as Berkeley (California), Milan (Italy), and Chicago
(Illinois).

Coombe and Stoller’s narration resonates well with the civil disobedience
campaign against police brutality in New York City triggered by the killing of
Amadou Diallo, an unarmed transnational migrant street peddler from West Africa
who was gunned down in his doorway on the streets of New York by the Street Crime
Unit of the New York Police Department. In New York a wide variety of new
political subjects have been drawn into a broad political coalition supporting daily
acts of civil disobedience. The new "temporarily sutured" (Mouffe, 1988) political
subjects, mobilized against arbitrary police practices, included both local and
transnational actors: radical and moderate black and white citizens, Jewish rabbis,
media celebrities, local, state and national political figures, and hundreds of ordinary
people who submitted themselves to arrest for their acts of civil disobedience. They
included strange bedfellows such as former Mayors (and long time adversaries) David
Dinkins and Edward Koch; the incumbent Republican Governor George Pataki, who
criticized fellow Republican New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani; and, significantly,
Amadou Diallo’s West African mother, Katitou Diallo, who rebuffed Giuliani’s belated effort to express regret and participated in a protest rally organized by the Reverend Al Sharpton while accompanying her son’s coffin to the airport so that he might be buried in his home village in Africa. Just before taking her son back to Africa to be buried, Diallo’s mother turned to the assembled reporters present at the rally and forcefully declared “I’ll be back”. Since then she did just this, returning to the United States to participate in a multi-city civil rights campaign designed to end police brutality while also becoming active in a nationalist discourse in the capital city of her native country of Guinea, opposed to mistreatment of African transmigrants who now routinely move back and forth between Guinea and various U.S. cities, including New York.

The emergence of a new urban political coalition such as this is no mere epiphenomenon of “globalization”. Political coalitions in urban politics operate in and through “local” conditions of cultural production. Yet, in considerable measure, as this case illustrates, the “local” itself has become transnationalized as transnational modes of communication, streams of migration, and forms of economic and social intercourse continuously displace and relocate the spaces of cultural production. The social imaginary necessary to discern the effects of the new types of crisscrossing social relations forged by transnational connections requires a historicized political economy and a transnational ethnographic imagination that can make coherent sense of these transnational connections and give concrete meaning to the notion of “global interdependence”.

3. Locality, Interconnectivity and Difference

Anthropologists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1997a, 1997c) have offered a clear-headed critique of the scholarly conflation of place and culture that is also germane to my effort to contextualize emergent transnational social relations and to situate them in the field of urban studies. Gupta and Ferguson point out that representations of localities as cohesive community formations fail to recognize and deal with a variety of boundary penetrating social actors and processes now very much a part of the transnational world in which we live. Left out of such localized communitarian narratives are the border dwellers that live along border zones
separating localities, regions, and nation-states. These social actors engage with actors and networks based on the other side of juridical borders in processes of intercultural borrowing and lending, which anthropologists call “transculturation”. The “locality as community” problematic critiqued above is equally inattentive to the socio-cultural and political implications of the growing number of border crossers –i.e., migrants, exiles, refugees, and diasporas– who now orchestrate their lives by creating situations of co-presence that link social networks across vast geographical distances around the globe (Smith, 1994). Such border penetrating processes go a long way toward helping explain, though they by no means exhaust, the difference-generating relations of power that constitute cultural and political identity and difference within localities defined as both political jurisdictions and as socio-cultural spaces. 

Gupta and Ferguson have identified some key dimensions of cultural production that are complicating efforts to view localities in communitarian terms and thus to ground ethnographic practice and urban research locally in a transnational world. The first of these is the growing interdependence (economic, socio-cultural, and informational) across linked spaces that belie notions of discrete, autonomous local cultures. Second, the emergence of wider discourses and practices of postcolonial politics (abetted, in my view, by the globalization of mass media) is producing a variety of hybrid cultures, even in geographically remote localities and nations, that problematize the very notion of “authentic cultural traditions” even as social analysts seek to inscribe and preserve them. Finally, the boundary penetrating processes now characterizing transnational connections have facilitated the social construction of “communities in the making” as imagined spaces, often occupying the same geographical locale. These imaginings of communal identity necessarily entail processes of inclusion and exclusion, i.e., processes which create “otherness”. For example, the social construction of the constitutive outside, or “other”, is very much part of the ethnic and racial relations that have erupted antagonistically throughout the 1990s in transnational cities throughout the world (see, for example, Smith and Tarallo, 1995).

The culturally and politically constructed character of such racial antagonisms and their relation to power and place has been well captured by Gupta and Ferguson (1997c:17). Identity and alterity, they explain, are produced “simultaneously as the
formation of ‘locality’ and ‘community.’ ‘Community’ […] is premised on various forms of exclusion and construction of otherness […]. With respect to locality as well, at issue is not simply that one is located in a certain place, but that the particular place is set apart from and opposed to other places. The ‘global’ relations that we have argued are constitutive of localities are therefore centrally involved in the production of ‘local’ identities too”.

My conceptualization of “locality” (like ethnicity and nationality) as a complex, contingent, and contested outcome of political and historical processes, rather than as a timeless essence also challenges the theoretical framing of “locality” as an inexorable space of resistance to globalization. Instead of opposing autonomous local cultures, be they tribes, militias, urban formations, or regions (à la Castells) to the economic domination of global capital, the homogenizing flows of cultural globalization, or the hegemonizing seductions of global consumerism, it is necessary to pay close attention to the ways in which dominant global cultural forms may be appropriated and used or even significantly transformed in the context of social relations that link localities to networks of power stretching beyond their geographical boundaries (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c: 5).

In my view, several more particular questions stem from this larger one. How perceptions of locality and community are discursively constructed in different time-space configurations? How are the understandings springing from these perceptions internalized and lived? What role in producing politically salient differences within localities is played by the cultural, social, and economic connections localities have with worlds “outside” their borders that configure their interdependence? What roles do the global and local mass media play in framing the understandings and practices within socially constructed communities and their constitutive field of otherness? (Cvetkovic and Kellner, 1996; Kellner, 1997; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c: 10)

Having raised these questions I further suggest that we leave open to ethnographic and historical investigation the character of the contextualizing socio-spatial interdependencies in which particular localities are enmeshed at particular times. Specifically, I agree with Gupta and Ferguson that it is possible for local interventions to “significantly transform” dominant cultural forms. I would therefore leave open the question of whether or not the crisscrossing relations of power that
penetrate and lubricate localities must necessarily be understood in terms of the metaphor of hierarchy. Gupta and Ferguson appear to assume that they must be so understood when they state that in studying the forms of interdependence linking places and spaces in transnational connectivity we must move our gaze from the local sites of community formation to the wider issue of “the spatial distribution of hierarchical power relations” (1997a: 40).

If Gupta and Ferguson are here envisioning a hierarchy of larger to smaller spatial scales – e.g. from localities, to regions, to nations, to the world – in which the larger scales necessarily dominate and constrain the smaller, then they are negating their insight about local to global transformations and simply reproducing the metaphor of nested hierarchies of scale that I have thoroughly critiqued elsewhere (Smith, 1999). If, however, Gupta and Ferguson mean to suggest that social relations between global level actors and local level actors are necessarily hierarchical, a different problem arises. At the level of social action, hierarchical power relations are only one among many different socio-spatial patterns of power that a transnational gaze can discern. The agency-based power relations implicated in what some have called “global-localization” are often indeed asymmetrical and hierarchical, as when multinational corporations locate an export processing zone in a poor third-world city or when migrant groups in a new local and national milieu seek to renegotiate slowly changing urban racial hierarchies. Transnational power relations may, however, be more competitively structured, as when transnational small business enterprises forge relations to their landlords and clientele. This may be so even as the relations between transnational entrepreneurs and their (often co-ethnic “new immigrant”) workers are hierarchically structured (though often contestedly so). When thus viewed contextually and relationally, transnational power relations may even be relatively egalitarian, as when local environmental activists coalesce across national boundaries to object to locally specific environmentally degrading projects such as rainforest logging or a large scale urban development project.

The point I am trying to make is not to deny that power relations are often hierarchically structured, but to maintain that all power relations must be viewed contextually as contingent outcomes of political struggles. Historically, these struggles produce a multiplicity of power relations ranging from more to less to non-
hierarchical, depending on the historically specific circumstances and understandings that make and remake particular structures of power.

4. The Social Construction of "Place" and "Heritage"

When Gupta and Ferguson turn from the question of the patterning of power relations across space to the issue of the social construction of space as place, they acknowledge this contingency. The open-ended questions they raise in response to this issue are, in my view, as germane to questions of the spatial distribution of power as they are to issues of identity and place-making. These questions are: “With meaning-making understood as a practice, how are spatial meanings established? Who has the power to make places of spaces? Who contests this? What is at stake?” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997a: 40)

It is precisely questions such as these that can move urban researchers interested in the social construction of “locality” beyond essentialist assumptions about the equivalence of locality and culture. For example, research on the politics of urban heritage has produced a spate of studies on “the making of place” by a wide variety of political actors including local neighborhood groups, government officials, and business interests as well as wider networks of social practice such as architectural activists, historic preservationists, and global developers. In particular places these actors collude and collide in contests over the cultural meanings of place. Historically and ethnographically grounded case studies bring into focus the issue of the politics of representation, thereby modifying a discourse on globalization and community that has been dominated by agency-less narratives of urban and regional change that tend to exclude non-capitalist actors and their representations of space and place from consideration.

In such grand narrative interventions into the “heritage debate” urban theorists such as David Harvey (1989) and Sharon Zukin (1991), for example, have essentialized local cultures as vernacular traditions about to be erased by the march of capitalist modernization. In their capital vs. community motif, global capital, as a unitary actor, is framed against a multiplicity of separate, internally coherent, and “authentic” local cultures. The former is seen as penetrating the latter by a one way flow of mystification and power. Abstract “capital” is denounced for having
appropriated and marketed various dimensions of authentic cultural heritage as in the case of the use of local vernacular architecture by real estate capitalists to shape the built environment of theme parks, luxury apartment complexes, and shopping arcades. Viewed in this light, the appropriation of local cultural forms, in this instance architectural artifacts, becomes yet another leitmotif of a grand narrative that invests capital with unidirectional, omnipotent dynamism while relegating local residents to passive roles as bearers of a dying cultural heritage. Once again, the social construction of the local as a static, sedimented community roots non-capitalist social actors in place and freezes them in time. It also suggests that the fixed place to which they are “bound” is about to be replaced by a phantom simulacrum scripted by global capital.

What sense can we make of this grand narrative? What can we learn from an examination of extended cases studies of the politics of urban heritage? In an insightful review essay “Mapping Meanings: A Cultural Critique of Locality Studies”, Peter Jackson (1991: 215-228) reviews the complex politics of place-making found in a series of detailed case studies of historic preservation. Jackson’s study nicely illustrates how the turn to the analysis of culture by leading urban political economists like Harvey and Zukin has been partial, naively modernist, and even essentialist (1991:225). Such representations involve a projection of “authenticity” onto a putatively disappearing historical past for the purpose of denouncing the role of capitalism in the historical present. Jackson suggests that the “heritage debate” is better understood as raising questions about the politics of representation rather than posing a stark choice between “genuine preservation” and “misappropriation” of an actually existing “authentic” urban past. “Rather than simply showing how capital ‘uses’ culture in an instrumental way”, he concludes, abundant case study evidence demonstrates that:

“such a crude argument has to be modified in light of the contingencies of each particular situation. Which groups were involved and how were their interests articulated? How did the changing legislative and fiscal environment make certain forms of investment more attractive than others? What coalitions between different interest groups were sought and achieved, and with what effects? Clearly, one cannot divorce the ‘cultural’ aspects of reinvestment or preservation from the apparently ‘political’ and ‘economic’
dimensions [...] but neither can the political economy of urban and regional change be understood without a more fully developed understanding of its cultural politics”.

In short, economic processes like investment, disinvestment, and reinvestment in “place” are unavoidably culturally coded. Likewise the cultural processes of representation take place in and change their material contexts, including the built environment of cities. We, as analysts, are thus unavoidably involved in interpretive reconstructions of who produces and who consumes particular images of place and space, and with what effects. The study of these processes from the vantage point of the politics of representation in cultural studies enables urban researchers to move beyond a reified and unitary view of “actors” like “capital” to a historicized analysis of precisely “whose past is being perceived, how it is being represented, and whose interests are being served by such unavoidably selective readings” (Jackson, 1991: 220; see also Jackson, 1992). In sum, any local community’s historical past is a historically contested rather than a timelessly embedded social phenomenon.

Moreover, the contested politics of representation applies not only to any locality’s historical past but to the shaping of its present and the formation of its alternative future(s). This brings to the forefront the vexing question of just what makes a place a place like no other place. Phrased differently, what about a place persists and what changes over time? And this is precisely what power struggles over “place-making” are all about, namely, who changes what in alternative representations of any place’s present and future and how do these changes selectively appropriate or reject particular elements of any place’s historical past?

A good example of empirical urban research influenced by these sorts of questions is Jon Bird’s (1993: 120-135) study of local resistance by grassroots artists and activists to the development of the London Docklands by Olympia and York, the now bankrupt global development corporation. Bird describes the efforts by local activists in London to use a poster campaign and other street tactics to offer oppositional versions of the official discourse of Docklands planning deployed by Olympia and York and their allies within the local state. Bird characterizes this campaign as an emergent “postmodern culture of resistance”, a local cultural politics of alternative historical memory that avoids a melancholic politics of loss and regret.
by recording the “voices of challenge and resistance encoded in the rhythms of subcultural street life [...] and the presence of alternative traditions of representation” (1993: 134).

One obvious advantage of this approach to the representation of “locality”, when compared to the conflation of the local with the communal considered above, is that it allows for the construction of alternative representations of local traditions in the same place, thus making room for a conceptualization of the local as a site of contestations over meaning and power rather than a reservoir of unitary local subjectivity. One limit of Bird’s approach however, from the perspective of the network-based imaginary I am advocating in this essay, is that it conflates the politics of everyday life with a purely local politics of consciousness. Thus, for example, in Bird’s narrative the resistance practiced by the artists and activists opposed to global restructuring of London’s docklands derived entirely from a narrow subculture of street life that has recovered and equally local “alternative tradition of representation”. Given that the activists involved in this grassroots action were also likely to be engaged in alternative discourses of the worlds of the London and international art and architecture scenes, it is at least reasonable to argue that the “local” protest may have emerged from the extra-local networks of communication that may have informed these social actors and inflected their political practices. This crisscrossing of discursive domains is a key dimension of the transnational urbanism I am seeking to make comprehensible in this work.

5. Localism, Transnationalism and Everyday Life

It is not surprising however that Bird readily equates everyday life with the local spatial scale. Urban researchers interested in the ethnographic inscription of the practices of everyday life have often conflated the local level of analysis with the politics of everyday life. In so doing they often engage in a process of legitimating local spaces of resistance to modernity in its various forms –capitalism, statism, and technological development. However, one of the foremost critical problems facing ethnographic accounts of everyday life in the face of increasing transnational connectivity is that “everyday life” is not a fixed object of investigation, a readily
discernible set of practices that can be easily located and subjected to empirical observation and cognitive mapping.

In my view, at the current transnational moment “the politics of everyday life” needs to be opened up more widely as a social and political imaginary. The “everyday” needs to be freed from its association with purely local phenomena. In transnational cities people’s everyday urban experiences are affected by a wide variety of phenomena, practices, and crisscrossing networks which defy easy boundary setting. Multiple levels of analysis and social practice now inform the politics of everyday life in localities throughout the world.

In his discussion of what he terms the “transversal” politics of everyday life David Campbell (1996) has clearly expressed this multiply inflected reality:

“Likewise, neither is ‘everyday life’ a synonym for the local level, for in it global interconnections, local resistances, transterritorial flows, state politics, regional dilemmas, identity formations and so on are always already present. Everyday life is thus a transversal site of contestations rather than a fixed level of analysis. It is transversal […] because the conflicts manifested there not only transverse all boundaries: they are about these boundaries, their erasure or inscription, and the identity formations to which they give rise”.

Sociologist Martin Albrow and his associates (Albrow et al., 1997: 20-36) have written insightfully on the social construction of the boundaries of imagined community in British Muslim neighborhoods in cities throughout the United Kingdom. Rather than viewing religious fundamentalism as a local expression of belonging and identity framed against economic globalization (as in the work of Castells), these researchers connect the rhetoric of belonging found in various local British Muslim enclaves to a wider social construction of Islamic community (umma) transmitted by transnational religious and cultural networks. Everyday life in the Muslim neighborhoods is infused with knowledge and meanings produced in these transnational networks and encountered in the local neighborhoods on a daily basis. The social construction of belonging to a transnational Islamic community is produced and transmitted through a transnational network of social and technological linkages including religious ceremonies, telephone conversations, television and radio programs, newspaper accounts, videos and music. As Albrow et al. conclude, in
everyday visits to relatives and friends, in interactions at work, and in other neighborhood forms of community involvement, local Muslims employ this network, which is physically absent but hardly spiritually distant, to socially construct a “locality”.

In short, everyday life is neither a fixed spatial scale nor a guaranteed site of local resistance to more global modes of domination, whether capitalist or otherwise. Rather, our everyday life world is one in which “competing discourses and interpretations of reality are already folded into the reality we are seeking to grasp” (Campbell, 1996: 23). Grasping this sort of reality now requires us to develop a transnational imaginary and to fashion perceptual tools capable of making sense of the new identities emerging from this politics of representation and boundary-setting.

Urban studies scholars have turned increasingly to ethnographic research methods to give purchase to this transnational imaginary. Indeed, over a decade ago Andrew Sayer advocated a methodological marriage of political economy and ethnography, because, in his view, ethnography was capable of shedding light on “preexisting cognitive and cultural materials” (1989: 256) not available through political-economic analysis. To its credit, this move produced a convergence of one stream of radical urban geography with an emerging trend among urban anthropologists toward a contextualized ethnographic practice premised on a desired unification of ethnography and political economy (Marcus and Fischer, 1986; Clifford and Marcus, 1986).

In my view, however, this marriage and historicization of methodological approaches is desirable for reasons other than those suggested by Sayer. It is simplistic to assume that ethnography offers a sure-footed, transparent, empirical tool for mapping “preexisting cognitive and cultural materials” onto an otherwise abstract political-economic terrain. Cultural materials are constantly being produced and reproduced by human practice rather than standing outside of social life as pre-given producers of meaning and social action. Accordingly, it is necessary to historicize both political economy and ethnography. Once this is accomplished the two approaches to urban studies can be used in tandem to help make sense of highly fluid social processes affecting particular places at particular times. This combination of historicized methods of social inquiry forces to our attention contingent questions of
agency and meaning-making. It can help us to sort out the trajectories of the crisscrossing networks of spatially dispersed social relations of co-presence through which social action in a transnational context is now filtered and informed.

An excellent example of a carefully historicized, contextually situated ethnographic research project that captures the crisscrossing character of the politics of everyday urban life in these transnational times is Jan Lin’s (1998) book length case-study *Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change*. In this study Lin tells the story of the historical transformations of New York’s Chinatown as an urban “place”. The book was written as an antidote to long-standing negative symbolic representations of various Chinatowns and, by implication, of Chinese transnational migrants as timeless sites of clannishness, insularity, concentrated social problems, and resistance to change. Lin depicts New York City’s Chinatown as a site of crisscrossing social and organizational networks of meaning and power that infuse the neighborhood with its dynamism and account for its “internal” political conflicts.

Especially compelling is Lin’s portrayal of the considerable factionalism of the Chinatown local polity stemming from a conflictual politics of place where the very meaning of “Chinatown” is continually contested. Some of these “internal” political struggles expose cultural and ideological fault lines stemming from still evolving geopolitical relations among and between the Chinese mainland, its various regions, Hong Kong and Taiwan—the places originating the flows of people, money, ideas and transnational connections into and out of New York’s Chinatown. The historical, cultural, and political heterogeneity of these connections is often masked by the apparent ethnic homogeneity of the category “Chineseness” (and even “Asian-American”) in U.S. political discourse. Lin brings the connections and their political consequences to life by discussing for example, the political struggles for local influence between a once ascendant mercantile elite from Guangdong province now being challenged by new Fujianese merchant associations. He pays close attention as well to other internal conflicts over place-making which pit new immigrant based labor and community organizations against both of these capital fractions as well as against the urban redevelopment and law enforcement policies of the local state. He also finds instances where these factional disputes are overcome by practices that produce a temporary political unity formed in opposition to discursively constructed
“outside” political interventions into the neighborhood by particular urban redevelopment schemes initiated by transnational Asian real estate capitalists in alliance with redevelopment agencies of New York City government. Lin’s historicized political-economic and ethnographic analysis demonstrates that political identities in a neighborhood defending its preservation are not pre-given features of an ontology of locality but rather emerge as a result of specific political struggles and collective actions.

How was Lin able to capture so well the interplay of these local and cross-border dynamics in the contemporary reconstruction of New York’s Chinatown? His recombinant research approach is worth consideration. Under the rubric of a qualitative community study, conducted “in global perspective”, Lin combined participant-observation over an extended period in several community-based organizations; ethnographic encounters including both “neutral” observation and active engagement in some of the disputes he studied; an extended case study method designed to trace connections between micro community level social situations and “external” contexts such as transnational investment and migration flows; formal interviews with representatives of Chinatown economic, community, labor, and political organizations as well as urban planners and public officials; and a contextualizing semiotic analysis of the political representations of Chinatown and Chinese immigrants found in films, novels, television serials, and journalistic stories. These latter methods were especially helpful in inflecting Lin’s historicized political economy perspective with a nuanced cultural understanding of the social construction of place, ethnicity, and community. This sort of approach to urban studies offers a fruitful model of urban research grounded in the study of material and cultural practices. Taken together, his recombinant methods comprise a useful step along the path to a truly historicized and transnationalized approach to urban studies.

6. Transnational Urbanism as Re-imagined Locality

My reconsideration of localized communitarian metaphors in this essay has had four aims. The first has been to move urban studies beyond naturalistic constructions of “locality” as an inherently defensive community formation. While “race” and “gender” are now widely regarded as socially constructed categories,
“locality” is still often assumed to be a space of nature springing from human sociability. I have tried to show that even the most material elements of any locality are subject to diverse readings and given different symbolic significance by differently situated social groups and their corresponding discursive networks. The result is a highly politicized terrain where the representational politics of place is constructed and contested. Here and elsewhere (Smith 2001) I have called this crisscrossing terrain transnational urbanism.

I also have sought to demonstrate that the schema most frequently used to conceptualize the global-local connection by leading urban theorists has tended to reify the terms in this dialectic. In so doing they have reproduced a totalizing binary framework, which, by privileging the local as a space of “authenticity” and “community”, has inverted the value of the terms. In this schema the global is conflated with the abstract, universal, and dynamic (i.e., “capital”), while the local is invested with, concreteness, particularity, and threatened stability (i.e., “community”). Such a discourse treats the global a priori as an oppressive social force while constructing localities in more positive, albeit more static, terms. (Cvetkovic and Kellner, 1997) This binary formulation overlooks the ways in which transnational networks are constituted by their interrelations with, and thus their groundedness inside the local. They thus ignore the considerable interplay of spatial scales and discursive practices to be found in any “locality”. They thus underestimate the intricacy involved in sorting out the social interactions and processes at multiple spatial scales that constitute the complex politics of place in today's transnational context.

My third aim has been to illustrate some of the junctures in contemporary urban politics where the politics of place-making within bounded political jurisdictions overlaps with a delocalized, network-based conception of political life. I think it is important to locate such overlapping political spaces, since without such overlap, in a pure “space of flows”, the local and national state begin to disappear from view as does their important role in mediating economic, political and cultural flows that cut across their territorial jurisdictions. Indeed, it has been the political project of some critical international relations theorists to argue for a reconsideration

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2 For a related critique of representations of “urbanity” see Goss, 1997.
of the centrality of bounded political communities in political thought because this privileges a politics of place over a network-based view of politics. (Low, 1997: 240-280) My goal, however, has not been to entirely displace a place-based by a network-based conception of urban politics but rather to insist that because of the spread of transnational networks it is now necessary to open up the politics of place-making to encompass the articulation of representations of “place” with the flows of money, people, and cultural practices that are now being extended and territorially reconfigured across space.

The final goal of my critical reexamination of the role of “locality” in urban theory has been to begin thinking through some of the methods of urban research capable of capturing the socially constructed character of urban political life under conditions of contemporary transnationalism. This effort seeks to discern the meanings that people give to their social locations in a world of increasing transnational connectivity and to understand the social and political consequences that follow from these understandings.

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CHAPTER 5

Post-Nationalism in the Same Old Nation

Carlos Monsiváis

Does Mexican post-nationalism, that hybrid we can perhaps imagine as a McDonald’s-sponsored congress of indigenous dancers or the transmission of traditions via closed circuit, exist? To what extent do the defensive needs of a population that, except in privileged areas, comes up-to-date only superficially, besiege the idea of post-nationalism itself? Given that Mexican nationalism emerged with the purpose of granting a rewarding identity to the new country, while responding to the United States’s imperialistic actions, and has therefore and among other things been a political, social, and cultural compensatory mechanism, is then post-nationalism the psychic and cultural atmosphere that globalization demands? What stimuli are derived from the volatile promises of entities that revolve around the capacity of consumption and have no pride in their singularity? Do ideological designations have any meaning in the face of the over-determinations of the economy and of planetary sensations and products?

The question “does post-nationalism exist?”, has an affirmative answer if we identify nationalism with its better-known forms: for instance, the culture of the Mexican Revolution, the majority of traditions in rural areas and among the urban poor, or the invention of the unique country called Mexico, as expressed until the 1960s in the myths of the family, the community, education, and popular culture, and in the attitudes towards history. And the answer is negative if we consider persistent traditions (the cult of Guadalupe, for example), the central role of inequality, and the continuity of languages that are sentimentally favored by the oppressed. It is not only the process of economic integration with the United States (Mexico is North America’s foremost client, and 80 per cent of its economic transactions are carried out with North America) that has contributed to this, but a historical fact as well: for a long time, namely, since the exhaustion of the Mexican Revolution, nationalism has
ceased to provide satisfactory explanations for the meaning of the contemporary. If governments continue to ritually define themselves as nationalists, it is only out of historical inertia; in practice, nationalism has been suffocated by its attachment to localism.

1. On Singularity as Absolute Similarity with the Rest

In Latin America, the typical is changing form, at least partially, and arrogance regarding the specific, which externally distinguishes nationalisms, is receding more and more into the past. In realities ruled by “the misplacement of identity”, what is now typical is to set aside the beloved and “return” to places where culturally one had not been before. This is due not so much to shame over what one has lived as shame over what—due to the place of origin— one has not lived.

When there was more time available for peripheral countries to swell with pride, or fewer witnesses to other realities, nationalisms functioned as subjugating formulations. If one was not a nationalist, one did not have access to everyday speech. To use a broad example, in those days it seemed rhetorical to refer to “Latin American” culture. There were only national cultures, albeit undergoing a process of assimilation. Nowadays, on the contrary, and despite the varying degrees of isolation and the variety of responses to economic crisis, elements of unity are visibly abundant in Latin America. Among them:

- **The outward appearance of cities.** This is a result, among other things, of the architectural banality imposed by postmodernism, the spread of franchises (from K-Mart to Blockbuster), the California curse of kitsch, the cult of modernity, which enthrones the “relinquishing of idiosyncrasy” and a proof of regression.

- **The constant deterioration of poor areas**, which makes the habitat of those lacking in resources incompatible with the aesthetic vision.

- **Dependence on North American culture industries.** There is a monopolistic domination of North American film through videos, DVD’s, and distribution to small theaters (92 per cent of distribution), and in general of North American youth culture, bestsellers, and psychology, which has invented traumas that are surmountable through the exercise of “recipes of the will”. To this must be added the autochthonous television productions, most particularly soap operas, which
ratify the tyrannical definition of entertainment: “What lies before your eyes is the utmost because it is all there is”.

- The *cult of technology*, which has become the most outstanding clandestine religion and public cult. And, among us, the home computer as god. This has all sorts of consequences. One of them: in the medium term, the strongest enemy of right-wing fundamentalism is the Internet. Another: modernization by force.

- The *multiple directions of Americanization* (quickly defined as the only possible means of internationalization), which dictatorially sets the criteria for the contemporary, lavishes frustration and self-deception (“I live just like in the North American suburbs”), and appeases those who have access to only the margins of the consumer society (the great majority). On the other hand, if we are to consider its achievements, Americanization is a great method for coming up-to-date; it increases tolerance, and destroys feudal remnants and fortresses of isolationism, which are eroded by globalized information and migrations.

- Definitions of *national community* which, upon becoming dogmas, become a prison-house and a trap. In Mexico in the 1950s and 1960s, the notion of underdevelopment had cultural and existential repercussions that affected structures as well as people. It was admitted, albeit not acknowledged, that developed beings were to be found in the metropolises, while underdeveloped ones were in one’s country. Subsequently, the contrast between the First and Third Worlds was incorporated into the nation’s political and emotional consciousness and, furthermore, among those who considered themselves precisely this, namely, Third-World [tercermundistas], the expression became an insult. “Pinche tercermundista” [Bloody Third-World person]. Now, the harangue of neoliberalism (a term which in Latin America is for now equivalent to “invincible imperialism”) divides people into globalized and local. And, typically, local is a new offense. According to an underlying assumption, not belonging to the metropolises is usually equivalent to being born outside the history that matters and that is now the global history.

- The *importance of migrations*, which have transformed a large part of the historically accepted identity into mythical nostalgia and have become a bridge between the mystically-adopted Nation and assimilation to another culture.
Migrants set the rural world in motion and become exceptional interpreters of Americanization. They leave as migrants and return as Chicanos. They leave as peasants and return urbanized. In this sense, Mexico becomes “Chicanoized” in order not to feel the effects of Americanization so brutally.

- Psychic equilibrium is achieved thanks to the emphatic way in which traditions channel novelties. This could be termed the “Mexicanization of Americanization”, and has been underway for a century. What starts as blatant imitation soon acquires traditional features as a result, one could say, of atmospheric reasons.

- The definitive role of self-help literature in everyday utopias. Thanks to the countless recipe books on behavior and “personal improvement”, millions of people who’ve been expelled from social mobility imagine themselves to be following an upward road.

2. Interior Design is Gringo-style with Pre-Hispanic Motifs and Mestizo Souvenirs, the Owners are Cosmopolitan but Conversations Have a Flavor that is Still Very Much our Own

National culture is strengthened by the continuous process of incorporation of the new, which is blended with the selective use of traditions (abruptly said, national culture is herein understood as the corpus of a community’s un-renounceable achievements). Nationalism is at the same time weakened by the theatrical character of its convictions (I will hastily define nationalism: the legendary ideology of the skills and potentialities of the nation). Among popular classes, the meaning of “being Mexican” is usually ruled by theatrical nationalism. In the 19th century, upon granting the Virgin Mary its form as the Virgin of Guadalupe, the Vatican declared: “It did not do the same with any other nation”. For the poor, nationalism is an emotional reward, which grants them the partial identity useful in festivities and moments of helplessness and in the proud handling of public feelings. When incorporating themselves to the “imagined community” of the nation, the majority tend to do so with theatrical language and attitudes, which blend seriousness and sarcasm, carnival and funeral, helplessness and sexism/machismo. The nationalistic habits of the ruling classes are never excessive because their interests and their unconditional adherence to “what is typical of metropolises” prevent it.
3. “I am Purely Mexican but Only at Certain Hours”

When the energy of the Mexican Revolution evaporated, the nationalist dogma became basically an agreement between the entertainment industry, first and foremost sports, and the psychic and oniric needs of the communities. And when the myth of the closed nation that equitably distributed its idiosyncratic features (its emotional stimuli) was shattered, somewhat deluded formulas appeared: some believe in civil society with the same emphasis they formerly placed on the nation, the pride over the pre-modern “that is very much our own” has been replaced by the worship of technology; multiculturalism is admitted without much conviction or understanding. And this has had as a result a drastic leap in the idea of nation, not –as in ancient accounts– a self-sacrificing mother or elusive and cruel stepmother or mother, but an entity that is no longer approachable with “family” criteria, but only historical, legal, and sociological ones.

Historic nationalism, which has always been more demagogical and sentimental than it has been coherent, is worn out by modernization, educational development, the coming up-to-date of communities and people, and the priorities of survival. And this weakening progressively illuminates the unknown areas of the national. What is known in Mexico about the laws, the geography, the regional features, the discriminations? I will give an extreme example: in 1994, the Chiapas rebellion displayed the profound national ignorance regarding ethnic groups. Traditional nationalism never incorporated indigenous peoples, did not respect their specific characteristics, and therefore served as a smoke screen for racism. The cry of “¡Viva México!” [Long live Mexico] historically left out women, indigenous peoples, the marginalized, and the dissidents, who were not Mexico but its outskirts. The compact Mexico of nationalism extended in many ways the Mexico of the colonial-period social stratification, where women were condemned to organic subordination and Indians to invisibility. There are as yet no studies on the nationalism of women and the nationalism of the indigenous peoples, but most likely the conclusions of such studies would be distressing.
4. Globalization: the Inevitable, the Ungraspable, the Ubiquitous, the Elusive

Ah, the dangers and disadvantages of being local in the Global Village that has appointed Americanization as its exclusive representative! What can one do with symbols that are difficult or impossible to translate? How can one avoid that, among the new generations, the substantive traditions of nationalism evoke the horizon of the closed society? At a time marked by computers and the speed of financial markets, the credence of nationalisms is substantially eroded by their ineffectiveness. They have been useful at various junctures, some of them tragic, but they have become inoperative in a universe that reduces sovereignty and ridicules the traditional notion of border. If globalization is brutally excluding, it at least spreads an international language and procedures that organize the thoughts of the young. On the other hand, “that which has always been around”, namely, nationalism, marks the disadvantages and, according to the new generations, legitimizes them.

The contradiction that emerges is both real and apparent: the deeper into crisis the national (which for most is the starting-point and only horizon of opportunities and realizations) goes, the more anachronistic nationalism becomes.

5. “¡Viva Post-Mexico!!? Can There Be Post-Nationalism Without a Post-May 10, a Post-September 15, a Post-November 20, and a Post-December 12?”

What would be some of the components of “post-nationalism” in the case of Mexico?

a) The growing fragmentation of collective experience, despite the unifying role of economic crises. When plurality is acknowledged, as a matter of principle the Other, or what of the Other is found in the Similar, is recognized and accepted, and the raison d’être of the diverse is confirmed by a simple fact: in mass society what is truly rare is the existence of minorities that are so to speak minority. We are so many that it is extremely difficult to find beliefs, practices or characteristics that are attributable to only a few.

b) The decline of anti-imperialism as a mass sentiment. After the expansionist war of 1847, and for over a century, anti-imperialism was the touchstone of nationalism, a necessary attitude given the successive attacks—many of them military—on the country’s sovereignty, among others, Pershing’s Punitive
Expedition in search of Pancho Villa, the 1914 invasion of Veracruz, the imposition of the Cold War and the constant plunder of raw materials. The empire’s plunder was so ostentatious that for a long time anti-imperialism amply justified nationalisms. Starting in the late 1940s, the Cold War pushed aside the anti-imperialist process, which came to be considered “subversive” and, once the right renounced its anti-Yankee phobia, even “unpatriotic”. The process resumed in 1959, with the Cuban Revolution, the blockade against Cuba, the Bay of Pigs and the 1965 North American invasion of Santo Domingo. But unceasing migration to the United States and the ineffectiveness of anti-imperialist reactions exhibit the depth of the changes. North America is no longer, as in El laberinto de la soledad, the Other. It is the Other to whose territory have gone the cousins, siblings, aunts and uncles, friends, and fellow country people of millions of Latin Americans. And, although there are still reasons to resist imperialism (intervention in Haiti, the bombing of Panama, the predatory nature of transnational corporations, its powerful contribution to ecocide), radical anti-imperialism has vanished, rancor against one country has progressively ceased to be a mass sentiment and has become a rather passive rejection of racism.

c) Nationalism, which was among other things a historical and sentimental recording of the devastating effects of modernity, has entrenched itself in speech (not in its “purity”, but in its vehemence and capacity of adaptation), in jokes (its anarchist fantasy), in the absent-minded or specific evocation of traditions, and in the complex subordinate relations with the State and the laws. Put on the defensive, nationalism has become a selective strategy of memory, with the added luxury of an unusual irony (a self-critical nationalism is a contradiction in terms).

d) The vindication of localism and regionalism, although appearing to issue from nationalism, is a comparative method for relating to the world. Formerly, according to this logic, one was localist by necessity, for what else could one be when faced with the fierce exclusion of peripheral countries? Now one is localist in order to embrace the extremes of the international and the national and, consequently, there has been a shift from the generalization that exalted
the People in the novels of the Mexican Revolution, *costumbrista* literature, and popular film and song, to the region, the neighborhood, the social group. It is impossible to completely dispense with mythologies, but the idea of the national is progressively detaching itself from the aura of legends.

e) A pre-modern sign of nationalism was its confidence in the autonomous and regenerative powers of the people. The modern metamorphosis depends on the conversion of The People [*el Pueblo*] into Public, and People [*Gente*] appear. The Public is located mostly in the areas of spectacles and sports, while the People appear in the remaining activities. As part of labor division, the government sponsors the National History, and the entertainment industry addresses the more obvious contents of nationalism, which is no longer seen as civic duty but as sentimental orgy. In this hasty mythology, to be Mexican is an experience that is progressively detached from politics and community commitments. At what time is one deliberately Mexican? At the time prior to political elections (albeit not all), at the time the soccer team or the boxer adorned with national emblems appear, at the time of moral reactions in the face of corruption or repression scandals, or at the time of culminating events (an earthquake, the murder of a presidential candidate)? The rest of the time one is from Chihuahua or Nayarit, employed or unemployed, without possible adjectives, and closet patriotism and competitive nationalism become apparent in the hopes vested in a boxer or a soccer team.

At the boxing ring or the stadium, spectators draw emotional strength from repeating the name of the country, and this “intercourse of Anteo with the ground” (of the spectator with the cry ¡Me-xi-co!! ¡Me-xi-co!!) is accompanied by flags, three-colored make-up, psychological preparation lasting for months or a whole lifetime, the enthusiasm of those sentenced to death on the day of their liberation, the pleasure of sacrificing individualism for the sake of the imaginary and ephemeral community. The team or the boxer are the Homeland, the Homeland confronts the foreign, the Homeland loses and the feeling is extinguished without considerable pain, or the Homeland wins by knockout or a large score and the feeling overflows because this time –and the impression is no less powerful for being non-
verbal— the rancorous ghosts of that timeless time in which triumphs were cut short by the resignation of those “born to lose” have been vanquished.

f) The visible absence of “nationalist” theories, linked to the international discredit of nationalism and the impossibility of organizing communities on the basis of the “virtues of the race”.

g) The ambiguous or marginalized position of patriotism in urban culture, as a result of the weakening of the “national mystique”. Also, and this points in the same direction, all nationalistic mystique has been lost and the “religion of the homeland” can no longer be located. Nationalism is already secular, and this accelerates its decline.

h) The omnipresent sense that the official nation has failed.

i) The dependence on English for all that regards linguistic renovation, as a result of both technology and fashion.

6. The Decline of Patriotism

What is patriotism in urban culture? You may choose: A governmental and school ritual, the fits of soccer crowds, the occasional enthusiasm for Mexico that differs from the former, historical one, on one account: the pledge to sacrifice one’s life for the national symbols no longer exists. The residual patriotism that remains has abandoned the former contents and muffled to the limit its war dimension, which was for long its essential component. There are no wars, there are no invasions, according to the government (and economic reality) integration with the United States is the only way out. For this reason, what was so vigorous in the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th has become exhausted: the religious sentiment of nationality, offering one’s life on the altars of the homeland, the belief in the (dispossessed) individual’s redemption by the weight of the community. As secularization has advanced, a political and educational fact has consolidated the vanishing of heroic atmospheres: the governmental monopoly on civic sentiment (“One must ask permission in order to be patriotic”), whereby patriotism has become a remote or ungraspable emotion that retains its public prestige without any commitment to exemplify it. No longer does anyone attempting to persuade a crowd address them in a heroic tone: “Patriots!”
The former process is not equivalent to de-nationalization, nor does anyone point out explicitly that “if we are to globalize, let’s do so without any sentimental dead weight”. Among numerous changes, which have affected everything but the term, nationalism persists as an adjustable sensation and a strategy for survival. One may examine for instance the migratory flows, the “wetbacks”, the legions of strangers in a strange land. In order to adapt to different realities, they have recourse to the unexpected technique: they worship the customs they have left behind in various ceremonies of memory. Thus, without any feelings of guilt, they shed those habits that make circulation in hostile, racist, persecutory spheres difficult. Provided they maintain their primary identity (the adaptation capacity), immigrants abandon the identity principle that entails knowing in detail the exact place they occupy within their community. And the painful experiences of uprooting pay for their new assets: linguistic development, contact with technology (which becomes their second skin), rebuilding of rural atmospheres in the urban environment, substitution of traditions (which follows a rhythm that is opposite that of import substitution).

7. “Making Amends for the Injustices Suffered by the Dead”

If anything, post-nationalism points to the constant blending of values and techniques. If, through a conditioned reflex, nationalism seeks the emotional ownership of the nation, post-nationalism is, by virtue of its characteristics, identical to, similar to, and different from the existential creeds of previous generations. Everything changes, nothing stays the same, everything is combined. No one lives like their parents did, but that lifestyle is evoked with an emphasis that is as real as it is theatrical. While the “great advantages” of being Mexican are stressed, a considerable part of traditionalism goes to the museum (“Big competition today! Which Mexican loves death the most?”). As the poet said: “Homeland, I give you the key to your happiness, / always be faithful to your daily mirror” [“Patria, te doy de tu dicha la clave, / sé siempre, fiel a tu espejo diario”]. But the mirror sees different situations daily, and there is no such thing as a self-identical homeland, assuming it ever existed. Customs are defended through censorship, and parents verify their progress with respect to their ancestors upon noting what their children reject. A set of ancient stimuli is declared to be anachronistic or becomes kitsch: patriotic recitations,
oratory, dreaming in unison of a better future, heroic phrases, the vulgarity that was the great spiritual triumph, the belief in the immanent greatness of the nation.

The desire to be different, that is, critically detached from tradition, intensifies tolerance, which among other things is a method of cultural updating that declares prejudices to be useless. For reasons of formation and survival, historic nationalism has been intolerant, and transformed idiosyncrasy (the Mexicanness defined by patriarchy) into a deterministic totem. The boom in sharp oppositions has concluded: province/capital; innocence/virtue; nationalism/cosmopolitanism; popular culture/high culture; indigenism/assimilation; *criollismo/mestizaje*. These polarities have been eliminated with little intervening theory, merely by social impulse. And if they continue to be reference points, this is solely due to journalistic ineptitude and conservative fanaticism, which are reluctant to get rid of their big clichés. How can one persuade the classism of indigenous qualities?

8. On Nationalism as Determinism

Stated in many different ways, a certainty spreads undisputed: the communication lines between the so-called official, privatized, Nation and the Nation of the majority, who resist as best as they can (not very successfully) injustice, discrimination, the annulment of rights and labor segregation, are scant and superficial. The classification is far from new, but it is confirmed daily by visual evidence, statistics, and analyses. Formerly, very few dared to critically detach themselves from nationalism (which was never defined), because they did not believe any alternative existed; nowadays, the construction of democratic spaces begins with the elimination of determinisms. And nothing erodes the fatalistic version of nationality more than the stripping of official demagoguery and ironic and parodic approaches to the nation and nationalism. When approaching the heroes, irreverence (a religious term) is replaced by familiarity. There is a freer handling of the idea of nation because the wait for miracles has been canceled.

What is considered post-nationalist? For instance, regarding the national canon, one would describe as post-nationalist:

- The “disrespectful” treatment of national heroes in novels, comics, television shows, painting, theater, engravings, etc. This speaks of a more fluid approach
to the heroic past. In 1972, television comedian Manuel Valdés, “el Loco”, was fined and suspended for six months by Televisa for referring to the great liberal as “Bomberito [Little Fireman] Juárez”. This punitive measure would be inconceivable today.

- The debate on Identity and Idiosyncrasy is attenuated or with its rhetorical aspects underlined.

- The doubt over the imperturbable existence of National Features (elements of essence). Now one says “it seems Mexican” when noting the majority features, which on the other hand are absent from television in all but remote controls.

If the hypothesis of post-nationalism is conceivable, it has to do with the new customs. Another nation with different rules thus becomes visible, one where pluralism replaces homogeneity, the anachronistic element of tolerance, which gradually replaces intolerance, is stressed, the active role of women progressively replaces domestic slaves, freedom of belief substitutes for religious monopoly, and the demand for indigenous rights declares the invisibility of ethnic groups abolished. In Mexico, Mexicans had the social and psychological obligation to display fixed behaviors, to adjust to the norms and registries of Mexicanness, a coercive invention. Now, the nation has changed to such an extent that it already includes women and, for example, in order to sustain numerous traditions, one must describe them more and more as an issue of aesthetics rather than custom. Thus, competitions of Nativity scenes, Altars of Dolores, Altars of the Dead and pilgrimages abound which formerly would have been unnecessary or inconceivable. For this reason, not without metaphoric exaggeration, not without fondness for what occurs, it is possible to catch a glimpse of Post-Mexico, the relay nation, which still speaks Spanish, which still depends on the family (no longer tribal), still for the most part believes in the Virgin of Guadalupe, still accepts the PRI in the Presidency of the Republic, but already relinquishes determinisms and the notion of everlasting rooted behaviors. And if fatalism changes, the essence is repaired/restructured. Is it already time to shout ¡Viva Post-Mexico!?
PART TWO

Sovereignty and Hegemony:

Transnational Political Space
Several years ago, the Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio, while noting a series of deeply negative elements in the present situation – constant tensions in the relations between different States, apparently uncontrollable environmental degradation, and the alarming growth of the world’s population –, observed, all this notwithstanding, the existence of a positive element, which has been central to the development of the modern juridical conscience: the growing concern for human rights, evident in all spheres. Hence, he himself has labeled the present time the “age of rights” (Bobbio, 1991: 97ff), insofar as such rights have come to play a central role in the unfolding of our contemporary debates. However, Bobbio himself has always been aware of the dangers stemming from the constant reference to rights and the difficulties involved in the attempt to make them rigorous technical instruments. In a famous controversy on the foundation of human rights, he maintained that these could only have a relative foundation, which he found in the existence of an agreement by the international juridical community, its best reflection being the text where the United Nations founders showed their “good intentions” by establishing a catalog of “rights” they considered should serve as the developmental framework for human life within the member States and also in the relations between States. Nevertheless, against those who sought to find a more solid foundation for human rights, Bobbio considered there was no absolute foundation, but only the relative foundation based on the communis opinio of civilized nations. He finished by stating that the problem of human rights was not so much a philosophical as a “political” problem (Bobbio, 1991: 61). The “political” problem of human rights in the “age of rights” continues to be as important now as when Bobbio pointed out the need to find effective ways to protect and guarantee them, which for him represented the main issue in the present situation.
The current world is characterized by a series of interrelations in economic, cultural, and political life that allow us to define it as a “transnational world” (Kaldor, 1999: 195). This process of interconnection did not emerge suddenly, but is the result of a long evolution over which a series of networks transcending the national States was created. All this has made it necessary to revise an idea that was at the origin of modern States: the idea of sovereignty, which now comes to be labeled as a “principle in the process of collapsing” (Rodotà, 1996: 33). The creation of the United Nations and, specifically, the Universal Declaration whose 50th anniversary we celebrated not long ago, has contributed in a particularly significant way to this collapse of the idea of sovereignty as it affects human rights. Sovereignty has been eroded and diminished by the implementation of the United Nations Charter dispositions on human rights matters. It is now believed that regarding human rights States have obligations towards the international community in its entirety (Carrillo Salcedo, 1995: 19-20). From this point of view, the recognition of human dignity in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights penetrates “into the very heart of sovereignty, that is, into the relations of a State with the people under its jurisdiction” (Carrillo Salcedo, 1999: 20). It has been said that the United Nations Charter represents a genuine “international social pact” through which International Law is transformed in such a way that its subjects are no longer only States, but also individuals and peoples (Ferrajoli, 1999: 145). As a consequence, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constituted a decisive event in the juridical conscience of civilized nations. However, its elaboration was not without tensions, and it is believed that the final result is not a genuine reflection of values shared by all human beings, but essentially a reflection of values specific to Western countries (Cassese, 1990: 38), which has motivated recent attempts to revise the whole set of rights recognized therein. In reality, the Universal Declaration, read today, produces an ambiguous impression. On the one hand, it is bitter and sad to note that many of the rights therein recognized have often been contravened and that, furthermore, not only has the effective fulfillment of those focusing on social transformation not been attempted, but oftentimes their scope has tried to be limited as well. But it also produces a certain positive impression to observe that they have contributed in some measure to lay the foundation upon which a “new world order” should be built.
(Sellers et al., 1996). Still, the Declaration must be understood in a precise context and it has become at least partly obsolete because it does not sanction peoples’ right to self-determination (later solemnly proclaimed at the General Assembly), grant victims of human rights violations the right to petition or proclaim the right of oppressed groups and peoples to rebel against despotic regimes when a peaceful means of safeguarding human rights is not possible (Cassese, 1990: 42-43). The Declaration’s value has been primarily symbolic, since it has determined a series of rights considered essential to civilized society. Their effective protection has been entrusted to regional organizations that, at least in part, have managed in some cases to impose limitations on the despotic exercise of power.

However, it is also true that human rights are frequently called upon as a form of legitimation, as an alibi in the service of political interests, and frequently become a mere rhetorical device, one more of the clichés permeating political language. References to human rights may simply conceal attempts to interfere in a State’s sphere of action that do not stem from truly humanitarian considerations, but instead serve to justify forceful actions that don’t pursue the objective they’re apparently directed at. Hence, references to an “imperialism of human rights” often actually reflect the fact that there are still no precise mechanisms for conflict resolution in international society and that ideas considered to have a high symbolic content may be used to give the appearance of legitimacy to actions that would otherwise be considered violations of the respect for peace which is central to international relations. This does not mean that there are no situations where intervention may be necessary, but only that it is difficult to determine in each specific case when the conditions to justify it are met. In any case, it seems that the United Nations should play a central role in the making of these decisions.

The question has been raised as to whether a new declaration should replace the Universal Declaration, considering the great changes recently taking place which especially affect the way we understand human rights. Among these recent transformations, the following have been noted: the weakening of the State’s centrality in international life, the growing importance of new non-state actors (such as Non-Governmental Organizations and transnational companies) in international relations, and the process of diffusion of power (which has brought about important
changes both in its nature and its distribution among the different actors in international life) (Carrillo Salcedo, 1999: 123). At present, the majority of States are subordinate to transnational reality, with the result that many of their actions cannot be carried out independently from transnational entities that are decisively intervening in the creation of conditions imposed on them. “Transnationalization” is particularly significant in the case of human rights, since in most cases these were originally the rights of individuals against the State, and nowadays many rights are at the mercy of actions taken by transnational companies operating independently from the national States. This process, which has been intensified in recent years, has led to talk about a crisis of the nation-state, since the latter has lost control of most problems, to the point where it is even said that many have become “States in the process of dissolution” (Carrillo Salcedo, 1999: 124). The proclamation of the “death of the State” (which has been announced for years) is no more than the exaggeration of a tendency that is far from being completed and, foreseeably, States will continue to play an important role in problem management. But what is certain is that they are no longer the only instance that must be taken into account for the solution of many issues and, specifically, it is foreseeable that human rights will increasingly escape their sphere of action.

Among the main deficiencies attributed to the Universal Declaration is the failure to recognize the so-called “last-generation rights”. The majority of these rights has been determined subsequent to the Declaration’s formulation and thus could have hardly been incorporated at the time. In fact, these new rights are closely related to the “transnationalization of life” and their full effectiveness requires the use of means that go beyond the national State (for instance, environmental rights cannot be understood outside a transnational context). But, moreover, there are many economic and social rights that can be effectively fulfilled only through the firm intervention by those transnational companies that presently play such an important role in international life.

The widespread categorization of rights into different generations corresponds to the idea that there has been a growing recognition of rights in different periods in the evolution of societies. According to this idea, first there were civil and political rights which came about when, as a result of new living conditions, the increasingly
influential rising social sectors demanded the recognition of minimum guarantees for social development. These rights basically assumed a sphere in which the State should not intervene; they are rights of the individual against the State that thus guarantees a certain sphere of freedom. Hence, they are described as developing in connection with the rise of liberal ideology. The growing mobilization of the working class subsequently led to an extension of political participation rights and later to the vindication of economic and social rights. These no longer require the State to abstain; on the contrary, they require a positive action on its part to guarantee minimum living conditions and facilitate a certain social equality. This is why they are described as “equality” rights associated with socialist ideology, and have often been opposed to freedom rights since, without the necessary economic reference, the latter become hot air. The recognition of economic and social rights (that many consider are not rights as such, insofar as they are subject to variable economic factors that hinder their fulfillment) is linked to the development of the social State, that is, the State considered to have to actively intervene in economic life and grant benefits that guarantee citizens some minimum services as a safeguard against the uncertainties of the changing situations that may arise during their lifetime, “from the cradle to the tomb”. What’s new in these rights is that they are no longer tokens of charity (which in some form or another has always existed), but rather have been fashioned as true “rights”, demandable at least as attainable objectives, and have been the result not of a gracious concession, but of the working class’ struggle to achieve a “living minimum”. In addition, new rights have emerged in recent years, the so-called “last-generation rights”, which correspond to the changes in living circumstances that have taken place since the end of World War II. These rights, which are still not clearly defined and have only reached partial recognition in some of the latest Constitutions, are mostly found in the sphere that has been termed, by contrast with the so-called rights to liberty and equality, the sphere of “solidarity”, and thus bring reality to the fraternity present in the motto of the French Revolution. These rights (which include the rights of peoples, the right to quality of life, the protection of freedom in the face of expanding computer technology, the right to Humanity’s cultural heritage, the right to environmental protection, and the right to peace) require the action of institutions that transcend the national States, which alone are incapable
of effectively guaranteeing them. However, the appearance of these new rights is not without problems. The majority of the freedom and equality rights have been rights of the individual or of social groups against the State, but last-generation rights are located in a different sphere. Furthermore, some question the fact that new rights are being incorporated into the catalog of human rights when even those already recognized are not effectively guaranteed. If economic, social, and cultural rights are scarcely protected and have even been disputed in recent years by the neoliberal offensive questioning the very idea of the Welfare State (whose mission would be to attempt that the effective realization of social rights be progressively extended), what sense would it have to expand into a new field of “diffuse”, unclearly defined rights that, given the lack of specific means to put them in practice, would remain unfulfilled? Still, it is said that the appearance of last-generation rights corresponds to the “contamination of the idea of freedom” that is causing the already recognized rights to lose effectiveness in the present conditions. We could then ask ourselves if the catalog of human rights is a closed list or we can instead expect the emergence of still new ones. Some have stated that once a right is recognized it is not possible to eliminate it. But this is hardly verifiable and the last century has witnessed frequent regressions and the expansion of totalitarian movements completely indifferent to human rights. The attainment of liberties is always subject to the possibility of changing conditions and only through a “struggle for rights” can we create a world where they have a certain degree of effectiveness, for only those who fight each day to attain liberty deserve it.

The idea of the appearance of successive generations of rights is connected, in a sense, to T.H. Marshall’s suggestion that citizenship has been progressively expanded. Marshall notes that “citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community” (1992: 18) and its evolution has been signaled by the fact that, with the development of capitalism, a gradual recognition of civil rights, later political rights and finally, already in the 20th century, social rights has taken place. In Marshall’s analysis, each stage of citizenship is tied to the interests of a rising social class. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the rural land-owning aristocracy led the movement in favor of a civil citizenship; in the 19th century, the industrial middle classes brought about political citizenship; and in the 20th, the working classes started
the movement towards social citizenship (Somers, 1999: 218-19). However, Marshall’s focus has recently been subject to revision, since it is considered to reflect only one particular case (the English one) and, moreover, newly arisen circumstances make it necessary to modify his scheme. Not only recent “attacks on social citizenship” (Procacci, 1999: 17), which make social rights increasingly problematic from a juridical point of view (since they appear to have less normative force than civil or political rights), but also the very need to distinguish among different ways of speaking of citizenship, force us to modify Marshall’s perhaps unduly linear (albeit of great explanatory power) scheme. In this sense, Bottomore makes a distinction between “formal citizenship” (based on belonging to a nation-state) and “substantive citizenship” (which, according to Marshall’s concept, consists of a set of civil, political, and especially social rights and thus involves some form of participation in government affairs) (Bottomore, 1992: 66). Marshall’s analysis entailed a “sociologization of the concept of citizenship”, which may have had positive effects but has produced a situation where “the sociological approach to the subject of rights, systematically ignored by juridical culture, seems to ignore in its turn, in an equally systematic way, juridical studies on these problems” (Ferrajoli, 1999: 97). Ferrajoli considers that the category of “citizenship” is not equivalent in legal and social fields, and that its less-than-rigorous utilization has had as the consequence that, when the time finally arrived to take human rights seriously, through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, their universality was denied and the whole set was made conditional upon citizenship, ignoring the fact that positive Law ascribes most rights to all people and not just citizens. The result of this application of the category of citizenship is that it may be used as foundation, not for a democracy based on the expansion of rights, but a regressive democracy limited to a single country. What Ferrajoli proposes in order to overcome this limited idea of citizenship, which comes to the foreground when migratory phenomena cause the appearance of individuals and social groups with cultural, ethnic, and religious characteristics of their own in the heart of the more-developed States, is the “definitive de-nationalization of rights and the corrective de-statalization of nationalities” (Ferrajoli, 1999: 57). As is the case with the idea of sovereignty, the idea of citizenship thus appears as inevitably in crisis due to the emergence of new expectations going beyond the national States. In his
revision of Marshall’s famous work, Bottomore also highlights the consequences of ethnic diversity ensuing from large-scale immigration, which include the restriction by many States of the right to citizenship or the fact that, even when the latter formally exists, certain ethnic groups cannot in practice enjoy its substantive rights in the same conditions as do others (Bottomore, 1992: 66). Consequently, the migration of labor has produced world-scale social and institutional changes of great significance. Migration would thus be responsible, together with the globalization of corporate capital, for the deep transformations affecting particularly the more-developed countries (Guarnizo, 1999: 91). However, globalization, which is now posited as the most decisive event in recent years, has not been spontaneous but is the result of a long, as yet unfinished process. Even though some have considered it a “myth” (Veseth, 1998), we may think it a reality, one that allows us to designate a new form of interrelation between different States and transnational companies. But there isn’t only an economic globalization (Adda, 1999), as defended by a certain system of thought, easily identifiable with neoliberal positions, that sees it as the only possible alternative and a source of wealth. This thought corresponds to the “globalization ideology” Beck has termed “globalism” (Beck, 1998: 164ff). There is also a cultural globalization, a political globalization, an ecological globalization, and even a still incipient juridical globalization (Schaeffer, 1997). Economic globalization itself has been facilitated by certain political measures that have helped make possible the “global market” that is seen as the present world’s most-representative characteristic. Even though some authors consider it to possess “utopian” attributes, allowing for a better solution of all problems, the truth is that inequalities between the privileged and least-favored sectors have increased, while the differences between developed and developing States have broadened. All this may make us think about globalization’s “perverse effects” and blame it for the cutbacks in benefits until now solidly established in the Western States. This may lead to demonizing globalization and making it responsible for this type of actions. But globalization may also have beneficial effects, insofar as it supplies a new framework wherein some problems may find their solution. Current environmental problems, for example, are so serious that they demand global action and cannot be resolved through individual actions by national States. The tendency to consider globalization responsible for all evils may
prevent us from considering the positive aspects of interdependence. In the case of human rights, globalization affects many issues. In the first place, it poses the need for human rights to be effectively protected at the international level and for the creation of institutions that will allow them to be fully guaranteed. But, on the other hand, economic globalization may entail a reduction in social rights until now solidly established in the developed States. Moreover, national States become inadequate to carry out the policies of rights recognition and are forced to accept the existence of groups crossing their borders in search of better living conditions. As Giddens has noted, “states are again coming to have frontiers rather than borders” (Giddens, 1998: 130). What is yet to be attained is a “global civil society” that crosses national borders and paves the way for a “cosmopolitan democracy”. A well-known work by Martha Nussbaum (1996) on the need for a cosmopolitan moral education gave rise to an interesting controversy that highlighted the lack of agreement around this issue. Held (1995: 219ff) had also proposed a model of cosmopolitan democracy, but at present the idea of a democracy extending beyond the nation-state is utopian, although one can observe certain signs pointing in this direction. Reality continues to be marked by the large differences between developed and developing States, and by the difficult articulation of the various ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities within the more-developed countries.

The migratory movements we previously referred to, turn present-day societies into multicultural societies. However, “multiculturalism” may be understood from very different points of view: as “the cultural logic of multinational capitalism” (Žižek, 1997) or as the “politics of recognition” consecrated by the “politics of difference” (Taylor, 1994: 82). The spread of the term “multiculturalism” has led to its being applied to societies very different from the ones it described in its inception, and today studies on the subject proliferate also in Europe (among others, Bonazzi and Dunne, 1995) although, as Glazer has emphasized, they are very different in scope than, for example, those in the United States: “one asks oneself what could multiculturalism mean in European countries, which don’t have a history of deep racial division, nor immigration as a central identity theme. These are the main traits characterizing the appearance of multiculturalism in the United States” (Glazer, 1999: 195). But what has caused the issue of multiculturalism to be raised in Europe is the
fact that immigration from less-developed countries has turned European societies into societies with important ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities. Despite attempts to set limits to it, this phenomenon is unstoppable and makes it necessary to find forms of respect for the principle of difference in the framework of plural societies. The concern for a “transnational citizenship” has to do with the “right to emigrate” (Bauböck, 1994: 321) that the more-developed countries attempt to control by all possible means, even though there are many arguments in favor of the freedom of movement and the possibility of seeking better living conditions when the minimum necessary for survival is not guaranteed in the State of origin. A transnational society should expect these migratory movements to intensify and, as noted earlier, the limitations it intends to impose won’t be able to stop it. Given that Western societies will be increasingly affected by the presence of minorities, it is necessary to take into consideration the possibility that “collective rights” be recognized, in order to allow for a better representation of groups with a different tradition. Until not so long ago, it was believed that a special form of representation for these groups was not required, but nowadays there are many who advocate “group representation rights” that will assure minorities to be heard (Kymlicka, 1996: 141). What happens is that minorities usually don’t manage to make their concerns known and many of their members are denied the condition of citizens. Once again citizenship appears as a category that may serve more to limit than to promote human rights, which should be recognized for the whole population and not just a restricted group.

Ferrajoli’s hypothesis that taking rights seriously today entails detaching them from citizenship understood as belonging to a specific state community, means recognizing their super-state character. That would entail protecting them not only inside the more-developed States, but granting them true universal character. The issue would be transforming the rights of the citizen into “rights of the person”, and incorporating also in that category the right of residence and the right of movement within our privileged countries, which presently function as “reservations” barring access to those not included. The rights of residence and movement had been proclaimed as universal at the beginning of the Modern Age by our very Western culture and yet their universality and reciprocity has been denied, and they have been
converted into exclusive and privilege-based rights of citizenship. But if Western values are to be credible, their effective universalization is required. Ferrajoli himself admits that this statement has the taste of a “legal utopia” (1999: 117-19), but the history of law is the history of utopias, and the idea of human rights has always embodied the best aspirations of Humankind. In the last analysis, what Ferrajoli proposes is a “world constitutionalism”, which, although still lacking in guarantees, he sees being created through international conventions and which should lead to the suppression of the category of citizenship understood as recognition of a privileged status conveying rights denied to non-citizens or, on the contrary, to the establishment of a universal citizenship that would recognize the same rights to all human beings, men and women.

In recent years, in a more limited sphere and in accordance with the process of the construction of the European Union, the elaboration of a European Constitution, which would be based on the existence of a common tradition and in which human rights would play a leading role, has been proposed. However, that “common European constitutional Law” (Häberle, 1996: 187) doesn’t seem as yet completely developed and there are many who consider that the instigator of the idea is not a presumed “European people”, as of today still non-existent, but rather the States, which are thereby promoting a constitutional process (Grimm, 1996: 4, and comments in Habermas, 1999: 137-43). The formation of such a European Union could have unwanted consequences, like the weakening of the Constitutions of the national States before the appearance of a civil society of European texture, a political public space of European scope, and a common European policy have brought about the autonomization of supranational decision-making processes with respect to the national-scale processes of common opinion and common will formation.

If “European constitutionalism” seems difficult, a “world constitutionalism” seems even more so, despite there being authors who believe the United Nations Charter should be interpreted as a principle of Constitution for the international juridical community, which would explain why human rights have gone from being an objective of the Organization to becoming one of its constitutional principles (Carrillo Salcedo, 1999: 141-42). Still, following the Universal Declaration, human rights have come to be one of the essential elements configuring the international
order and, even if their realization has thus far not been sufficiently effective, there is no doubt that the materialization of worldwide freedom, justice, and peace posited as desirable in the Preamble to the *Universal Declaration* will only be possible insofar as the “recognition of the intrinsic dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” is attained.

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CHAPTER 7

How to Think Globally Without Losing Your Mind: Transnationalisms and the Study of Social Change.

Alison Brysk

What does transnationalism mean and what does it mean for the study of social change? The study and exercise of power across borders began with interstate interactions of war, trade and diplomacy—the conventional focus of international relations. But since the 1970s, global politics and international studies have been increasingly influenced by flows in which “at least one party is non-governmental” (Keohane and Nye, 1971; Risse-Kappen, 1995). While a large proportion of cross-border interactions are secular dynamics such as profit-seeking and demographic displacement, a growing and increasingly salient subset of transnational relations seek social change. Such relations have been variously conceptualized as “global civil society”, “international society”, “world civic politics”, “transnational networks”, “transnational social movements”, and even (parts of) “international regimes”. (Keane, 2003; Bull, 1995; Wapner, 1996; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2001; Rittberger, 1993) This essay will examine the usefulness and implications of these approaches to transnationalism for the comparative understanding of social change.

Transnationalism as a source of social change has its roots in the globalization of domestic civil society, and its branches in the expansion of the private domain of globalization (Castells, 2003). The concept of civil society is a political space between the individual (in some readings, the household) and the State, which may serve as a source of socialization, interest formation, mobilization or delegated authority. The contested characteristics of civil society are that it is non-State (yet may include political parties), non-market (yet may serve as an alternative source of production, consumption, or investment) and public sphere (leaving unclear the private politics of the family, sexuality and contested identities). While civil society is generally defined by non-violence, the use of force by private actors to pursue political goals may be politically and analytically salient, distinguishable from profit-seeking crime and
anomic violence. Consideration of “uncivil” society may be an important safeguard against normative bias, and against the equation of civil society with relatively privileged citizens of democratic states who are free to pursue their interests through open institutions. (Cohen and Arato, 1992)

The global diffusion of agendas, resources, networks and arenas for social change seems to require some transnational version of this concept, but exporting it across borders retains all of the conceptual problems of the notion of domestic civil society and adds new dilemmas of globalization. For example, when the private sector politics of the family are transnationalized, they appear as kinship networks which commonly sponsor migrant associations, production chains, nationalist or religious movements, violence against women and other forms of authority and resistance. Globalizing civil society may represent an aggregation of domestic actors, the emergence of a new stratum of non-state global organizations and campaigns, some combination or hybrid form or something else entirely (Rosenau, 1990; Castells, 2003). Common caveats are a systematic imbalance in North-South participation at the global level, and the reactive character of transnational struggles to interstate organizations and structural dynamics such as neoliberalism.

Despite these unresolved features, diverse concepts of transnational civil politics are widely referenced to document if not explain contemporary attempts at social change. A prolegomena to adjudicating the correct concept is to map the assumptions, uses, reach, and limitations of alternative notions. For each such use, we can ask: how does it work? What does it do? In this way, we can begin to discern whether the various transnationalisms are competing paradigms to capture an emerging phenomenon, parallel aspects of a diverse set of changes or simply subsets of some larger genre of analysis. Since my own research agenda has drawn from a series of approaches to these questions, I will interrogate my own uses of different concepts of transnationalism and the impact this has had on my own study of social change.

1. Power Shift

The “discovery” of global civil society (Lipschutz, 1992) and world civic politics (Wapner, 1996) during the aftermath of the Cold War supported and assumed
an analysis that the basis of power across borders was changing. The presence, activities and international diffusion of both global and local civic actors were said to constitute a power shift (Matthews, 1997; Florini, 2000) which granted increased influence to ordinary citizens, democratizing forces and global commons goals. The power exercised by global civil society was generally “soft power” (Nye, 2004): the power of information, persuasion, ideas and identity. Sometimes transnational social movements moved into a cross-border form of traditional lobbying, which could indirectly influence state policy by mobilizing local and global resistance above and below the target government (Falk, 1981; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). More diffuse global influence could occur through agenda-setting, gaining recognition for new transnational issues or identities or signaling new common interests.

But a now-standard critique of this optimistic model questions the efficacy, innovation and above all the accountability of “global civil society” (Clark, 2003; Laxer and Halperin, 2003). A counter and defense of global civil society’s democratizing potential emphasizes its partial positive contributions. Global civil society may contribute to democratic outcomes such as contesting repressive states even if global campaigns are not organized via a democratic process, and unrepresentative organizations such as religious institutions may still play an important role in socialization or aggregating interests.

My own studies of human rights in Argentina (Brysk, 1993; 1994) are fairly representative of a genre of case studies documenting the emerging or unexpected influence of global civil society. A social movement formed around transnational norms of human rights, and some transnational identities, mobilizes pressure “from above and below” to transform a repressive state and democratize a transitional regime. Transnationalism operates as a set of norms, networks, and institutions/arenas. Social change occurs through transnational monitoring, the exercise of conditionality (mostly bilateral and multilateral rather than transnational) and the “spiral model” interaction between transnational pressure and domestic politics (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). This type of work initially sought to explore the power of ideas and identities, to bring civil society back in as a political actor, and to problematize the conventional concept of power. Case studies of transnational social movements also build towards our understanding of world politics as a
multilevel game, and the implications of these multilevel interactions remain an essential referent for transnational studies.

2. Bargaining

A more agnostic but broader interpretation of civic transnationalism depicts global non-state interactions as a new level of analysis in international relations. Just as the two-level game approach adds the influence of domestic civil society to the interstate formation of foreign policy (Putnam, 1988), transnationalism models international relations as a three-level game including global actors with independent influence on world politics (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997). Rather than global civil society as a bearer of ideas and values, transnationalism is a layer of bargaining for a variety of local and global interests. Transnational networks are not necessarily social movements, and their influence comes more from the network form than from principled norms or the personal empowerment of participants (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). However, content matters in that this kind of transnationalism does seem to form more readily to contest global issues such as environmental protection, or to express trans-border identities like diasporic communities. And in a top-down version of soft power, transnational relations are enabled by the increased influence of information and communication as a parameter of globalization (Rosenau, 1990).

Research on indigenous rights networks and campaigns (Brysk, 2000) is a case of truly global civil society, and social movements that are “born transnational”. In From Tribal Village to Global Village (Brysk, 2000), I found it necessary to distinguish the indigenous rights movement—which followed the power shift pattern—from an indigenous rights network comprised of coalitions of like-minded groups and individuals that operated in a broader arena of transnationalism. Such research highlights direct ties between the local and global that bypass, cut across, or even reshape the national. This study also expands the multilevel game from a transnational strategy to reform the state to a multilevel strategy to govern transnational and global actors who are the targets of transnational networks. One potential contribution of this kind of transnational study is to show how both rights and democracy depend on border-crossing collective identities and the governance of transnational flows and
institutions. Social change occurs via campaigns and conditionality like those above, but also through establishing new global norms and institutions. This type of work expands upon a notion of the power of ideas to mobilize outsider actors and inspire reform, to a more constructivist notion of the internalized transformation of national and international interests. My own work draws on some approaches to globalization (Castells, 2003; Held, 1995) as an overlapping set of multiple arenas with distinctive dynamics rather than a unified set of flows or trends, specifically, the interstate, market and global civic arenas. The latter is most analogous to this usage of transnationalism as an arena for political contestation.

3. Counter-Hegemony

A more delimited but thoroughly global version of transnationalism focuses less on the trans-local and more on global mobilization as a form of potential counter-hegemony to globalization (Held, 1995; O’Brien et al., 2000; Wapner, 1996). When my collaborators and I attempted to assess this kind of transnationalism’s potential to carry human rights accountability beyond the state to the global level, we encountered globalization as a double-edged sword (Brysk, 2002; Brysk and Shafir, 2004). Globalization simultaneously displaces citizenship as the source of individual empowerment vis-à-vis the state, but promotes the development of new global rights claims, mechanisms and venues. In terms of the study of social change, these findings direct our concern to non-citizens (and second-class citizens) as a population at risk from both transnationalism and state-based abuse. The mandate of transnationalism becomes a global power shift to address the global democracy deficit: the call for accountability in global market institutions and access to global governance institutions. This interpretation of transnationalism as more than a movement and less than a level of analysis further broadens our search for levers of social change across other multilayered and interacting venues that cut through the layer cake. Prominently, these would include regionalism, mixed intergovernmental-private forms of regulation (tropical timber regime, World Commission on Dams) and knowledge-based “governmentality” (Foucault, 1970, 1979, 1994).
4. Governance

By the turn of the millennium, the study of transnationalism began to turn to the private domain of globalization rather than an international aggregation of domestic civil societies, as transnational civic actors participated increasingly in global governance. In this approach, global civil society moves from a rights advocate and “hero in history” to a more multivalent actor and arena –a generator of both rights and wrongs. Transnationalism does not contest globalization, but helps to constitute it. Transnational actors may serve as a parallel source of “private authority” in markets, knowledge issues and regulatory relationships (Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter, 1999). Global civic organizations form patterned relationships with intergovernmental institutions, including delegated administration of global policy, as when NGOs serve as service providers for the World Bank (Nelson, 1995). In the most developed form of these trends, transnational civic groups may help to compose “international regimes” that coordinate and bound the actions of states and global institutions in a defined issue-area (Rittberger, 1993).

In Human Rights and Private Wrongs (Brysk, 2005a) I attempted to delineate the sources of social change available to global civil society when the target is the transnational private authority of markets, professions and families. Deepening some aspects of “soft power”, constructivism and previous work on transnational social movements, I found effects through identities, leverage and rights claims. Global civic networks with a purposive agenda must socialize international publics and state authorities to recognize new identities (like children as bearers of rights), as in the power shift model. Transnational activists must then discover or create bargaining modes that leverage global and private arenas –such as socially responsible investment. Finally, seekers of social change across borders are ideologically counter-hegemonic as they reshape understandings of the nature and legitimacy of global authority, ultimately resulting in new rights claims. But even the most privatized forms of globalization are ultimately hosted or potentially regulated by the State, leaving a perpetual governance gap alongside the democratic deficit.
5. Bringing the State Back In?

Ultimately, the study of civic transnationalism cannot be isolated from transnational ties based in or including states. Just as many scholars of domestic civil society emphasize its interdependence with the state, global civil society may be inseparable from governments and global institutions. Several broader analytic approaches to the global level of analysis bear potential relevance to the sources of social change and the role of civil society across borders. The study of interstate relations as unit-based is now supplemented by the network-like approach of trans-governmentalism (Slaughter, 2004) and related work on legalization (Goldstein, 2001). In both cases, crosscutting relationships among government agencies or international diffusion of legal frameworks and mechanisms are influenced by global civic norm promotion, transnational lobbying by challengers and global professional identities of participants. Sociological institutionalism, constructivism’s structural cousin, posits a set of world scripts that shape the form as well as the content of interstate globalization, transnational civic action and the relationship between them (Boli and Thomas, 1999). Finally, the English school notion of “international society” maps a set of international understandings and identities that shape interstate behavior, contrasting with the conventional assumption of anarchy. Although the main proponents of this approach concentrate on the international society of states, a subset of English school theorists has broadened their approach to encompass non-State transnational actors as regularized participants with assigned roles and rules (Bull, 1995; Wheeler, 1992).

My current research on comparative human rights foreign policy comes full circle, returning to the interstate heartland of traditional international relations –with a kind of “methodological transnationalism” (Khagram and Levitt, 2004). Global Good Samaritans (Brysk, 2005b) is a policy-oriented comparison of states that are “part of the solution”; power-holders that unexpectedly promote universal human rights and build the international human rights regime. It is also a case of international regime construction and the socializing power of “international society” which sits uneasily beside the transnational studies emphasis on networks. In this kind of interaction, states may act as norm innovators, participate in networks and regimes, sponsor transnational processes and global civic actors –and still also be targets of advocacy
and reform campaigns. It thus appears to be a dynamic in which governance is constructed transnationally, in part by states playing a unique catalyzing and authoritative role.

The theoretical framework and hypothesized motor of social change marries a constructivist reconstruction of national interest to a post-nationalist reading of the identity politics of states, and this is where transnational civic actors enter the picture. Transnationalism inspires a search for alternative, collective, and universalist constructions of national interest. But such global ideas must be rooted in and enacted by local agents such as political leaders, local civil society and even political parties – all woven through the web of transnational identities and mobilizations.

6. Conclusion

Does the rise of global civil society signal a power shift, presage an unelected hierarchy of elite cosmopolitans or is it a neutral bargaining arena that is simply one more force to be considered in world politics? Does the civic side of globalization constitute a source of counter-hegemony or has the participation of non-state actors in global governance normalized their political role and robbed them of their democratizing mandate? Could it be that civic transnationalism plays each of these roles under certain circumstances or in different arenas?

One indication of the latter possibility is the usefulness of each of these stances for different aspects of empirical research on transnational civic activity. Although several interpretations derive from “incommensurable paradigms” such as pluralist and political economy perspectives, they may still be identifying equally valid effects of the same phenomenon. Perhaps the most fruitful approach for research on transnationalism is to suspend assumptions based on the nature of the actor, derive concrete predictions for mechanisms and limitations of social change from each approach and map the multiple pathways of political processes that change the world – from above, from below, from across and even down the middle.
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As narratives of globalization have proliferated in recent years, two distinctive formulations have emerged. One sees the phenomena of globalization as linked to capitalism (and to “neo-liberalism”), and it is portrayed as a dark, negative force, obsessed with finding new forms of expansionism and historically linked to colonization processes. A second version of globalization, a positive one, conceives it as a result of postmodern efforts that celebrate a non-homogeneous world. This version insists on differences of cultures and relativizes cultural standards and places. These two versions emerged, as Frederic Jameson argues, from a new concept of communication, one that “has suddenly acquired a whole cultural dimension”. Because “the communicational signifier has been endowed with a more properly cultural signified or signification”, Jameson suggests, we have only just begun to grasp the new messages about this “new world culture” (Jameson, 1998: 56).

What is interesting about this explosion of narratives about globalization is how it signifies a renewed effort to develop a coherent story, from different ideological angles, about the nature of “our times”. Jeffrey C. Alexander has described these processes of naming the Zeitgeist—the “spirit of the times”—as reflecting a sense of instability, of the imminent transitoriness of the world, that introduces myth into social theory. Alexander, however, insists that “despite the fact that we have no idea what our historical possibilities will be”, all theories about social phenomena must theorize not only the past and the present, but also “the future as well”. And we do so, he continues, “in relation not only to what we know but to what we believe, hope and fear”. Theories of globalization, like theories of postmodernity and, before that, theories of modernity, have always mixed our beliefs with our hopes, thus demonstrating Alexander’s conclusion that “there is always an eschatology, not merely epistemology, in theorizing about social change” (Alexander: 1995: 10).
Narratives of globalization are, then, not just ways of understanding our present but also different projects about our future. These different ways can be dark versions of globalization, which end up bringing back the old ghost, the Manichean monster of imperialism and the forces of domination; or we can find a more positive narrative, one which will emphasize heterogeneity and imagination, paying little attention to some of the problems and tasks that we have in building up a new normative future to cope with the complexity of our times. I am interested in a rather different narrative of globalization, one that would propel a strong claim for a normative horizon and clarify the challenges we face in our future. In order to develop this alternative story, I need first to clarify the territory where this new global narrative should begin.

Let’s begin with the idea that narratives of globalization often get trapped within a complex entanglement of different problems whose normative status is not clearly delimited. Allow me just to single out a few of those global problems that are tied up in this net, so that we can visualize the complexity of understanding the tasks of our present time. First we have the so-called economic problem of the expansion and strengthening of the global market, and the way that world-economy is interrelated. Then, we have the anthropological problem of cultures, the idea of differences and similarities among them, the idea of homogeneity and heterogeneity, and the possible standards for knowing and evaluating cultures as such. There is a significant part of the narratives of globalization that seem to be concerned with problems of a legal and political kind, themselves related and inspired by their relation to possible moral interpretations. This can be illustrated by the growing recognition of human rights as universal rights, a problem that directly relates to the creation of an international tribunal for condemning crimes against humanity, an institution that implies a worldwide public sphere and attendant moral responsibilities. Global ecological problems are also related to the moral sphere, but they belong also to the economic and political domains. Finally, we have the framing of all these problems by the new structure of the technological tools that have triggered and transformed our modes of communication and have developed new spaces for human interaction and communication. All of these areas require the development of viable social theories that can provide us with a new conceptual intelligibility so that we can
visualize the coordination and cooperation that are needed to solve these new problems of complex plural societies. It is here where new philosophical and political thinking is so urgently needed, for the key categories of modern politics must be re-conceptualized: the nation, the idea of homogeneous will, the concept of the state and the idea of the public sphere and civil society. This is the path I want to explore. I would like first to critically visualize some possible interconnections of the critical political categories. I will reframe them in a normative narrative of globalization to outline a path of what I will call an “enlarged project of social integration”. From the historically constituted categories of the “nation-state”, the referent of social integration must now shift to the idea of “nations without borders” and “world-public sphere”.

1. Nations without Borders and Citizens of the World

The concept of nation has been under scrutiny for the last decade, and far from becoming clarified, or being enriched by different interpretations, the concept has maintained its paradoxical elusiveness, its difficulty of being defined without falling into contradiction. That is the reason why there are different and opposing definitions of the term. Seyla Benhabib has called these different perspectives on nationalism a debate of “essentialists versus constructivists” (Benhabib, 1999: 300). While Benhabib’s view of the two contradictory conceptions of nations is correct in describing the approaches as different methodological perspectives, a closer look might allow us to avoid the mistake of thinking that a term like nation can be created without construction, without some “fiction” surrounding it. The fact that all nationalities are based on stories and myths is not recognized by Benhabib’s overly narrow conception of culture. The issue is not a simple one. Benhabib is right in claiming that fiction is not everything, but what seems less compelling is her claim that the essentialist position is not built in fiction in turn. How fictions and facts work together is the complicated field of a theorist. Just as there are some elements that we can empirically link to history, geography and politics, there are others, interspersed with them, that can trigger a conflictive situation “out of nothing”. Think of our earlier ideas about socialist countries, and then think of our mistakes in judging what could happen to a country like Yugoslavia. It is important to stress, with Benhabib,
that such identities as nations are related to historical factors, geographical situations, economic problems and social and political struggles, which should not be disregarded by social theorists. Benhabib is thus right in indicating the failure of constructivists’ reduction of social phenomena to pure fictions. However, I disagree with Benhabib in thinking that the problem of the constructivist view is that it cannot explain why certain narratives become nationalistic at certain specific times and not others, and why some narratives have the coherence to motivate people to die for the ideal of a nation. In fact, the connections of stories with empirical social phenomena are all tied up in a symbolic web, which is why I believe Benhabib’s conception of culture needs to be broader.

Constructivists may not give us coherent accounts of why stories make sense or cease to make sense (Benhabib, 1999: 302). Yet, while history and its contingencies are necessary elements, I want to suggest that the only possible way to acquire some consciousness about these phenomena is to develop hermeneutical criticisms that detect the subtle connections of myths and facts. We need to develop an arena of hermeneutical critique where those stories can be submitted to public scrutiny and myths can be exposed as objects of propaganda or lies. In my opinion, all the ideas of nation, essentialist and constructivist, have a symbolic content and, thus, can be interpreted and used in different ways to achieve certain goals. What allows people to fit inside patterns of racist behavior or separatist strategies is a specific definition of a nation, one that stresses only a sense of belonging and relates itself only to ethnic goals.

Such ideas of nation lack the modern normative conception of solidarity, something that is shaped by certain practices and institutions, which must necessarily play a strong role in shaping the integration of heterogeneous citizenship. Stories and their heritage are always symbolic nets of meanings that play with different historical factors, including contingent ones. But they can be interpreted coherently in a public worldly exposure, and they can be denounced on a normative basis for their racist content, ethnocentric tactics or anti-democratic goals.

An important task for social theorists and philosophers, therefore, is to make us aware that stories are built to project specific meanings of a nation, and, as such, they can always be the subject of our criticism, evaluation and normative restrictions.
Myths are parts of stories that we tell ourselves; what kinds of goals these stories center on –the idea of a nation as integrationist or separatist– is what decides whether or not these are narratives about a democratic nation. Collective hermeneutical revision of national stories is a vital task if we are to be aware of the dangers of believing certain stories. Yes, the mythical element is tightly entangled with contingency, but we should be alert to detect characteristics within these stories themselves. If we are going to be able to ferret out elements of exclusion, racism and xenophobia, social theorists and philosophers must project their critical hermeneutical achievements into the public sphere in a manner that draws widespread attention. Thus, what is demonstrated by the recent debate about different concepts of nation (constructivist versus essentialist) is that there has never been a univocal meaning of the term. Rather, there are different histories and traditions that have used the term for more democratic or more ethnic purposes. We can reconstruct how these different notions were developed in countries like Germany and France, and follow their fatefuly different outcomes in this century. Whereas France used the normative notion of nation, Germany used the ethnic one.

In what follows, I want to explore the historical origins of the concept of nation, its connection with the idea of state, and how they together accomplished the possibility of allowing for the integration of a community of people into a “political community”. The normative core of the category of nation-state allowed a project of integration to develop through the mediation of institutions of law that opened the space for individuals to challenge the borders of who could become a citizen. At the same time, the other idea of nation, the nation as ethnically defined, became a vigorous part of the idea of belonging to a community, which held that the identity of a nation needed to be defined against others. The struggle between these two opposite conceptions of nation over the last two hundred years has led us to a new challenge, namely, to the possibility of building up a new category of nation, one that could be defined as a “nation without frontiers” through the mediation of a “world public sphere”. This idea would be the possible culmination of the normative project envisaged by Kant (2006) in his work Perpetual Peace, in which he was the first to introduce the idea of a world public sphere.
The historical notion of the concept of the nation was an artifice to build solidarity among strangers, that is, beyond family ties and in order to construct an artificial community, a political community. Thus, the Enlightenment’s use of the concept of nation became coupled with the concept of state in order to perform together a double role. The first was to build a political community with solidaristic ties; the second was to build up the kind of collective agreement among citizens—a social contract—that would allow them to define their own ways of self-legislation (Kant and Rousseau). Thus, the concept of state, in its historical conception, is a key political category that defines its roles through the political device of a social contract. Through it, the idea of how power was legitimately exercised, internally and externally, became a subject of collective interest. “State power”, as Habermas claims, “constitutes itself in the forms of positive law” (1998: 107). Laws thus became the mediation between the state and the citizens. For our purposes of understanding the different meanings of the idea of nation, we should be aware that, empirically, the creation of a nation and the creation of a state were not necessarily simultaneous processes. Think, for example, of the case in Germany. When both state and nation did develop at the same time, as they did in some of the modern European nation-states, they created a successful normative channel for solving some of the tensions produced between the power of the state and the citizens of the nation. The tensions produced at the juncture between the nation-state and its institution of law were translated into how and who were considered the subjects of that nation, and, thus, who could bear the responsibilities and duties of citizenship. I will describe this as a process of the expansion of the normative contents of the political categories of the nation-state. Such a process described the legitimate use of state power by declaring that democratic institutions of law can help solve the tensions of social integration. The public sphere, a needed arena created by the political community, is the institutional place where the citizens could discuss the proper ways of regulating democratic institutions and keep control of how the state administers its delegated power.

As I have earlier suggested, however, at the same time that this understanding of nation was created by the ideals of democracy and their implementation through nation-states, there were other meanings of nation that emphasized collective self-
identification and traced those identities to early antiquity, and from the Middle Ages to our modern times, via mythic stories about communal groups who separated themselves from others by seeing those others as negative forces. Community and nation mean here exclusion, and signify their national specificities as a special, superior kind; thus, their goals are not to become a part of a larger community but to define themselves against other communities and to maintain their own purity.

The two meanings became interrelated in the different histories of the development of 18th century nations. As Habermas tells us, the concept of nation “became an efficient mechanism for repudiating everything regarded as foreign, for devaluing other nations, and for excluding national, ethnic, and religious minorities, especially Jews” (1998b: 111). Thus, some theorists think that there is an essentializing feature of humankind which can be traced through the history of different stories that narrate how certain communities had the need to extricate themselves from other groups, and how they built up their own identity by “cleansing” themselves from ethnic mixing. In my view, however, the artificiality of national myths, both in their learned origins and in their dissemination through the propaganda and education of nationalistic stories, are political tools with anti-democratic goals. One could say that the normative ideal of the category of nation-state served its historical purposes for social integration. But we must be aware that it was the other concept of nation that led empirically to the exclusion of the others who were not considered civil enough to belong to the political community. However, the normative core of such a social construct allowed, at the same time, for the creation of spaces of contestation where those who were not considered citizens could question the borders of such a definition and struggle to be considered members of that society. Thus, the category of a democratic nation-state acquired its full normativity once its mechanisms led to a process of differentiation between the state, the market and civil society. Civil societies regulated the constraints of state power through the institutional public spaces. In such arenas, the independent civil society could discuss without constraints the issues of general interest and produce critical responses to the state’s initiatives. The result of these processes allowed for the creation of historical rights for the subjects of the nation-state. In our present times, as ideal types, they have come to be conceptualized as human and civil rights.
Once we understand the history of the development of normativity in the binomial concepts of nation-state, we should be able to ask a new set of questions: Is it possible to recover the category of nation-state without its ethnocentric, particularistic, communitarian ideal? Is there a possibility of using the term nation without the impairment of the concept of the state? If so, is it possible to envisage a new coupling of the idea of nation with the notion of no frontiers?

My answer to these questions is yes. It is possible to recover the term nation in a revised fashion, a nation without borders that can be possible only through the implementation of a political culture, one that leads to the ideal of “cosmopolitan citizenship” and to the creation of a world public sphere. These are the new normative terms, the key political concepts which I intend to use in developing a new perspective on globalization.

As in the enlightened sense, the term nation here would only function as a political construct that would allow citizens to build “solidarity among strangers” through common aims and goals, namely, the construction and implementation of all kinds of rights –human, political, social and cultural. Citizens of the world can have all kinds of cultural differences, belong to different kinds of states and histories, but they must share a common political culture, the culture of democratic institutions and their laws. To build a world public sphere that would keep state power inside of legal limits and coordinate strategies and decision for a world civil society, we need an arena where permanent deliberation about all the world’s issues are subject to criticism and debate.

2. A Cosmopolitan Political Culture as the Basis for a New Identity

Our century’s wars and our failed attempts to develop more encompassing notions of identity, like the European community, would seem sufficient evidence to describe my proposal as utopian or even as a dream. However, we have more clarity on certain issues than we had in the past, and this has been precisely the product of our failures and problems. Indeed, what I want to show you is that these learning processes have given us some clues that show us where to pursue this dream. We cannot witness coldly any more Kosovos, Sebrenices or Rwandas. Our narrative of globalization must make us aware that identities and cultures should be open to
influence, reshapings and unending transformations. Homogeneity should become an undesirable goal because it does not reflect the richness and variety of the perspectives of our times. Heterogeneity, hybridity, mixing and fusion are the only normatively acceptable options of our present. If immigration and exile have contributed to shaping and transforming the world and our societies, they have done so by erasing the frontiers that first defined nations with territories. We need only look briefly at the core of aesthetic expressions which often carry the most authentic representations of our social values.

Cultures are porous and elastic, absorbing and processing new as well as ancient stories. Contemporary cultures are like materials to be shaped; they acquire forms with mixed hands and benefit from becoming more and more creative. Salman Rushdie describes this culture of hybridization as a never ending one, critically questioning any search for homogeneity and purity: “Do cultures actually exist as separate, pure, defensible entities? Is not mélange, adulteration, impurity, pick’n’mix at the heart of the idea of the modern, and hasn’t it been that way for most of this all-shook-up century? Doesn’t the idea of pure cultures, in urgent need of being kept free from alien contamination, lead us inexorably toward apartheid, toward ethnic cleansing, toward the gas chamber?” (Rushdie, 1999).

Rushdie himself is the son of several cultures. He does not belong to Hindu India, or to the Muslim or the British. He stands by the claim that there is nothing pure, either in what he is or what he writes. On celebrating the anniversary of the democratic founding of modern India, Rushdie wrote an article in the New Yorker trying to answer the question “who are the best contemporary Indian writers?” While he found an extraordinary number of good Indian writers, both in Hindi and in English, to the surprise perhaps of many of his readers, he found that most of them had relocated to other countries like England, as he had himself. India is by no means the only example of such aesthetic hybridity. The most revered contemporary Mexican writer, Juan Rulfo, is considered one of the pillars upon which Latin American literature has been built. In reply to a question about the influences on his work, Rulfo, instead of giving a list of Mexican and Spanish writers, openly claimed that he could not have written his work without William Faulkner, John Dos Passos and Ernest Hemingway.
In another sign of the cosmopolitanizing thrust in contemporary culture, one might look at the way that Germany, long the most reluctant country to revise its definitions of citizenship, has begun to change. Their reversal of tradition is the product of profoundly educating themselves through democratic learning practices and cultivating the institutions of democracy. Schroeder’s victory was due, at least in part, to his still unfulfilled promise of reversing the fate of millions of “guest workers” in terms of their possible citizenship. Those guest workers, in many cases, speak better German than many of the Germans themselves. The Turkish who live in Germany are not purely Turkish anymore, but they are not German either. Schroeder promised them the right to dual citizenship, so that they do not need to forget who they are even while they enjoy full rights within the German state. The mixing and influencing between Turks and Germans, in fact, has only just begun. Germans, once so reluctant to change their habits, are opening themselves now; as the result of a very hard learning process, they have acquired the kind of democratic anti-ethnic political culture I have earlier described.

The French have until now resisted strongly the influence of their immigrants. But who can be so blind as not to notice that some of their best contemporary writers come from Africa or Asia? Think only of Albert Camus and of Marguerite Duras. The French culinary tradition, so closed for centuries to any outside influence, has begun to open itself to fusion and to non-Western influences. Neither are French designers merely French anymore. They continue to use their famous names, but the people running the fashion world of “couture” are German, Italian, English, Japanese and Spanish. The best actors and soccer players of France come from Spanish and African backgrounds1. In light of these openings in French culture, it should come as no surprise that a well known intellectual and philosopher, André Glucksmann, has called for the solidarity of the French against the ethnic cleansing and murders perpetrated by Serbs because, in his words, “to die for Pristina is to die for Europe” (cited in Cohen, 1999: 15).

Even in our poor countries in Latin America, the influences of exile and immigration have been vastly important in reshaping and cosmopolitanizing society. After receiving many different exiles from Spain, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, El

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1 One should recall, perhaps, that the first immigrants to France were Spanish.
Salvador and Guatemala, Mexico has improved itself not only because of the many new and creative institutions created by those new arrivals, who came to my country to work, and find peace, and to influence a better world. We also have gained from our very contact with these exiled peoples, which has made us aware of their suffering, losses and of our own good fortune, despite our lack of real democracy. Some of Mexico’s greatest intellectual institutions were built by the initiatives of exiled people, for example, El Colegio de México and FLACSO. The best and most prestigious presses were founded by exiled intellectuals. Immigrant intellectuals and artists mixed and configured utopian movements that made Mexico a singularly creative center of aesthetic and political intensity during the 1940s, 1950s and even the 1960s. Most interestingly, contemporary Mexicans have begun to become influenced by the ancient representatives of Mexico who were buried in the past and have recently been recovered through their entering into the public sphere. The Indian cultures of Mexico are beginning to develop and exert influence, and their cultures, already imprinted by Spanish colonization, will be fused again, this time not in a syncretistic way, but in a more open, egalitarian and democratic manner.

The first time I saw a Chicano movie I realized how different these Mexican immigrants to the United States were from Mexicans who stayed in Mexico. Strangely enough, however, it was their Mexican tradition, a mixture again of many different Indian groups and of Spanish people, which helped them create more social, cultural and familial stability than many African-Americans, a stability that helped their children have easier access to education, as some new sociological research has shown. The most interesting writers in the United States are not white males anymore, but people from other cultures, races, and genders who have revitalized “American” literature.

We could go on describing many different examples of this new and unprecedented mixing of cultures, in food, taste, ethnicity and culture. The point is that new diversity has both been stimulated by and contributed to democracy by opening our societies to criticism from the “outsiders” who permanently challenge the so-called “borders” of what being an American, Mexican, German, French or Indian means. To see this clearly, I would like to focus on the term “politically correct”, which is used in everyday life in the United States to refer to some big changes in the
normative political standard that can be legitimately employed to describe, behave and talk to others in a manner that grants them the respect they are due in a globalized nation-state. People might now have become used to the term, but it is an artificial device, like everything else in political culture, one that helps us learn how to treat others respectfully until it becomes our second nature. The more such devices exist, the more societies are open and allow for cultures to exist without borders or restrictions.

Cultures and identities should, thus, be open and permeable to possible influences. The more they mix, the richer the panorama of possibilities displayed in the world public sphere. But if an increasing range of political cultural commitments are shared by all, there are some of these that, in conclusion, I would like to consider especially carefully. These are reflected in the concept of the individual that forms the basis of democratic civil society and, in the global public sphere, informs the concepts of human rights.

3. The World Public Sphere as a Space for the Defense of Human Rights

There are things that we share with others more than anything else, and these things usually have to do with widely shared experiences. All human beings have experienced pain; suffering has become one of the most important events that makes us solidaristic with other people. Many of the initiatives of democratic countries are now related to helping other countries avoid suffering; allowing people to become respected within the societies in which they live implies defending the rights of individuals in lands outside our own. Solidarity is thus not something abstract and far away, but a feeling we are able to experience even among strangers, if we know that those others are in a state of pain because they have been treated unfairly. My last and most important argument for the enlargement of a project of integration, then, is to suggest the possibility that, in order to achieve democratic integration, there must be legal support for the rights of every individual in the world. The world public sphere is the only way to make the defense and protection of human rights a priority among the tasks of globalization. I am speaking here of the elements of political culture that are not about ethnic identities and differences, and that have nothing to do with resisting or avoiding the mixing and fusion of cultures, races and people of our times.
As Habermas has compellingly argued, with global communication “the peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastical or overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humankind” (Habermas, 1998a: 176).

Solidarity among strangers can, in fact, become one of the main political themes around which we can build a new global identity configured through the common ground of a political democratic culture. It has always been easier to side with a “foreign” people who are suffering, for it makes us feel equal and want to be helpful. Such a response to the suffering of others is and always has been an important sign that only those who have freedom, respect and rights are able to worry about people other than themselves. Perhaps the project of the European community has faltered because member nations have not been able to make use of such a common ground, have been unable to make the commitment to help others and, by helping them, become morally better themselves. In the context of the recent NATO war to defend Kosovar Albanians, this may be changing. According to the reports of Roger Cohen in *The New York Times*, many Europeans are finding new ways of experiencing common identity through their concern for other people’s destiny. Cohen compellingly argues that “images of stunned deportees with unseeing eyes have stirred terrible memories. In a Europe no longer divided by cold war, the images have prompted a determination to act, and to establish a continent-wide respect for human rights that will serve as the basis for the Europe of the next century” (Cohen, 1999: 15).

Our cosmopolitan culture situates solidarity as the basis of its existence, and that is why it must include a political culture that respects and promotes democratic institutions and the law, for only these institutions can protect individual political, social and cultural rights. What I am suggesting is that this can happen only through a certain kind of globalization, one that allows for the creation of a world public sphere. A world public sphere would replace key elements of the nation-state as a mechanism of social integration, allowing the space of public appearance to be open for the
inclusion of marginalized oppressed people with no rights, thus allowing integration without “imprisoning them in the uniformity of a homogenized ethnic community” (Habermas, 1998c: 138). Hannah Arendt’s most basic concern, the right to have rights, would be the leading theme that would mediate between political culture and world legal constitution. The principles of integration would be informed by the notion of what it requires to become a full human being, for it is by becoming human that we have the right to have rights wherever in the world we are. There must be a new international constitution articulating legal procedures to protect the individuals from political exclusion, exile, immigration and diaspora. Again, Habermas well describes the kind of historical process involved: “First, the outlawing of war already proclaimed by the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 was translated into punishable criminal offenses by the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals. These offenses are no longer limited to crimes committed during war, but incriminate war itself as a crime. Second, criminal law was extended to include ‘crimes against humanity’, crimes carried out under the instructions of state organs and with the assistance of countless members of organizations, functionaries, civil servants, businessmen and private individuals. With these two innovations, the states as subjects of international law for the first time lost the general presumption of innocence of an assumed state of nature” (Habermas, 1998b: 178). By building up a strong democratic culture, we strengthen the responsible ties among citizens of the world by implementing rights and by reinforcing their sense of duty to closely monitor the protection of these rights around the world. There is now evidence that this is not only possible but that it is actually happening. We must look at the cosmopolitan groups of world civil society gathering around themes of mutual interest like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and non-governmental human rights groups, which have become the “citizens of the world”. Greenpeace has developed strategies to fight against government and private firms which endanger the environment and the existence of species. Amnesty International has forcefully made public, year after year, the diagnosis of human rights violations in each and every country, including the most democratic ones. It is because of such international non-governmental human rights groups that, in the last years, Mexican Indians –the ones organized in Chiapas by the guerrilla group called the Zapatistas– have received all kinds of support and help from outside of Mexico.
These human rights NGOs have not only made numerous interviews with the leading figure of that guerrilla movement, Subcomandante Marcos, but they have even helped Marcos publish his stories, letters and books. They have provided medicines and food for the population of the surrounding villages where the Zapatistas are hidden. They have visited them, and the Mexican government has been very worried about the subsequent findings and reports to the world. These groups have made it impossible for the government to act in ways that it would have undoubtedly preferred if the whole world had not been watching. Perhaps what is more relevant to the argument of this paper is the growing impact enjoyed by these human rights groups in the transnational public sphere. They have, for example, often developed powerful strategies by which interested cross-national publics could succeed in reversing some legal order made by European or American states. With growing attention to world public issues, the global world civil sphere has started organizing worldwide conferences about problematic issues that can no longer be viewed as only national in scope: the ecology meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the conference on poverty in Copenhagen, the gathering on women’s oppression in Beijing in 1995.

While there is, as yet, no worldwide government, the global public sphere does possess legal institutions that have begun to exercise regulative power through persuasion rather than force. The International Court in The Hague is regarded as a weak world civil organization because its prosecutions and trials possess only symbolic significance. Yet its proceedings have been closely monitored by world public opinion, and feared and contested by private corporations and national governments alike. When the United States bombed the ports of Nicaragua to prevent them from getting needed oil, they were prosecuted by several nations, and The Hague found the United States guilty as charged. For Latin America, this was one small but symbolic battle, and it did not go without notice. While Americans did not recognize the ruling, it was a success for the world public sphere. Nowadays, the same International Court is facing the problem of how to prosecute individuals and government groups who have committed crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing. Cambodia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are first on the list. Democratic governments understand the importance of this supranational court as they try to control Slobodan Milosevic’s effort to carry on the campaign of ethnic
cleansing and genocide that began with his fellow Serbs Ratko Mladic and Radovan
Karadzic, both now convicted by The Hague. The legal arm of the world public
sphere does not need to operate only through this World Court, for international law
about human rights has gained prestige and influence within national legal systems as
well. The legal prosecution by Spanish courts of Augusto Pinochet –despite the
former dictator’s many strategies to avoid prosecution– was finally accepted in the
United Kingdom, and with its help, this Chilean opponent of democracy eventually
will be prosecuted by the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón. The most important
implication of a democratic form of law is that it applies equally to the sovereignty of
states and individuals, emphasizing the personal liability for crimes committed in the
course of government and military service. Spain recently lived through the
prosecution of many ministers of its former Socialist government. They were
prosecuted by, among others, the same judge Baltasar Garzón. This fact shows the
connection between democratizing institutions inside the national unit and the
extension of normativity that enlarges democracy’s scope to the global domain.

The fact that Garzón has been successful, despite possible interferences of
British law, and the conflicting interests of powerful people and countries, shows the
real possibility of implementing the idea that citizens can have rights and
responsibilities beyond their states and national frontiers. The more democratic a
country, the less can it allow persons to escape their responsibility for committing
“crimes against humanity” in any of its forms. Garzón has initiated a world-historical
event that illuminates how we are stepping into a global normative order, one that is
forcing us to make the transition from state law to “cosmopolitan law”, or, as Kant
would have said, to das Recht der Weltburger, the first step for a global order.

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Discontents: Cultural Conflict and Common Ground in Contemporary


CHAPTER 9

Solidarity, Reciprocity and Recognition: Confronting Pluralism, Reconfiguring Democratic Citizenship in Transnational Context

Raymond Rocco

As with most emergent concepts, the current meanings and uses of transnationalism are widely contested and we find it used to describe a broad array of activities, practices, and relationships. Some scholars configure it primarily and narrowly in terms of the various dimensions of the ties that migrants establish and maintain with their homeland. Others focus on the expansion of extensive circuits of capital and networks of investment, while the emergence of new forms of social movements that span across at least two nation-states are the focus of still another approach. In response to this ambiguity, several recent works have attempted to provide a way to delimit the different and various dimensions of the discourses. For example, Sarah Mahler argues that we can distinguish perspectives that approach transnationalism “from above” and “from below” (Mahler, 1998: 66). The former are those approaches that concentrate on explaining the ways in which “transnational corporations, media […] and other macro level structures and processes that transcend two or more states” pursue and promote political, economic and cultural dominance (Ibid: 67). Studies that focus on transnationalism “from below” are more concerned with discovering and examining the range of strategies that are developed at the micro level of “everyday life” by “ordinary people” in contexts that transcend national boundaries and by which they modify, resist, or transform their conditions. The limitation of Mahler’s discussion, however, is that she provides no way to integrate or connect these approaches, so that while the schema provides a useful way to

1 For the first view, see Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc (1994). For a discussion of approaches to transnationalism that focus on capital, see Appadurai (1990: 296-99). The emphasis on transnational social and political movements has been developed in a number of works by Michael Peter Smith (1992; 1994).
2 Mahler (1998) cites the work of Smith (1992; 1994) as examples of this approach.
categorize approaches, we are still left with two distinct foci. Smith and Guarnizo propose an approach that attempts to incorporate the different elements represented in the literature and stress that transnationalism is a “multifaceted, multilocal process” whose complexity must be understood not only in terms of its constitutive processes, but also in terms of the scale and “scope of effects that contemporary transnational flows have upon the societies involved” (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998: 4). This complexity is the result of “the convergence of several historically specific factors” that include the following: the globalization of capital, technological revolution in communication and transportation, global political transformations and the “expansion of the social networks that facilitate the reproduction of transnational migration, economic organization and politics” (Ibid). Yet another formulation is advanced by Lins Ribeiro who argues for the analytic distinction between globalization and transnationalism. He considers globalization to refer to the “historical economic process directly related to the expansion of capitalism” that creates the “economic and technological basis that makes possible the existence of transnationalism”, which Ribeiro considers to be the realm of politics and ideology. He proposes the following conception: “The organization of people within imagined communities, their relationships to power institutions and the reconfiguration of identities, subjectivities and the relationships between the private and the public spheres are the main thrust of the discussion on transnationalism” (Ribeiro, 1998: 325).

While my discussion is obviously not intended to be a comprehensive review of the various approaches to transnationalism, those I have described above are representative of some of the different emphases found in the field. And it reflects the fact that the major difficulty confronting the development of a common analytic framework lies in deciphering and delineating the nature of the articulations between the economic, cultural, social and political dimensions of transnationalism. This is what seems to be at issue in these representative formulations. How exactly are the circuits and networks of capital accumulation and investment linked to the specific patterns of cultural re-figuration, and how do these affect the nature and effectiveness of the claims of political jurisdiction over newly forming communities of transmigrants? How are the process and content of the formation of social identity
affected by the reconfigured patterns of family and household networks, relations and practices? Each of the approaches to transnationalism provides insights into different aspects of these processes but we are far from a theory of transnationalism that can account for the linkages between the different levels and societal dimensions reflected in these elements.

Thus studies of transnationalism are forced to proceed with concepts and formulations that are at best tentative and provisional. However, despite the lack of a coherent theory, what we do know is that the various dimensions that are included in the formulations summarized above do exist and have had profound effects on societies. The related processes of economic globalization, cultural reconfiguration, transmigration and political disjunctions have altered the basis of the nature of concepts and institutions such as the nation, state, sovereignty, citizenship and civil society and have modified the way in which established notions of power, authority and space are constructed. The flows of peoples, cultures and capital across social and geopolitical borders have transformed the configurations and boundaries of social formations to such an extent that modernist formulations and notions of traditional political and cultural relations can no longer adequately account for them. One of the clearest examples is the challenge that has arisen to the assumed isomorphism of territory, sovereignty and culture that has been at the root of the concept of the nation-state and the constellation of derivative discourses on community, membership and citizenship that have emerged since the Treaty of Westphalia. It is the effect of the social field of transnationalism on the latter grouping in particular that I want to address in this essay.

1. Citizenship, Community and Membership in Transnational Context

The significance and importance of these concerns are reflected in the fact that the examination of the implications of the processes of globalization and transnationalism for citizenship has become one of the principal concerns of a

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3 See, for example the essay by Gupta and Ferguson (1992) for a discussion of this disjunction and its implications for social theory. Also, much of post-colonial scholarship has arisen at least in part as a response to this disjunction and has focused on developing notions such as “border zones”, “third space”, and “third timespace” to challenge the inadequacy of the binary and essentialist foundations of modernist social and political theory. See Rocco (1999b).
considerable number of works in recent political theory\textsuperscript{4}. While the particular emphases, approaches and positions vary greatly in this literature, all the analyses have in some way had to address the rapid growth in both the scope and scale of the multiculturalism promoted by these processes.

At the core of this problematic is the set of tensions that have resulted from the rapid and extensive migration of populations from Third World countries to the metropolitan centers of Europe, the United States and Australia. The often extreme cultural disjunctions between the immigrant populations and the host society have resulted in the creation of spaces of liminality characterized by a topography of surface level engagements floating above zones of at best anxiety, and at worst suspicion and distrust. The significance of the emergence of these zones for democracy and citizenship has been configured around the axis of diversity, social and value pluralism, and the basic question that emerges is something like the following: what forms of democratic practices and institutions can reconcile cultural membership and democratic citizenship in societies characterized by fundamental differences in values and beliefs between significant sectors of the population? In other words, what must the nature of democracy be in multicultural societies? And given that most large scale societies are multicultural, then, what we are really asking is: what must the nature of democracy be in the contemporary period.

My intention is not to review the entire spectrum of debate but rather to focus on one aspect of the issue, namely on the theorization of the intersection between citizenship, democracy and multiculturalism. What I argue is that this intersection is one of the most problematic dimensions of the issue and that while it is central to virtually all the major positions, in my view it has not been sufficiently developed in a way that addresses the particular realities of multiculturalism. I propose that this intersection consists of the nature of the social relations that must exist between members of a society who hold fundamentally different moral and cultural values in order to promote a legitimate, just and inclusive form of democracy. Although this concern is not always necessarily framed in these terms, all positions nevertheless

ultimately rest on either implicit or explicit assumptions about the requisite qualitative nature of societal relations. I want to substantiate this argument by reviewing several constructs of the relations between citizenship, democracy and multiculturalism and demonstrate that each rests on the existence of a particular substantive characteristic of societal relations, such as mutual obligation, mutual recognition, reciprocity or solidarity.

Let me begin with the opposing views of Rawls and Habermas, which along with the perspective of Taylor, are perhaps the most influential constructs of the relationship between citizenship, democracy and multiculturalism. Both Rawls and Habermas focus on the intersection between citizenship, democracy and multiculturalism in terms of a notion of public reason by which the validity or justification of the claims or arguments of individuals is to be determined by standards of judgment that differ for the two authors. In Political Liberalism, Rawls (1996) presents a reformulation of the theory of justice he had offered nearly two decades ago. In the more recent work, the goal is to defend a version of liberalism that addresses directly the new condition of multiculturalism, or pluralism as he refers to it, that I have argued has resulted from the processes of globalization and transnationalism, as well as from the political transformations of the last decade. Rawls states that the major question that his work addresses is: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?” (Rawls, 1996: xxvii). This, he argues, is a problem of political justice and Rawls advances a response by reconfiguring his notion of justice as fairness that rested on moral premises into what he calls a “freestanding” political concept of justice that “applies to the basic structure of society” (Ibid: xliii). It is freestanding in the sense that it does not derive from a comprehensive substantive doctrine but rather rests on its own “intrinsic normative and moral ideal” (Ibid: xliiv). Rawls then offers the following as the basis of his approach:

“Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation (defined by principles and ideals) and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in
particular situations, provided that others also accept those terms. For these terms to be fair terms, citizens offering them must reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms are offered might also reasonably accept them” (Ibid: xlv).

This criterion of cooperation that Rawls refers to as “reciprocity” must ultimately find expression and be incorporated as rights and duties within the major institutions of society if pluralistic (multicultural) democracy is to function effectively (Ibid: 16). Much of Political Liberalism is devoted to specifying and qualifying the conditions, characteristics and concomitant factors that are implied by this premise and that are necessary to establish and sustain its connection to the political realm proper. This last point is important to Rawls since he wants to emphasize that the solution to the problem of fundamental differences in democracies must be located as a “political” solution that is forged within public institutions (public sphere?) and not within the realm of civil society, or “background culture” as he calls it (Ibid: 14). Yet there seems to be a tension in Rawls’ position here since he also holds that “the role of the criterion of reciprocity as expressed in public reason […] is to specify the nature of the political relation in a constitutional democratic regime as one of civic friendship. For this criterion, when citizens follow it in their public reasoning, shapes the form of their fundamental institutions” (Ibid: li). However, the language of friendship is a curious choice for conveying the insistence that the political realm (as Rawl’s construes it) must be the forum for addressing differences. This reflects an ambivalence at the core of Rawls’ argument about the relationship between the social and the political. He does not want to be interpreted as accepting any particular substantive value or commitment, yet neither does he want to ignore the fundamental role of “background culture”. And so he attempts to provide for a linkage by arguing as follows: “In a democratic society there is a tradition of democratic thought, the content of which is at least familiar and intelligible to the educated common sense of citizens generally. Society’s main institutions, and their accepted forms of interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and principles” (Ibid: 14). Thus civil society can be the source of “shared principles”, which I take it, would provide a basis for an “overlapping consensus” but cannot itself be the site of the public sphere. While Rawls seeks to construe reciprocity as a variant of a procedural
contractualism, his conception of it nevertheless constitutes a qualitative concept rooted in a particular set of substantive assumptions about what the nature of social relations must be like for democracy to function effectively.

Like Rawls, Habermas has recently attempted to rework some of his earlier formulations and as part of that project has offered a wide-ranging articulation and defense of what he refers to as a “deliberative model of politics” (Habermas, 1998). Habermas considers both liberal and communitarian views of politics as incapable of providing the normative standards for the justification of democracy and to account for the reality of pluralism. While the former conceives of democratic politics in terms of the procedural dimensions for reaching compromises, the latter advances a concept that rests on principles of substantive ethical content. In contrast, Habermas provides an alternative formulation that he argues “takes elements from both sides and integrates these in the concept of an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making” (Habermas, 1996: 26). He develops this by elaborating the notion of “communicative rationality” that has been one of the cornerstones of Habermas’ work for the last two decades. He argues that the core of this notion is “the linguistic medium through which interactions are woven together and forms of life are structured. This rationality is inscribed in the linguistic telos of mutual understanding and forms an ensemble of conditions that both enable and limit” (Habermas, 1998: 3-4). From this notion, he has formulated a discourse ethics that establishes a procedure for justifying the norms of justice that must define the institutional basis of democratic legitimacy and through which rational agreements between differing parties can be reached. Habermas elaborates the nature of this procedure through his construct of the “ideal speech” situation, which spells out the general conditions that must exist for this process to function effectively. Thus the model of deliberative politics proposed by Habermas rests on a discourse theory of ethics and society that derives the validity of political norms from the “very structure of communicative actions” (Habermas, 1996: 26).

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5 Habermas has produced an enormous range of works in which he has developed an overall theory of society within which the model of deliberative politics dealt with here is situated. I focus only on that portion of Habermas’ theory that addresses this directly.
In contrast to Rawls, Habermas has argued for an institutionally expansive notion of the “political” and he has used the notion of the public sphere to develop an argument for the particular role that participation must play in democratic systems. For Habermas, the public sphere consists of those institutional spaces in society where individuals who are affected by collective decisions and societal norms have an opportunity to engage in public dialogue as a means to affect these. This is a form of democratic participation that must go beyond the formal institutions of government and that includes the realm of civil society. It is a recognition that democratic legitimacy must have a foundation in the realm of public life more generally defined, one that is rooted in the dialogical, intersubjective engagement of individuals seeking to find agreement through discourse. As a means for elaborating this process, Habermas relies on the notion of the ideal speech situation through which he establishes the specific conditions that must exist within the public sphere in order for this dialogical, intersubjective engagement to result in the validation of democratic norms. What are these conditions? In summarizing this aspect of Habermas’ argument, Benhabib correctly observes that “the normative constraints of the ideal speech situation or of practical discourses have been specified as the conditions of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity” (Benhabib, 1992: 105). These two criteria and the relationship between them define, I argue, the way in which Habermas construes the intersection of citizenship, democracy and plurality.

Let me focus on this aspect of Habermas’ argument. It rests on the notion that for the ideal speech situation to realize its function of promoting the process of the resolution of conflicting values, there must first exist social bonds of mutual trust and reciprocity between those who engage in that public dialogue. And these in turn require an intersubjective network of mutual recognition, which Habermas has sought to elaborate through his discussion of the relationship between justice and solidarity. Adapting and modifying the work of Kohlberg on moral development, Habermas argues that individuals can only take form “by growing into a speech community and thus into an intersubjectively shared lifeworld” (Habermas, 1989-90: 46). Therefore any norm that governs behavior cannot secure the integrity of the individual “without at the same time safeguarding the vitally necessary web of relationships of mutual recognition in which individuals can stabilize their fragile identities only mutually and
simultaneously with the identity of their group” (Ibid: 47). Thus justice, which is the realm of promoting equal treatment and dignity for individuals, cannot be realized without solidarity, that is, without at the same time pursuing the welfare and wellbeing of the members of a community without which the individual could not exist as himself or herself. For Habermas, then, the grounding of the legitimacy claims of democracy rests and depends on the existence of these qualitative characteristics and the social relations between its members. Without bonds of respect, mutual recognition and solidarity, the conditions for the realization of a just and democratic society would be absent.

The positions laid out by Rawls and Habermas have served as the basis of considerable debate that includes important extensions, critiques and modifications which have implications for theorizing those qualitative dimensions of the intersection of citizenship, democracy and multiculturalism reviewed above, namely, mutual respect, reciprocity and solidarity. I will limit my discussion to some of the important arguments that pertain only to this dimension. One of the most influential of these has been advanced by Benhabib in her assessment of the debate between Kohlberg and Gilligan on moral theory (Benhabib, 1992). As an adherent of a modified version of the model of deliberative democracy put forth by Habermas, Benhabib subscribes to the premise that claims to democratic legitimacy in such a model rest on general principles and moral “intuitions” based on the discourse model of ethics. Thus her concern with the moral premises underlying the positions developed by Rawls and Habermas.

Benhabib argues that the conception of the moral domain found in the contractarian tradition that Rawls represents, is in fact a limited, partial and exclusivistic construct whose validity is thereby seriously restricted. Benhabib develops this critique by introducing a distinction between two perspectives of the self-other relations that are the basis of moral theorizing. The first she labels the “generalized other” which views self-others relations in terms of the norms of formal equality and reciprocity by which “each is entitled to expect and to assume from us what we can expect and assume from him or her” (Benhabib 1996a: 159). This perspective is based on commonality and implies the need to institutionalize mechanisms that can secure and guarantee the viability of mutual expectations and thus the moral categories
entailed by this view are those that have to do with rights, obligations and entitlements which require relatively formal and thin social bonds. While Benhabib clearly considers this dimension of the moral domain as necessary to establish democratic legitimacy, she argues, that it is however not sufficient. What is absent is the standpoint of the “concrete other” which views individuals as rational beings with specific histories, needs, identities and desires. Thus it is individuality and uniqueness of the self that comes into play here. The logic of this perspective calls for moral norms that promote mutual recognition and affirmation rather than expectations and which, according to Benhabib, include friendship, love and care. Benhabib refers to this ethical position that characterizes the domain of the concrete other as the “ethics of care”. What Benhabib proposes is that moral positions based solely on the image of the “generalized other” are incapable of facilitating or establishing the grounds for an authentic engagement between the self and the other because the other in this view is an abstraction, or as Benhabib describes it, a “disembedded and disembodied” being which brackets out the otherness of the other. Therefore the principles that discourse ethics establish for the model of deliberative democracy can be valid only if 1) they are based on the equality, dignity and equal standing of each person, and 2) on an open, dialogical process that promotes and facilitates the incorporation of the substantive or concrete otherness of the participants (Ibid: 171). By introducing the qualitative dimensions of personal bonds and care in the form of the “concrete other”, Benhabib argues that the distinction and tension between a more formalistic “ethics of justice and rights and one of care and responsibility” can be overcome (Ibid: 170). Again in this formulation we find that it is the qualitative dimension that enables the effectiveness of democratic pluralist citizenship.

While in general agreement with Benhabib’s project of trying to establish and maintain a balance between the formation of individual identity and the collectivity, Nancy Fraser argues that there is a limitation that arises from the way that Benhabib has construed the relationship between the qualitative dimension that underlies the discourse-based ethical position and the political sphere (Fraser, 1986). Fraser notes that Benhabib's account of the “concrete other” is meant to emphasize the specificity and provide for the affirmation of the individual and that, as indicated above, the qualitative bonds that correspond to this perspective are love, care and friendship
normally bonds of intimacy within more private relationships, and based on the ethic of care. Fraser refers to this position as the “individualized concrete other” but suggests an alternative formulation that she believes addresses the logic of political power more directly (Ibid: 427). She calls this “the standpoint of the collective concrete other” and with it wants to stress the significance of group membership for understanding the connection between moral and political practice. In particular, Fraser wants to underscore the fact that the model of democratic legitimacy must be able to account for inequalities of power. These inequalities will in all likelihood be reflected in what she calls the “socio-cultural means of interpretation and communication” by which she means the vocabularies and narrative traditions and resources that are available “to individuals and groups for the construction of individual life-stories or group identities and solidarities” (Ibid: 428). Thus viable democratic public spheres must insure that the discourses of the various cultural groups have a real and meaningful space and presence. Without this, the dialogue that is the supposed to be the means both for validating the discourse model of democracy and for mediating deep cultural and value differences would in fact be no dialogue at all.

Fraser argues that this emphasis on the collective dimension of democratic public space, on the “collective concrete other”, requires a different sort of ethical foundation, one that reflects a different dimension of qualitative social bonds that facilitate effective participation in the public sphere. She suggests that this perspective or standpoints leads to an ethic of solidarity which “would require one to relate to people as members of collectivities or social groups with specific cultures, histories, social practices, values, habits, forms of life, vocabularies of self-interpretation and narrative traditions” and the “ethical force of this orientation is that we owe each other behavior such that each is confirmed as a being with specific collective identifications and solidarities” (Ibid: 429). Thus the qualitative bonds that facilitate the emergence of effective democratic public spheres are based on networks of social practice that instantiate norms of mutual affirmation and collective solidarity. In Fraser’s formulation, these bonds of social solidarity mediate between the ethic of care and the ethic of justice and rights, and therefore seem to function as the ethical domain that corresponds to the realm of civil society, and that bridges the institutional spaces of
public and private relations. These are indeed modalities of reciprocity, but reciprocities of recognition and validation rather than of exchange or obligation.

This necessity to insure the authentic and inclusive nature of the process of dialogical deliberative engagement in the public sphere has also been addressed by some who rely on the notion of toleration as the mechanism for configuring the intersection of citizenship, democracy and multiculturalism⁶. This is the particular focus of the analysis and argument proposed in a recent essay on diversity by Adeno Addis (Addis, 1997). He notes that particularly in liberal analysis of the tensions between multiculturalism and democracy, toleration is advanced as the primary principle for responding to the existence of minorities whose culture differs substantially from the majority culture. However, Addis points out that there are in fact positive and negative constructions of the notion of toleration and that is the latter sense that is normally adopted. In this view, toleration consists of exceptions to majority practices, beliefs or values that the majority grants as an act of “self-restraint” or “generosity” to a minority. The majority is seen as bearing the “costs” of toleration. But Addis argues that in fact it is the minority that bears the heaviest costs, for negative toleration, or what Addis refers to as paternalistic toleration, is based on a sense of endurance, on forbearance or indifference and not on a sense of respect for the minority. It is to tolerate as in “putting up with”. Addis argues that: “For minorities, paternalistic toleration is often purchased at the heavy price of not being recognized as equal participants in the polity, ironically the very thing that toleration is meant to cure” (Ibid: 120). This results in the paradoxical outcome that toleration both includes and marginalizes at the same time. For the majority allows the minority to participate within the polity but only on its own terms, which are reflected in the fact that it is only in terms of the language, principles, values, beliefs and narrative traditions of the majority embodied in the public institutions that legitimate public action can take place, thus in effect marginalizing the minority within the public sphere. The public identity of the polity is in fact defined by majority culture and so it is extremely unlikely in this situation that the minority culture can influence the “background framework within which sense is made of public deliberations about the terms and conditions of political life and institutional arrangements” (Ibid: 121). It is

⁶ See for example the argument advanced by Kukathas (1997) and the response by Walzer (1997).
clear that a public sphere that is based on the thin qualitative nature of social bonds under the conditions of paternalistic tolerance cannot establish any of the conditions of mutual recognition, reciprocity, solidarity or respect that are necessary for dialogical deliberative democracy to effectively mediate the conflicts that arise from the type of deep differences that are characteristic of multicultural societies. Addis summarizes the likely consequences as follows.

A society that acknowledges the fact of pluralism (and its normative desirability) without providing the institutional means through which the ethic of reciprocal empathy, respect, and inclusiveness are cultivated is a society which at best allows minorities to be tolerated as the marginal Other or, at worst, lays the ground for an endless and destructive conflict, where in most cases the minority will probably shoulder the greater cost (Ibid: 126).

As an alternative to paternalistic toleration, Addis advances what he calls the notion of “pluralistic solidarity”, a type of social bond that promotes a “partial and contingent […] shared identity” between majority and minority by fostering forms of communication between them that leads each to perceive and understand that their distinctiveness is to a large degree defined in terms of its relationship with the Other” (Ibid: 127). This shared identity can only be created discursively through genuine dialogue that promotes an understanding of the substantive specificity of the culture of each Other. In this sense, Addis clearly accepts the deliberative model of democracy as the best approach to reconcile democracy and multiculturalism. But he makes a crucial addition to the model as typically articulated. He argues that if we are to come to understand what constitutes and defines the specificity of each “Us” that coexists in these societies, then we need to get beyond the thin layer of engagement that characterizes paternalistic toleration. We need to address the process by which each “Us” comes to form its image of each Other. Addis argues that it is through the institutions of the media, the law and educational system that the cultural imaging of each group is framed. Therefore the dialogical engagement must be situated within these institutional means by which those images of each “Us” are constructed. It is only by creating institutional spaces that facilitate and foster mutual interrogation, a mode of institutional dialogue, that the process of “shared identity” can function effectively for it is within and through these structured spheres of interaction that we
can in fact reveal who “we” are, “tell the stories about where we have been, what is important to us, how we relate to one another, and what and who the problems are, as well as possible solutions to those problems” (Ibid: 128). Pluralistic solidarity can only be forged through structures and processes that facilitate the telling and listening to each Other’s stories, where the exchange is framed in terms of narrative and existential categories so that the fullest dimensions of the lived experiences can be conveyed and understood. Formal requirements, procedures and rules alone cannot promote the type of “partial and contingent” qualitative social bond that is necessary for this process to function and to establish the basis for a viable pluralistic democratic citizenship.

Despite the considerable differences between each of the positions reviewed here, they nevertheless converge around the issue of specifying the qualitative conditions and forms of social bonds that must exist for a viable democratic multicultural citizenship to function effectively. They rely on different conceptual devices for doing so, such as mutual recognition, reciprocity and solidarity. I have referred to this dimension as the junction or intersection of citizenship, democracy and multiculturalism. Now I want to return to the connection between this intersection and transnationalism and address explicitly the implications of this theoretical discussion for the broader theme.

As I indicated at the beginning of this essay, the processes of transnationalism and globalization have accelerated the growth of non-European communities within the major cities of Europe and the United States. As a result, these societies have become even more deeply multiethnic and multicultural in nature and it is clear that cultural difference and disjunction is now a permanent characteristic of the contemporary world. Thus resolving the tensions between multiculturalism, democracy and citizenship that have deepened in the last three decades is one of the fundamental challenges that liberal democracies must confront if they are to remain viable. Bruce Ackerman, one of the major contemporary liberal theorists, has gone so far as to say that “if America [sic] cannot confront the problem of pluralism, it is finished as a nation” (Ackerman, 1994: 365). But I submit that confronting pluralism successfully cannot be accomplished by relying on the established conceptions of liberalism, democracy and pluralism and the relations between them that define the
limits of both the theoretical and political boundaries as they are embodied in the dominant institutional structures. The normative structure of these dimensions rest upon assumptions about the qualitative nature of social bonds that cannot lead to nor sustain the type of dialogical engagement that is advanced in the positions I have reviewed as being necessary for an effective, just and inclusive democratic society. Only a modality of collective social solidarity that enables the type of mutual interrogation that can lead to the kind of “partial and contingent” shared identity that Addis articulates can do so. This can be accomplished only by the creation of institutionalized public spheres that facilitate and promote a form of social and cultural engagement whose goal is explicitly that of mutual understanding of the substantive specificity of each Other. However, we need to be willing to consider that it may very well be that this requires that the very meaning of the concept of democracy as it has been elaborated for the last three centuries needs to be completely transformed.

Indeed I believe that this is the position that Alain Touraine has adopted in his treatise on democracy (Touraine, 1997). In summarizing his argument, Touraine states that: “In the past, democracy struggled first for political freedom, and then for social justice. What struggle is it waging today? This book offers an answer: democracy’s raison d’être is the recognition of the other” (Ibid: 190). He is not arguing that recognition alone can provide the foundation of democracy but rather that mutual recognition must be its goal. Touraine does not abandon nor minimize the need for rights and freedoms but rather implies that these should be construed as means to promote the form of mutuality that recognition both implies and requires. They are not subordinate to recognition but are in fact constitutive of it. And this reconfiguring of democracy in terms of recognition can only be achieved by the creation of institutional spaces where the particularity of an “experience, a culture, or a memory can be reconciled with the universalism […] of juridical and administrative organization” (Ibid: 191). These democratic spheres are places of “dialogue and communication” and the “politics of recognition makes possible and organizes a recomposition of the world, which must bring together that which has been separated” (Ibid). In a position that parallels that advanced by Addis, Touraine holds that in this concept of democracy, “membership in the collectivity, the civic spirit, and therefore
participation in collective actions and symbols must give way to as direct an encounter as possible with the other. The ability to listen and debate must replace mobilization toward a common goal” (*Ibid:* 192). Touraine completes this argument with the following:

“The criterion by which a democratic society is to be gauged is not the form of consensus or participation it has attained but the quality of the differences it recognizes and manages. It is the intensity and the depth of the dialogue between different personal experiences and cultures, which are so many particular and limited responses to the same general questions” (*Ibid:* 191).

For Touraine, the most extreme form of difference that this model of democratic engagement and recognition must confront is represented by the immigrant, who he takes to be the “emblematic figure of modern society. An immigrant is at once integrated into the society in which he or she lives and foreign to it. The host society must recognize his or her experience and language. It must experience his or her presence not as a threat but as the return of a part of human experience that the host society has been denied or has lost” (*Ibid:* 192). Here Touraine takes the line of argument that makes mutual recognition, solidarity or reciprocity the centerpiece of democracy to the conclusion that I contend is implied in its premises. It makes the eradication of the image of difference as “foreignness” the defining characteristic of democratic pluralistic citizenship. Yet the imagery of foreignness has been a fundamental and constitutive element of even those analyses of transnationalism that are sympathetic and supportive of immigrant rights in democratic systems. What the transformational re-articulation of the meaning and purpose of democratic principles proposed by Touraine reveals is the intrinsic limitations of these constructs. The conclusion that must follow is that democratization in transnational context cannot be realized until the forms of

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7 The positions articulated by Touraine and Addis are clearly advancing a similar notion of the kind of qualitative bonds necessary for a viable democracy. I suggest that their positions imply a different concept of subjectivity. If by subjectivity we mean how we construe our sense of self and relation to others and to the world, then it would appear that these formulations rest on a notion of subjectivity that develops and is formed through integrating structures of narrativity, rather than free standing notions of self, reason or cognitive and/or affective dimensions. Instead, this narrative subjectivity consists of the process that weaves these elements together in both a diachronic and synchronic configuration that provides simultaneously for the continuity and adaptation of the subject. See Sommers and Gibson (1994) for a defense of a narrative-based notion of the subject.
engagement between “Others” have been decoupled from the optic of difference as “foreignness”. And only the type of institutional spaces that Addis articulated can provide forums of narrativity that allows for the mutual interrogation of the substantive specificity of the participants. Not until they are reconfigured within these reformulated parameters can the notions of mutual recognition, solidarity and reciprocity lead to the theoretical and institutional grounding for the type of democratic pluralistic citizenship that resonates with and corresponds to the fluid forms of transnational social formations that define the contemporary world.

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CHAPTER 10

Asymmetries in the European Union:
Nine Distinguishing Features of the
European Integration Process

José Antonio Nieto Solís

“Let’s not confuse borders and limits”
Sampedro (1991: 16)

1. Introduction: The Need for an Interdisciplinary Focus

The process of integration of the European Union (EU) member countries is a privileged laboratory to study the new manifestations of the phenomena of transnationalization and globalization present in our day and age. The following pages are an attempt to characterize European integration from an interdisciplinary perspective. Of the nine distinguishing features we will propose, two relate to the dynamics of European integration, two others to the EU’s economic model, two to its social profile, two to the Union’s political dimension and one will be derived from the analysis of the incipient foreign policies of the European Community.

The presentation does not seek to cover all aspects of a phenomenon of such analytical complexity as the EU, but it does intend to point out those that emerge from the main spheres of action of European integration, taking also into consideration the relations between them. Occasionally, this circumstance will force us to address the same issue from different points of view.

The hypotheses contained in this article have arisen from the study of the EU’s main financial tool, the General Revenue and Expenditures Budget, and a good portion of the considerations that follow are statistically supported by the Community budget, which is why the appendices include data extracted from it. In my opinion, studying the budget is a very valuable approach for detecting the limits and possibilities of European integration and understanding its attributes and weaknesses.
The budget supplies an X-ray of European integration where the Union’s basic asymmetries are easier to assess (Nieto, 1999).

These asymmetries are an essential part of the EU’s basic characteristics, which is why they cannot be appraised without taking into consideration their nature, causes and implications. Some of them will be explained, and even justified, by studying the history of European integration. Others, on the contrary, reflect essential imbalances within the Union, whose persistence could jeopardize the integration experience itself.

2. Mechanics of European Integration and Supremacy of the Economic Model

The first basic asymmetry in the EU concerns the greater protagonism granted to economic integration over political and social integration (Pelkmans, 1997). The term asymmetry refers to the presence of a decompensation or imbalance, which shouldn’t necessarily be interpreted as a definitive dysfunction or deformity. There has often been talk of a “Europe of merchants”, of the predominance of big business and economic interests, and a Europe that favors capitalist accumulation over social legitimation processes. All this seems to converge in criticism of Europe’s deficiencies in matters of social and political construction, by contrast with the greater weight of the Union’s economic model. However, two objections can be raised against this point of view.

In the first place, appearances are not the whole reality, since the political dimension has always been behind economic integration. And, in the second place, the economic model supplies a mechanics of integration endowed with its own automatism, which has to a great extent contributed to the success of European integration, even at the expense of underdevelopment in other aspects, such as the social profile of integration. In other words, the birth of the European project had its origin in an eminently political agreement, intended to put an end to war in the Old Continent. Political agreements, beginning with the development of the Franco-German pact, have continued to be at the foundation of European integration and have even made possible the creation of the Monetary Union and the circulation of the euro in 2002. That is, the political dimension has always been present in the EU, even if the economic model has been more visible.
Furthermore, criticism against the apparent predominance of the economy does not sufficiently acknowledge the greater ease this sphere provides for reaching common agreements and tacitly implementing mechanisms that entail apparent reciprocal or multilateral benefits. Even though the distribution has not been equitable, the integration of European markets has had global advantages that allow us to assert that none of the participating Member States have seen their economic situation deteriorate. It is a positive-sum game that has made the growth of European economies more dynamic.

One could even state that, had it not entered through the false door of the economy, European integration wouldn’t have been possible. Still, one might ask how long should this asymmetry continue and, more specifically, how long will social matters and internal cohesion, as well as the political aspects necessary to secure a concept of common citizenship, continue to be relegated behind the economy. Furthermore, the primacy of the economic model has been reinforced by the progressive establishment of the Monetary Union. But it is possible that the single currency will itself demand a greater development of Europe’s social profile and political dimension. It is possible that the common currency will require a greater advance in European construction, and not only in the Union’s monetary macroeconomics.

3. Predominance of Negative-Integration Mechanisms

The second basic asymmetry in the Union has to do with the traditional distinction between negative- and positive-integration mechanisms, with the former entailing the elimination of forms of discrimination and eventually the suppression of borders, and the latter involving the implementation of common policies and measures jointly defined by the countries participating in the integration process (Nieto, 1995).

It is a well-known fact that, historically, European integration has shown preference for negative-integration mechanisms, that is, the creation of an economic space without internal borders, based on the harmonization of legislations and the mutual recognition of the respective national norms, as long as these don’t induce discrimination towards other nations’ economic agents. Considerable progress has
already been made in the construction of this common space, and this impetus will be
decisive as the single currency is established in Europe and other countries of the
world.

On the other hand, common policies are scarce and have few resources at their
disposal, as can be deduced from analysis of the Community budget. Some limited-scope
actions on internal policy (cohesion and Police and Judicial Cooperation) and
foreign policy (development aid and External Actions) have been added to the
traditional development of agricultural and commercial policy, the only truly common
EU policies. And some of these new actions actually involve intergovernmental
cooperation mechanisms, which makes the establishment of common policies still
more complex.

Once again, looking towards the future, we can raise a fundamental question:
will Europe be able to face both its internal demands and those that emerge from
globalization, not to mention a greater development of its common policies? Is the
suppression of economic and monetary borders sufficient without a parallel advance
in the social and political cohesion of the common space being shaped?

It seems evident that European integration needs to also rest on these other
dimensions if it doesn’t want to produce a greater estrangement in its citizens. After
analyzing the history of European integration, one may accept the deliberate
gradualness, the functionalist strategy, and even the pragmatism that has thus far
presided over European construction. But it is difficult to accept that this dynamics of
integration must be definitive. Thus far it hasn’t generated enough backing among the
citizenry, and although it has this backing among economic agents, in prospective
terms this doesn’t seem sufficient to guarantee the necessary legitimacy on which
common actions and policies must be erected in the future.

4. The Uneven Sectoral Impact of the EU’s Economy

The third basic asymmetry in the Union concerns the economic model and
affects in the first place its sectoral perspective or microeconomic focus. From this
point of view, one can highlight the uneven sectoral impact of European integration,
that is, the variable influence the EU exerts over the various economic sectors, which
leads to a significant lack of uniformity in the microeconomic regulation of European integration (Fernández, 1997; Molle, 1990).

As has previously been noted, integration mechanisms comprise two basic means of action. One entails the development of common policies and requires the application of regulation, control, and even financing instruments by Community institutions. The other, on the contrary, barely allows for the application of common norms or Community support mechanisms but, instead, is driven solely by the purpose of gradually approximating national legislations, avoiding at least possible incompatibilities within the same activity sector between different European countries. This is the case with most sectoral activities, over which Community legislation has only a partial impact and sometimes only in a general or horizontal manner.

The majority of industrial and service activities, as well as education and health care, constitute glaring examples of serious deficiencies in Community legislation. In order to compensate for the lack of common actions and policies, the EU has several horizontal-type instruments available whose scope of application can be extended to those sectors lacking Community regulations. The existence of uniform and increasingly broader foundations in Community law, as well as the common management of European policy in the defense of competition fill some of the existing normative gaps and guarantee the suppression of discrimination based on strictly national criteria.

In reality, European policy regarding competition and a significant portion of Community law contain an odd formula that allows giving primacy to internationalizing or supranational aspects over national norms that might be incompatible or protectionist and, therefore, discriminatory towards other Member States. This is justified in the programmatic requirement to guarantee free competition within the European market, despite the evidence that the growing processes of capital concentration and centralization clearly come in contradiction with the maintenance of effective competition (Schaub, 1999; Beck, 2000).

All this notwithstanding, the sectorally asymmetric development of European legislation seems wholly justified if we consider the enormous structural differences between the various countries. Furthermore, it would be dangerous to ask the EU to
regulate all activity sectors with equal intensity. Such an aim would entail a step towards centralism, contrary to the spirit reflected in the Treaty of the EU, which is decentralizing, federalist, and based on the new principle of subsidiarity. Moreover, the European budget would not be able to sustain a higher level of regulation over the Member States’ economic sectors, so that in this case the uneven sectoral impact of common policies does not seem to point to any essential imbalance in the Union’s normal operation.

5. The Macroeconomic Model and Nominal Convergence

The fourth basic asymmetry in the Union also refers to the economic model, but now from a macroeconomic perspective. The concern for nominal convergence over real convergence has shaped recent developments in the EU on its road to monetary union. The asymmetry has in this case several types of consequences for economic policy, although they can be summarized in the greater attention granted to certain macroeconomic variables or indicators over others.

The fight against inflation and the concern for the control of public finances have been the two pillars of Community macroeconomic policy. This choice is coherent with the strictest economic orthodoxy, and also with the preference for monetary policy over other economic and social policy instruments. Discipline and austerity in price stability and public deficit reduction entails setting aside alternative policies of a fiscal nature, policies with a more marked redistributive content, or simply with a stronger inclination for unemployment reduction. It also involves paying less attention to reducing internal imbalances and, in particular, existing differences in income level. It is true that some of these objectives have been partially addressed by structural funds, but their scant budgetary endowment denotes the limited redistributive scope of the Union’s actions.

Discipline, liberalization and (nominal) convergence have become essential references in the EU’s macroeconomic policy, although one often has the impression that these references veer towards their own limits: ultra-orthodoxy, neoliberalism and monetarism, respectively. Moreover, the birth of the European Central Bank and the wide-ranging independence the Union’s monetary authorities have enjoyed since January, 1999, has brought these limits closer. It is clear that the Treaty of the Union’s
economic model opts for a monetary authority free of political and social interferences, with its eyes almost exclusively set on the euro’s strength, price stability and the cleaning-up of member countries’ public finances. All these are common objectives of extraordinary importance, but they don’t fulfill the need for real convergence in Europe, that is, approximation in income and employment levels.

Irrespective of the greater or lesser degree of fulfillment of the established macroeconomic objectives, two fundamental questions arise. One refers to the difficulties that may appear if the member countries’ economies don’t follow convergence processes or even begin to diverge as a result of asymmetrical external disturbances or shocks (De Grauwe, 1994). How can one act in these cases if conventional instruments of exchange and monetary policy don’t leave any room for national maneuvering? War (and/or security and defense) expenditures, for example, affect the Member States’ public finances and price controls to different extents, which may hinder the European Central Bank from adopting global measures, variously conveying to the Member States the need to adjust their economies and expenditure policies.

The second question refers to the lack of legitimacy the European Central Bank (ECB) may be accused of if its decisions are not shared by the Member States or the European Parliament. How can one act in this case if the Treaty of the Union does not entrust any institution with specific surveillance of the ECB? Is this another manifestation of the Union’s democratic deficit? Fortunately, there is a high degree of consensus in the search for nominal convergence; but neither the objectives nor the measures necessary to achieve greater real convergence or internal cohesion within the Union are sufficiently defined. The EU’s macroeconomic orthodoxy seems to veer towards monetarism and neoliberalism, both by the asymmetry of its objectives and the distaste for consensus exhibited by the institutions that must keep a check on them.

6. The Lack of Definition of the Social Perspective in European Integration

The fifth characteristic or EU asymmetry has to do with the social perspective and, more specifically, with the relative lack of interest in the social aspects of integration and the insufficient development of European social policy in comparison
with the individual Member States’ social policies (López, 1997). Europe has always kept a low profile in social matters for three reasons.

In the first place, because the structural differences among the Union members as regards the Welfare State and welfare policy matters are remarkable. In the second place, because European social policy was conceived from the beginning to have an almost exclusively functional character, that is, to be at the service of the development of the common market through the free circulation of agents of production. And in the third place, because there are no common means of implementation nor a common budget to address social problems, however serious these may be, as the unanimous concern for unemployment reduction shows.

As a consequence, European social policy has barely interfered with that of its Member States, it has focused on facilitating the free movement of people, and has preferred to blur its objectives in the midst of other actions and policies, preferably regionally-oriented ones. The small approximation in welfare levels experienced by Union countries seems to have been motivated by the double phenomenon of welfare cutbacks in the richest nations and the advance, however limited, of the Welfare State in the less-developed economies. But this approximation does not constitute a clearly defined or stable tendency (Bilbao and Olaskoaga, 1999), nor does it seem due to the minute effort made by European social policy. On the contrary, one has the impression that, after the application of the principle of subsidiarity, the European construction model prefers to keep the application of social policies in the hands of governments, though, naturally, this should not deter from the establishment of certain Community-wide objectives and means of implementation.

A genuine European social policy should create a link with employment, education and health care policies, and should also contribute to reducing the difference in welfare approaches and benefit levels between the northern countries, which have historically had a well-developed Welfare State, and the southern nations, where the family has typically served as the basic solidarity unit. Far from this, it barely maintains as own objectives the fight against certain forms of discrimination and against the most widespread manifestations of social exclusion. Both of these are functional aspects in the creation of a common space and a future Union citizenship, still devoid of content. Within this narrow conception, there still remain many loose
ends (for example: the handling of immigration) capable of seriously changing the scope of Europe’s social policies.

The questions that emerge from these types of dysfunctions cover a broad spectrum since, in the absence of social integration mechanisms, it is possible for centrifugal and even nationalistic tendencies within the Union to become reinforced. For this reason, it doesn’t seem misguided to assert that the advance in economic integration matters experienced thus far must be followed by a significant impetus at the social level. Without it, the current asymmetry could turn into a serious imbalance capable of raising strong anti-Community sentiments and jeopardizing the very essence of European construction.

7. Cohesion, Regional Policy, and Structural Actions in the EU

The sixth basic asymmetry in the Union can also be addressed from the perspective of the insufficient development of the social profile of integration, although in this case it relates to a more precise redistributive instrument, specifically, one more closely linked to territorial organization: regional policy. The recent expansion in European regional policy has filled Community gaps in social policy matters, but has also given European policies a peculiar stamp, since through its structural actions the Union is interfering in governmental tasks and in such a way as to promote administrative decentralization in favor of the regions (Rojo, 1996; Nieto, 1997).

Regional policy has shown a spectacular growth in recent years and has been supported by parallel instruments, generically termed economic and social cohesion or internal cohesion policies. This represents a substantial change in the operation of the European Union, since regional policies and structural funds fulfill a three-fold task. In the first place, they are measures to accompany the operation of the common market. In the second place, they involve the implementation of compensatory and redistributive instruments in favor of the areas that are least-developed and most affected by economic decline. Finally, they involve actions that encourage and give impetus to European integration itself.

For these reasons, we have here the most genuine example of positive-integration policies in the EU. Moreover, their influence over territorial planning, and
hence the population, is decisive since criteria, objectives, and European finances in this sphere are determinant in the management of regionally-oriented national policies. As a result, regional, structural, and economic and social cohesion policies come to transcend the field of economy and penetrate into the core of politics and social organization. They contribute to a quasi-federal conception of the Union, since they assign certain tasks to the Community government, while others remain in the hands of regional governments.

As has been repeatedly noted, with this new distribution of competencies (implicit in the European integration model and reinforced by the application of the principle of subsidiarity) national states are gradually losing importance and powers. States are reducing their range of national action, a phenomenon which is intensified by globalization and the freedom of operation granted to transnational companies, whose normal functioning increasingly hampers the management of the old national economies (Berzosa, 1999; Molina, 1998).

Given this picture, it seems necessary to reinforce regional policy as an instrument designed to complement the big market, reducing internal divergences within the Union and stimulating European integration itself. Moreover, basing the Union’s geographical and territorial actions on the principle of subsidiarity offers unquestionable advantages for administrative management and renders redistribution-oriented policies, including social policies, smoother. In other words, in the EU, regionally-oriented action criteria can minimize the conflicts inherent to any cohesion, solidarity or redistributive policy, since they combine decisions based on objectifiable common criteria with relative regional freedom in the application of the measures needed to carry them out.

For this reason, the only question that may be raised in this case is the following: why hasn’t a significant increase in regional policy been anticipated, especially in the incorporation of Eastern European countries, which need these types of instruments, since their standards of living are less than half the EU’s per capita income? It seems that either the model in favor of cohesion and incipient European solidarity has become exhausted or its defenders are short on arguments in Community budget negotiations (Lázaro, 1999).
The final big problem seems to be that internal cohesion and enlarging the Union towards Eastern Europe are not compatible with the current European budget nor the one being drawn up for the next few years (as may be seen in the attached tables). The “Europe of nationalists” has shown, through the budgetary framework initially agreed-upon for the period 2000-2006, its reluctance to transnationalize redistributive policies. And this despite the existence of numerous reports that attribute a two-fold benefit to structural funds: for direct recipients, since their investment allowances are increased; and for non-direct recipients (wrongly called donors), since the demand for investment goods necessary for the development of the less-prosperous areas falls upon them.

Europe appears to be stagnant: it continues to grow more on the side of the market and the currency, and continues to be almost atrophied on the side of cohesion. In this case, it is disappointing to note that the asymmetry has been detected and steps have been taken to resolve it, but the stinginess of national governments and the poor functioning of common institutions don’t allow for further progress.

8. The Exhaustion of the Union’s Supranational Model

Now that the economic and social aspects have been discussed, it seems necessary to address some topics with a clearer political content in order to establish a multidisciplinary framework in accordance with the essence of European integration. It is advisable to refer, in the first place, as the seventh EU’s distinguishing feature, to the exhaustion of the supranational model on the basis of which European construction was initiated. Supranationality approaches federalism, without reaching it, and exceeds the simplest forms of intergovernmental cooperation, while maintaining sovereignty instruments typical of intergovernmentalism. European supranationality seems to have reached a limit for two reasons.

In the first place, the 1991 Maastricht Treaty expanded common actions to include instruments for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP or Pillar II) and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA or Pillar III), but did so by means of intergovernmental cooperation instead of proceeding to broaden the scope of common actions through communitarization or supranationality (European Community Policies or Pillar I of the Treaty of the Union) (Oreja, 1998). Unfortunately, the Member
States’ incapacity to advance on the road of intergovernmental cooperation has been made clear both by the absence of common foreign policies (common anti-policy in the former Yugoslavia) and the paralysis in internal police and judicial cooperation (deficiencies in citizenship and immigration matters). However, the new Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997 and in effect since May 1, 1999, has continued this asymmetric development, by making common policy decisions possible by majority vote in some spheres, but making the implementation of common actions conditional on prior unanimity among the Member States in others. Supranationality has not emerged reinforced from the new treaties.

And in the second place, the European supranationality model seems exhausted insofar as its most important reference, the European Commission, has been forced to tender its resignation after the no-confidence vote and subsequent investigation on its administrative activities promoted by the European Parliament. The institutional triangle that upholds decision-making in Europe seems called upon to modify its short-term power balances (Oreja, 1998). The European Council, rightful representative of national interests, will not tolerate further cutbacks to its sovereignty, once its members have lost their freedom of action in monetary matters, which in symbolic and political terms greatly erodes the executive powers’ traditional operation. The European Parliament, elected by universal suffrage, wants to exercise its assigned powers, particularly in legislative matters, but also in matters of governmental and budgetary control, two areas it has recently been very active in. And, finally, the European Commission emerges as the scapegoat that allows the growth of the other institutions at its expense. It lacks legitimacy, since it hasn’t been elected by the citizens, and arouses little affection, perhaps because it is inspired by the model of enlightened despotism and the existence of a technocracy naturally predisposed to seeking the common European good.

What’s odd is that the attack against the supranational institution par excellence, the Commission, has been undertaken without there being a previously outlined alternative model. It is also odd that at least two other Community institutions, the Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, are inspired by the same model and yet very few voices have been raised against the lack of democracy sustaining their actions (Sánchez-Cuenca, 1997). Evidently, this apparent lack of
legitimacy affects neither the Community’s efficiency in juridical and monetary union matters, nor the results globally obtained for the whole of the EU. Still, it would be desirable, from the political and social point of view, to advance towards a reduction of the Union’s so-called democratic deficit.

It seems that the current institutional crisis may contribute to broadening the EU’s legitimacy base, by promoting communication between the citizenry and Community institutions. However, it may also render European construction more fragile, since both the genesis and final passing of new proposals on European construction matters will depend to a greater extent on the political-ideological disputes transmitted by the representatives of the parties in the European Parliament and on the ties they may have with their counterparts in the Member States governments. Institutional asymmetry is evolving, in this case, towards more conventional forms of legitimacy, but it is not clear whether they are more pro-European.

9. The Estrangement between Society and Institutions

As the eighth distinguishing feature we find the divorce between European society and its institutions, which may cause a greater estrangement between the peoples of Europe and the objective of integration itself. This is an issue where political and social considerations converge, perceptible in the lack of enthusiasm the European Union arouses among its citizens. Despite the information provided by European-wide surveys, the Maastricht Treaty referendums held in Denmark and France have demonstrated a serious division between supporters and detractors of European integration, between euro-optimists and euro-skeptics, and perhaps even, though it’s not the same, between integrationists and nationalists.

This situation, which is repeated with more or less intensity in all the member countries, may be considered a reflection of the uneven interest that political topics have among citizens, intensified in the European case by the connotations of the clash between localist and Pan-European, nationalist and internationalist feelings. It is also surprising to observe that European leaders’ speeches rely on the idea of Europe but rarely take it as a transnationalizing action guide. Moreover, on not a few occasions Europe is blamed for unpopular measures, while the most outstanding successes are
attributed to the good handling of domestic policy. What is lacking are leaders capable of making the concept of European integration understood and of developing new forms of compatibility between nationalisms and the Union’s supranationalism.

For this reason, the absence of common feelings in favor of integration hinders the formation of a sense of shared society. Either European history has not provided enough identification elements among the various peoples in the Old Continent, or else the political project being outlined is incapable of arousing common excitement today. Looking back and looking forward, one observes the absence of a civil society supporting the objective of integration (Sánchez-Cuenca, 1997). And this is a sensitive problem because it may promote Europe’s social cancer, the expansion of nationalisms, which, while not reaching dramatic proportions, have never ceased to manifest themselves in various ways in Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy or France.

For this reason, one may ask to what extent is it possible to continue advancing in European construction without greater citizen support. We know that economic mechanisms have thus far facilitated integration, but the problems raised by the internal organization of so broad and complex a structure as the Union renders the convergence of points of view and results increasingly difficult. There are constant doubts, but the project moves along. Crises recur, but Europe may emerge stronger from them. There are controversies of very different scope, but a certain degree of success cannot be denied if checked against the huge ambitions implicit in the European integration process. However, Europeans begin to sense that what has been achieved thus far doesn’t leave much room for satisfaction, neither in introspective terms nor regarding external influence.

10. Dysfunctions in the EU’s Foreign Policies

Finally, as the ninth distinguishing feature we must consider the role of the EU’s foreign policies, their influence on the economy and international relations, and their imbrication with the globalization phenomena. This is another sphere where the impact of European integration has been quite uneven. There is important asymmetry between the common management of commercial policy and, from here on, a good part of the Union’s macroeconomic policy, and the management of other aspects of
European foreign policy, where there is no common action whatsoever. In matters of international politics, development aid or presence in the great international forums, the European Union still doesn’t offer a bloc image. Despite existing plans, it hasn’t managed to speak with a single voice nor defend itself or act in a uniform manner.

Not even the European commercial policy exhibits wholly satisfactory results. Europe is the primary commercial power in the world, but lacks foreign policy instruments to back this partial supremacy. Perhaps the use of the euro as an international currency will be of help in the future, but thus far the Union’s role in international forums, including strictly commercial ones, has not matched the economic importance of the combined Member States. The new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), established in the Treaty of the Union, was born with an intergovernmental inclination, which hinders the attainment of common positions and actions. Moreover, Member States do not seem willing to yield to Brussels all the means of action they have historically held in foreign policy matters, some of which are an intrinsic part of their idea of nation and their history as colonial powers.

In this situation, it is difficult to address the geo-strategic problems arising in a Europe increasingly open to globality. It is even complicated to make the foreign policies of the European countries more coherent, since they often act without apparent connection in development aid matters or intend to make historical criteria (barely compatible among each other) prevail in international agreements on preferential trade. Latin American countries, for example, have traditionally occupied a marginal place in Union foreign policy, although in recent years the situation seems to be changing thanks to the reduction of the preferential margins that formerly sustained the EU’s foreign policies, as well as initiatives undertaken on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the new globality paradigm invites a deeper revision (than has taken place up to now) of European strategies, objectives and means of implementation in the international sphere.

The new EU Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, has among its articles a Title intended for reinforcing cooperation, which may be applied to various spheres, among them the CFSP (despite flexibility in foreign affairs being so difficult to achieve). By virtue of this new form of closer cooperation, some Member States will be able to progress more rapidly in certain areas of integration, without other countries being
able to obstruct their initiatives. This mechanism entails the risk of forcing internal divisions, although it may also facilitate the administration of certain tasks that are perceived in widely different ways by societies whose structural differences are often very wide. Moreover, reinforced cooperation, variable geometry or the concept of a variable-speed Europe, has somehow already been applied in the creation of the euro by only eleven countries, although in this case the decision was coated with own criteria: nominal convergence criteria. The problems derived from maintaining several speeds in European integration matters will be rendered even more visible as enlargement towards Eastern Europe proceeds. The area that was until now preferential in European foreign policy will become a part of the Union’s internal management problems. This will be a historical challenge for Europe’s future, a challenge that will force a rethinking of essential aspects of the Union, such as the budget, institutional representation, cohesion, support for agriculture, immigration, or, without intending to be exhaustive, foreign policy.

But the list of neighbor countries capable of causing significant geopolitical imbalances is considerable. And European policy on development cooperation is being questioned with increasing intensity (Martínez, 1995), not only because of the limited scope of its common planning and management and its lack of noteworthy results, but also because it is based on the application of asymmetrical or preferential measures in favor of certain developing countries, which means sustaining discriminatory practices against other nations. In Eastern Europe, the battered Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Arab world, the Union must come up with its own responses, whose outcome will significantly affect the success of European integration itself. Of course, Europe must also find instruments of participation in international relations in accordance with the leading role it wants to play in our increasingly transnationalized world, one that is nevertheless still lacking regulation mechanisms adapted to globalization (Bhagwati, 1998; Soros, 1999; Nieto de Alba, 1999).

One may raise numerous questions regarding the difficulties involved in using market expansion as the sole regulatory mechanism, both within the areas of integration and from the perspective of North-South relations (Berzosa, 1999). It is not reasonable to think that the sole functioning of markets will guarantee a sufficient
level of cohesion among the Member States and their regions, but it is also not easy to find other elements of cohesion (such as religion was in previous epochs) capable of replacing the market as the foundation for European union (Rubio Llorente, 1999). But these are questions that deserve to be studied in more depth than was initially stipulated for this article of approximation to the European Union. Nevertheless, studying the limits and possibilities of European integration and understanding the asymmetries that characterize its nature and operation are aspects that may also be useful in understanding similar phenomena that might extend to other regions of the world in the 21st century, or at least be given special attention in areas such as Latin America. With the change of century, integration may either consolidate itself as a new form of government and emerge in other areas of the world, or else become a frustrated alternative in the apparent transition from the local to the global.

WORKS CITED

APPENDIX

Table 1. Size of the Community Budget

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<tr>
<td>% Public expenditure</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% EU’s GDP</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per-capita expenditure</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>131.3</td>
<td>191.8</td>
<td>218.1</td>
<td>235.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (mecus)</td>
<td>2,411.3</td>
<td>14,773.5</td>
<td>42,495.2</td>
<td>66,733.4</td>
<td>81,607.8</td>
<td>88,516.4</td>
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</tbody>
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Note: 1999 data are budgetary forecasts

Sources: Elaboration on European Commission SEC (98) 1110, Budgetary Vademecum, 1998

Table 2. Evolution of Revenue in the EU Budget (%)

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<tr>
<td>Agricultural levies</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customs duties</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAT</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th resource</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>48.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellanea</td>
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<td>18.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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Note: 1999 data are budgetary forecasts

Sources: Elaboration on European Commission SEC (98) 1110, Budgetary Vademecum, 1998

Table 3. Evolution of expenditures in the EU Budget (%)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>EAGGF-Guarantee</td>
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<td>70.3</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structural funds</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<td>15.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<td>Reimbursements and others</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
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</table>

Note: 1999 data are budgetary forecasts

Sources: Elaboration on European Commission SEC (98) 1110, Budgetary Vademecum, 1998

Table 4. Financial Perspectives (2000-2006)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>46.05</td>
<td>46.92</td>
<td>47.82</td>
<td>48.73</td>
<td>49.67</td>
<td>50.63</td>
<td>51.61</td>
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<td>Structural funds</td>
<td>36.64</td>
<td>37.47</td>
<td>36.64</td>
<td>35.60</td>
<td>34.45</td>
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<td>Internal policies</td>
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<td>6.71</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>7.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>External actions</td>
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<td>7.07</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>7.61</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>7.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>5.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
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<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total commitment appropriations</td>
<td>101.53</td>
<td>103.84</td>
<td>104.10</td>
<td>104.17</td>
<td>104.41</td>
<td>104.79</td>
<td>105.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total payment appropriations</td>
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<td>102.93</td>
<td>103.52</td>
<td>103.81</td>
<td>104.17</td>
<td>104.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Payments in % of GDP</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.13</td>
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Note: One billion euros at 1999 prices. Includes PECO pre-accession expenditures for an annual total of 0.52 billion for agriculture, 1.04 for structural funds, and 1.56 for external actions (see COM (98) 164 final)

Sources: Elaboration on European Commission SEC (98) 1110, Budgetary Vademecum, 1998
PART THREE

Transnational Figures and Memories
CHAPTER 11

Shelter Homes, Horror Dwellings: Neoliberalism and Latin American Trans-Communitarian Proposals

Adriana J. Bergero

This article will address a cultural corpus related to the shift in the space-place symmetry and the location-identity-community triad brought on by the restructuring of local socio-cultural space upon interaction with global culture. Massey maintains that “the longing for such coherence is none the less a sign of the geographic fragmentation, the spacial disruption, of our times” (1994: 147; emphasis added)\(^1\). According to this, the epistemic period ruled by the construct of place as a space inhabited by homogeneous communities with a strictly essentialist anchoring on identity certainties and fixities, which even managed to survive epochal changes, would have now been left behind. Among the asymmetries unveiled to the First World as a result of the current epistemic fracture, the most evident are those hybrid identity spaces that have always been present in Latin America’s de-centered modernity and that, with every globalization cycle, have readjusted “the sedimentation, juxtaposition, and interweaving of indigenous traditions […], Catholic colonial Hispanism, and modern political, educational, and communicational actions” (García Canclini, 1989: 71). Modernization generated participation crises that made visible the uncoupling of place/identity and the Imaginary Nation’s residual pieces, its representational gaps and contradictions. This tension materialized in military coups, which can be considered correcting gestures and timely regulatory operations aimed at decelerating civil society movements and reorganizing the place/identity map by means of expulsion into exile, inner exile, the physical/legal obliteration of the disappeared and control over memory. The most emblematic were those taking place on June 27, 1973 (Uruguay), September 11, 1973 (Chile), and March 24, 1976 (Argentina), which unfolded in an “ornamented scenography [that…] only sought to

\(^1\) Massey (1994) describes as new something that has been a constant in peripheral capitalism.
introduce a radical capitalism” (Eltit, 1997:45). These three coups d’état occurred immediately before the region’s adoption of neoliberal economies and cultural processes of recruitment and consensus, which was quickly and colorfully achieved thanks to a Trojan horse, whose return was so vociferously celebrated by all social sectors that it should have aroused suspicion: the return of democracy.

My purpose is to speak about places where the hands of neoliberalism have imposed their cultural contracts upon the Southern Cone’s re-democratization processes. For obvious reasons, I will focus on the paradigmatic case of Chile, although I will refer to the entire region by means of various postcolonial cultural texts sharing a common objective: the proposal of imaginary social ties that, by virtue of their markedly non-essentialist nature and procedures, articulate new forms of community relations. All of these proposals, which are lodged in liminal edges, pores and zones, run counter to systemic representations and their attempt to tear the subject away from his/her organic community and transform him/her into an abstract entity that is yoked by inertia to the speed and direction of market culture.

1. Los vigilantes

Diamela Eltit’s novel Los vigilantes [The Watchmen] (1994) is a commentary on post-dictatorship Chile’s main features: neoliberal modernization, market economy and culture, pluralism, and the consolidation of a consensus positing consumer values as the only desirable ones. Their lure is based on the widespread publicity that “the West is at your hand’s reach” (Eltit, 1994: 110) despite the highly asymmetric integration of the various social groups within the structures of consumption and satisfaction of the neoliberal capitalist State. Eltit’s novel follows, step-by-step, the elaboration of discourses meant to stigmatize those who have been marginalized by the capital accumulation crises. It describes the effects of adjustment policies on those sectors that have already been demobilized (the unemployed and the homeless) and those in the process of demobilization, which include Margarita and her son. The above-mentioned representations have a three-fold purpose: to identify, to persecute and later to eradicate economic misfits, a topic that has often been addressed by the author of El padre mío [My father]. At the same time, Los vigilantes demarcates certain cracks, tension zones and residual areas similar to those described by Nelly Richard as “formations of symbolic-cultural deposits and sedimentations that bring together the shattered meanings that tend to be omitted or discarded in the name of
social reason”, in such a way that “what is secondary and non-integrated can displace the signifying force to the edges” (Richard, 1998: 11). Hence, it is only coherent that Eltit refers to cognitive edges—the body and its sensory maps—, resorting to the sensory register struck by the violently unsheltered life of the homeless. The sensory elements force the reader to traverse the ravages and horrors hunger and cold have imprinted on these residual bodies, thus denaturalizing poverty and marginality as social categories considered to be both inevitable and affecting the other. A sensory bridge of lateralness is achieved between Margarita—and the reader—and the homeless which helps to build strategies for re-signifying the social.

The novel resorts to a minority type of discourse, the daily epistolary reports the you character has demanded from Margarita and whom she addresses. Thus, writing becomes, paradoxically, a site where private space is intervened, since the intimate, which has already been absorbed by various probing and overseeing technologies, is forced to become transparent: her letters must give unimpeachable evidence that she has fully internalized the culture of the site called the West. This is verified by the watchmen who cooperate with the laws of you, a figure whereupon converge Margarita’s reports and wherefrom emanates the gestuality of two syncopated operations Los vigilantes captures in the process of execution: the reformulation of the New Imaginary Nation and the eradication of its residues. What is curious is that, from this residual space, Margarita and her son speak a devalued, diffuse and precarious language that is untranslatable to the language of the possible, the social text regulated by neoliberal culture. In other words, they inscribe the contradictions of the dominant narrative in the only vocal space they have available: the reports to the West. The you character is Pinochet or, and, at the same time, an agency that cannot be situated in local empirical spaces and that, in any case, is not open to appeal: “you are not, you only occupy an abstract place” (Eltit, 1994: 110). “I don’t know who you are since you are everywhere, multiplying your commands, through punishments, through threats that pay homage to an uninhabitable world” (Ibid: 112). His location is a de-territorialized space: “who are you? […] Which house do you inhabit? From which official room have you issued your decrees?” (Ibid: 115). The text emphasizes the relentless nature of the new “regulations ruling the city” (Ibid: 105): “I still cannot understand […] why the authorities continue to favor such rigid laws […] against people destined to an inevitable death” (Ibid: 84).
Margarita’s letters are a means of self-imposing subjection and submission as part of the project to mold identities according to the New Nation’s identity codes. In case of deviation, they become accusatory proofs for the West’s records. Among the metamorphoses required from Margarita are making “the homeless’ image correspond to the enemy”, joining “the neighbors […] I will perform the same detours as your mother in order to avoid seeing any homeless people”, and making “myself into the Western image you’ve always wanted. I’ll be another, another, another. I’ll be another” (Ibid: 84-85). This is a means to force anchoring onto the West’s global identity already internalized within the city’s social imaginary. Gatti uses the term strong identity modes to refer to those identities offering a model grammar that demarcates centrality, and promises permanence and unity of identity as a function of the center (1999: 43). These identities are preserved thanks to the model’s reproduction (this is the task of Eltit’s watchmen) by the subjects themselves, “whose identity is a function of the degree of competition and proximity to […] the center’s elements” (Ibid). Outside of this, in social absence (Barel, quoted in Gatti, 1999) from public and political records, the subject is incomplete and provisional. Not wanting, however, to stay in the spaces of negativity of the social map and, at the “risk of being punished, existing individuals make themselves visible by founding their identity on those aspects of their difference that are negatively judged” (Kastersztein, quoted in Gatti, 1999: 45). By participating in the written trace, that is, the identitarian stroke of social visibility, the self-interpellated individual is guaranteed inscription surfaces –to use Nelly Richard’s expression.

In Los vigilantes, the global ends up reorganizing the local, penetrating everyday subjectivity and sociability praxes, but still giving rise to its own counter-language within an amphibious, intersecting, vice versa space. According to Mike Featherston, with globalization, “we are interdependent; […] the flow of information, knowledge, money, commodities, people and images have intensified to the extent that the sense of spatial distance which separated and insulated people from the need to take into account all the other people which make up… humanity has become eroded. In fact, we are all in each other’s backyard” (1993: 169). However, “different social groups, and different individuals, are placed in very distinct ways in relation to the flows and interconnections” (Massey, 1994: 49). In this global power geography that visibly organizes the social by creating and stressing difference, not all share this backyard and, as a result, the marginalized in Los vigilantes are subject to maximum
proxemic distances\(^2\) from institutional spaces, they are expelled from them and confined to a disinserted place where they arrive after a punitive process brought about by their lack of adjustment (negative identity): “The homeless […] went towards the houses to ask for help […] The neighbors kept the doors shut despite their pleas and the fact that some of the homeless froze to death standing against the gates” (Eltit, 1994: 66).

Thus, the neighbors watch the borders of the New City: the house. In the neighbors/watchmen junction, the categories inside-outside refer to highly problematic identitarian social spaces: the horizontal social space of lateralness (neighbors) is superimposed on a vertical spatiality (watchmen), and this bicephalous function causes the social to deteriorate, since the neighbors’ proximity and fellowship is alienated by the watchmen’s gaze in search of signs of maladjustment. Those justifying the child’s expulsion are metaphorized in an alleged mental deficiency that has kept him at an oral and pre-linguistic stage. Defective and excluded from institutional languages, his babblings are inaudible and his hunger is negatively explained as voracious orality. This regression to a state of ultra-dependency and extreme helplessness can be extrapolated to groups of people deprived of food: since hunger promotes the group’s death, the boy’s regressive lack of growth (lack of development) metaphor refers to the misfits, who are condemned to live outside the New Chile’s gated economy.

“If I didn’t shelter them, the end would come to them in a matter of hours […] Doesn’t the fact that they have returned to the streets indicate in turn that they have lost their homes? Explain to me: why did they have to lose their homes? These questions of mine must be useless and, worse yet: worthless” (Ibid: 84). Margarita’s marks of maladjustment are, to begin, these worthless questions that re-contextualize the homeless in another social space the social imaginary has been forced to obliterate. This inverts the prevailing tendency to the synchronic, which is probably due to the fact that the systemic extracts as profit there from the production of designified meanings, thus avoiding the competition and oscillation of referential frames that would either denaturalize the expelling Darwinian logic alleging mental weakness, inadaptability or individual defects, or else would re-launch utopian historical references and imagination: “Doesn’t the fact that they have returned to the

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\(^2\) In cultural geography, this is socially-constructed distance.
streets indicate in turn that they have lost their homes? Explain to me: why did they have to lose their homes?” (Ibid: 84; emphasis added).

I am interested in analyzing the metaphor of the house within the geo-social map of the neoliberal State. Eltit’s novel builds the house-body as a protective, warm, connective and organic space similar to the uterus remembered by the boy, in contrast to the intensely cold and unprotected urban spaces endured by the homeless. The hierarchical separation between private and public space is spoken by the architecture of the single-family house where the bourgeoisie’s family scene is staged: the space between the main door and the intimate inner core is articulated by atriums and antechambers, porticos, walls, staircases, curtains and hallways that create borders and imperceptibly organize private space around an architectural semiotics of control, supervision, and claustrophilia. Wingley maintains that the architect-father-husband plots architectural praxes that are “subordinated to a prior text” (1992: 366), that of women’s subordination. But, what exactly are the socio-subjective praxes induced by these centripetally-circulating boxes intended to protect? “The house enforces a preexisting law. The law of the house precedes the house” (Ibid: 335): the integrity of a good house depends on its capacity to exclude the outside from a spatial-economic-social unity that reinforces the family institution by reproducing the spaces of the domestic.

In turn, single-family houses serve as boxes-stages for a scene whose gestuality is extensive to the outside. Margarita is expelled for openly disobeying the prohibition of stepping outside the house’s double claustrophilia (subjective and social): her mistake is reading everything backwards, that is, reading the house as a claustrophobic and confining enclave, and the street as a nurturing, intersecting, collective identity reference. Thus, she abandons the stage of the bourgeois family scene and, every time she does so, is contaminated by the street. In this way, Los vigilantes detects cracks in the apparently sealed design of the region of the possible. These cracks become visible in the microstructures of social practices, such as Margarita’s, which, albeit local and contingent, display the heterogeneity of Transition Chile’s social signs. The protagonist goes beyond the house and thus follows a common feminist theme of leaving the domestic in order to enter the public sphere. Nevertheless, her steps towards the outside do not necessarily entail a revision of the house paradigm, which remains intact, thus obliterating its twofold identitarian
violence made up of captive patriarchal inclusions (those of gender) and social exclusions (those that gate the house against the collective).

In late capitalism, the street’s modern, open function is replaced by the shopping center’s guided and restrictive architectural circuit, a praxis that has its parallel in residential spaces. In order to gate the organic city, the private spaces that serve as antidotes against “people’s real fear of public streets” (Balmori, 1991: 91) induce social praxes that acritically accept the fracture of public space and the need for a precautionary withdrawal towards the private. Margarita reads the Imaginary Nation’s new mapping, which “needs our overwhelmed figures for the sacrifice to be executed” (Eltit, 1994 107). The sacrificial body (the public) is isolated and amputated from its antipodal enclave, the space of (private) satisfaction: “I cannot accept that the city is divided between the visible and the invisible in order to invent an impartiality that ends in the orgiastic arrogance of satisfaction” (Ibid: 11). In order for “the entire city to be eliminated and recovered in another dimension” (Ibid: 92), it is essential to create an openly paranoiac discourse that will demonize the body that is to be sacrificed.

“[Y]ou say that the homeless intend to annihilate the order respectable people have been building with such difficulty […]. You talk of the crimes, the faults, the ethical disorders appearing throughout the streets […]. You think that our only defense is making our houses into fortresses since the city has become an impassable space” (Ibid: 83)

Neil Smith notes that, “[e]victed from the private spaces of the real estate market, homeless people [are…] consistently erased by institutional effort to move them elsewhere –to shelters, out the buildings and parks, […] out of the city– [or] by the desperate personal campaign of the housed to see no homeless” (Ibid: 89). In fact, in the social imaginary’s battlefields and tension zones, the house construct is being profusely subject to redefinition. But this oscillation of the house may also be read as the opportunity to escape the box and change the stage of the bourgeois family scene. When Margarita opens the door to the two homeless families, her house/womb radiates warmth, protection, nourishment, intimacy, and identitarian connection. It is evident that proxemic borders and the notion of the private spoken by capitalism’s housing property system prevent lateralness. Not in vain, feminist urban utopias tend to imagine community spaces whose spatial praxes induce interfamily and group cohabitation and fellowship. In Margarita’s uterus-house, one can hear the homeless’
bodies settling down in sleep, heartbeats, obliterated stories, laughter and breathing as joint acts by a single body. This cancellation of proxemic distance abolishes the cultural and subjective borders of *inexorable* social fragmentation in order to imagine precisely the social body’s natural interdependence. By opening her house, Margarita blurs spatial-identitarian barriers between the inside and the outside, redefining the private as not necessarily excluding the public, while at the same time reversing the hierarchies that superimpose the *public*, understood as the only possible *political* language, on the unnoticed (political) centrality of everyday life. She also appeals to discredited *subjectivity* as a means to counteract the emptying of the collective being operated in the public sphere by the systemic desensitizing neglect towards social responsibility.

In *The Politics of Everyday Fears*, Massumi notes that “[c]apitalist power actualizes itself in a basically uninhabitable space of fear […] according to the socially valorized distinctions applied to it by selective mechanisms of power implemented throughout the social field” (Massumi, 1993: 23). In *Los vigilantes*, together with the widespread probing of civil society, we find this discourse of fear signaling an urban geography made of ghettos and borders with “traps especially built against urban vagrancy” (Eltit, 1994: 92); “the streets are plagued by homeless of whom [your mother] is afraid and, in order to avoid them, she must make numerous detours” (*Ibid*: 48). Margarita ignores this system-imposed strategy of collective identity every time she walks the streets *without* avoiding eye contact with the homeless, but particularly when she allows the ghetto to enter her own house. Thus she undoes social praxes of compulsion and rejection. She even washes the homeless’ bodies:

“I undressed them one by one and, with the finest linen cloth […], I sought the true skin underneath, the skin of deprivation. It was a mutual search, a mutual knowledge, a mutual shudder […]. Water acquired a different meaning when I ran the cloth over my own arms. My arms were extenuated. The night became openly generous to us. You should know that it was a night prone to beauty” (*Ibid*: 97).

The replacement of the first person singular by *we* affirms the spatial-bodily *contamination* undergone by the linen cloth, which, having washed the wounded bodies, serves to unite them with Margarita: the bodies touch one another and the shudder makes the night “prone to beauty”. Since tactile distance is that of greatest
intimacy between bodies and, therefore, the most avoided in socio-phobic haptic schemes, Margarita’s *maladjustment* lies in allowing entrance to *disinsertion* when instead it is presumed that the house and she herself must reproduce and safeguard the West’s *insertionist* patriarchal and capitalist order. At the same time, Margarita takes charge of an extended non-biological family, thus expanding the feeling of motherhood outside the bourgeoisie’s cubicular family scene; she becomes a mother to children with terrified eyes and to ejected adults, who are now protected from the cold and from their painful condition as undesirable bodies thanks to the warmth radiated by both the fire and hugging. In this way, the protagonist redefines the domestic space of the house in political terms; she politicizes it by making it, against systemic plans, a *transcommunitarian* identitarian social space. In Eltit’s city, far from being a subaltern, Margarita acts as a social agent who controls her own set of relations with the world despite the fact that the city is being consumed “in a silent war, a mute and disproportionate battle” (*Ibid*: 112); “a bloody season” (*Ibid*: 77) whose goal is to achieve “an immaculate city” (*Ibid*: 64).

Since the watchmen “don’t want to belong to a devalued territory […] they are willing to take any measures that will save them from such terrible humiliation”. Consequently, they resort to make-up, theatrical and scenographic operations aimed at making those areas whose “surrounding impairment can get to be alarming” (*Ibid*: 81) invisible. The image of a society that must appear to be homogeneous and tension-free at any price guarantees the eradication of any obstacles to the flow and profit of global capital, as well as the concealment of its residual territories: “The city […] seems to me an unreal space, a place open to the operatic and the theatrical” (*Ibid*: 40), the protagonist complains. John Rennie Short describes something similar in connection with postmodern urban recycling: “to encourage civic boosterism, tourism, inward investment […] because of interurban competition and increasingly footloose industry and capital investment, cities have to compete with each other in selling themselves” (Short, 1996: 428).

Hence cities’ efforts to produce an elegant corpus of images. This cultural project had its inaugural moment at the Seville Expo ’92, a moment strategically chosen to put in circulation a new rhetoric intended for globalization: at the doors of the European Union, the New Chile had to publicize its particular novelty, that is, stage a scenographic *performance* narrating its new identity after the expeditious cut towards democratic Transition. “Chile-Expo Seville ‘92” was characterized by
“megalomania, super production, an exhibitionist display of resources meant to prove and to show that it could ‘cover it all’ and ‘put everything before people’s eyes’” (Richard, 1998: 164), a seductive sign addressed both to global capital and the internal cultural market: ostentation as a mark of identity, “the fantasy of showing and proving itself [mostrar y demostrar-se] held by the Chilean Transition” (Ibid: 165).

The huge 100-ton iceberg taken to Europe in a 30-day voyage attempted to salute the cold, “which is linked to the reckoning and efficiency of technical rationality. The image of cold sought to contradict as clearly as possible the old stereotypes of disorder the European gaze tends to project on Latin America” (Ibid: 175). This was a hidden polemic seeking to erase, in one stroke, both the heat and the lethargic attitude of exoticist tropicalism. The new agent, on the contrary, promised not to get involved in the multiple-rhythm couplings-uncouplings of peripheral modernity: supported at all times by very good watchmen, it would tidy up its work methods and suture the gaps and asymmetries between the local and the global, between social polymorphism and the market’s homogenization. It promised to grant the New Chile a sensationalist gestuality that might repeat, obstacle-free, the clonization of global culture. This would be the first cut and separation, which is an essential clause in its contract with global capital. The agent of neoliberal policies, the watchman of clonization, thus aspires at any price to become a valid interlocutor, both allocutor and ventriloquist, since s/he is able to speak the language of the free market and obeys the programmatic demands of the globalization of place/identity. What was really being exhibited in Seville was “modernization understood as a simple performative law yielding technical-operational profit” (Ibid: 170). According to Richard, far from proposing the always untidy “empanada and cheeseburger” cultural hybridization, the pavilion’s designers were avoiding the typical sudaca [pejorative for South American] collage arising from a shoddy and peripheral modernity –in Marco Antonio de la Parra’s words–, with the “desire to distinguish themselves from the rest of South America, which, in a gesture of loathsome arrogance, was described as the bad neighborhood” (de la Parra, 1998: 224; his emphasis).

Another of the Pavilion’s themes was the supermarket-as-scenography: its saturation of products pointed to the prospects of high demand and consumption envisioned by neoliberal policies, while discursively attempting to incorporate Chile into “a vocabulary of brand-names advertised everyday and everywhere as falsely shared values for social seudo-identification” (Richard, 1998: 172).
exhibited postcards with the most official images of Chile (Don Francisco, kites, José Donoso, Claudio Array, the Straits of Magellan, Chiloé architecture), that is to say, pieces of Chile on sale, openly offered to global capital’s intervention. The installation anticipated the profit obtainable from images, which are clearly dominant commodities in global culture, while imagining inclusion for all, a semiotic message of unrestricted access to consumption that supermarkets learned from early 20th century department stores and later improved. These stores’ marketing strategy was to bring the merchandise, which was formerly displayed behind counters and mediated by salespeople, closer to the consumer, who was able to touch it, caress it and desire it. But the department stores’ seduction was replaced in supermarkets by the compulsion of buying: much less physical contact, much less caressing, and greater purchasing speed. This speed parallels that of capital, which is now more eager than ever, jumping around the globe from one place to another with such unpredictability and indifference that local neoliberal agents must be very accurate in order for the gaze to fall on the exact point they intend to catapult. Margarita describes it thus in *Los vigilantes*:

“[T]hey go from house to house transmitting laws with no meaning. New laws that seek to provoke the amorous gaze of the other end of the West. But the other West is terribly indifferent to seduction and appears to see the city as only a worn-out theatrical piece […] What the neighbors seek is to govern without hindrance, to oppress without limit, to pass judgment without caution, to punish without reprieve” (Eltit, 1994: 41).

The neoliberal project’s precursor was *allessandrismo* (Jorge Allessandri), which was inclined to carry it out within the framework of an authoritarian regime capable of neutralizing the social pressures and interclass commitments generated by political modernization (Moulian, 1997: 201). Its first phase –between 1973 and 1977– was tied to Pinochet’s dictatorship and to a new cultural space that replaced the 70s’ political debate by economicist logic.

“Prices, which are objects’ main commercial property, don’t stem from their essence or even the costs of production. They stem from a metaphorical crossing, form curves expressing the aggregate selling and buying decisions

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3 “Little boxes with lapis lazuli, a big package with scant content. The first impulse was to own those beautiful containers that later revealed themselves to be empty. Feeling cheated, many people abandoned them at the exit, where they piled up as cultural debris from a country with more image than substance” (de la Parra, 1998: 226).
of multiple individuals. The mysterious fetishism of these social decisions lies in the fact that they must be processed in the mysterious core of a “black box” (Ibid: 202).

In order to erode symbolic support for state-worship, which considered the state the natural regulator of exchanges, the neoliberal project began by imposing the thesis that economic development was incompatible with populist democracy, that there could be no rational economic planning outside capitalist management. The dictatorship thus created a new utopian language endorsing the view that “automatic market mechanisms represented the only efficient method to assign resources, a method which avoided the State’s bureaucratic and prebendary intervention” (Ibid: 202). From Chicago, Friedman and Harberger prescribed economic shock policies: accelerated privatization, opening to foreign investment by means of a drastic reduction in tariffs, import diversification, “a ‘negative’ industrial policy that was limited to natural selection, that is, based on businesses’ capacity to face external competition, which had increased as a result of tariff reductions” (Ibid: 294), and the disciplining of workers and even business owners. The provisions of the terrorist phase, the four 1976 Constitutional Acts that set the legal foundation for Pinochet’s dictatorship, had dismantled the public sphere through the Junta’s monopolization of power, the interruption of political rights and public opinion (Edict 107, March 1977), and the progressive neoliberalization of trade unions.

The natural form of exchanges would now be processed according to the neutrality of automatic controls. This economist permeation of cultural discourse was consolidated in the 1977-1982 period thanks to the empirical demonstration of economic success, which cemented neoliberal discourse in the social imaginary: “success was the proof of its truth”. On the other hand, giving the market center stage “as the rational determiner of price, particularly the price of the workforce” (Moulian 1997: 208), undermined certain notions that had been the object of frequent debate and negotiation during Allende’s government, such as fair price and common good. From then on, “[I]n the area of economic exchanges, the market would be the one to determine the ‘common good’” (Ibid: 208). This objectification, automation, and scientifcity permeated the social imaginary, persuading its members that, since “theory has captured reality, making it intelligible and, thus, manageable through technocratic reason, ‘reality’ must necessarily respond to theory” (Ibid: 281), and any further debate was uncalled for. The clear success of macroeconomic indicators would
now be the center of all. The omnipresent cold that beats *Los vigilantes*’ homeless could very well be Eltit’s representational complaint against the freezing of all social exchange, which is now filtered by an inaccessible and neutral regulator capable of precluding interclass commitments, state perks, and even humanitarian discourses favoring the opposite direction. The childish Chilean iceberg’s semiotic meaning could also be related to the harshness of the New Chile’s arrogantly expelling *winter streets* portrayed by Eltit.

The second stage in the neoliberal process (1977-1985) entailed “closing the gap between economic freedom and political despotism”, rescuing “the 20th century’s mythical word, democracy, and discursively reconciling it with neocapitalism”, in other words, “giving way to a democracy that would be compatible with neoliberalism at various levels” (*Ibid*: 211). This imploded democracy had to prevent political rights from overriding economic ones, in order to avoid what happened during Allende’s government. The programmatic intentions of the neoliberal capitalist revolution became clear on June 11, 1977, in a speech Augusto Pinochet delivered to the young at Cerro Chacarillas⁴; his words allowed the soft institutionalizers to more accurately sketch the new democracy, which would combine “elections with designation, such that there would be some institutions not subject to the chances of majority law” (*Ibid*: 228), while paving the road for big international financial capital. It was even alleged that “economic transformation, to the extent that it continued in the direction already taken, would open the way for true democracy” (*Ibid*: 234). What followed was a process of forward and backward steps that included periods of economic crisis and political mobilization, such as the 1985 and 1986 street demonstrations sponsored by the Coordinadora Nacional Sindical [National Union Coordinating Committee] and the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre [Copper Workers Confederation], which were so severely repressed with tear gas and random “street shootings” that the public space became a danger zone fraught with objective death risk. Finally, the dazzling neoliberal capitalist revolution that was being prepared since the military coup became consolidated. The Chilean miracle represented the good self-generating health of capitalist development. Moulian complains when he asks: “And why did the leftist opposition not perceive the growth potential in the new capitalism?” (*Ibid*: 261).

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⁴ It is also important to remember the Carta Fundamental [Fundamental Letter] sent by Pinochet to the Comisión de Estudios Constitucionales [Constitutional Studies Commission] in November, 1977.
In conjunction with the replacement of the “painful and conflictive [images of] Chile […] by other […] positively good and clean ones” (Richard, 1998:176) intended to highlight “the splendor of the new times” (Eltit, 1994: 105), there was an attempt to obliterate historical reference to Allende’s government. It is not by coincidence that Margarita –and Eltit–, going against the New Chile’s discourse, warns the character you: “you should know that the homeless shaped their particular history long ago. A history that sprang from I don’t know what profound dissatisfaction. I took part in their stories during the coldest winter months” (Ibid: 95). As a result, Eltit’s novel links the New Chile’s homeless to dictatorship Chile and its “confinement spaces and massive dismissals of workers” (Eltit, 1997: 45), brought on not only because they were inadaptable or non-supportive of the regime, but because they had contributed to Salvador Allende’s popular base. During the coup, “the intent was to recover the concentration of wealth at the expense of the exacerbation of the body –particularly the people’s bodies–, which was pushed to the limit of deprivation, and abused in frightening torture sessions, in endless mental humiliations” (Ibid: 45). In this way, Eltit reads the eradicating effects of the New Chile’s adjustment policies as another twist in an implacable retaliation process that has once again punished the popular sectors, now speaking other typologies of violence, in a language that still points to political domination but where economic tutelage discursively camouflages its military and repressive agency.

Margarita reads her disinsertion from the celebration: “I have lost the cause and I will be excluded from the feast celebrating an imaginary triumph. I have been expelled towards the edge’s fault, where plagues and voluntary infections are said to incubate” (Eltit, 1994: 115). In open contrast to the New Chile’s feast –and on the side of voluntary infections–, Eltit’s protagonist describes a very different directionality: “We’ve been wandering about for a long time, acting out a poor nomadism. And hunger. The hunger we have dragged everywhere during this long, countless time” (Ibid: 117). Eltit’s novel shows the immaculate city’s backstage and denounces the watchmen’s shooting-party against the bodies sacrificed in the name of “the splendor of the new times” (Ibid: 105). Los vigilantes posits a crisis of representation that dissolves the effectiveness of “the myopia of the visible” (the phrase is Melucci’s). According to Gabriel Gatti, the latter has allowed sociology to operate by discarding invisible sociability zones:
“This is where we find [...] the weak modes of collective identity, those non-
naturalized identitarian monsters inhabiting the boundary zones among firm
and institutional identity conditions, sly object-subjects who have chosen the
leftovers from the crisis of our representation mechanisms as their habitat and
have taken their invisibility before our devices’ […] eyes as the foundation
on which to build their strategies” (Gatti, 1999: 39).

Eltit’s novel proposes cultural praxes that force a shift in the platforms of
vision and allocution that force the gaze to go beyond the borders of the social. As a
consequence, social absence (Barel, quoted in Gatti, 1999) resulting from the lack of
access to public record ceases to be the only alternative to strong identity modes. Gatti
would ask if this obsession with the written trace, the myopia of the visible, doesn’t
end up sacrificing those sociability areas that are read as leftovers within the
discipline, that is, doing something similar to globalization’s neoliberal policies:
sacrificing what can be looked at. This is the opposite of Saskia Sassen’s mapping of
the global city (1994; 1995), which highlights precisely the spots occupied by
populations with scant public record, but who materialize discontinuity and breaks in
strong identity modes. For, as Gatti alleges, the problem is not only adjusting the gaze
so as to give the invisible public record, but precisely the invisible society’s status as
object (Barel).

2. Estrella distante

Fernando Reati recalls that “the word ‘amnesia’ is etymologically related to
‘amnesty’ and ‘anesthesia’” (1996: 11), three terms that are connected to the re-
democratization processes that followed the Southern Cone coups d’état. It is
inevitable to link their collective memory control policies to the implantation of the
neoliberal model: the policies of oblivion were a complementary cultural discourse
aimed at redirecting the social imaginary from a problematic past to the synchronic
euphoria of consumerist worship of the present. At the same time, they allowed for
another displacement: the adoption of vestments, gestuality and objects inserting the
subject into a global identity, a process which, in the social imaginary, was
accompanied by dis-identification, removal, de-territorialization and affective distance
from the internal debts, those matters that were left unresolved by the legal complex
institutionalizing impunity in the region. In the case of Argentina, documents such as
CONADEP’s (Comisión Nacional de Desaparecidos [National Commission on the
Disappeared]) *Nunca más [Never Again]* (1984), granted public record to the invisibility of the disappeared, but didn’t prevent Argentinean congress from passing, in the middle of the re-democratization process, the “Punto final” [Full Stop] law (1986), which limited the time frame for trial requests and claims. Subsequently, the “Obediencia Debida” [Due Obedience] law (July 1987) established that those acting on account of the “obedience due” to their superiors were not legally prosecutable, which reduced the number of punishable officers to only the most visible heads of each repressive body. In 1989, Carlos Menem issued a pardon for all the officers undergoing legal proceedings. In the case of Uruguay, the Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado [Law on the Expiration of the State’s Punitive Aim], proposed by democratic president Sanguinetti and approved by the Congress in 1986, made it impossible to try members of police and military institutions for alleged human rights violations. On the basis of this discourse, any claim against state terrorism became a mere punitive aim that from then on was completely neutralized, while the victims’ legal status was technically canceled. In 1989, the referendum called to ratify the Expiration law was surrounded by an intimidatory discourse suggesting that the law’s repeal would have negative consequences for the stability of democracy; as a result, it was ratified. This closed all possible avenues for legal vindication aimed at restoring the right to memory and to the legal circulation (reappearance) of victims in the collective imaginary (Reati, 1996: 14-18). These laws institutionalized obedience to the prohibition to remember. The ad-hoc process of forgetfulness, pacification and social reconciliation was the starting-point, and later became the prerequisite for the permanence of controlled democracies, subject to either Augusto Pinochet’s sinister profile carefully watching over the public scene in his role as Senator for Life, the ghost of inflation, or the sudden interruption of the process of incorporation into the liberal economy. But this amnesia’s reassuring words elude “a complex network of ethical-political connotations, which include […] what is understood […] as ‘democratic opening’ and the more abstract consideration of the possible relations between history and political-institutional praxis –[…] between memory and action– in the process of reconstruction of individual and collective subjectivity” (Moraña, 1996: 34).
In Chile there was never any legal debate denouncing state terrorism; on the contrary, the triumph of the 80s Plebiscite\(^5\) determined the dictatorship’s continuity, already in the process of donning democratic robes. Pinochet’s regime was (self)empowered by the new constitution. The Plebiscite swallowed the possibility for any further referendum: it literally set the start for the New Chile and the Chilean miracle –the country’s vitality in external and internal markets, its spectacularly expansive incorporation into the neoliberal model. “Chilean capital is stealthily occupying more and more space in the continent. The idea of empire excites our foot soles. It makes more than one […] smile when in reality there are still reasons to weep and wail” (de la Parra, 1998: 254).

Even in amnesia, the marks of the traumatic past persist: every scar is an “inscription surface” that active memory may read. Expelled from the public realm, the amputated memory will survive in the private sphere or other imaginary places where what amnesia ravishes, the historical and political re-contextualization of memory, may be rebuilt. *Estrella distante [Distant Star]* (Bolaño, 1997) imagines a space for the reconstruction of Chile’s collective identity, which is obviously not territorial Chile. Bolaño’s text revolves around the traces of a distant star, a writing, the last stroke of an event that happened in the past but whose last imprint, whose light, albeit remote and evanescent, is the sign and the stamp that allows its trajectory to be reconstructed. The novel recreates the de-codification of a variety of texts written in dictatorship and post-dictatorship Chile, newspaper clippings, poems, articles of literary criticism on the New Chilean Poetry, photographs and airplane inscriptions tinged by futurism and Nazi final solution necrophilia [“Death is Chile”, “Death is responsibility”, “Death is cleanliness”], etc. The text is highly fragmentary and disperse, because it must vanish at any price in order to erase the location of its author, a torturer and former Chilean Air Force officer, the slippery Carlos Weider/Alberto Ruiz-Tagle, now sheltered behind anonymity in a Spanish Mediterranean coastal village.

The de-codifiers of this nomad document are collective semiotic agents and, at the same time, representatives of the victims and judges in a trial that would be unthinkable in territorial Chile. Those in charge of reading the victimizer’s writing, the Chilean exiles, represent the disappeared Nation of exile and inner exile. They

\(^5\)“The Plebiscite […] was a fiasco. The polling-station committee member lists were a complete listing of military government supporters” (de la Parra, 1998: 145).
accomplish their task after overcoming the centrifugal violence of personal diaspora that abruptly relocated them in the United States or Europe, the shredding of identity brought on by their loss of a political place, the legal erasure of proofs, the alteration of the signs of depredation, the confusion of a social imaginary driven in the direction of oblivion, and the time elapsed, which blurs faces and handwritings but not memory. The de-codification process unfolds by trial and error: “From now on my narrative will basically be founded on conjecture” (Ibid: 29), “the picture was taken at a certain distance, which is why Weider’s features are blurry […]. He is wearing a leather jacket […] from the Chilean Air Force” (Ibid: 46). In the attempt to “recognize [him] by his posture” (Ibid: 52), there is always a feeling that “something was missing” (Ibid: 16). It is a process of forward and backward steps that is sometimes interrupted: “after that night, the news on Carlos Weider are confusing, contradictory, his figure appears and disappears […] surrounded by fog” (Ibid: 103). All this notwithstanding, the recovered traces slowly build a documentary corpus that takes shape against the grain of the figurative and conjectural power of the metaphor of the disappearance of bodies. The proofs are reconstructed in another place, so as to avoid the dead work that this attempt would entail in a society where memory is seen as necrophilia. Estrella distante suggests that the country’s collective memory is scattered throughout spaces, the exiles’ destinations that the essentialist notion of Nation would consider foreign, since it has been expelled from territorial Chile as part of the exiled Nation.

The authoritarian politics of continuity camouflaged behind democratic language and impunity produces insecurity, helplessness and loss of the sense of community, since it is based on a perverse discourse that continues to place the preservation of security and the execution of justice in the hands of the same entities responsible for the crimes. For this reason, it could be said that this New Chile is not really a house or, if it is, it is a sinister house. Far from this perverse logic, the de-codifying agents in Estrella distante must reconstruct memory, reactivate the social responsibility of vindicating the victims and punish the victimizer, and do so in another place, in the social imaginary of exile, which retains memory, which takes it away in order to preserve it from the politics of oblivion. Bolaño’s novel imagines the construction of a very special place/identity: since the category of nation has been appropriated by the New Chile’s discourse to mean an amnesiac place, the world of exile serves as its contradiction, it is a prosthesis of the nation that is living memory.
and territorializes collective identity by reorienting the deviations of meaning towards the visibility of the internal debt, in the exact opposite direction of neoliberal discourse’s amnesia.

*Estrella distante* addresses the deep crisis of representation in the New Chile. At the same time, reversing the non-place of exile, the community in *Estrella distante* and its methods of collective management rebuild the jigsaw puzzle of memory and restore the law in a place where exile attempts to annul them as agents, to transform them into banished [des-terrados] subjects, that is, subjects without land [tierra], without a voice or political agency: social memory re-territorializes them and reterritorializes Chile. The accounts and facts handled by the two detectives, Bibiano O’Ryan and the narrator, include the stories of Muñoz Cano, la Gorda, Tatiana, the writer Soto, Amalia Maluenda, Abel Romero, “the most famous cop in Allende’s period” (*Ibid*: 121), and Graham Greenwood, who is an expert at deciphering the “secret messages” (*Ibid*: 110). They form a transcommunitarian group with a variety of origins: Sweden, Spain, the GDR, France and the United States. The direction followed by the torturer in his hurried process of dilution is gradually sketched during the reconstruction of the memory bank from a multiplicity of angles; the connecting vessels of active memory rescue the victims, who speak behind details and comments remembered by the group. At the same time, the agency of this Chile of Memory proposed by *Estrella distante* manages to stop the chameleon-like game that hides the predator and his social debt, and is made possible precisely by the cancellation of debate, by impunity and oblivion. In Bolaño’s novel, memory is an ethical debate, but not only as counter-reference for the New Chile. *Estrella distante* follows the traces of Ruiz-Tagle/Weider from the Chilean torture chambers to the fascist movements presently erupting in Europe; at Perpignan’s train station, for example, a Chilean exile discovers:

“[…] three Neo-Nazi youths and a bundle on the floor. The youths diligently kick the bundle. Soto stands at the threshold until he discovers that the bundle moves, that a hand and an incredibly dirty arm emerge from the rags. The bum, who is a woman, yells don’t hit me anymore […]. Perhaps Soto’s eyes fill with tears […] for he senses that he has found his destiny […]. Before engaging in battle he insults them in Spanish. In the untoward Spanish of Southern Chile” (*Ibid*: 89).
It is not only the memory of dictatorship Chile that is actualized in *Estrella distante*, for, on behalf of the military security service, the versatile Ruiz-Tagle/Weider infiltrates Violeta Parra’s popular traveling show and gatherings of leftist intellectuals. He immediately brings to mind Argentinean Navy captain Alfredo Astiz, whose victims also remember his camouflage abilities, similar to Ruiz-Tagle’s, and his appearance as a “nice, handsome, educated” young man (*Ibid*: 29). Thus, in the figure of the torturer, Bolaño condenses a series of marks of identity common to all of the Southern Cone military coups, while issuing a transcommunitarian warning against the different varieties of fascism, which are genetically linked to the compulsion to oblivion, impunity and social irresponsibility. Incidentally, in “Necrospective”, Baudrillard speaks of a logic of justice obliteration that even invalidates Auschwitz (1993: 92). Where memory has become an inappropriate intruder, as tributary to a discourse persuading of the loss of difference, the prevailing logic endorses oblivion’s convenient neglect within the dominant framework of global cultural clonization.

Bolaño’s novel registers subtle gradations in violence. With Pinochet’s dictatorship already well underway, Ruiz-Tagle/Weider displays photographs of tortured prisoners at a party for army officers held in Providencia, a Chilean upper-class suburb:

“In some of the pictures he recognized the Garmendia sisters and other disappeared. The majority were women […]. The women resembled mannequins, in some cases dismembered, shattered mannequins, although Muñoz Cano does not rule out the possibility that in thirty percent of the cases they were still alive when the snapshots were taken” (Bolaño, 1997: 97).

However, the ensuing effect is not what he expected: the first spectator leaves the room “pale and contorted […]. She looked at Weider –it appeared that she was going to say something to him but couldn’t find the words– and later tried to reach the bathroom. She wasn’t able to. She threw up in the hallway” (*Ibid*: 95). A fraction of the people stay by Weider’s side, while a considerable sector begins to retreat: “we looked at each other and didn’t recognize each other, but in reality it was as if we did not recognize each other, we seemed identical we seemed the same” (*Ibid*: 98). This crack suggests a split between the continuity of violence’s exhibitionist discourse and its retreat. This distance must be read as part of a process of emotional separation.
from the physical evidence of violence (the pictures), which, albeit pointing to the elimination of the torturer as an inconvenient reminder of the violence that was necessary to clean up a sick society, still does not involve legal and ethical reparation. In other words, those who, on the road to the New Chile, tidying themselves up for democratic/neoliberal gestuality, leave the photographic exhibition and vomit in the face of violence, do so not necessarily as protest against violence, but against the vision of violence. Ruiz-Tagle’s mistake is having given visual language to what should have never been seen. In fact, the New Chile’s social imaginary seems to coexist without much difficulty with the entire archive of the invisible violence perpetrated during the dictatorship, as well as the invisible violence provoked by the adjustment policies narrated in Los vigilantes, which are less directly attributable to the State. The torturer is demobilized with the fantasy that his disappearance will lead to the disappearance of the harm that has been perpetrated and of the legal possibility for claims.

The reaction to Ruiz-Tagle’s photographic exhibition may be read in the context of international reactions after the Letelier-Moffit murder, when the problem of human rights violations in Chile crossed borders to become an internal United States problem. The criticism voiced by Kissinger himself at the UN Assembly (June 1976) and the strong condemnation issued in the “Kennedy Amendment” congressional report (July 1976) indicated the distancing from repression that had taken place in Nixon’s administration and would later be strongly emphasized by Carter’s. The first measure aimed at cleaning up the country’s image, thereby allowing for the continued flow of international capital, was the removal of Contreras, who was linked to the murders of Prats, Soria, Letelier, the attack against Leighton, and the disappeared, from his position as DINA director. This was an attempt to personalize guilt “by identifying a ‘scapegoat’ whose irrational and excessive behavior explained the brutality of terror” (Moulian, 1997: 231). His fall entailed the noisy dissolution of the DINA and could have produced truly cathartic relief had the DINA not been replaced by the Central Nacional de Informaciones [National Information Center] on August 13, 1977, and Contreras not been silently promoted to General in November of the same year.

The region’s countries’ political framework is compromised since the most essential elements of the military dictatorships have been left untouched. Despite seeing itself as a full democracy, authoritarian referents will remain in force in Chile
until the identitarian process operated by the recovery of justice does not become a reality. Antonio Manuel Garretón questions the true democratic nature of the New Chile, because “the constitutional and institutional reforms that would have opened up the authoritarian enclaves inherited from [Pinochet’s] regime were not initially considered a main issue, nor was an agreement ever made in this regard with the most democratic sector of the opposition […]. Instead, the choice was to prolong, to postpone the full stage of transition” (Garretón, 1993: 99). Hence, no transition whatsoever has occurred in the New Chile. At the same time, the limited transition that has taken place, a transition without institutional break, has forced the collective identity to live with the premises of inclusion and integration. The Chilean political class seems to have agreed upon a very special sacrifice in exchange for incorporation into the global order: the deliberate de-politization and weakening of democracy, in favor of “an imaginary stage of triumphant ‘modernity’ that has enticed the political ruling sectors, generating a consensus-style politics that attenuates differences regarding the future” (Moulian, 1997: 364) and indeed lays aside debate about the future, which is a vital ideological battlefield.

For the Perpignan bum in Estrella distante and the homeless expelled by the New Chile’s watchmen, the only possible reconstruction of place/identity entails transcommunitarian action that may offset the social imperviousness of the language of capitalist transnationalism. Estrella distante is a stubborn inscription surface that reminds us that one may lose pieces of memory but not the capacity to remember. It also answers Chilean sociologist Tomás Moulian’s call to “historiographic passion” as a means to “promote the installation […] of a historical conscience” (Ibid: 374). This would reestablish the genealogical link between dictatorship and re-democratization, highlight their paternity and the figure of their Pater, and, by rejoining his de-contextualized presence to a chain of reconstructions, unwhiten his innocuous tutelage/saviorship as facilitator of the Chilean miracle.

3. Transitions and community management and identity

In El mundo del fin del mundo, by Luis Sepúlveda (1994), a fishing community in the Straits of Magellan confronts the depredation caused by the Japanese fishing fleets; Patagonia Express: Apuntes de viaje, by the same Chilean author (Sepúlveda, 1995), describes a Bolívar-style transcommunitarianism without nationalities in Patagonia; in Un viejo que leía novelas de amor (Sepúlveda, 1992) he
proposes a similar model for the upper Nangaritza River shuar-Ecuadorian jungle, a region that has suffered violent exploitation by Belco, Oryx, Eso, Hispanoil, PetroCanadá, Arco, British Gas, Yukong Ltd., Maersk Oil and Gas, Unocal, Elf Aquitaine, Braspetro, YPF, Occidental Petroleum, Conoco, Opic, Britoil, Mobil, and Teneco (Ruiz, 1993). The settlers’ survival entirely depends on a process of bricolage with the culture of the weak identities (shuar) and its model of complete co-agency with nature, an identitarian place that Donna Haraway considers regenerative, since it is a site from which to look at the inappropriate and invisible other in society with non-human organisms, recalling Chico Mendes and Brazil’s Amazonian indigenous populations—via Hecht and Cockburn:

“Our position as defenders derives […] from a relationship with ‘the forest’ as the integument in their own elemental struggle to survive […]. [T]heir authority derives not from the power to represent from a distance, nor from an ontological natural status, but from a constitutive social relationality in which the forest is an integral partner, part of the natural/social embodiment” (Haraway, 1999: 310).

According to Featherstone, the present globalization cycle “points to the more positive evaluation by the West of otherness and difference […]. Others are neighbors with which we must necessarily interact, relate and listen” (Featherstone, 1993: 172). It is noteworthy that none of the mentioned texts seem to be persuaded of this sudden romance of corporate capital with otherness. Moreover, they do not see the interdependent “flow of information, knowledge, money, commodities, people, and images” (Ibid: 199) as a collapse of borders: “In fact, we are all in each other’s backyards” (Ibid). On the contrary, they all agree in rejecting the logic of the possible and the strong identities of capitalism as the sole identitarian space. If anything, the global cultural model appears as a backyard that it might be best to avoid. However, we should stress that it is precisely the already outlined identitarian mode imposed by the global that pressures for the formulation of new modes of collective management.

For the transcommunitarianism of the Estrella distante exiles, the fishermen in Magellan, or the shuar jungle co-agents, exclusion and invisibility have already disappeared from the network that used to grant them negative semantic value by comparison with the strong identities. As practice of knowledge, representational framework and social operator granting public record, the cartography of the visible in all these cultural proposals has become a representational outside that is out of place,
inadequate and incoherent. In the invisible area of sociability, each community has drawn its own mapping, such that, installed in its own representational model, it is no longer outside the field and artifacts of vision. In *The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse*, Abdul Jan Mohamed alleges something similar. He maintains that “Just as domination works by constant adjustment, so the strategies of the dominated must remain fluid in their objects” (1990: 13). Thus, the invisible society’s status as object is processed outside systemic discourse: “The minority’s attempt to negate the prior hegemonic negation of itself is one of the most fundamental forms of affirmation”.

The above-mentioned texts agree in positioning the subaltern subject in another space whose coordinates and semantic-social praxes are based on disregarding the center and anchoring centrality on the local. The agent of identity ceases to be exotic, minority, subaltern, dominated, marginal, residual, peripheral, inappropriate, monstrous or weak, precisely because it does not look at itself from the point of view of dominant discourses. The vision of the invisible—the reversion of social absence—appears as a common proposal in several directions. Gatti (1999) maintains that the invisible social “stems from the crisis of representation” when the discarded elements, “whose absence also springs from this selective operation”, are rethreaded and the gaze’s blind spots marked.

Since De Certeau (2000), everyday life is read as (re)producing socialization praxes that shape the sense of belonging to a collective identity. At the same time, since it is articulated from different local places, it is subject to material and imaginary re-readings by the practicing subjects. The practitioner may redirect those praxes by allowing another type of register to circulate. This is why, for Rossana Reguillo, “everyday life is constructed at a strategic place where society can be analyzed from its complex plurality of symbols and interactions, since it is a space where the practices and structures of reproduction, and simultaneously of transformation, can be found” (Reguillo, 1998: 98). In Margarita’s Santiago, Patagonia or Nangaritza, everyday life has witnessed a significant loss of its former essentialist, normalizing and soothing character, which is why control over definitions no longer stems from the persuasions of power; participants in these communities no longer recognize for themselves the representational games emanating from the systemic; as a result, they no longer feel involved in any of the Imaginary Nation’s remains. The micro powers that “shoddily” confront the normalizing intentions of power (*Ibid*: 108) progressively articulate themselves “as a set of revisable and
correctible actions […] the actors constantly perform ‘evaluations’, and thus ‘ratings’, of their everyday actions” (*Ibid*: 109).

In Argentina, there exist modes of collective management that are aligned in this direction: the *escrachamientos*, popular participatory forms that anchor the urban space in local memory, against the grain of the progressive clonization of global spaces. These collective acts were originally performed by human rights defense groups, but soon a variety of communities joined in, to the point that their announcements now appear in the public space of radios, streets, and *plazas*: “HIJOS [CHILDREN], HIJOS Uruguay, Vecinos Solidarios de Floresta [Neighbors of Floresta in Solidarity], ACHA, Grupo de Vecinos por la Plaza ‘Madres del Pañuelo Blanco’ [Neighbor Groups for the ‘White Handkerchief’ Mothers’ Plaza], LER (CHILENOS EXILIADOS [CHILEAN EXILES]), PVP MPP (Uruguay), Comisión por los Derechos Humanos de Paraguayos en Buenos Aires [Buenos Aires Commission on Paraguayans’ Human Rights], Murgas Verdes de Montserrat [Montserrat Green *Murgas*], Trabajadores y Despedidos del Correo [Postal Service Current and Fired Employees], Presos Políticos de La Tablada [La Tablada Political Prisoners], Acción AntiFascista [AntiFascist Action], Necesario [Necessary], Asociación de Madres de Plaza de Mayo [Association of Mothers of Plaza de Mayo], Madres de Plaza de Mayo Línea Fundadora [Mothers of Plaza de Mayo Founding Line], Encuentro por la Memoria [Encounter for Memory], Ex-Detenidos y Desaparecidos [Former Arrested and Disappeared], Murga Los Descarrilados de Parque Avellaneda [The Derailed Parque de Avellaneda *Murga*], Familiares de Desaparecidos por Motivos Políticos [Relatives of Disappeared for Political Reasons], Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos por Razones Políticas Uruguay [Relatives of Arrested and Disappeared for Political Reasons Uruguay]”. This varied set of sponsors involves the city’s four cardinal points and the four Southern Cone countries, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina –almost a MERCOSUR, albeit with different objectives. At the same time, it is trans-generational, since it brings several generations together: relatives, mothers, and CHILDREN (*HIJOS, Hijos por la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio* [Children for Justice and Against Oblivion and Silence]) of the disappeared. Included are social associations such as the *murgas* [street bands] with their *candombero* dances (Afro-Uruguayan carnivalesque processions), and neighborhood and political associations (Acción Antifascista, Encuentro por la Memoria, Necesario). It is worth noting that the LER group
identifies itself as “exiled Chileans”, while, at the same time, the manifesto builds an interactive, clearly transcommunitarian social space that replaces the modern states’ nationalist separations by a place/identity achieved through collective management.

The term escrachar originated in a combination of two words from the Italian, a language that was semantically very active in Argentinean Spanish (lunfardo/cocoliche) at the turn of the century, as part of urban proletarian immigrant culture. On the one hand, scraccâ, to expectorate, on the other, schiacciare, to break, to tear apart. In lunfardo, escrachar means “to portray, to photograph someone, without ability or against their will”, “to put someone in an embarrassing position, to denounce someone openly, publicly”, “to beat, to hit”, “to smash something against something” (Conde, 1998: 156). This mode of collective management constitutes an inscription surface. Every escrachamiento entails a long, multiple social agency process consisting of the torturer’s prior identification and documentation, the location of his family residence, and the group’s subsequent appearance in front it: victims and/or relatives narrate on loudspeakers the documentary and testimonial reconstruction of events that the Punto Final and Obediencia Debida laws have made to vanish. The escrachamiento that took place on November 20, 1998, at 6:30 pm, for example, had two objectives: locating the town of Floresta’s Concentration Camp, “Rivadavia and San Nicolás (Rivadavia at 8000), site of the Orletti Detention Center. From there, we will go escrachar ESMA torturer, Dinamarca, and we will end at Lacarra and Rivadavia, site of El Olimpo Clandestine Detention Center”. In turn, the announcement for the December 20, 1998, escrachamiento against Dr. Julio César Caserotto, “occupation: physician, child kidnapper”, informs of the following:

“He was Head of the Gynecology Department at the Campo de Mayo Military Hospital (1977-1983).
While holding the position of Army Major Doctor, he assisted clandestine deliveries by women who were illegally detained and who, after giving birth (handcuffed, hooded, their hands tied), were disappeared by means of the Death Flights [Vuelos de la Muerte] and whose children were then appropriated.
He was denounced to CONADEP by six doctors, four midwives, and two nurses who worked at the Campo de Mayo Military Hospital. They made him responsible for deliveries performed under subhuman conditions and for taking part, together with murderers Bianco and Di Benedeto, in the military Apparatus in charge of children kidnapping.
He was released thanks to the Obediencia Debida law.
Currently, he is working in the City of Mercedes as gynecologist and only PAMI representative.

We demand the imprisonment of Dr. Caserotto and all his accomplices. We demand the restitution of the appropriated children. *No oblivion or forgiveness. Justice and Punishment for the Guilty*.

This identitarian strategy consists of *seizing* the city on *the side of memory* and reconstructing an identitarian urban map that would have been unthinkable during the dictatorship. It is a cultural praxis that, by locating the sites of horror, unmasksthe abetting gestuality of impunity and, operating against it, strives to itemize, with cartographic precision, streets and addresses, locates what is unnamed and un-nameable, and puts in circulation a meaning that runs counter to the ravishing imposed upon Chilean society: for Marco Antonio de la Parra, the spatio-temporality of the regime’s *continuum* demands “a humiliating co-habitation of all of us with fraud” (1998: 144). In addition to a cohabitation-complicity with the sites of horror, as highlighted in Carlos Cerda’s *Una casa vacía* (1996).

The novel addresses the unnoticed and sinister physical proximity to horror in the everyday urban space of Santiago, a city whose spatiality has, for Cerda, become a subliminal site of permanent identitarian recruitment by the regime. The year is 1985 and “*carabineros* [policemen] armed with guns, truncheons, tear gas bombs, shields, and other weapons” repress street demonstrations organized by the Coordinación Nacional Sindical and the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre in reaction to the drastic adjustment measures imposed by the neoliberal capitalist revolution, which have left thousands unemployed. The novel tells the real story of a family who arrives at a former clandestine women’s torture site located at the corner of Irán and Los Plátanos in Santiago de Chile. In order to make it once again inhabitable, the house is quickly restored and painted, its “dirty floors, full of huge burn marks and strange stains all over the place” (Cerda, 1996: 114), are thoroughly scraped, as part of a clean-up process intended to make it look its best and completely erase the traces of its past history, especially those in a sinister photography room/basement, which is “horrible, filthy, the most deteriorated part of the house” (*Ibid*: 119). This house/nation is fully renovated so that it may coexist, in the ferment of Irarrázal Street’s coffee-shops, bars, movie theaters, and squares (*Ibid*: 221), with the glittering Saturday night life and may serve as backdrop for flashing pro-regime economic
winners such as Sergio, who made pacts with the Carabineros and now wear white double-breasted suits and play the stock market.

None of the neighbors remember ever having heard anything in that house. *Una casa vacía* insists that, in Chile, nothing refers back to the past and, for this reason, the hair-raising possibility even exists of living in a house like this, still pervaded by disturbing signs, piercing screams left over by the victims, moans, “something that crept with a lot of pain and seemed about to die” (*Ibid*: 167). The connection of this empty house to the *dwelling of horror* (*Ibid*: 166), that is, its re-*territorialization* in Santiago’s collective memory map, provokes –once again– vomit, “shivers, uncontrollable death rattles, shudders […] that induce goose bumps” (*Ibid*: 123). Here “everything is tense, suffocating, sick […] I think it is because of fear” (*Ibid*: 179). It is the nation, as *dwelling of horror*, and the perks from terror. This enticement to complicity –by spatial proximity– was made possible by a transition *aimed at impunity*. On the contrary, *escrachamientos* allow the neighbors to break with this space that calls for the denial of historical memory. Demarcating urban spaces and re-signifying them by means of testimonial and documentary discourses delivered by *loudspeakers* during *escrachamiento* allows every social agent to define his/her own critical distance within his/her everyday life, thus retaining his/her agency while restoring to the city its capacity to serve as mapping for collective memory. Let us not forget that *escrachamiento* derives from two semes that are relevant to this case: on the one hand, “to portray, to photograph someone, without ability or against their will”, “to put someone in an embarrassing position, to denounce someone openly, publicly”, “to beat, to hit”, “to smash something against something” (Conde, 1998). And, at the same, from *scraccâ*, to expectorate, to expel what has remained choked and choking, the memory choked by the laws of forgetting.

This praxis is the exact opposite of global space’s. The “Mercado de Abasto” shopping center opened its doors in Buenos Aires in November, 1998, thanks to George Soros capital. Formerly, the huge building had been in ruins, pointing to the turn of the century, a period linked to the world of work and to anarchist, communist and socialist political mobilizations. Similarly, Puerto Madero’s current recycling exhibits a predictably clonic architecture that manages to dilute its former function as active anchor in Buenos Aires’ identitarian mnemotechnics. Puerto Madero is, literally, modern Buenos Aires’ founding site. Spaces in ruins (historical vestiges) have thus been mutated into profitable scenographies with memorialistic historical
meaning; “inside the shopping center it does not rain and it is not cold, the change from day to night goes unnoticed—the artificial lighting is [...] ‘professional’ or theatrical, there is no ‘class struggle’ [...] thanks to the discreet overseeing and the accepted homogenizing convention of certain attires, the excellent services make it possible to spend ‘a whole lifetime’ there” (Fernández, 1996: 20).

In the shopping centers that are sprouting like mushrooms in the non-differentiated urban space, the amnesia of local interaction is rehearsed, the consumer’s life is sterilized, and s/he is dignified in the common global mimetic identity, thanks to the clonization imposed by the advertisement images s/he sees and the spaces s/he traverses. Puerto Madero and Mercado de Abasto are two examples of the celebration of consumerism which displace former writings signifying them as allocutionary monuments to the organic city’s conflictive nature. Another example (undoubtedly the most spectacular of all) of urban obliteration as a language for memory control is Punta Carrera, formerly a women’s prison during the Uruguayan dictatorship. To the visitor acting as parachutist-of-memory, it appears as a cared-for and sober building located in a very affluent sector of Montevideo, now recycled into a shopping center. In fact, every time they enter it, the residents of Montevideo are forced to a soft incorporation of/proximity with silence.

Argentinean Alejandro Agresti’s film Buenos Aires viceversa (1997), addresses the social agency of the most vulnerable sector in Southern Cone societies, the young members of the post-re-democratization generation. The new generations appear as strongly deprived of conceptual elements within de-historicized societies, paternalistically protected from the workings of memory and, at the same time, joyfully installed in the de-territorializing space of the shopping center, which is precisely the setting of Agresti’s film’s last scene. Marc Augé reads the shopping center as a non-place where the organic is left aside: “The space of non-place creates neither singular identity nor relations; only solitude and similitude” (Augé, 1997: 101-02), far from the complicity of language, “local references, and unformulated rules of living know-how” (Ibid: 101). In Buenos Aires viceversa, the dumb masses authenticate Baudrillard’s vision of the systemic: “Everything flows through them, everything magnetizes them” (1993: 2). The Buenos Aires population vibrates thanks to the consumer and entertainment industries, is imploded in the de-territorializing seduction of the fetish object, and transformed into mere passing channels for market strategies. Systemic theory alleges that what the global economy’s homogenization
contributes is a greater degree of hyper panoptic transparency: clonic spaces are predictable places, since their functions have proven themselves in a predestined circulation that cancels contradictory space-time coordinates, and the dense asymmetries, discordant deviations and imbalances of the social. The construction of a transcommunitarian collective identity that, all this notwithstanding, the new generations of Buenos Aires viceversa perform takes place, paradoxically, in the non-place of a shopping center that is watched over by a demobilized former torturer like Ruiz-Tagle, who is now a panoptic agent for a private security company.

At first sight, in Carlos Menem’s Buenos Aires, everything appears to be viceversa, nothing makes any difference because reality has been legally falsified, is always on flight and a simulacrum, beginning with the fact that the same urban space is shared by the torturers and the tortured. The former torturer in Buenos Aires viceversa has managed to fit into the transition without being detected. He condensates the neoliberal transition. This allows him to continue his sinister trajectory of violence, which culminates, not against political groups as used to be the case, but against the undesirable elements created by economic disinsertion, such as those portrayed by Eltit (1994). As the shopping center’s security agent, he puts his trigger-happy fingers in motion –this is the most habitual form of police brutality in Latin America⁶– and, spectacularly, as if carefully executing every gesture in imitation of a Hollywood film, kills a small child that has just committed a minor robbery.

In Buenos Aires viceversa, the new generations are metaphorically embodied by a young blind woman feeling her way through the city without a map –since so much of the city has been made invisible–, an orphan street child, two HIJOS of disappeared persons –one of whom was given to the torturer’s family–, who, together with two underemployed mechanics, an unsuccessful boxer from the provinces and a hyper televised woman, are able to reestablish the links that have been obliterated by the Imaginary Nation’s control over interpretation. The group re-signifies the shopping center’s systemic space, mocks the hyper panoptic predictability of a culture that proposes to abolish the organic city’s exchanges and makes it into an inscription surface. As was the case with Margarita’s hugging utopia, the social energy of bodies

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manages to prevail and, by reversing the praxes of the socio-phobic neoliberal world and its indolence-generating closed preserves, this transcommunity *re-territorializes* itself as historical agent, defines the debt, gives shape to collective identities and projects, and does so in the space with the greatest restriction of physical movement, interpretive non-differentiation, and mediation of organic city contact. *Buenos Aires viceversa* proposes that, even in a social space undermined by the clonic deterritorialization of consumer culture, social agents may take a different direction.

The Latin American cultural products that have been analyzed describe the crises of representativity and representation in neoliberal capitalist state democracies. They imagine the wonder to be experienced in unusual, warm shelter homes and in unthought-of hugs, and new types of families whose range of action and generosity have undertaken the reactivation of social responsibility. But, most importantly, they show significant agreement in their flight, in the open invitation to imagine transcommunitarian models whereby to counteract both the sinister dwellings that cloak/retain scenes of terror and the fortress-homes that the free market’s indolence prescribes. The extremely dense saturation and the pronounced social chasms generated by the global have ended up provoking, as a reaction, an unexpected and welcome revision of collective identities. The dispossession of the *house* and the revision of its function and meaning can provide the opportunity to escape the *box* and capitalism’s *private and public scene*. This is the only way to explain this imagination running counter to dominant models, which tenaciously turns the national stage, the family scene and collective representativity inside out with the goal of culturally *reterritorializing* Latin American communities.

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CHAPTER 12

Translocal Territories of Memory:
Some Graphic Humor Types
from Franco’s Dictatorship to the Present

Cristina Peñamarín

Living in a global context entails not only that markets, production and communication are organized in transnational networks. It also implies that the experience of what is near or far, of one’s own or alien, is constructed with elements that are at once local and translocal, archaic and futuristic, from one’s own and from alien traditions. Memory, understood with Pierre Nora (1984-1992) as the constant dynamics of remembrance and oblivion by living societies, has new means to construct its territories. But in addition it is motivated by new demands.

Nora has spent a decade studying the “places of memory”, the milestones and references we collectively construct when the real means of memory, the links that joined a community’s present and past in a continuum, have disappeared. He is interested not so much in history, which is a social science based on compilation, mediation and detachment, as in the modes of remembrance societies assign themselves: the objects, emblems, sayings and ceremonies that crystallize whatever a community chooses to remember. An object, material or immaterial, becomes a “place of memory” only if imagination invests it with a symbolic aura, this author maintains (Nora, 1998).

Here I will treat memory as a key instrument in the construction of the collective imaginary, more specifically, the imaginary shaping of the we in relation (of identification, rejection, competition, etc.) to its significant others. The social construction of memory milestones is an essential element in the formation of the basic framework of common references and values of our world, and the sphere of interactions and language that, in addition to being closest to us, most understandable and familiar, is a central component of our identity, even if still traversed by cracks and conflicts.
Memory and the imaginary are not a mere reservoir of learnings and acquired knowledge. The places we collectively return to time and again until they become common referents are those that are marked by affect, that have the virtue of expressing and giving shape to the interests, fears, desires, rejections and hopes of the members of the community, which is defined precisely by those common referents. Addressing the construction of our world entails considering the values we identify with as discursive places from which we speak, categorize and feel; places that, although frequently unnoticed and unquestioned, mold the image of what we’d like to be, the core of a project of collective identity. The affective, understood as the manner in which we are involved and affected by relations with our world, with others and with the Other, must be taken into account in any approximation to memory.

Its affective character is one of the features of memory that Nora stresses in order to distinguish it from modern historical science, which is legitimated by its detached attitude. We can understand memory precisely as the sediment left by the social activity of locating, rooting and establishing the territory that a community feels its own. We thus follow M. Halbwachs (1980), who believed that memory, which is always socially constructed, is a premise and a condition for the existence of a community. The common symbols, the milestones of memory arise, according to Halbwachs, from the emotional experiences the group shares.

If we understand the concept of territory in ethological terms, as the sphere that an individual or a community feel their own, and even as a constituent element, we can define its main features: (i) What determines the formation of territories is the marker of one's own/alien. But what is one’s own is the result of a process of appropriation of the other, the outside or the alien, and a parallel process of alienation or estrangement from one’s own. For this reason, it is applied to (ii) social processes that are fluid –symbolic territories are not discrete entities separated by rigid borders– and dialogic, since they take place by interaction with alien symbolic systems and institutions that are then re-signified, at the semantic as well as the affective and evaluative levels. Since (iii) territories must be marked, that is, signaled in a perceptible manner, both for the members included in the we and those excluded from it, they are simultaneously subjective and objectified in recognizable signs. This objectification allows people separated by geographic distance to share the same marks of identity to ascribe themselves to the same symbolic territory of belonging. What needs to be investigated, and what I will deal with here, are these processes: the
dynamics of formation of territories for the memory of a community, so as to make accessible to analysis the dynamics of formation of collective identities (although the term identity must be used with caution in order to avoid its frequent reification).

I believe that Renato Ortiz’s (1996) use of the ethological metaphor of territory shares some of these views, as when he states that the nation “is the result of a double movement of de-territorialization and re-territorialization in a sphere of a different dimension”. The former identification of the inhabitants of a geographic territory with a lineage, a religion, a monarchy, etc., was progressively replaced by identification with the territorial, administrative and symbolic entity of the nation. I am also interested in another observation by this author: the nation –Ortiz goes on to say– favors mobility of things and people within its geographic enclosure. But “modernity requires a deeper uprooting”. When it is radicalized, modernity accelerates the forces of de-centering and individuation, and the conditions of mobility and disembedding, thus engendering new identity referents, such as youth, whose behavior cannot be understood except in the context of globalization.

One must say that the phenomenon of translocal identification has been known to occur at least since the spread of the book, which is a mobile medium for discourses and stories and, therefore, languages, styles, and characters with whom the reader can identify, as was the case, for example, with *Don Quixote*, *Madame Bovary* and *La Regenta*. In these characters, identification with literary models took place at the individual level. But in the 20th century, massive tourism, film, records, comics, and television have made possible large-scale mimesis, the simultaneous adoption of the same identity referents by large sectors of the population. The formation of youth as a differentiated social sector in the second half of the century is significant in this respect. This sector is defined by having a distinctive style of consumption and behavior, its own brands, its heroes –movie and music stars, etc., its characteristic spaces and rituals. These are, in Ortiz’s words (1996), “life references” that make up the same collective imaginary despite ethnic, national, and other differences.

It is true that the media and the global market spread “a genuine world mass culture in the anthropological sense of culture, namely a way of life”, as Hobsbawm maintains. But this author notes that “somewhere on the road between the globally uniform coke-can and the roadside refreshment stand in Ukraine or Bangladesh […] globalization stops being uniform and adjusts to local differences” (Hobsbawm, 1998). Similarly, many authors have observed that standardization also stimulates
differentiation. Thus, certain circuit identities are formed within the sector of the young, such as those grouping together reggae or punk fans, for example, while others cross several ages and strata, such as those determined by adherence to a certain ideology, and certain values and discourses, say, environmentalism. As for gender identities, which in traditional cultures tend to receive an essentialist definition (men/women are thus), since industrial modernity they are being constantly redefined, with feminist leadership sometimes denied or questioned, and others accepted.

What distinguishes the formation of collective *territories* from the usual human task of social and cultural production and reproduction is the fact that those we call territories are the basis for identification with a community of belonging. We are part of a social group by the chance occurrence of birth but, especially since modernity, it is possible for us to identify with the symbols of a specific group or current, without necessarily estranging ourselves from our community of origin. And this identification with symbols allows the collective experience to belong to us as something of our own.

Identities can rarely be apprehended as finished but, instead, are processes whereby social actors identify with and distance themselves from the referents circulating in the social discourses within their reach, and which may eventually crystallize in formations such as *circuits* or *territories*. In these fluid territories or currents, certain elements of identification may acquire a relative stability and solidity, when the identity they demarcate is satisfactory to their members (or when there are circumstances such as conflict or struggle with another community, which, at least since Simmel, have been known to favor the closure and consolidation of social groups).

Understanding identities as processes invites us to address the social work of the production of signs as marks of differentiated and valued territories. This social work is carried out by various agents: writers; intellectuals; armies, which, especially in conflict situations, are capable of creating powerful mass images; institutional agents, which, in the case of the national states, plan out the production of factors of national cohesion like education, a unified official language, maps and history of the territory, etc.; and, finally, more or less anonymous social agents, such as speakers, the media, artists, musicians, designers, etc. No identity referent seems *a priori* indispensable, although some referent or set thereof is necessary in order to signal and make perceptible a community’s own territory. How are the marks of territory that
will become identity referents for a community constructed? How do we address the processes of appropriation or identification, which we know are embedded in life contexts and the relations they entail with “others”?

I will refer in this paper to the process of estrangement by a sector of the Spanish population from the beliefs, values, and symbols imposed by Franco’s dictatorship and the formation of a democratic current of public opinion, as shown in a series of dialogic and polemic texts: cartoons published during the period when Spain was subject to repression and censorship, and politically and economically isolated from its neighbors, although, especially after the 1950s, in contact with foreign cultures thanks to the influx of tourists and the controlled diffusion of publications and films, mostly North American but also European.

Universal values reveal themselves as an essential component of the identity of today’s Spaniards as Western. I intend to address how adherence to these values developed even before Spain freed itself from Franco’s dictatorship and became a Western democracy, and to show, by means of examples from graphic humor, how those values took shape among a general public during the dictatorship, how they took root “in the motives and hearts of citizens”, as Habermas says (1989), while at the same time a collective heritage of memory different from the one imposed by the regime was being molded.

During Franco’s dictatorship, the State sought to occupy all possible places of memory. Official history and the celebrations, emblems, news media, and pulpits all propagated ad nauseam the same belligerent, fossilized, and contrived discourse, which was far removed from living language and alien to people’s experience, especially those who hadn’t lived through the war, but only the dictatorship. Yet, the survivors’ memory had been fashioned by the freedom and the plural frameworks of meaning the vanquished Second Republic had introduced. On the other hand, the media strengthened their international sources and television expanded during the second half of the century. Finally, thanks to their appealing characters, films and comics, which were considered innocuous entertainments, and the literature that escaped censorship allowed the imagination to position itself in places very different

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1 I will hardly refer to the different phases in the internal evolution of the Regime or the numerous expressions of dissent and political opposition, which are aspects that have been already amply studied. In the brief space of this article, I will confine myself to proposing some examples of graphic humor as a perfunctory illustration of the process of construction of alternative referents for collective memory.
from the pious, rhetorical, and gloomy mandatory readings. The places of official memory were never those of real memory, as Pablo’s cartoon shows.

Graphic humor is well-suited for studying the social dynamics whereby the territories imposed as a common sphere of thought and feeling for all are contested and new processes of territorialization around other referents begin to develop. This type of text always attempts to create complicity with its addressees, who must understand something that is not explicitly stated, but only suggested through the words and the ways of thinking or looking peculiar to others, which are mocked and belied by the text itself (Peñamarín, 1998). The genre’s polemic richness stems from the relations it establishes with the perspectives and positions alluded to or represented in the texts. The reader cannot avoid perceiving the allusion to the position from which commonplace discourses, which are known only too well, are enunciated, or their questioning through certain values the text presupposes are shared with the author.

In Pablo’s drawing, the big lectern in a church choir holds a book of hymns or prayers that has been covered by a comic book, which is a low-culture, childish, humorous object, suitable for relaxed and pleasurable reading, but completely alien to the attitude that is mandatory in church. The high and the low, the sacred and the profane, the solemn and the jocular, the imposed and the chosen, the exposed and the hidden, are opposed in such a way that each one covers and denies the other. They don’t dialogue, because, as Bakhtin (1981; 1986; 1989) has noted, the authoritarian word is unmovable in its Truth, not dialogic, but they coexist in the same space thanks to the audacity of the mischievous singer, whose point of view incidentally coincides with the reader’s. In addition to representing a transgression of the norms of the sacred space, the drawing makes visible a common pleasure object known to all the readers of the magazine it’s published in, together with a way of using it that favors liberation from those norms and de-legitimates their authority, at least for the singer-reader from whose perspective we observe it. Readers accustomed to private readings of comic books and those guilty of hidden transgressions similar to this one recognize themselves in the scene, in which something that was until now considered private, as
pertaining to each individual, is transformed into an image that communicates something to many, into a public symbolic image.

M. Gardiner (1999) has noted Bakhtin’s interest in images, particularly bodily images, for example in his studies on the carnivalesque. Moreover, the dialogic perspective that Bakhtin developed for the analysis of verbal language has been applied to the analysis of cultural objects, among other authors by García Canclini (1995), by means of the concept of hybridization. The Bakhtinian perspective allows us to perceive the social tension between the voices and gazes involved, their power conflicts, and the interests, values and affects at stake in the visual, auditory and verbal texts and objects that record and give shape to the social dialogue.

As is well-known, language is for Bakhtin a socially live medium, which is why he always refers to the languages of a given sphere in the plural. Each one is marked as peculiar to a given sector, profession, age, style, etc., and there is no word or meaning that is neutral. Every use of the language involves a conflict between identification and distance with respect to the social voice of the habitual users of the code and their world views, since every language is also a “specific objectual-semantic and axiological horizon”. How can we apply this type of analysis to images? Do images share with words the feature observed by Bakhtin, whereby they indexically point to a code and, therefore, to a group of its users?

The symbolic images we find in graphic humor give rise to texts that comment on issues known to the readers. For Bakhtin, all texts are dialogic, because, in addition to the social indexical property of words, when thematizing any subject, the speaker always finds it already commented on by previous discourses, illuminated by the words already said about it, and s/he must choose among the various ways of considering it, which entails positioning him/herself with respect to them and the social groups maintaining them (Peñamarín, 1989). The symbolic image also has the means to register and display the perspectives and the ways of conceiving, valuing, and feeling about an issue that are characteristic of the different social sectors.

The book of religious hymns in the solemn lectern behind the choir’s handrail creates a context that is recognizable to the readers of the period (only a few would recognize the lectern as a choir lectern, but most would identify it as one of the objects used by the priest during religious ceremonies). What the context demands, the type of participation it imposes, and the inappropriateness of reading a comic book, together with the subversion of values it entails, could not but be recognized by
the readers. The values the reader is invited to share with the author, Pablo, are, in the first place, those pertaining to the immediate reality: the occurrence literally or metaphorically represents many real transgressions, and this occurrence that had until now remained hidden, is made visible, objectified into public signs. And, in the second place, the values of joy, laughter, and freedom that one can attain if one is capable of not yielding, at least while reading, to the values imposed by authority.

During most of Franco’s dictatorship, no explicit critical discourse was permitted and no such discourse existed outside underground publications, which circulated under considerable risk among small groups. But vignettes in newspapers and humor publications, which were lawful media directed at a wide public, gradually introduced a critical view of Spain that was based on implicit positive values that censorship would not have allowed to be made explicit.

For a long time, the type of humor displayed in the few publications devoted to it, such as La Codorniz, a literary and graphic magazine founded in 1941 and whose audience included both right-wingers and democrats, was completely removed from the country’s reality. But humor progressively became one battlefield among others. Using the technique of opposition, that is, the clash between two incompatible perspectives, one of which belies or mocks the other with the audience’s complicity, humor began to question commonly accepted values and to re-signify social clichés; it brought taboos to light, inverted hierarchies of prestige, etc.

One of the methods used in the struggle to open up new territories of thought and expression was to create social types, both positive and negative or ridiculous. “Psycho-social types –Deleuze and Guattari (1991: 67) write– have this precise meaning: in the most insignificant as in the most important circumstances, they make the formations of territories, the vectors of de-territorialization, and the processes of re-territorialization perceptible”.

One of the most significant of these types was the paleto [country bumpkin], who became very popular in both film and conversational and graphic humor. The paleto is a variation of the “simpleton”, the traditional idiot in popular comedy. He is represented as an uncultured, rough and unkempt peasant,
incapable of any refinement or adaptation to modern languages and styles. In a 1955 ABC cartoon, Mingote makes him appear almost as pathetic as he looks, with desolation born from his total sense of exclusion, at a swimming-pool we don’t see but can imagine filled with people in modern bathing attire. The freedom of modern fads and customs strikes this paletó who is incapable of understanding and much less assimilating them. Similarly, in La Codorniz in 1950, Herreros depicts the unlikely event of a fortune-teller predicting a blond, delicate, spiritual and poetic woman in the paletó’s life, a series of qualities –delicacy, spirituality, poetry– that were seen as incompatible with his character.

In 1967, Mingote contrasts the already technocratic discourse of television with the rural audience, made up of paletos, powerless to understand such language or the technical and capitalist rationality it was introducing. But in this case the opposition doesn’t only serve to show the paletó’s insurmountable backwardness. The characters’ lack of understanding also makes evident the stupidity of technocratic language, which is claimed as learned but Mingote transcribes as gibberish. The drawing also contains criticism of certain aspects of modernization that, in contrast to the uninhibited bathing suits in the 1955 cartoon, are not positive signs of the change they announce.
This counter-figure of modernity, the *paleto*, represents the stagnant time of underdevelopment. Laughing at the *paleto* was a way to represent what Spaniards didn’t want to be and, at the same time, remove it from the audience. In those days audiences couldn’t find any value in that culture, which was rather perceived as lack of culture, for only formal education and cosmopolitanism were valued. But the phantom of “lack of culture” was too close to home—which is why it had to be put at a distance—, since any Spaniard traveling abroad, not an easy thing to do those days, felt like a *paleto* in Europe—unable to speak other languages and lacking the modern ease of those Europeans whose countries were quickly growing wealthier and modernized while Spain seemed to remain stuck in underdevelopment. If it is true that the person who laughs is threatened by precisely the object of his/her laughter (Girard quoted in Abril, 1991), then ridiculing the *paleto* can be interpreted as an attempt to exorcise the threat perceived by Spaniards when observing themselves from the point of view of the appreciated *other*, that is, the modern person they wanted to be. The insistence on this psychosocial type expressed and fulfilled estrangement from peasant culture and its wealth of memory and traditions linking the present to the past in a continuity that was considered incompatible with the culture of specialization and fragmentation prevailing in the modern world we yearned to join.

The *carca*, the reactionary male or female, was another way to represent detained time. S/he was perceived as representative of a very pro-Spanish ultraconservative right. The audience recognized the memory that founded his/her identity, but did not accept it as their own. The history of the *carca* is that of Spanish conservatism, which official discourse taught as the history of the “good” Spain (from the Reconquest and the Catholic Monarchs, who unified the territory and, despite starting the empire, were conveniently still not “modern”, to the ultra-catholic Francoist present). This type allowed the translation of the officially good Spain into the bad one.

Because of its proven inclination towards criticism, humor was highly suspicious to the dictatorship. In this cartoon, Máximo condemns the *carca* and, thereby, the whole Regime and its aim to censor and repress humor and laughter. The job of humorists is here self-described as globally hostile to the Regime and its most

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2 This type has practically disappeared today, when it would not only be incorrect, but also a sign of insensitivity towards cultural differences and autochthonous traditions, to deny traditional rural cultures their wisdom and dignity.
ardent defenders. The next image is emblematic of the genre’s capacity to give visual reality to an idea or sensation, to superpose the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic, and present different subjects’ perception of the same event, in this case the “good manners” taught in childhood. As in many of these cartoons, this one contains no explicit allusion to Spain’s situation, but a majority of the public would interpret it along these lines. This created complicity between author and public that allowed them to understand each other on the basis of forbidden values that they were learning to mold into recognizable signs under the censoring gaze. The carca’s figure allowed to hyperbolically represent official discourse in its relation to the greater or lesser transgression laughter always entails the values of an enlightened and open education and “high culture”, as when he is shown “murdering” books.

There are numerous cartoons such as Eduardo’s and Munoa’s in next page, which establish a contrast between the static character of old dark figures and the dynamism and modernity of the young, who ignore the conservatives’ attempts to stifle it. Young, modern Spanish women were already practically indistinguishable from the foreign ones in Eduardo’s drawing and the cartoonist takes as much pleasure in the sensory as in the ideological facet of the symbolic icon. This indulgence in the figure’s sensuality is intended to make evident the model’s beauty and value. The modern young women symbolize an appealing and desired world, the “outside” that is already becoming Spain’s own as a present loaded with future. In these drawings’

3 Young men, however, did not have the same meaning in the period’s graphic humor, where they were portrayed as rather ridiculous with their long Beatles-style hair, their strange attires, and their ye-ye [groovy], as the media contemptuously called them, attitudes and languages. The hippies and progres [lefties] who appeared later were somewhat different, since they embodied a more political opposition to the Regime.
women in black, the carca type is blended with that of the traditional, usually rural woman, to create a single contemptible subject. The violence underlying the discourses and resources of the authoritarian power was thus answered with a similar violence, stemming from a logic of confrontation that at the time was perhaps unavoidable.

The types of the paleto, mute witness to a change that excludes him, and the carca who, on the contrary, always voices his/her aggressive condemnation, don’t appear only as archaic figures in the process of disappearing. Humor makes use of their archaic character to depict emerging modernity and change at a time when the archaic never lost its prominent position. These figures seem to indicate that, when official discourse and history construct the image of the community on the basis of values the community does not feel its own; it relegates this discourse to oblivion and attempts to destroy its prestigious signs while polemically constructing other referents of memory. Traditional culture, which is represented by these psychosocial types, is perceived as lacking in creativity and resources with which to intervene in the contemporary world, as cornered between a modernity that detractors considered too intent on imitating foreign values [extranjerizante] and traditionalism, understood as the appropriation of the traditional carried out by the Regime. Modernity, on the other
hand, was not always celebrated without reservations. Many cartoons oppose the huge, modern, invasive building blocks—both in the new city neighborhoods that could barely take in the massive rural immigration and the touristic coast—to traditional houses, towns, and landscapes, in an attempt to denounce this aspect of modernization as destructive, dehumanizing and incapable of coexisting with the traditional habitat and ways of life. For decades, the effects of the interbreeding of the local and the translocal, the traditional and the modern, were felt as almost uncannily dissonant, especially since “the new” and the spirit of gain inspiring it seemed destined to destroy everything else, including the natural environment, as in fact occurred in the touristic coast, among many other places.

In this conceptualist cartoon by OPS, El Greco’s *Knight with Hand on His Chest*, a painting which very appropriately represents the sternness of official Spain, shows a woman’s breast, as if “black Spain” had grown a female breast. I don’t intend to interpret an image that admits countless interpretations, but it suggests to me that Spaniards have stopped believing the outward appearances of official images and are now trying to discover something incongruous and hidden in them. The female breast is also an emblem of what the regime called *la apertura* [the opening], a timorous liberalization through which it attempted to broaden its social base and its already exhausted discourse. This it didn’t achieve at all, although *la apertura* did give rise to the immensely popular phenomenon of *destape*, that is, the proliferation of partial female nudity. In OPS’s drawing, the representation of the breast does not attempt to arouse sensual or erotic attraction, but only “mention” it. Femininity and woman’s physicality seem to make their way through the knight’s stern, black clothing, or open him to feminization, thus creating a monstrous bearded woman with qualities alien to the knight’s canonic representation, such as softness and sweetness.
Foreigners appear in these cartoons mainly as tourists, that is, people who are not interested in the reality of the country they visit, don’t know anything about its culture and history, and see its residents as mere curiosities. In next Mingote’s, the tourist’s words open a double perspective, external and internal for, while Spaniards wouldn’t allow a foreigner to describe their achievements as irrelevant –and there sit the glorious works of the past, in this case the Escorial Monastery, to disprove it– they shared his opinion insofar as it referred to the present. The polyphony expressed in these words allowed not only to escape censorship while expressing a critical opinion, but also avoided directly offending the pride of Spaniards, who could recognize and at the same time scorn an opinion that underestimated them. In other words, they could accept the limited value of their present achievements without completely despising themselves, since at least in the past they showed themselves capable of great works, which is what the tourist seems to ignore. In drawings such as this one, the foreigner’s perspective is ridiculed, but this is a way to materialize it as a dialogic mirror in which to observe the present from a point of view different from the official one, which always insisted on celebrating the Regime’s achievements.

A visual opposition between the great architecture of the past and the flimsy modern constructions, be it in the eyes of foreigners or of Spaniards themselves, appears in many other drawings by Mingote, with a similar composition of visual space: the ancient architectural work is generally placed at the center and drawn large-scale with an accuracy and detail that are lacking in the schematic elements around it. The polemic discourse is constructed on the basis of an assessment the author tries to posit as unquestionable: the beauty and effectiveness of past Spanish achievements. Praise of the Spanish tradition thus underlies criticism of the present, possibly as a means to counteract the widespread tendency to devalue one’s own in the face of the country’s backwardness and poverty.
For many Spaniards of the period, foreign countries represented emigration, particularly to Germany. Máximo proclaims through this absurd image what was said only in a low voice: that Spaniards were leaving the country in large numbers driven by poverty. At the same time that he contests official triumphalism, he critically alludes to landscape painting and its ennoblement of a Spanish countryside whose serious problems it ignored. Emigrants are not visible in the genre, precisely because they were absent from the visual space, but they are still mentioned in the writing, as in this drawing by Máximo or in the letter read by the old man in Villena’s drawing.

Villena’s cartoon makes clearly visible what Europe meant to Spaniards. In all cases Europe offers what for each character is most important: sexual freedom for the young seducer, free trade and money for the bourgeois businessman, and work, via emigration, for the peasant without means. The boy imagines a Europe that is not separate from Spain by any visible border. Furthermore, in their imagination they all locate themselves in Europe, which can be read as a prophetic dream of the type that makes the future inevitable. In these texts, we witness the construction of an alternative self-definition that entailed the progressive creation of a new symbolic border between us/them. In this process, the community of the we was molded by the
identification of its members with certain values and models, often located outside the nation’s political borders, and the ensuing distance with respect to the other referents and values, in this case national ones, from which the imaginary we wanted to distinguish itself.

The final years of the Regime were particularly cruel for democrats. Convinced of having reason, the world and the future on their side, they still had to helplessly endure the unbelievable survival of the dictator, his merciless repression, and even the police murders and pseudo-legal executions of his opponents, which filled Spanish democrats with shame. This is the shame expressed in Forges’. Shame over human rights and justice violations indicates, in addition to the author’s adherence to those values, which he expects to share with his audience, his identification with the country he belongs to, even if that belonging hurts. “That kind of political shame is very good and always needed”, B. Anderson has stated (1999).

But shame stemmed not only from the dictatorship’s political immorality. Seen in the cold light of day, the houses and streets of Spanish towns had the poor and degraded look characteristic of underdeveloped countries, so different from the well-kept and rich appearance of the
European cities we admired and envied during our travels. Only the darkness of night attenuated that difference. Shame appears in the subject who adopts the point of view of those others s/he admires, with whom s/he identifies in his/her imagination, and among whom s/he wants to be included, in this case Western Europeans, when s/he has failed to meet their value requirements, or when state crimes are confronted with the ideals of universal democratic citizenship embodied by them.

Certainly, memory positions us and gives us the means to erect a territory of our own, both personal and collective. But some memories alienate us from our own world. I’m not referring so much to hateful memories, which contribute to shape us even as they make us relive unpleasant experiences, but, rather, imposed memories, those felt as alien, as a form of internal colonization attempting to appropriate our vital and mental space. There are societies where the feeling of identification with the national community doesn’t generate pride but, instead, belonging is felt as shame. Although it is generally presumed that self-complacency and pride characterize identification with the collective we members of communities devalued for political, economic, or other reasons that place them in the lower rungs of hierarchies of prestige, associate belonging with negative and disturbing self-deprecat ing feelings that lead them to either try to transform the community, position themselves outside of it in their imagination, or sometimes combine both attitudes.

One must indicate that the author of these drawings, Forges, transformed the \textit{paleto} stereotype during the 1970s, when he began to portray his peasants as modern, educated, wise, and very aware citizens who embody a critical view of their society. He did the same with old rural women, in an attempt to re-signify stereotypes which he maintains even now, with these lucid characters still appearing in his cartoons.

The scoundrel we imagine reading comic books during worship, the simple-minded peasant, the inflexible bigot, the beautiful young woman, the foreigner and the monster are local and translocal types, who are popular in different traditions and cultures and take on a specific shape in each context and work. They allow blending the discursive intentionality of the individual text with the long memory of living traditions. In graphic humor of Franco’s period, we find them characterized in such a way as to articulate the desire of audiences and authors to overcome the traditional culture and ways of life that were considered incompatible with cosmopolitan modernity and customs; and to portray and criticize the lack of tolerance, justice, and freedom, official lies, inefficiency, poverty, etc. They became instruments that
allowed to make excluded perspectives visible, to attain a pluralistic view of one’s own reality, and, for instance by means of the foreigner, to engage in exotopy –as Bakhtin calls it–, that is, shifting to a point of view outside of one’s own social environment, which all cultures must in some way practice in order to reflect about themselves. In so doing, they necessarily broaden and displace the set of commonplaces and contribute to the formation of new territories for the imagination, memory and reflection of a community.

During Franco’s dictatorship, graphic humor contributed –together with many other media, genres, discourses and social and political opposition movements (neighborhood, workers, student, feminist and other social movements)– to create an understanding and assessment of the social world that was shared by a large majority of Spaniards who, even though they only discovered or, in the case of the elderly, rediscovered true democracy and freedom after Franco’s death, had imagined and desired them much earlier, and had in some way, often secret and implicit, participated in the collective reflection about their need and the struggle to attain them.

To what extent can the formation of a current of democratic public opinion in a dictatorship be compared to the formation of a collective identity? In the process I have outlined one can find certain similarities and differences with B. Anderson’s analysis (1983) of the formation of national identity in countries subject to colonial power. In addition to noting the modern discontinuity in the traditional perception of time, space, and faithfulness the concept of nation requires, Anderson stresses the effectiveness of certain textual procedures in the formation of an image of community. These procedures include the allusion to places, types, expressions and experiences that are recognizable as their own –and were until then excluded from public language– by readers from the colonized ethnic group, in novels such as Rizal’s in the Philippines, Lizardi’s in Mexico or Marco Kartodikromo’s in Indonesia, or in newspapers in these and other colonized countries; the “ironical intimacy” of the means of communication, such as that created by Rizal with his readers; the affects the authors of these texts managed to share with their readers, etc. These procedures cannot but contribute to the formation of an image of community that only those who share those allusions and affects, namely, the colonized populations they are addressed to, can feel as their own.
D. Dayan (1999) has clearly formulated a key question: “What distinguishes a collective entity called an audience –or a public– from other social groupings or communities (be they ideological, religious, cultural, national, etc.)?” I believe this brief survey of certain territories of memory suggests that a collective entity begins to share an identity when its members recognize and feel the same symbolic territory as their own, that is, when they feel this territory as one of the constituent elements in their personal identity. For this to occur, it is probably necessary that they share something other than serving as audience for certain media: a certain historical context, certain feelings towards their situation, etc.

However, the attitude regarding the referent of the nation and the means to symbolize it are different in the case we are examining and in the anti-colonial nationalism studied by Anderson. Franco’s dictatorship appropriated the symbolic territory of the nation and many of its most relevant signs of identity were tainted by the Regime’s ideology and its way of exercising power. This was the case, for example, with the Escorial depicted by Mingote, residence and tomb of 16th century “emperor” Philip II. A monument such as this one could not be proposed as symbol of a valuable Spanish tradition without entering in a struggle for the territories of memory, since it was contaminated by the power that had been exercised upon it and by means of it. In the peripheries whose languages and signs of identity were repressed by the dictatorship, it would predictably be perceived as an emblem of centralist Spanish nationalism, authoritarian and nostalgic of the past empire, rather than a peacefully shared sign of national identity. All of this could not but have an effect on the present perception of the identity of Spaniards.

It is difficult to delimit the shared features and symbols that define Spanish identity today, assuming it has any consistency. It is much clearer for the peripheral nationalities, Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc., whose residents identify with their nations and with the task of constructing their own symbolic territory. However, despite the confusion and fragmentation in Spanish identity, I believe there is one trait all Spaniards recognize themselves in. They all want Spain to be a Western democracy, they feel bound to a Western identity whose main defining trait is the value of universal values, those that promote, in rights and institutions, the elimination of differences based on geographic or ethnic origin, religion, gender, etc.

But we have to study the adherence to values as it is exercised, for example, in Spanish reactions to African immigration. Media news on immigration reflect an
ethical and affective split. When immigrants are subject to mistreatment in Spain, when they suffer deprivation or medical neglect, there are reactions of outrage in certain sectors of the population and generally also in the media against the violation of immigrants’ human rights. When a political authority has to answer for one of these violations, s/he does so while reaffirming his/her adherence to universal values.

At the same time, there are news where those same immigrants appear as a mass that hounds territorial borders in Ceuta and Melilla –the two Spanish cities in Northern Africa– and reports multiply on the tricks and hoaxes Africans use in attempting to enter our territory. In many other news and media reports immigrants are shown in connection with illegality, violence, crime, drugs, etc. (Peñamarín, 1997). The unknown other is thus transformed into an internal, known, judgeable, and condemnable alterity. Studies on other Western host countries’ media accounts about immigration reveal similar representations (Van Dijk, 1997). Those others are perceived as a threat and certainly not only in the media⁴. And generally disconnected from the news about immigrants (since it is equally essential to the logic of the media to connect and disconnect news reports), are reports and commentaries on the world’s economic imbalance and forecasts regarding its evolution, which suggest that last century’s tendency to increased inequality between rich and poor countries, and areas within them, will continue in the future, which in turn will necessarily entail an increase in migratory flows towards the more favored areas.

In El Roto’s drawing –the same author that signed the drawing of the feminized knight as OPS–, we once again observe how, due to its marginal, or at least off-center, place in the media, graphic humor can defend values and propose ideas that would be out of place in the spaces that provide information about our world. This type of visual text connects what in journalism is disconnected. Whereas in newspapers the global evaluation of human and material resources is separate from the close-up view of the suffering and death of immigrants coming to the rich countries, for example in boats attempting to cross the Straits of Gibraltar, El Roto joins both aspects together in a highly stylized and dramatic scene.

⁴ I must say I don’t believe that the media intentionally manipulate the public. Even though they represent the interests of power elites, in a market society the mass media tend to record and give shape to audiences’ feelings, which are also molded by other agents, such that we may say that media and audiences mutually create each other (Verón, 1996; Abril, 1997).
The scene certainly situates us as spectators outside of it, in a place as distant as it is delocalized. This procedure, as Bakhtin has suggested, is necessary for any community to attain knowledge about itself. El Roto presents characters that are sketched in enough detail for us to perceive the desperation that leads them to attempt the impossible leap. Without showing any faces, the drawing suggests the feelings of human beings we can relate to. Without developing a sequential narration, it narrates the process that leads them from destitution to desperation and the illusion of a way out. Lotman has noted this capacity of art to combine the point of view of the third person with that of the first person: “I transfer the function of the third person to the scene: all that which can be seen I transfer to another person (to him), and all that which remains in the sphere of internal emotions I attribute to myself, thus appearing as the embodiment of the first person” (Lotman, 1998: 59).

The feelings that move the characters and the situation that determines them are shown simultaneously: the endless series of men setting out for the abyss separating the two caps and their determination suggest a structural relation to the represented world. The scene therefore portrays not an isolated event, or even less an accident or novelty, but a lasting process with no end in sight, an existing situation. In its synthetic, albeit not elementary, manner, the text avoids the compartmentalization of issues, ways of knowing, and ways of connecting issues amongst themselves and with the audience. This minimal dramatic text connects the global with the human, symbolism with expressiveness, and the analysis of structural inequality with emotion, and points to the possibility opened up by certain spaces in the media to fashion characters for memory, and symbolic representations and dramas or stories
that allow us to participate in the experience of others while at the same time understanding it in relation to the structure of our world.

The construction of milestones of memory is an instrument in the symbolic strategies of social actors who participate in the social dialogue by transforming, and even inverting, the meaning and value of cultural references, as Forges has done with the types of the paleto and rural old women, and El Roto by shifting the media’s perspective on immigration. The process of contesting official representations and values from alternative representations was probably less reflexive in Franco’s time than is possible today, now that the critical observation of cultural texts from perspectives and positions that are consciously situated—by gender, class, culture, etc.—is becoming progressively more common. This greater reflexivity, which allows us to see that texts may present issues from points of view that are peculiar to a time and place, while also performatively contributing to shape them, may perhaps guide the creation of texts that will broaden our knowledge of the complexity of the global to include an understanding of our objective and subjective relation to others, as well as individual or marginalized perceptions and affects.

**WORKS CITED**


CHAPTER 13

The Globalized Nation’s Residual Imaginary: Migrant(‘s) Memory

Abril Trigo

1. On the intellectual’s epistemic anguish when the theoretical model does not fit

It is perhaps inevitable to begin this essay with a personal note that is not really such. A couple of years ago I conducted a series of interviews in a Uruguayan migrant community in Fitchburg, a town near Boston. Strictly speaking, it was conventional ethnographic field work, which provided me with abundant material to publish as life stories, as a testimonial-style book, so to say. I knew from the beginning that the book would not be about my “Fitchburgers” [fitchburgueses], as my study objects came to be called, but about myself, my identity, my relationship with the nation left behind, my unresolved migrant experiences. While my critical consciousness aptly warned me that the more objective, rational and analytical my research sought to be, the more insidious would the subjective folds and unconscious traps become, the deconstructivism of what used to be cultural anthropology offered me the solution to the problem: I would write a self-ethnography in which I would speak not about myself but from the point of view of myself (Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Marcus and Fischer, 1986; Linden, 1993).

And I wrote it, but never got to finish it. There was something that did not fit, a troublesome disagreement between what the ethnographic material yielded and my interpretation of it; between the documents and their hermeneutics. I was handcuffed by a methodological and epistemological dilemma which eventually revealed itself to be also ideological. The explanation turned out to be embarrassingly trivial: in the migrant experiences narrated by my Fitchburgers I had been attempting to corroborate a theory of migrancy that would fit my need to psychologically and ideologically process my own experience. I had not only tried to understand myself in them: I had been trying to justify myself in them. I had used their migrant experiences not as events on the basis of which to understand my own, but as a text in which to read the preconceived theory that
would justify me. In sum, while the awareness of my subjective involvement in the project originally facilitated taking a self-critical position, it subsequently facilitated a double ideological entanglement, sublimating my existential uneasiness into a perverse mode of theoretical tourism that allowed me to legitimize my identity’s floating positionality vis-à-vis my Fitchburger migrants (Kaplan, 1996: 66).

2. On the Various Ways of Migrating

“To me an immigrant is a person who has failed in their own country”
Raúl Berthouet

Specifically, my purpose was to determine the concrete social and historical characteristics of migrancy, reading them against the grain of the mystified modes of exile and diaspora, and stressing the historical process of their articulation and the shift from (modern) international immigration to (postmodern?) transnational migrancy. But, upon theoretically elaborating these issues, and dazzled by the de-territorialized, nomadic, fluctuating and transient conception of migrancy proposed by Iain Chambers (1994), I fell into a different type of mystification.

Migratory phenomena, whether individual or collective, have a universal character, since they are linked to unequal socioeconomic development between geographical areas that are interrelated through complex expulsion and attraction systems. Migrations thus obey multiple social, cultural, political and economic factors, whose combination determines the various forms of historically-recorded exiles, diasporas, displacements and migrations. Towards the end of the 19th century, once the capital accumulation stage necessary for the first industrial revolution had concluded, and national states and the pertinent scientific-technological discourses had been instituted, Europe fully entered its imperialistic phase. New technologies introduced transformations in the modes of production, communications and transportation that violently affected urban-rural demographics and promoted a great migratory wave. Peasants were expelled from the countryside or attracted to the cities, where they did not find employment: famines devastated the rural populations and degraded urban groups: the European states fought against one another for new territories from which to extract riches and in which to place human surpluses: the American states fostered open-door immigration policies. This second great migratory wave to the Americas, which included importing indentured labor, such as Chinese
and Hindu coolies and the policies coordinating it, supported a sort of internal colonialism based on the extermination of indigenous populations and developmentalist and expansionist ideologies linked to social-Darwinist racialism. As Hobsbawm (1989) suggests, a perverse feedback came to be established between modern nationalisms—which were patriotic, xenophobic, and traditionalist—and the migrant masses. The latter, intimidated by the host societies’ xenophobia, recreated nationalisms within the diaspora or assimilated with the fervor of converts; the former, feeling threatened by these guests of stone, embraced chauvinism. Economics, immigration, xenophobia, nationalisms… This tangled skein articulates several double dualities: imperialism and internationalism; colonialism and cosmopolitanism; emigration and immigration; all of which integrated the kaleidoscope of fin-de-siècle modernity that was about to burst asunder during the Great War.

Every migration is a cumulative-type traumatic experience whose effects, not always visible, promote a “radical crisis of identity” (Viñar and Viñar, 1993: 60). The Grinbergs, European-based Jewish-Argentinean psychiatrists, have said:

“Migration is a change […] of such magnitude that it not only brings to light, but also jeopardizes, identity. There is a massive loss of objects, including the most significant and valued ones: people, things, places, language, culture, customs, climate, sometimes profession and social or economic milieu, et caetera, all of which are tied to memories and intense affects, and also exposed to loss are parts of the self and the bonds corresponding to those objects […]. It is a commotion that shakes the entire psychic structure” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 39-40).

The modern international immigrant was generally a sedentary person who, in order to protect him/herself from the pain of loss and anxiety over the unknown, performed a dissociation, ranting about the then-there and exaggerating admiration for the here-now, or else demonizing the latter and idealizing the former. Utopia and dystopia were the two empty sides of a sign that needed to be filled. What is essential is to maintain the dissociation: “the good” in one extreme and “the bad” in the other, regardless of which one represents each of these characteristics. Because, if the dissociation fails, confusional anxiety inexorably follows, with all its feared consequences: one does not know anymore who is friend or foe, where one can triumph or fail, how to differentiate what is useful or noxious, how to discriminate between love and hate, between life and death (Ibid: 20).
Making peace with both worlds after a painful process of grieving the loss (peace cannot be obtained as long as the object lives in memory) and detachment from part of oneself (psychic castration), allows the individual to “suffer his/her pain” and assume his/her immigrant condition, performing a kind of cultural synthesis, a sedimenting of experiences, an emotional fusion. When the emigrant finally resolves the fractures and discontinuities between the then-there and the here-now, s/he becomes an immigrant. S/he can then devote him/herself to social praxis without conflicts or leftovers from the past:

“This knowledge will not be only intellectual (K link), but much more existential (‘the 0 becoming’, as Bion has called it); s/he will not only know that s/he emigrates, but will “be” an emigrant […]. ‘To be’ an emigrant is, therefore, very different from ‘knowing’ that one emigrates. It involves fully and deeply assuming the absolute truth and responsibility inherent in that condition. Realizations of this type pertain to a mental and emotional state that is difficult to bear. This explains the need to resort to multiple defensive operations, in order to remain at the stage of only ‘knowing’, rather than ‘being’, emigrants” (Ibid: 81-82).

The modern international immigrant, even if s/he left his/her country dreaming about returning, always embarked, as a result of the period’s imaginary horizon and technological and material possibilities, on a life project, on a journey with possibly no return, as was usually the case. This, added to the fact that s/he usually migrated from the metropolises to the periphery, provoked an acute feeling of loss over the familiar world left behind and a strong willingness to settle, to identify with a host society that was ready to assimilate him/her: in sum, to become an immigrant (Safran, 1991: 85). Immigration was thus the dominant – albeit not exclusive or excluding – migration mode during the expansive phase of imperialistic capital: our grandparents were the protagonists of this story without heroes. Between capitalism in its imperialistic phase and proletarian internationalism, immigration shaped a mechanism that was closely interwoven with the economic, demographic, and cultural production modes of modernity. Subsequent to World War II, the trans-nationalization of capital led by post-Fordism and the flexible accumulation model, together with the concurrent weakening of national markets and the revolution in the means of communication and transportation, provided the breeding ground for migrancy, a new mode of migration that inverts the direction of modern immigration (from the peripheries to the metropolises) and is conducted by temporary workers who end up
permanently settling, and which post-colonial criticism has tended to include under the terms “diaspora” and “exile”. This, as we shall see below, is the dominant migration mode under the transnational phase of capital (Jameson, 1991; Lenin, 1970).

3. Exile: Trope of Modernity

“I told myself: five years working to death, with enthusiasm for this golden cage... And one is still here, right? Always looking over there, to the south”

Nelson Saldivia

Surrounded by the aura of persecution, loneliness, and banishment, exile has constructed myths and nourished literatures. As a modern trope, it celebrates the singularity, alienation and individualism of the avant-garde artist, misunderstood and distant, cosmopolitan by force and condemned to melancholy and nostalgia for the irretrievably lost home and land. Carol Kaplan has analyzed the mystifying nature of every socio-historical specificity of this trope: “Normalizing exile, aestheticizing homelessness, the critical mythologization of the ‘artist in exile’ moves from a commentary on cultural production based on historically grounded experiences of displacement to the production of a style that emulates exile’s effects” (Kaplan, 1996: 40). Exile has also been fetishized on account of its peculiar ethical, political and intellectual productivity, which arises from the particular liminal, interstitial, on-the-edge positionality that characterizes it. This is what Julia Kristeva (1996) and Edward Said (1984) maintain on the basis of certain reflections Theodor Adorno wrote down under the triple effect of fascism, war and consumer society. “Dwelling –says Adorno (1996: 38-39)– in the proper sense, is now impossible [...]. The house is past [...]. ‘It is even part of my good fortune not to be a house-owner’, Nietzsche wrote in the Gay Science [1968]. Today we should have to add: it is part of morality not to be at home in one’s home”, and therefore, “for a man who no longer has a homeland, writing becomes a place to live” (Ibid). These are the ethical and epistemic bases that encourage the autonomy of Art and make possible the Adornian intellectual’s negative dialectics, a method that allows for an effective critique of bourgeois culture. These foundations privilege the distanced perspectivism that “exile” apparently provides and legitimize the emancipating role of writing, as the only and authentic
space of freedom, all of which leads to Kristeva’s canonization of the “dissident intellectual” (Kristeva, 1996). But what happens when the exile is not an intellectual and does not write? Does exile then lose its liminal and productive character? And then, is it only exile that provides that liminal productivity? Kaplan asks herself:

“Euro-American modernist discourses of displacement mystify and homogenize the terms of these historically specific exchanges, travels and circulations, masking the economic and social differences between kinds of displacement in a homogenized “cosmopolitanism” and generalizing nostalgia through celebration of the condition of exile […]. How does the metaphor of exile work in particular kinds of cultural criticism, and to what (or whose) ends? And how does the critical articulation of diasporic subjectivity either support or destabilize the Euro-American discourse of exile? In addition, how can the distinctions between exile, expatriation, diaspora, and immigration be made meaningful in historically and culturally specific ways?” (Kaplan, 1996: 102-03)

Among those who have most contributed to the post-modernization of the exile trope is Edward Said, who in “Reflections on Exile” starts from the premise of the universal and trans-historical nature of exile, which he defines as “the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home”, and whose “essential sadness can never be surmounted” (Said, 1984: 159). The difference between the individual (and individualized) exile of former days and the massive (and massified) exile of today would then be a difference of scale and, as a result, the individuality of the modern cosmopolitan exile is enriched, almost magnified, when compared to the present-day masses of refugees, displaced peoples and immigrants. In his/her transcendental uprooting, the exile develops his/her creative capacity, since s/he has the untransferable ability to cross borders and break through thought barriers (Ibid: 170). This allows Said to maintain, in Culture and Imperialism, that “liberation as an intellectual mission […] has now shifted from the settled, established and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the migrant, and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile” (Said, 1993: 332). Although aware that each migrant obeys specific historical circumstances, Said transfers the avant-garde mystique of the modern exile and the facile dramaticity of the contemporary refugee to the new –intermediate and mediating in a complex way– figure of the postcolonial intellectual in diaspora, in such a way that “the critical
discourse of the diasporic cosmopolitan intellectual draws upon both Euro-American modernist exile formulations and post-modern theories of location, most often de-historizing specific contexts through a celebration of migration and displacement” (Kaplan, 1996: 112). This has caused a vitriolic critique from Ahmad, which, albeit at times disproportionate and excessively principle-based, captures in a couple of strokes the “rhetorical inflation”, the epistemic abuse and the ideological imposture of many immigrants now settled in metropolitan universities, who, through a very convenient readjustment to the demands of the transnational theoretical market, have self-assigned themselves the cloak –the comfortable non-representational representativity– of the postcolonial and postmodern diasporic intellectual (Ahmad, 1992).

4. Diaspora: Postcolonial Metaphor

“I am afraid of returning to Uruguay, what can I say [...]. Of not wanting to return”
Ana Comesaña

The term diaspora is thus privileged in the understanding that it “shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community” (Tölölian, 1991: 4-5). The massive displacements of refugees due to ecological, military or political catastrophes always provokes ideological adherence, humanitarian sympathy, and conflicting passions, even if the generalized enthusiasm is extinguished long before the problem at hand is resolved. Diasporas –collective exiles–, whose historical paradigms are the Jewish and Armenian ones, also enjoy a secular prestige that postcolonial criticism attempts to extend to communities that are simply migrant and, since at least in theory their members have the possibility to return, lack the epic prestige and tragic halo of exile or diaspora.

The high value of the diaspora metaphor in the postcolonial theoretical market has a clear political meaning that is loosely linked to identity politics, even if it ultimately arises from the postmodern displacement of the avant-garde aesthetization of exile. As Clifford asserts: “The language of diaspora is increasingly invoked by displaced peoples who feel (maintain, revive, invent) a connection with a prior home [...]. Many minority groups that have not previously identified in this way are now reclaiming diasporic origins and affiliation [...]. The phrase diasporic community conveys a stronger sense of difference than, say, ethnic neighborhood did in the
language of pluralist nationalism” (Clifford, 1994: 310). The generosity of the concept when it is thus understood eventually weakens its effectiveness as an instrument of knowledge; its broadness becomes ambiguity, to the point that even African-Americans or “Hispanics” in the United States could qualify as diasporic peoples.

One of the most outstanding differences between immigration and diaspora lies in that, unlike the immigrant, the diasporic subject resists assimilating to the host society and, throughout everyday life in the community (diasporic experience), continues to vicariously identify (with the help of collective memory) with the imaginary homeland. This is why diasporic identities are excluded from the territorial and historical normativity of anyone national pedagogy (Ibid: 307). This difference can be seen as a product of the acceleration, massification and growing complexity of migratory flows caused by the demographic explosion in neocolonial areas, the intensification of socio-economic gaps and the displacement of national markets by a global market, wherein migratory flows respond, like an echo, to the free movement of capital, producing entire communities of seasonal migrants who end up settling in the host economies against the latters’ immediate interests (Castles, 1993: 51). In this sense, the difference signals the passage from international modernity to transnational (post)modernity, which explains the postcolonial critics’ preference for the term “diaspora”, since, while the “modern” immigrant was readily assimilated, the “postmodern, postcolonial and postnational” diasporic member seems not to be: s/he may adapt, but never assimilate. As Clifford notes, “whatever their eschatological longings, diaspora communities are ‘not-here’ to stay. Diaspora cultures thus mediate, in a lived tension, the experience of separation and entanglement, of living here and remembering/desiring another place” (1994: 311; emphasis added).

Every community in diaspora, like the diasporic imaginary nourishing it, functions as a shock absorber for the migrant experience—as do the family, a sports club, or an Internet network—; it serves as a place to stay and a transitional moment necessary if one is to survive in the alien space-time. But more importantly, the experience of diaspora operates on the permanent feedback of the dissociation, mediated by the community and the everyday ghetto experience, between the dystopian here-now and the utopian then-there. This is why, unlike the immigrant, the diasporic subject lives in a constant state of grief, which will only be resolved with the realization of utopia, namely, the return to, and materialization of, the imagined
homeland. Diaspora is thus a sort of permanently deferred collective utopian-dystopian dissociation.

Now then, does diaspora account for the heterogeneous variety of contemporary migrations? Is it not, just like exile, a term over determined by ideological guidelines taken from Western modernity? As Kaplan has noted, even though Clifford is careful not to fall into simplifications, his argument rearticulates, in postmodern wrapping, the paradigm of modernist exile, insofar as his conception of diaspora is built on an implicit contrast to the carefully omitted concept of immigration. The representation of immigration and diaspora as models that are historically and culturally tied, the former to modern nationalism and the latter to post-national globalization, involves an ideological subterfuge, according to which postmodern diasporic subjects would enjoy (thanks to the benefits of globalization) the freedom to shape hybrid and de-territorialized identities, whereas modern immigrant subjects would remain handcuffed by the arbitrariness of nationalist affiliation. In other words, globalization would free individuals from the tyranny of the nation-state. “This valorization of generalized hybridity is presumed to construct a global or cosmopolitan set of identities that are superior to the 19th century conventions on nation, race, and gender that immigrants negotiate in their efforts to assimilate” (Kaplan, 1996: 136). What is being disregarded, among other things, is the concrete reality of millions of migrants, their everyday efforts, their endless struggle, their sorrows upon sorrows, their small triumphs, a reality that, filtered through the cosmopolitan postcolonial intellectual’s theoretical sieve, is literally compressed into an inapprehensible, unnamable, beyond-representation Lacanian Real.

5. Ontology of Migrancy

“I have already forgotten I am an immigrant; I already feel, as one would say, at home. But I like to continue considering myself Uruguayan”

Mauricio Rodríguez

This concealment adopts a celebratory character in Iain Chambers’ concept of migrancy (1994), defined in direct contrast to the journey trope, which always entails precise departure and arrival points and the certainty of a possible return.

“Migrancy, on the contrary, involves a movement in which neither the points of departure nor those of arrival are immutable or certain. It calls for a
dwelling in language, in histories, in identities that are constantly subject to mutation. Always in transit, the promise of a homecoming –completing the story, domesticating the detour– becomes an impossibility” (Ibid: 5).

The poetically incantatory tone of Chambers’ writing, full of indolent nostalgia and delight in its prophetic melancholy, superbly reproduces, with a postmodern twist, all the tics of Western literary avant-gardism. What can I read in Chambers’ uprooted we but the distressed nostalgia of the civilized and modern Western Subject for his/her decrepit world of certainties, now irreversibly contaminated by invading hordes?:

“To the forcibly induced migrations of slaves, peasants, the poor and the ex-colonial world […] we can also add the increasing nomadism of modern thought. Now that the old house of criticism, historiography and intellectual certitude is in ruins, we all find ourselves on the road. Faced with a loss of roots, and the subsequent weakening in the grammar of ‘authenticity’, we move into a vaster landscape” (Ibid: 18).

Is the nomadism of modern thought epistemologically, politically and ethically equivalent to the forced migration of slaves and peasants? To whom does Chambers’ we refer? It obviously answers to that presence “that no longer lies elsewhere: the return of the repressed, the subordinate and the forgotten in ‘Third World’ musics, literatures, poverties and populations as they come to occupy the economies, cities, institutions, media and leisure time of the First World” (Ibid: 3). His elegant discourse displays a sophisticated form of theoretical tourism, inherently Eurocentric, and conceptually, thematically and stylistically assembled, where the author presents and hides himself –floating and absent, he alludes and eludes– as a purely textual texture. Thus theorized, migrancy turns out to be a trans-historical and universal phenomenon, which, by transcending specific circumstances –since it is intrinsic to human nature–, becomes ontological, an existential matrix of Being only explainable by resorting to Heidegger’s metaphysics of modernity. “Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world” (Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, quoted in Chambers, 1994). It is true that “we are all migrants”, as Said maintains, but is attributing this ontological character to migrancy not a trivialization of concrete historical conditions? (Ahmad, 1991: 154). What epistemic value does it have to say that “the history of human migration could well have started with the expulsion from paradise”?, that “laboring, giving birth, and migrating –three varieties of pain– have been, since that primordial
border crossing, distinctive signs of human mourning”? (Ferrer, 1993: 60). This type of ontological sweep, formulated under the protection of a rhetorically poetic discourse, is scarcely philosophical and fully mystifying, and, just like Chambers’ postmodern theoretical cosmopolitanism betrays the sophisticated modern European traveler, Ferrer’s invective reproduces the former’s ethnocentrism and ahistorical arrogance, only in inverted fashion: “a European never migrates. His journey –even if it is for life– is imperial and he travels –even before leaving– through the folkloric and pret-à-porter image of Arabness, Latinity, or African negritude shaped by centuries of colonial outposts and by the humanistic imperatives of the Western governments of the moment” (Ibid: 61).

Chambers’ migrancy builds on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of nomadology (1987), without a doubt the most radically subversive cultural guerrilla strategy to have emerged from the postmodern Western intelligentsia, a strategy that is nevertheless sustained by the anarcho-vanguardist trope of the artistic-literary subject’s self-marginalization and self-displacement. The key metaphors in Deleuzian discourse, which are elaborated against the grain of modern Western rationality (rizhome > tree, schizoanalysis > psychoanalysis, de-territorialization > capitalist state), have a deeply disruptive meaning in their concrete enunciation context (Europe, France, Paris), but what happens when the same theoretical arsenal is transposed to a neocolonial or peripheral situation? What happens to the disruptive energy of de-territorialization when it has to be translated from its original formulation (dislocation and dispersion of desire in capitalist consumer society) into peripheral and dependent societies? Does it continue to have the same political charge and the same ideological meaning regardless of the situation, the involved subjects, or the forces at play? And what happens with re-territorializations? Is the de-territorialization of the nation-state and the subject always desirable, regardless of circumstances? Is such de-territorialization possible and its re-territorialization inevitable? What would a nomad, a gypsy, a Bedouin think if it were proposed to him/her to de-territorialize?

These slippages are not considered by Deleuze and Guattari and, as a result, their theory, which is the most stirring and radical to come from Western postmodernism and which has an undoubtable critical capacity, displays the double flaw of anti-historicism and universalism, both of which ultimately originate in the same matrices they paradoxically seek to undermine: modernity and Euro-centrism.
This explains their inability to explain—or alone resolve—the transnational power relations under which globalized subjects are constructed. I very much doubt that the Bedouin is a vocational nomad; at the first opportunity the Gypsy settles down, even if s/he continues to live in a tent in his/her backyard. Only from the point of view of institutions (a point of view acritically adopted by Deleuze and Guattari) is it possible to see the nomad as a de-territorializing agent, as a dangerous subject. The nomad resists his/her de-territorialization from state institutions through—an always partial, intermittent and tactical—re-territorialization of them; for this reason, his/her re-territorializing agency is more important to the periphery than his/her de-territorialized condition. The desert as an unlimited space of freedom is a modern Western metaphor that makes sense only in the primitivist celebration of certain orientalism and is understandably useful for the decentered Western subject, but not necessarily so for the peripheral subject, the other, whose position—a purely imaginary locus for the metropolitan subject—functions as a margins metaphor whereby the latter constructs his/her critique of the center from the center (Kaplan, 1996: 88). The nomad is theoretically fascinating as long as s/he stays at a distance as other, but s/he is horrifying when s/he lives among us, which is why it is essential to keep him/her as other, as a horizon for us, but outside (Fabian, 1983).

“Thus when Deleuze and Guattari pose a ‘nomadology’ against ‘history’ they evince nostalgia for a space and a subject outside Western modernity, apart from all chronology and totalization […]. The movement of deterritorialization colonizes, appropriates, even raids other spaces […]. Deterritorialization is always reterritorialization, an increase of territory, an imperialization” (Kaplan, 1996: 89).

When the nomad and de-territorialization metaphors are transferred to the present-day migrant, as in Chambers’ theory, their ideological and epistemic markers take on a historicity that is only too palpable, since, strictly speaking, the Deleuzian nomad is defined precisely by his/her freedom of movement, his/her unlimited wandering, his/her lack of respect for borders, something which does not happen to (nor can happen to, nor can happen to be considered by) any migrant, although paradoxically it is the nomad who does not move or, rather, the one whose movement lacks meaning. As Stuart Hall says (1991: 33), nomadology can turn out to be merely another form of the postmodern global, an exotic escapade on the part of the postmodern metropolitan intellectual.
If I do not think it legitimate to consider any migrant in times of globalization a member of a diaspora, even though the volume, circuits and concentration of migrants in certain areas promotes the formation of diasporic communities, I find any ontologized formulation of migrancy equally inadmissible. It is therefore indispensable to develop a category that may account for a phenomenon that is vaster and slacker than exile and diaspora, while addressing the socio-historical specificity of the large human displacements occurring under transnational capitalism. Migrancy, thus considered, must allude not only to the event of migrating, but to the specific ways of life and the molding of a culture of migrating, while eluding any mystification regarding the social, cultural and human cost it brings about.

The transnational migrant, like the seasonal workers or swallows of earlier times, experiences a loss for the place left behind and connects him/herself to the host environment in a manner we could call hyper-real, and if, like any migrant, s/he resorts to a dissociation and concentrates his/her energies on an eventual return that is not necessarily subordinate to the realization of utopia, s/he always feels as if in transit, between two worlds (Chambers, 1994: 27). The transnational migrant constructs his/her here-now while besieged by the multiple discontinuities of a space-time that is homogeneous and empty, abstract and neuter, but never neutral, an alien territory where s/he wanders without managing to belong. This permanent estrangement inevitably causes a counter-pointing bifocality from which s/he negotiates every one of his/her actions, devises everyday strategies, gives meaning to practices that inevitably assemble the tensely synchronized here-now and then-there (Ibid: 318). This tension evidently produces a schizo, split, conflictive when not conflicted, id/entity; a flexible id/entity that is ill-adapted to the flexible accumulation of transnational capital; an id/entity in nepantla that is forced to operate in the subjunctive, as if it were perfect, monolithic, inalterable (Ibid: 25; Ong, 1993). This id/entity, as Stuart Hall notes, “is formed at the unstable point where the ‘unspeakable’ stories of subjectivity meet the narratives of history, of a culture” (Hall, 1987: 44), and, therefore, its conjugation in the subjunctive allows for a strictly
strategic suture—an affiliation rather than a filiation—, without which the individual would be lost in autism or schizophrenia.

The transnational migrant inhabits his/her time-space as if it were a mobile habitat, since, in its transience, migrancy is also a transitivity that ends up dissolving the inalienable and accurate identification with any particular space-time, in such a way that the promise of returning home becomes impossible. As Hall expresses it: “Migration is a one way trip. There is no ‘home to go back to’” (Ibid: 44). And this is so because in migrancy the individual ends up alienating him/herself from both worlds, because it is an experience characterized by an existential feeling of outsidersness [forasterismo] (Arguedas), of social, cultural and existential estrangement, as a result of which one is no longer at home anywhere, unlike the cosmopolitan celebrated by Said, Chambers and company, who feels at home everywhere1. I mean to say that the necessary flexibilization of identity produced by the experience of migrancy is not adequately explained by the de-territorialization metaphor, since it involves an inevitable re-territorialization in memory.

I am not sure that transnational migrancy represents a wiser or more tragic experience than other forms of migrating or living, but it no doubt takes on particular intensity when the fantasy of returning materializes. It is under this extreme circumstance that the then-there preserved in memory becomes unrecognizable in the reencounter’s here-now. The migrant then experiences the true dimensions of migrancy: a black hole in time and space where it means the same to have left yesterday or a thousand years ago: a sense of alienation as if one had returned from the world of the dead:

“The house that was the emigrant’s is no longer his/hers: other people live in it; his/her workplace is also occupied by others; the things s/he loved and that were his/hers are scattered (as part of his/her own split and disperse self, but which s/he has been unable to collect and take along)” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 218).

Herein lies the sinister, the Freudian unheimlich, the horror before the familiar unknown (Freud, 1955). The anxiety incubated over the foreseen loss suddenly gives

1 Perhaps nothing celebrates the Western tradition of the cosmopolitan exile trope more suggestively than the triple citation of the 12th century monk Hugo de Saint Victor, who wrote—according to Todorov, who quotes him from Said, who quotes him from Auerbach—that “The man who finds that his homeland is sweet is nothing but a tender beginner; the one for whom every soil is like his own is already strong, but the only one who is perfect is the one for whom the whole world is like a foreign country” (Todorov, 1989: 259).
place to the horror of not belonging, of having to assume an inevitable split that can only be accepted as enriching, albeit painful, when it is understood that one is no longer the same one was and that the one one was is now a foreigner, forever lost in a “contradictory [alterity] that saves us perhaps from the deadly confinement of the homogeneous, from the alienation brought on by the illusion of completeness” (Viñar and Viñar, 1993: 90-91).

Attempting to overcome the epistemic determinism of the mestizaje metaphor (the materialization of identity in dialectical synthesis), Antonio Cornejo Polar proposed to analyze “the migrant condition” on the basis of José María Arguedas’ idea of forasterismo. According to him, the migrant, despite living in a present that seems to amalgamate the many previous comings-and-goings, is neither able nor willing to blend his life experiences “because their discontinuous nature emphasizes the multiple diversity of those times and those spaces” (Cornejo Polar, 1995: 103-104). Thus,

“Whereas the mestizo [read here immigrant] attempts to articulate his/her double ancestry in an unstable and precarious coherence, the migrant is settled in two worlds that somehow have antagonistic valences: the yesterday and there, on the one hand, and the today and here, on the other, although both positions are inevitably influenced by one another in a permanent but changing fluctuation. In this way, the migrant speaks from two or more loci and –still more compromisingly– duplicates (or multiplies) the very nature of his/her condition as subject” (Cornejo Polar, 1994: 209).

This, in my opinion, is wholly applicable to the transnational experience of migrancy, which, unlike international immigration, does not lead to dialectical syntheses or stable blendings and identities, but instead keeps the different, and sometimes antagonistic, cultures in which the migrant is installed as a bird of passage suspended. And if we accept that language is a fundamental sphere of id/entity gestation, condensation and dispute, how very clever does Cornejo’s observation that there are two modes of linguistic production at play seem. Whereas immigration, like mestizaje, operates metaphorically, migrancy does so metonymically. In this way, the migrant’s discourse juxtaposes different worlds and imaginaries in a centrifugal, expansive dynamics, which contaminates language with other times and spaces and other experiences that traverse it in multiple directions, torn by the coexistence of the here-now and then-there, “almost as a symbolic act that, at the same instant that it
affirms the rotundity of a border, escapes it” (Cornejo Polar, 1995: 106). This metonymical mode of social and cultural production promotes a schizoid/entity, “a double consciousness”, as Du Bois describes it, as if the subject –a marginal being– were located “simultaneously between two looking-glasses, each presenting a sharply different image of himself” (Stonequist, 1961: 145).

7. On Territorialization in Memory

“Don’t forget the pago [hometown] if you go to the city, the farther you go, the more you will need to remember”
[No te olvidés del pago si te vas pa la ciudá, cuanti más lejos te vayas, más te tenés que acordar”]
“Pa’l que se va”, Alfredo Zitarrosa

Subjectivity, individual or social, takes shape in the intersection of time and space, considered not as abstract categories, but as materializing in the confluence of social praxis (here-now) and the exercise of memory (then-there). According to Lefebvre, these two coordinates are articulated in three interconnected experiences of space: “spatial practice” (aided by perception and sensorium), “representations of space” (the dominant space in any society), and “representational space” (the symbolically lived, dominated space the imagination seeks to change) (Lefebvre, 1992: 38-39). In other words, practical space, which is produced in the physical and material flows that ensure its reproduction (markets, transportations, communications, territorial demarcations, police); strategic-hegemonic space, which is conceptualized as science and technology (cartography, social physics, semiotics, geopolitics, ideologies); and tactical-subaltern space, which is lived through culture and imagination (family, home, town; rituals, traditions and everyday desires) (Harvey, 1989: 218-19). Even though the boundaries between these categories may be nebulous, it is possible to speculate that practical space is the one biunivocally constituted by, and constitutive of, social praxis, upon which the other two act: strategic-hegemonic space, which is the sphere of production and the symbolic, and tactical-subaltern space, which is the last reserve of memory and of users’ everyday practices:

“Redolent with imaginary and symbolic elements [the tactical-subaltern spaces] have their source in history –in the history of a people as well as in the history of each individual belonging to that people […]. Representational
space is alive: it speaks. It has an affective kernel or center: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or: square, church, graveyard. It embraces the loci of passion, of action and of lived situations, and thus immediately implies time” (Lefebvre, 1992: 41-42).

The home in memory and memory as a home are precisely the axes of Bachelard’s poetics of space (1983), in which the home is “our corner in the world”, “our first universe”, the “faraway region [where] memory and imagination do not allow to become dissociated” (Lefebvre, 1992: 34-35); “a place where every day is multiplied by all days” (Tuan, 1977: 144). Using topo-analysis, Bachelard proposes to unveil the depths of being, those depths where “space is everything, because time does not animate memory anymore”, since the latter “does not record duration in the Bergsonian sense”. This is the paradox of memory. Its form is time, but a dematerialized time, which lacks duration, density, texture, and, consequently, is only apprehensible through its anchoring in space. “It is through space, it is in space that we find those beautiful duration fossils, materialized by long stays”, where the subconscious resides (Bachelard, 1983: 39). It may be in a house, a street, or a neighborhood, a face or an object, a flavor or an aroma, no doubt a voice, where the true sense of homeland resides. It is the pago –town, village, region– that constitutes the migrant’s “object of nostalgia” suspended in memory, where it continues to beat without his/her having full access to it: “The object of nostalgia is not the country that was, nor the one they will return to. It is all that, but much more. It is the land childhood inhabited […] not only the past that passed: it is also the past that never was, the fantasies we dreamed, that dreamed us, and that still live there” (Gil, 1993: 9).

Despite the metaphysical twist Bachelard grants his memory-home, his actual descriptions refer us to everyday emotional experiences. In fact, although for him the untransferable nucleus of identity lies in the space lodged in memory, his poetics of space is nevertheless projected into the present through memories engraved on the body. I do not only mean physical memories, but the knowledge of space through the body and its transformation by movement. Memory of the pago is inscribed on the skin, in the senses, in “the resonance of absence in the body”: in the smells, the textures, the yearned-for sounds, “in the geography of the sensitive and erotic body” (Viñar and Viñar, 1993: 88). Not in “automatic” memory, which, according to Bergson, spontaneously responds to external stimuli in a reflex fashion, but in the
“memory-image” that is updated, in the present of praxis, by the archive of “pure memory”, which in turn is activated by the perception of surrounding reality (Bergson, 1950: 163, 171; Deleuze, 1991). It is precisely this interpellation of “pure memory” by the concrete circumstances of the here-now that activates the evocation of experiences from the then-there, and it is in the encounter of Benjamin’s present of the now (Jetztzeit) (Benjamin, 1968) with the past of accumulated experience (Erfahrung) that the lived experience (Erlebnis) is produced as duration: that is, as concrete present, now, while I write these words, with one foot in the past and another in the future.

Thus understood, the migrant(s) id/entity is produced in the intersection of the experience lived (Erlebnis) in the present of the now (Jetztzeit) –here-now– with the experience accumulated (Erfahrung) in the memory of the then-there. It is, of course, not a matter of a strictly personal memory nor a solipsist experience, but a cultural-performative memory produced by, and producing, a specific community (Gemeinschaft) through collective accumulated experience (Erfahrung). Cultural-performative memory is thus distinguished from the historical, instrumental and pedagogical memory at the service of national imaginaries, which is constructed on the spoils of the former with the explicit purpose of emptying it of Jetztzeit, of making tabula rasa and inscribing thereon the empty and homogeneous present of the nation-state (Halbwachs, 1980; Tönnies, 1971; Bhabha, 1990). Just as the most solitary experience is always conditioned by, and inserted in, a specific socio-cultural context, cultural-performative memory is the locus of convergence for a mixture of experiences and discourses: individual and collective, one’s own and alien, contemporary and ancient, real and imaginary. This allows Benjamin to locate within it the collective traditions and storytelling arts that condense rites and myths, festivities and mournings, codification and improvisation (Benjamin, 1968: 159).

Consequently, the present, which is arbitrarily defined as what is, should rather be understood as what is being made, since the present is nothing, but only pure becoming that has not yet finished being when it has already begun to disappear. Experience lived in the everyday is the cultural-performative memory’s duration in the present of the now; the convergence of being (the past is inescapably self-identical) and becoming (the flow of the present).

In sum, migrant id/entity is realized through the subject’s often painful detachment from his/her comfortable identification in/with the symbolic (the national
social imaginary and historical-pedagogical memory) in order to accept the disturbing certainty of his/her responsibility in the historical task (the community as performance) (Bhabha, 1990). But if the experience of migrancy is grounded on the transit and transitivity of identity, on the inevitably conflictive articulation of the social performativity/cultural memory equation, it also involves a double risk: if the migrant does not live the here-now as concrete social reality but instead experiences it as hyper-real, s/he will tend to reify the then-there lodged in his/her memory as the Real, thus obtaining an exclusive and excluding anchoring; if, on the contrary, s/he transforms the then-there of memory into a hyper-real reminiscence, s/he can become alienated from a here-now that, de-historicized, amputated from accumulated experience and deprived of the duration that grants the lived experience density, becomes fetishized as the Real. An adequate negotiation and restructuring of subjectivity necessarily involves processing memories as instances dialectically interwoven with the present in duration, as lived experiences in practice.

What happens, then, to the historical-pedagogical memory that sustains the national social imaginary when it is shaken by those trans-nationalization processes in the turbulent midst of which migrancy takes place? In many cases it ends up reinforced, which may even lead to renovated nationalisms of a racist and fundamentalist type; examples abound. In general, however, historical-pedagogical memory, which is inevitably sustained by the ritualized repetition of myths and ceremonies, discourses and institutions, is fatally eroded, thereby losing ideological effectiveness and historical validity. The pressures of the alien, strange and inhospitable here-now of the social environment the migrant is exposed to throw his/her identity into crisis and compel him/her to take refuge in the familiar, intimate and cozy then-there lodged in cultural-performative memory, which is where s/he seems to find his/her last reserves. What identity is this? The abstract identity of the homeland? The only identity the migrant has is the sediment left over from sorrow and the struggle against oblivion, an elixir for a loss that is beyond discourses and ideologies, a pain in the gut over very concrete and trivial things in the face of which any imaginary is ridiculous: the identity of the pago. As Hall says: “Face to face with a culture, an economy and a set of histories which seem to be written or inscribed elsewhere, and which are so immense, transmitted from one continent to another with such extraordinary speed, the subjects of the local, of the margin, can only come into representation by, as it were, recovering their own hidden histories” (Hall, 1991: 34-
35). Stated differently: fully immersed in the absorbing transnational culture and strongly interpellated by the hegemonic postmodern global imaginary, which surpasses his/her national culture from above, the migrant slips away from below through his/her reencounter with the local. Confronted with the proliferation of difference, which capitalism appropriates and promotes as a multicultural commodity—the exotic cuisine and World Music characteristic of what Hall calls “the global postmodern” (Ibid: 32)—, the migrant takes refuge in memories of the pago. These memories, which most of the time are not even discursively formalized, are recovered in concrete practices that update and act out the cultural matrices lodged in collective memory.

8. Soccer and the Libidinal Economy of Cultural Memory

“I always ask myself what my life would be without soccer, without carnival, without the muchachada [gang]”

Dante Suárez

In the case of my Fitchburgers, I was able to verify the persistence of some ideological-cultural matrices that have long inhabited the national imaginary, among them: social conformity as the road to individual happiness (which has given rise to the “mediocre country” (país de medianías) Carlos Real de Azúa spoke about); ethnic differentiation (as transplanted Europeans) with respect to the rest of Latin America (confirmed in the United States by a certain ease to pass for Mediterranean Europeans); cultural superiority over other Latin Americans and North Americans themselves (which allows them to sublimate the racism and discrimination they experience through a compensatory feeling of cultural superiority); and the garra charrúa [Uruguayan toughness], which is now interpreted as survival capacity (and which in soccer, as in politics, mobilizes a complete rhetoric of “endurance”: Uruguayans are tough, frugal, enduring) (Perelli and Rial, 1986). The imagineme of the garra charrúa, which sprouted from a series of international sports successes in the 1920s and 1930s that culminated in the 1950 Maracaná “epic”, came to be one of the axes of the Uruguayan imaginary until it was unmasked by the simultaneous crisis of soccer and liberal democracy in the 1960s. Thanks to the garra charrúa, Uruguayans, who are Europeans transplanted to the Latin American periphery, were thought to have inherited the restraint and tenacity of the extinct charrúas; but while this concept represents the ideological-pedagogical sublimation of soccer within the
national imaginary, in turn, soccer as practice and social gesture has shaped a cultural-performative matrix in the very core of collective memory, not necessarily discursive but strongly socially-structuring, symbolically cohesive and ritually iterative. Thus, it was precisely with the imbrication, in the 1930s, of a mature, albeit small, national market into an international market and the consolidation of modern sociopolitical structures, that soccer acquired a central place in the conservatively progressive, cautiously modern, ideologically mesocratic, insularly cosmopolitan, and skeptically optimistic imaginary of the Switzerland of America, both as ideological-pedagogical device and cultural-performative practice. This centrality of soccer, no longer mediated by the institutional and discursive instances of the garra charrúa (clubs, means of communication, ideological apparatuses, etc.) is what surprises –in the various meanings of the term– in Uruguayans settled in Fitchburg, whose everyday experience of migrancy and the negotiation of the here-now with the then-there cannot be fully understood without soccer as cultural-performative practice, gesture and memory.

During the 1970s, while the community maintained its quasi-familiar dimensions, people gathered around a soccer team. This period, which was to a certain extent foundational, has been recorded in a book where the immigrant population is documented according to nationality, *Around the World in Fitchburg* (Kirkpatrick, 1975). Under the heading devoted to Uruguayans, there is a special section on the Fitchburg Soccer Team, an international team made up and encouraged mostly by Uruguayans, which had its moment of glory when it lost 1-0 to a professional Finnish team (according to oral versions, it was the Finnish national team itself) (Ibid: 350-351). It ended up disappearing, undermined by desertions, the aging of some of its members, and various dissensions among them. In the 1990s, with the community dislocated and to a certain point stratified according to the age, class, and neighborhood affiliation of the successive migrant generations, which points to a “lumpenization” trend, there got to be two rival teams. Today, the only surviving one, which has lost much of its prestige among a large part of the community, has all but dissolved, after having been expelled from a local league as a result of a pitched battle during a game against a Salvadorian team. But soccer, always soccer, while finally failing as community cement, permeates everything and translates everything into cultural standards and modes of socialization. Many manage somehow to gather every week to play a *picado* [game] and the young have a leading role in the High School
soccer teams and the countless teams, many of them ephemeral, that sprout like mushrooms in the area, an area that is densely populated by South Americans, Portuguese, Greeks, Italians and Central Europeans and their descendants, and enjoys an intense soccer activity financed by the various ethnic communities. Among several former professional players and a young player with the ambition to succeed in the professional MLS, the most prominent figure is the director of the Fitchburg College soccer program, who, in addition to having ample experience as a semi-professional team coach and as director of the Fitchburg primary and secondary school system, has had a significant disseminating role that largely transcends the Uruguayan community, since he has molded several generations of players of different nationalities with an outstanding role at the state level. Whenever two Uruguayans meet, soccer is a primary topic of conversation, covering events and figures from the past, as well as information and controversies in current world and Uruguayan soccer. In this sense, to many, being informed about Uruguay means being up to date on the Uruguayan championship. Now then, what meaning can this soccer connection have, as practice, referent, pastime, rite or longing, in the cultural-performative memory of these Uruguayans, underneath and in spite of the dented garra charrúa imagineme?

9. First Half: Style

It has been said that every culture is reducible to a style. In particular, subaltern and peripheral cultures, which are forced to the consumption of finished cultural products, manifest themselves in their stylized appropriation of these products and the meticulous cultivation of their forms. Given the lack of better spaces, it is the adulterated use of hegemonic culture that materializes the poiesis of subaltern cultures, whose surplus of meanings, obtained by transmuting and transgressive expropriation and re-signification, establishes a style where the creativity of those without the power to invent emerges, the bricoleur’s arts flourish, the excesses of fashion implode, and the tricks of the scoundrel and the ruses of the weak adorn themselves. In this sense, soccer is without a doubt a “child of poverty” (Panzeri, 1967: 56). Style is a game.

Soccer is all this and much more, of course: it is a business, an industry, a commodity. But it is also a ceremony, an event, and a festivity as long as the pleasure

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2 See also Hall and Jefferson (1993), Hebdige (1990) and de Certeau (1984).
principle rules over the reality principle. If, as Mafud maintains, “the style of play is the product of a social style” (1967: 118), is it possible to speak of a Uruguayan style? Galeano once wrote:

“In the style and garra of some players, survivors of the golden age when players used to ‘give it all’, we somehow recognize a national style, with both its negative and positive features, the oftentimes dirty ‘cleverness’ as well as the resolution and imagination, the way of standing firm on the field and the fraction of a second a forward takes to rush through the side he is not expected at, open a gap and score a goal” (Galeano, 1968: 6).

Galeano’s celebratory attitude corresponds—as Sebreli (1981) harshly reproaches him on the basis of his own neo-positivist sociologism, according to which soccer is nothing but an alienating and politically manipulable mass phenomenon3—to a leftist nationalist populism that disregards the dark side of soccer. But if it is legitimate to speak of a modus of doing and living peculiar to each culture, it is then possible to discern soccer styles that are clearly linked to specific socio-historical instances. Of course, it may be as fallacious to speak of “the skill, virtuosity, roguery, and improvisation capacity of South American soccer players” (Santa Cruz, 1998: 162), as it is to identify this style with a particular nationality. In fact, the ideological-pedagogical appropriation of soccer by nationalist imaginaries started in the 1930s, in connection with professionalization and populist politics, as can be seen in the most conspicuous ideologues of Argentinean soccer, who until then had exclusively referred to River Plate soccer. Around 1926, an article in El Gráfico stated that, by comparison with European soccer, “the soccer practiced by Argentineans, and which we make extensive to Uruguayans, is more beautiful, plastic, and accurate”; and around 1928, El Gráfico columnist Chantecler noted that “the British are cold and mathematical and, for this reason, play ‘wise’ soccer; on the contrary, those from the River Plate, who are hot and improvising, play ‘genial’ soccer. And, among the River Plate people, Argentineans play with the heart and are swifter and more aggressive, while Uruguayans play with the head, and are more romantic and tranquil” (Archetti, 1981: 143).

3 “A typical example, among many others, of the mentality of the pseudo-leftist petty bourgeois intellectual is Eduardo Galeano, for whom the candid belief that soccer is an authentic expression of the people is inseparably linked to the no less candid belief that the Eastern countries’ bureaucratic State capacitisms constitute socialism” (Sebreli, 1981: 143). As Alabarces writes, Sebreli’s greatest limitation is not knowing how to “pierce through a surface where not only one, but a large quantity of discourses are articulated” and thus, in order to criticize clichés, he falls into “another repertoire of clichés: the instrumental use of the category of ideology, the reification of the worst Althusserianism, the obsession for control mechanisms” (Alabarces, 1997: 44).
The differences in style between both sides of the River Plate were already noted around 1923, but Uruguayan soccer was attributed more of a River Plate character, noticeable in its individual and talented play, while Argentinean soccer was seen to still reproduce the more effective but less playful patterns typical of British soccer. One can read in *El Gráfico* around 1923: “Among South Americans, differences in style have already appeared. Argentineans have distinguished themselves by quick onrushes with long passes, finished by powerful shots. This is a very different game from Uruguayans’, which is perhaps more brilliant but less effective. Precise, short passes, with little work at the wings, always close to the rival goal, but incapable of successfully concluding the attack” (quoted in Archetti, 1994: 35). The latter style soon came to define the “River Plate peoples’” soccer and, later, Argentinean soccer. In 1928, Ricardo Lorenzo, “Borocotó”, wrote:

“Soccer is the *criollos*’ [creoles’] collective sport, while tango is their music. Are these two preferences fundamentally different? The former is an aesthetic pleasure linked to emotional interests, club and neighborhood traditions; the latter deals with the strictly sentimental part, with some element of sensuality […]. By itself, English soccer, which is technical but monotonous, would have not been able to exert the influence our crowds’ spirit demanded. It lacked that typical something that reaches deep inside of us, that makes our voice hoarse in a heartfelt cry when the ball is collected by the trembling net; and thus we had to adorn it with eye-dazzling dribbling” (quoted in Archetti 1994, 35).

According to Eduardo Archetti, the “soccer imaginary” still alive in Argentina today was constructed precisely in this period by *El Gráfico* chroniclers, among whom Borocotó, who shaped the mythology of the *pibe* [kid], the *potrero* [open field], and the *gambeta* [dribble], figures prominently. This imaginary is sustained by the continuity of the mythical images of the pampa and the *gaucho* in its urbanized substitutes, the *potrero* and the *pibe*, who is the popular protagonist of the promises of

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4 “[A] *pibe* with a dirty face, his hair protesting its right to rebel against the comb; intelligent, fluttering, deceiving, and persuasive eyes, with sparkling looks that give the sensation of a roguish smile that his mouth, made up of small teeth that seem worn out from biting yesterday’s bread, cannot express. Some artlessly joined rags serve as pants. An Argentinian-striped tee shirt, too low-cut and with numerous holes made by the invisible mice of wear. A strip tied to his waist, crossing his breast sash-like, serves as suspenders. His knees covered with scabs from bruises disinfected by destiny; barefoot, or wearing sandals whose tears over the big toes betray the many shots he’s kicked. His attitude must be characteristic, giving the impression that he is dribbling a rag ball. This is essential, though: the ball cannot be any other. A rag ball, preferably wrapped with an old sock. If this monument were to be erected someday, there would be many of us who would take off our hats as if before an altar” (quoted in Archetti, 1994: 36).
modernity and whose contemporary example would be Maradona, and “reflects the power of freedom and creativity over discipline, order and hierarchy. The *pibes* are liminal figures, and the *potreros* territories where freedom and creativity can be lived” (Archetti, 1998: 110). Curiously, among the main sources of this Argentinean national imaginary one must include the already mentioned Borocotó, who was an influential sports journalist and screenwriter, and got to be editor-in-chief of *El Gráfico*, and Lalo Pelliciari, director of *Radio Rivadavia*, and later *Radio Mitre*, and the inventor, with his “genuine coarse [*arrabaleria*] expression”, of the celebrated goal and the whole histrionic rhetoric of radio accounts. Both were Uruguayan (Sebreli, 1981: 131).

But, as we have seen, around 1923 Uruguayan soccer was still less technical, more primitive and informal, than Argentinean soccer, even though it was linked to a society, an economy, and a culture already inserted in a regional market and to very specific international circuits. It is worth recalling that soccer was introduced in Uruguay around 1880, a couple of decades earlier in Argentina and slightly later in Chile and Brazil, by English technicians and bureaucrats employed by British companies. What began as an elegant sport and a hallmark of distinction, quickly emulated by the creole oligarchies, soon became, as had occurred in England, a pedagogical instrument no longer geared to the moral and physical education of young aristocrats, but, instead, a disciplining mechanism aimed at the popular sectors and a free-time management tool for the working class. Thus developed, simultaneously, an elite soccer, practiced in the English schools, and a business soccer, promoted by British companies as part of their advertising image (Leite Lopes, 1998: 129).

But since soccer could not be solely an instrument for social containment, it soon popularized up and down the social ladder: workers, both creole and immigrant, were accepted in the field and ended up monopolizing the teams, while young bourgeois and emerging middle-class university students tried to emulate and challenge the exclusive English clubs, in what came to be an early manifestation of sports nationalism. Thus, soccer progressively became a nationalist crusade on the one hand, and a neighborhood and popular event on the other, a “vast entertainment and mystification movement [and] a means of gregarious training, of mass psychological control” (Sebreli, 1981: 153), a “means of escape from historical-economic time, and consequently productive mechanisms, [that] maintains a surplus of meaning where the ludic spirit finds a refuge for creativity, for dodging [*hacer la gambeta a*] rules and
hierarchies” (Alabarces, 1998: 81). From these intersecting practices emerged the clubs, whose function went beyond that of mere soccer teams, since they sponsored dances and weddings, and *bochas* [wooden ball game] and *truco* [card game] championships in their social headquarters. For this reason, clubs originally had a strong territorial character and thus served a very important identity function for a population that was mostly made up of foreign immigrants and migrants from the interior, to whom patriotic interpellations meant little or nothing. As Sebreli says, “the young immigrant worker or son of immigrants identified with the neighborhood, which was something like a piece of the village enclosed in the middle of the anonymous and hostile city” (Sebreli, 1981: 38). The corner, the *boliche* [store], the neighborhood streets, the flat and familiar rhythm of the outskirts, the sidewalk oral networks, and the *picado* in the middle of the street, all of these supplied immigrants with a sense of parochial identity, of forming an endo-group, that was combined with other identity lines, such as gender, ethnicity, and class, and was compatible with the convulsive irruption of modernity in a society still ruled by pre-industrial customs and rhythms. The urban spaces of peripheral modernity witnessed the leap from the *potrero* to the field, from the *pibe’s* dream to professionalization, from informal soccer to spectacle soccer. Hence the pre-capitalist, almost rural, definitively ludic features of this style of soccer that was pure play:

“In the fields of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, a style was being born. A peculiar way of playing soccer was making its way, at the same time that a peculiar way of dancing was being affirmed in the tenement patios. Dancers did filigrees and flourishes on a single floor tile and soccer players invented a language in the minute space where the ball was not kicked but retained and possessed, as if the feet were hands weaving the leather. And the *toque* [stroke] –the ball stroked as if it were a guitar, a source of music– was born at those early creole virtuosi’s feet” (Galeano, 1995: 34).

This individualistic, roguish, teasing style, full of tricks, more tactical than strategic, more entertainment than reckoning, was, through its cult of toughness, its aggressiveness and astuteness, a symbolic way of democratisation and an apolitical way to confront modernization. A cultural means of resistance manifested in an enduring and rough style, shaped by the hopeful poverty of immigrants, who, through competition between social groups and national states, had access to a space of recognition and identity formation. Playing and being able to win was, for the popular
sectors, a symbolic confirmation of their social existence. This was the adequate style for pre- or semiprofessional, pre- or para-capitalist soccer, a type of soccer that was reluctant to become a spectacle and a commodity, even though professionalization embodied a promise of fame and social climbing for youngsters in the popular sectors. A type of soccer that functioned as a ceremony and an event, in which historical time and social order remained suspended, subordinated to a mythical, ludic, ritual time framed by the game’s magical circle (Verdú, 1980: 8; Mafud, 1967: 91; Alabarces, 1997: 49). This campito [ranch field] soccer, which the early immigrants transplanted to Fitchburg, allowed them to construct a place—demarcated by the familiar nature of the field and game rules—where every Sunday they could reproduce the then-there in the here-now. A ceremony whereby to recreate the pago within this vast and alien space, in the game’s ritual and the play’s joy. A mechanism of rudimentary organization and collective identification beyond the equivocal feelings of homeland.

10. Second Half: Libidinal Economy

The evolution of soccer throughout modernity shows an ambivalence between play and instrumentality, ceremony and spectacle, event and commodity, repetitive mythical time and linear historical time, the theology of the symbol and the politics of the sign. In a word, between a pre-capitalist practice freed to the pleasure principle (libidinal economy and collective partying) and a capitalist pragmatics ruled by the reality principle (monetary economy and introjection of order), whose materialization of power is the referee:

“The referee, who represents a constantly watchful repressive instance, becomes the reinforcement for the reality principle. The trustee and custodian of the scarce time and space that define the real. Without the referee, the pleasure principle can rule without restriction; with the referee, soccer renounces in pleasure what it gains in reality confirmation […]. The referee

5 The democratizing character of professionalization has been noted in the case of Brazil, where, openly discriminated by the amateur clubs’ aristocratsim, Afro-Brazilians saw professionalization as a mechanism whereby to rise socially and develop “a sense of national identity […] linked to the creation of a peculiar style”. As a result of racism, since they were excluded from the international sports market, “Blacks are condemned to ‘local’ success […]. For these and the other players, soccer cannot have the same meaning. There is the difference that separates the ‘good professionals’ capable of exercising their talent in the sphere of world soccer and the talented players who, having attempted ethnic emancipation through sports success, are condemned to recognition only in their homeland” (Leite Lopes, 1998: 125, 137). It is worth mentioning that the Uruguayan national team included Black players since 1916, such as the legendary Isabelino Gradín, Juan Delgado and José Leandro Andrade.
corrects ‘appearances’ or grants them the category of truth” (Verdú, 1980: 51-52).

The pivotal instances in this process have to do with the game and its actors’ professionalization for the benefit of productivity. Soccer’s libidinal economy, which manages the pleasure principle that is primarily supported on the body’s free movement, does not involve a necessarily unilateral physical and mental enjoyment, but the production of complex feelings of emotional investment and discharge which in the hincha [fan] dangerously approach a form of religiosity. “The hincha is darkly religious”, Verdú notes (Ibid: 28), since “he goes to the field ‘to suffer’. Joy is obtained only after suffering” (Ibid: 25). Soccer is, for the hincha, an act of faith and his enjoyment resides in the painful identification with the loved object and the community of supporters, and against all its enemies.

I do not know of any satisfactory explanation for the glaring anomaly whereby a country that is all but insignificant in the international context, such as Uruguay, could have had such an outstanding position in soccer during the 1920s: it was Olympic champion in 1924 and 1928, and organizer and champion of the first World Cup in 1930. If we consider that Argentina played the 1928 Olympics and the 1930 World Cup finals against Uruguay, we must stop considering the issue in national terms, since it is undoubtedly a regional phenomenon that can only be explained in global terms. If soccer is a modern sport that originated and developed under capitalism, whose logic it ended up assimilating and reproducing, how can we explain that at the beginning of the century the most successful soccer was produced in a corner of the periphery and not in the economically more developed countries? When FIFA was founded in 1904, it was composed exclusively of European countries; a few years later the River Plate teams’ hegemony became unquestionable, and subsequently it was shared with European powers such as Hungary and Italy, until the arrival of Brazil. After that, order was reestablished.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the primacy of River Plate soccer was due, in my opinion, to two factors. In the first place, the devastation of the young male European population during the Great War and the ensuing economic and social consequences, which would eventually lead to World War II. In the second place, because River Plate soccer had not yet achieved the same degree of modernization as soccer in other areas; that is, it had not yet become a commodity, and thus a spectacle, to the same
degree as in European markets. In a word, because it was a primitive soccer, more of a sports practice than a consumer spectacle. Until it became the latter, soccer continued to be, at least partially, a pastime for fans but also “a social and cultural phenomenon, where conflicts, hopes, frustrations and dreams are symbolically expressed” (Santa Cruz, 1998: 158). This is why it was inevitable that the best soccer emerged in countries where peripheral capitalism laid the pre-capitalist viscera bare, open fields abounded, and the muchachadas managed as best they could to play with rag balls. In the periphery soccer was played more and differently, that is, it was less inhibited by the productive logic of capitalism, it was a libidinal soccer, a street picado soccer that was played just because. Verdú elaborates on this:

“The process (miniaturized in soccer) that favored the passage from primitive capitalism to developed production capitalism entailed a meticulous transformation of men into objects. Into objects of production who, having been producers for themselves, became producers producing (for the team, the machinery, capital). On the other hand, the mechanism that ensured this transformation of men into individuals (parts that can be coupled) had a disciplinary character and is closely linked in soccer to the disappearance of amateurism” (Verdú, 1980: 126).

Indeed, the golden age of River Plate soccer occurred precisely at the time when European soccer started to professionalize (around 1905, when FIFA was formed, Great Britain was the only country to have professional soccer players), a process which no doubt had an immediate effect on our shores: “The exodus of players was one of the triggers for the birth of professional soccer in our countries. In 1931, Argentinean soccer became professionalized, and a year later the same happened in Uruguay. In Brazil, the professional regime began in 1934” (Galeano, 1995: 68). With the internationalization of the soccer professional system, River Plate soccer fully entered the economic sphere of capitalism and thus began the slow, progressive, inexorable decline of Uruguayan soccer, forced to ancillary dependency and to become foot power supplier for the big markets. Maracaná in 1950 was not the expression of any garra; it was the swan song of a pre-capitalist soccer style in the process of extinction. Its days were numbered, but it would nevertheless remain rooted in practices, customs, tastes, ways of walking and living, of looking and saying, of loving and suffering, in cultural-performative memory.
This is why soccer has had a much more important role in the historical shaping of Uruguayan society and culture than its praisers or detractors have acknowledged. In an alluvional society such as Uruguay, which has rather weak identity markers and is grounded on a scarcely nationalistic national imaginary, and has always had its foundational schizo nature exposed, soccer played a fundamental structuring function in the social, as well as the emotional and identity realms. In what measure did soccer round off, corroborate or implement modernity in the Uruguay that liked to think itself the Switzerland of America? To what extent did it permeate or condition social standards, political certainties, and cultural habits? How can we otherwise explain that it constitutes the only common denominator of Uruguayan migrants in Fitchburg, the barometer that signals the existence, or lack thereof, of a community identity?

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CHAPTER 14

The “New Immigration” in Spain

Lorenzo Cachón

1. The Triple Mutation in the European Migratory System

We can define a “migratory system” as “the association, having a certain disposition towards permanence and accompanied by a dense fabric of various types of interrelations, that is established between a region receiving immigration and a set of countries sending emigration” (Arango, 1993). According to this conception, at present there are four great “migratory systems” in the world: the North American, the Asian-Pacific, the Arabian Gulf and the European. This configuration of migratory systems has been in the process of formation since World War II. The war against the Nazi horror caused, in addition to great human losses, significant population transfers within Europe and, once it ended, transoceanic emigration resumed with force, especially in some southern European countries (particularly Italy). In those days, the “European migratory system” still didn’t exist; Europe continued to be the American system’s emigration-sending pole.

But in subsequent years a triple mutation took place in the historically emigrating Europe, first making northern Europe an immigration pole and later transforming also the southern Mediterranean countries into immigration countries.

As a result of the first mutation, the “European migratory system” was formed, with the southern countries as the sending pole and central and northern Europe as the receiving pole. This process started in the 1950s, when some central European States became areas of massive temporary immigration. This economic, massive, temporary and predominantly male emigration from the south towards the center of Europe was a new phenomenon (transoceanic emigration was simultaneously losing weight, that is, Europe was weakening its ties with the American migratory system): between 1955 and 1974, approximately 3.8 million Italians, 2 million Spaniards, 1 million Portuguese, 1 million Yugoslavs and 780,000 Greeks emigrated to central and northern Europe. At the same time, some non-European regions began to join the migratory system as sending countries –among them, the Maghribian countries
(whose emigrants mostly went to France, Belgium and the Netherlands) and Turkey
(whose destination was Germany). Once the first links in the “migratory chain” were
established, the presence of Arab and Turkish immigrants rose quickly, such that in
1987 there were in Europe around two million Maghribians (40% in France, 22% in
Belgium and 17% in the Netherlands) and about two million Turks (80% in Germany,
10% in the Netherlands and 7% in France). This first mutation occurred as a result of
the central European countries’ rapid economic development and their consequent
need for unskilled labor. States often organized the movements of temporary (or
seasonal) migrant workers, who in a sense behaved like “migratory birds”. Wieviorka
(1992) describes this period’s immigrant in France (and the characterization is valid
for the rest of the European receiving countries) in the following manner: “he was
generally a (male) worker who had come by himself, stayed at a shelter or was over-
exploited by a ‘dream merchant’, lived near the workplace, and had the lowest
occupational rank in production relations”.

The second mutation took place during the mid-1970s economic crisis. What
until then had been temporary immigration became permanent, despite numerous
immigrants returning to their countries (under forced or semi-voluntary conditions).
Restrictive policies may have (and in fact do have in Europe) as an –apparently–
paradoxical effect that temporary immigrants resist leaving the country for fear of
being unable to reenter, thus making permanent what would otherwise be temporary
(back and forth, and back and forth). Family regrouping was accelerated and as a
result immigrants became sedentary, they came “to be a renewed and stable part of the
population, introducing unheard-of problems and new images” (Ibid). The “migratory
birds” thus became human beings or, to express it in Max Frisch’s words, “We
wanted labor and, instead, people came”. And this occurred in the context of a deep
危机 in capitalism.

The third mutation in the “European migratory system” began in the late 80s.
In the midst of economic crisis and despite high unemployment rates, southern
European countries became immigration-receiving countries. After being “stopping
places” or “waiting-rooms” for Northern Africans on the way to central Europe,
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have become the final destination for numerous
immigrants as a result of the closing-off of traditional destinations, their own
economic development, their proximity to the sending countries, and the strong
historical and economic ties between the two Mediterranean shores. These new
migratory flows are not surprising. What is surprising is that they didn’t happen earlier, considering the historical importance of the flows of people and objects in different directions along the Mediterranean since the eve of capitalism, when it ceased to be the “desert of waves” Focillon spoke about. On the other hand, we shouldn’t be surprised that in these countries immigration frequently evolves in an irregular manner, given the characteristics of their labor market, the importance of the hidden economy in all four countries (irrespective of the presence of immigrants), and the moment/context in which the flows began.

Migrations to northern and southern European countries took place in radically different contexts:

- The northern countries became immigration countries during the quarter-century of relative social stability and economic prosperity the Western world enjoyed after the defeat of Nazism and the end of World War II, while immigrants arrived in southern Europe in the midst of a social and economic crisis, what Hobsbawm (1989) calls “the end of the short 20th century”.

- In the former, the great migratory flows began in a period of significant labor shortages; in the latter this occurred during a period of high unemployment rates.

- In the former, immigrants arrived during the expansion of the Keynesian welfare State; in the south they arrived precisely at the time when welfare policies were starting to be questioned by neoliberal policies and, as a result of the employment crisis, welfare States were entering a phase of necessary reformulation.

- Whereas in the north immigrants arrived during the introduction of a Fordist production model (and its correlate in the labor market, the “typical job”: stable and full-time), in the south this occurred when the regulatory structures that had provided the basis for political and social legitimacy and capitalist accumulation and growth between World War II and the 70s crisis, came to a head (leading to the growth of “atypical jobs”).

- Whereas in the former the great impulse towards modernization occurred during a phase of strong immigration expansion, in the south immigrants generally arrived following a rapid process of deep social transformations.
Whereas in the north States were the ones to largely “demand and organize” the labor flows, in the south States have attempted to “put order” in a phenomenon that has literally fallen on them.

In the north immigration developed during the period of expansion and consolidation of the industrial sector, whereas in the south this happened at a time when (both in northern and southern Europe) the service sector was growing and undergoing deep transformations.

This set of historical circumstances, among others, is responsible for the many differences between southern European countries in general, and Spain in particular, and northern Europe regarding labor market conditions, immigration, and discrimination (as well as unequal opportunities for immigrants and nationals). One important aspect is the position of immigrants within the various sectors of economic activity. The main difference is their presence in the industrial sector: for example, while in France one-third of foreigners work in industry, in Spain this sector employs only one-tenth of foreigners (including those from the European Union). In the central European migratory model, construction and, to a lesser degree, the service sector (spread into various branches) and agriculture are very significant. In the southern model, immigrants concentrate in the service sector (and only certain branches within it), agriculture, and to a lesser degree, construction.

But the “new world disorder” (Hobsbawm, 1989) characterizing this end of the century has made the “European migratory system”—as well as other aspects of international geopolitical reality—much more complex. We live in a period of turbulence in which the factors that have thus far explained migrations (demographic explosion, poverty conditions, economic crisis or political, religious, and ethnic conflicts in the countries of origin; labor demand by certain production sectors in the host countries, and the opinions of potential immigrants about the destination country or region, as well as immigration and asylum policies in Europe) have become more complex. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November, 1989, the economic and political situation in Eastern Europe, and the significant increase in the number of refugees from Third World countries are additional factors in this world disorder that have caused, as could not be otherwise, a turbulent situation in migratory fields, particularly the European system.
2. The “New Immigration” in Spain in the 1980s

In the mid-1980s, two events of great significance for migratory processes took place in Spain parallel to events in the rest of the southern European Union countries. In the first place, Spain evolved from an emigration to an immigration country because the (annual) flow of immigrants came to exceed that of emigrants. But we should recall that, in terms of stocks, the ratio of immigrants to emigrants continued to be one to three, that is, there were three times as many Spaniards living outside Spain as non-Spaniards living in Spain, and Spain continued to be the European Union country with the lowest percentage of non-nationals living in its territory. In the second place, there was a change in the type of immigrants arriving in Spain. If until then immigrants came primarily from Europe and Latin America (and were white, Christian and educated), since the mid-1980s another type has become increasingly important, leading to a “new immigration” that is different from the previous one and internally more diverse. It is “new” by virtue of the immigrants’ geographic-national origin (with a growing proportion of Moroccans, other Africans and Asians), their culture and religion, their skin color, their educational level and professional experience, the jobs they are called upon to fill, and the branches of activity for which they are sought. This new immigration is exemplified (in an undoubtedly reductionist way) by the arrival of Moroccans, the “return of the Moriscos”: a social process that summons the sociologist to explain why it didn’t occur earlier, given that all the conditions were there and, yet, it only became socially significant from the mid-1980s on.

The facts that need to be explained are, first of all, why the mid-1980s witnessed a drop in the emigratory flow and a rise in immigration, which transformed Spain into an immigration country and, secondly, why this “new immigration” gained increasing strength (sustained until now) precisely during those years.

One could call on the “push-pull” model, but this approach ignores the context in which migrations and decisions to emigrate are formed. One must go beyond and analyze, as Portes and Rumbaut (1996) suggest, “two different types of social structures: those linking sending and receiving countries and those linking communities and families in places of origin and destination”. But, even though this theoretical approach is adequate to study Spanish migratory processes, an explanation of the above-mentioned facts requires a more concrete formulation. In this article, we submit that Spain became an immigration country and started to receive a “new type
of immigrant” (for example, Moroccans) because the mid-1980s witnessed deep social changes that made certain jobs appear as “non-desirable”, that is, below the level considered (socially) acceptable, to a growing number of Spanish social groups. To express it with Sabel (1982), there was a change regarding “which jobs count as disgraces and which as accomplishments”. As a consequence, the demand for immigrant labor grew in certain segments of activity characterized by a high relative presence of the labor market’s “weak bands”, such as young people and/or women, and in certain geographic areas, and immigrants started to appear. In this article, we will attempt to offer an analytical outline of this process.

Since the arrival of the “first-come immigrants”, migratory networks have multiplied their presence, through legal as well as “undocumented” avenues. The (relatively sudden) Maghribian presence cannot be considered accidental, because all the necessary historical and structural conditions already existed. It was changes within Spain that provided the impetus for the “new immigration”. These events have also caused a certain ambiguity in admissions policies, which have oscillated between two poles: the “preference for nationals” and other European Union citizens, and the policy of quotas that, by juridically defining as fields for immigrant hiring precisely those branches of activity previously selected by the market, reinforces the latter’s segregationist and discriminatory logic. Between these two poles lies the “discriminatory institutional framework” (Cachón, 1995b) against immigrants that was being laid out since the first legislation on foreigners (after 1985) and through the (incipient) immigration policy (not proposed until 1992).

A preliminary note on the (biased) language used in the analysis that follows. We will call “foreign workers” those who have a valid working permit (at the end of a given year). This means we won’t address the situation of all foreign workers in Spain, since we’ll exclude those from European Union member States who, strictly speaking, shouldn’t be called foreigners: it would be necessary to find a new expression to refer to these “non-Spanish European Union citizens” (as the British have done with the word “denizen”), since they hold the same labor rights as nationals. Nor will we address all immigrant-origin workers, since we won’t include those who have become Spanish citizens (because, for this reason, they also don’t need a working permit).

We will try to answer three questions: where (in which branches of activity) do immigrants work in Spain; what are the characteristics of these branches; and,
finally, do Spaniards want to work in the branches of activity immigrants work in. And we will do so on the basis of aggregate data from official statistics. This sets some limits on the analysis: methodological limits, since the explanatory hypotheses are based on existing statistical information; and analytical limits, because for this reason we will only be able to work at an aggregate sectoral level (by branches of activity) and won’t be able to go into the study of real labor markets, that is, local markets, the social processes whereby certain immigrants are actually appointed to certain jobs (or vice versa), or the structuring of social networks and the construction of migratory chains. Our analysis intends to be (only) one step in the search for an interpretation of the migratory phenomenon in Spain from a labor market perspective.

Elsewhere I have noted the advisability of classifying immigrant workers in Spain into “settled” and “precarious” ones (Cachón, 1995b). Since the Encuesta de Población Activa [Active Population Survey] does not provide information on foreigners by branch of activity, it is not possible to make this distinction in the present article, but we believe this does not detract from the need to make distinctions between types of immigrants in the labor market. This leads to another observation on one of the issues not addressed in this paper that is, nonetheless, of fundamental import. “Undocumented” immigrants are the issue (i.e., are not the issue). Even if we don’t have reliable information on their number and sectoral location, some estimates can be made (see, for example, Cachón, 1995b; Colectivo IOE, 1999) and it doesn’t seem unfounded to state that the “undocumented” work in the same branches of activity as immigrants with working permits.

3. Where Do Immigrants Work in Spain?

Five branches of activity\(^2\) concentrated, at the end of 1997, 74.4% of the 178,747 foreign workers with working permits in Spain: domestic service (27.4%), agriculture (17.2%), hotel trade (12.4%), retail trade (8.5%), and construction (8.9%).

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1 This section largely follows (while updating some facts) the same line of thought as Cachón (1997b and 1998).

2 The official designations of the five branches of activity we mention in this paper (according to the 1993 National Standard Industrial Classification) are the following: “Homes that employ domestic staff” (we will refer to it as “domestic service”), “Agriculture, cattle-raising, hunting, and forestry” (we will refer to it as “agriculture”), “Hotel trade”, “Retail trade. Domestic repairs” (in the case of immigrants, “retail trade” mostly refers to street vending, although they have a growing presence in other types of retail business), and “Construction”.

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These five branches concentrate altogether less than 30% of total employment in Spain, which gives a preliminary idea of the high degree of concentration in immigrant employment. If on the whole immigrant workers comprise 1.4% of those employed in Spain, in three of these five branches their relative presence is much higher: they represent 14.2% of employment in domestic service, 3.1% in hotel trade, 2.8% in agriculture, and slightly over 1% in construction and retail trade. Therefore, the immigrants’ high sectoral concentration does not mean that they “monopolize” certain branches of activity. In four of the five branches, national (and European Union) workers hold more than 97% of the jobs, and only in domestic service do immigrants hold over 14% of them (see Table 1 in Appendix). There is a concentration by sector and, nevertheless, a low relative weight in those same sectors; this double image must be related to the fact that immigrants concentrate in certain regions and employment areas, while in the rest nationals continue to be a majority in those same sectors.

In the past few years, there has been a growing concentration of (new) immigrants in these branches of activity, especially domestic service and agriculture. If between 1990 and 1997, the number of valid working permits (at the end of each year) doubled (increasing by 109%), in these five branches the overall increase was 271% in the same period: on the order of 1,560% in agriculture, 568% in domestic service, and 162% in construction3.

There is a prevalence of female workers in domestic service (in 1997 more than 80% were women) and of males in agriculture and construction (95% were men), while there is a low female presence in retail trade.

Sectoral concentration coincides with “specialization” according to the immigrants’ geographic origin: Moroccans (with 75%) and other Africans comprise over 95% of foreigners in agriculture and 78% in construction (of these, 70% are Moroccan); women from the Philippines and the Dominican Republic predominate in domestic service, while in hotel trade it is Moroccans, Latin Americans and Chinese.

In addition to the “functioning” of the “market”, the positioning of immigrants in these branches of activity is determined by certain rules of what we have called “the institutional discriminatory framework”, which thus contributes to tightening the

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3 One should be cautious when analyzing the comparisons between 1990 and 1997 in Table 1, because the former includes European Union foreigners (who at the time still needed working permits, which they do not in 1997). In any case, the number of European Union workers in these branches was very small.
logic of the market. If, at a given moment, the “institutional framework” is the one that sets (by exclusion or preference) the field of non-circulation of immigrants (for example, through references to the “national employment situation”), in other cases the State ratifies what the market has previously set as “field of possibilities”. A clear example is the 1995 quota, which established that only immigrants from those countries the market had previously selected for certain branches of activity could benefit from it, thereby turning market “preferences” into legal “requirements” or “prescriptions”: (male) Moroccans were accepted in construction and (female) Dominicans, Peruvians or Philippines in domestic service.

4. What Are the Characteristics of the Branches of Activity Immigrants Work in?

We have studied a set of seven indicators of the following five areas of working conditions (in a broad sense): 1) human capital; 2) atypical work; 3) labor relations; 4) working conditions (in a narrower sense); and 5) salaries. The selected indicators are explained in Table 2 (see Appendix). In some cases, an indicator’s higher value reflects better working conditions in the sector (percentage of workers with higher-education degrees over the total employed; participation in union elections; average yearly earnings per worker). For the other indicators, a higher figure indicates a lower quality in the branch’s conditions (percentage of workers who are illiterate or lack formal schooling over the total employed; percentage of temporary workers over the total number of wage-earners; stipulated working hours; rate of fatal accidents per 100,000 workers). These observations can serve as reading guide for Tables 3 and 4 (see Appendix). Table 3 records the value of the seven indicators for the five branches of activity, and Table 4 the deviations from the mean of the overall Spanish labor market (that is, from all branches).

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4 Some notes on the method:
1) The purpose is to carry out a “macro” approximation at an aggregate level: in this way, the concrete individual working conditions of immigrants in Spain cannot be characterized. Furthermore, this type of approximation mitigates the differences upon comparison. An approximation like the one in this paper is consequently a “minimum ills” approximation, that is, if a more disaggregated analysis were carried out (at the level of sub-branch, occupation, and geographic location, for example), the data would reflect a more differentiated situation in working conditions (that is, more degraded in the sub-branches we’re interested in).
2) At a certain level of disaggregation, some comparisons affecting the last decade have been made difficult by the application of the new National Standard Industrial Classification since 1994.
3) We have only selected some quantifiable indicators by branch of activity using official data available from the National Statistics Institute or the Ministry of Labor.
Based on the value of these indicators recorded in Tables 3 and 4, we can highlight certain characteristics of the branches of activity with the highest presence of immigrants:

- “Human capital”, estimated from the percentage of workers with higher-education degrees on the one hand, and workers who are illiterate or lack formal schooling on the other, shows that the five branches are well below the mean, particularly those where there are more immigrants, their relative presence is higher and their growth most noteworthy, namely, domestic service and agriculture.

- Atypical work, evaluated as the percentage of temporary workers in each branch, is above the mean in all these branches (which are included among the ones with the highest percentage of temporary contracts).

- The density of labor relations, measured by participation in the 1990 union elections (the latest for which official data are available), is below the mean in three of these branches and slightly above in two others (retail trade and construction).

- The average working hours stipulated in the 1997 collective bargains is higher in three of these branches. Of the 44 branches of activity for which information is available, only five exceeded (in 1995) 1,800 annual hours, and two of these were hotel trade (50 hours above the mean) and retail trade (36 hours above the mean).

- Two of the five branches with the highest presence of immigrants, domestic service and construction, are among the ones with the highest rate of fatal accidents.

- The average earnings of the three branches (of the five under analysis) for which information is available show salaries well below the mean. Furthermore, we should take into account that immigrants work mostly in small businesses and occupy the lowest ranks, and in these categories salaries are systematically lower in every sector.

The conclusion obtained from the “aggregate” examination of the question posed in this heading is quite clear: one may state that the set of seven selected indicators demonstrates that, in general, the five branches of activity where three-quarters of immigrant workers concentrate have notably worse working conditions
than the mean of all sectors (or the mean of the Spanish labor market) and consequently, at the general and aggregate level at which the comparison is made, they are among the least “desirable”. With this, we have not described the concrete working conditions of immigrants, but only the general conditions in these branches of activity, which are still for the most part occupied by national workers.

In Spain there were no general data on the management of immigrant labor by companies until a 1995 study the ILO commissioned from the Colectivo IOE. According to this investigation –elaborated following Bovenkerk’s methodology (1992)–, net discrimination against Moroccans was 35%: for each job offered the immigrant group, 3.2 were offered to young national workers. The greatest discrimination was noted in Barcelona, followed by Madrid and Málaga (which were the three areas under study) and, by sectors, discrimination was highest in the service sector, followed by industry and construction (Colectivo IOE, 1995a).

There are also case studies and plentiful data that give a rather broad picture of the discriminatory conditions immigrants suffer in Spanish companies, especially in the branches of activity the majority concentrate in. Discriminatory practices don’t occur with the same intensity and/or frequency among national workers. The most frequent discriminatory practices against immigrants seem to be: irregular wage relations (hiring the immigrant without a contract or Social Security benefits), salary cuts (paying him/her below the stipulated amount), and worse working conditions (that violate rules and collective bargains). In some areas (certain sectors in certain regions), immigrants may be given preference precisely because they are a cheaper, more docile and more fragile labor force. Case studies allow us to point out three widespread practices: frequent changes from regular to irregular situations imposed by the company, longer working hours and lower salaries than national workers fulfilling similar functions in the company or sector

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5 In a report prepared for the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Dublin), we presented numerous case studies on domestic service, construction, agriculture, hotel trade and street vending (Cachón, 1995a; see Colectivo IOE, 1999). Together with discriminatory practices, there are also cases of good practices (Cachón, 1997a). As already noted, in this paper we do not address employers’ discriminatory practices towards “undocumented” workers, who comprise around 50% of the total non-European-Union foreign workers in Spain: they don’t have contracts or Social Security benefits, they earn notably lower salaries, have worse working conditions and, moreover, cannot complain.
5. Do Spaniards Want to Work in the Branches of Activity Immigrants Work in? A Poorly-Posed Question

In order to understand the position of immigrants in the Spanish labor market, we must start from the fact that this is, as all labor markets in advanced capitalism, a segmented market, that is, “a market” divided into a limited number of spheres or segments that don’t compete against each other and delimit (social) fields or spaces of circulation (and non-circulation). These labor market segments differ in their operation mechanisms and the benefits they provide workers: in them, “the processes of appointment, training, promotions, salary determinations, etc., as well as the workers’ and employers’ behavioral traits, are qualitatively different as we move from one market segment to another” (Villa, 1990). A series of institutional, economic, and technological factors define the “field of possibilities” where the strategies of business owners and workers interact, thus determining the structure of the various –relatively closed– markets that make up the whole of the “labor market”. The position of workers within the structure depends, on the one hand, on the “available job opportunities” and, on the other, “their level of acceptance of the working conditions”, that is, their “social power of negotiation” (Ibid). Job opportunities are determined, from the point of view of the labor supply, by the workers’ basic characteristics (gender, age, marital status, educational level, skills, ethnic origin, etc.) and their behavioral standards (reliability, diligence and other personality traits). These traits and behavioral standards tend to be used by employers as discriminating (though not necessarily discriminatory) selective elements in the process of job appointment.

The “level of acceptance” of working conditions is basically defined by the position workers occupy in the system of social reproduction, both within the family and the class structure. Their status within the system “delimits the position the workers occupy in the labor market, thereby defining their ‘level of acceptance’ of working conditions, below which they would consider their job opportunities ‘socially’ unacceptable. In other words, this defines their social power of negotiation […]that is[,] there are similar categories of workers with radically different minimum prices, regardless of their potential/real productivity” (Ibid).

We can give another definition of the workers’ “level of acceptance” based on Sabel’s concept of the “career at work”, which is another term for the workers’ “worldview”. Every group of workers has a different idea of success or career at the job, that is, “differ[s] about which powers define dignity, which jobs count as
disgraces and which as accomplishments” (Sabel, 1982). Based on this idea of dignity, accomplishment and disgrace, social groups determine what is or is not acceptable for group members.

Both the labor market structure and the workers’ position, their “social power of negotiation” and “career at work”, vary through time and are very sensitive to cyclic fluctuations in the economic system. Variations not only bring about changes in the labor demand of the different segments, but also modify the latter’s characteristics and broadness (see Sengenberger, 1988). The economic conjuncture’s impact on structural changes is more pronounced when a labor market is going through very active re-adaptation and adjustment periods.

For the past three decades, Spain has been undergoing a deep labor market transformation. Its repositioning within the globalized economy, which has been significantly affected by entry in the European Union; the transformations of its economic structure; the normative modifications introduced since the passing of the 1978 Constitution and especially in the last decade; and changes in the industrial relations system (especially freedom to organize and collective negotiation) have brought about a significant re-composition of labor market agents and segments. But there are additional elements that may have had a direct impact on the national workers’ level of acceptance of certain working conditions in recent years.

The mid-1970s (economic and political) crisis stirred up the swampy waters of the Spanish labor market and all the problems latent until then (largely thanks to the cushion emigration provided) exploded at once. The result was a process of job destruction without equal in OECD countries: the employed population dropped almost 20% between 1975 and 1985. Even though the active population moderately increased, the unemployment rate soared to 25%. In the following six-year period (1985-1991), the process was inverted and almost two million jobs were created, as many as those destroyed in the previous decade. However, unemployment fell only moderately because of the extraordinary increase in the active population stemming primarily from the rise in female occupational rates that came about when women under 45 massively left the home and joined the labor force. These behavioral features of the Spanish labor market are “anomalous” in the Western context by their magnitude, but not their orientation.

But it is not only a question of volume and trends. Simultaneously, deep structural changes have taken place in Spain that, while following the same direction
as those in other countries, have led to a serious realignment of the labor market structure: the continuous fall in agricultural population (which dropped from 22% in 1976 to 8% in 1998) and the increasing tertiarization of the economy, both in sectoral (the service sector went from 41% to 62% in the same period) and occupational terms. Another significant feature is the growth of so-called “atypical jobs”: temporary jobs, part-time jobs, etc. If one may suspect (the phenomenon has not been analyzed in depth from a comparative perspective) that every country has “its model” of atypical employment, the Spanish model is primarily characterized by the growth of “temporary work”: since the early 1990s, approximately one-third of salaried workers have a temporary employment contract. This type of contract mostly affects those who have just joined the labor market, namely, the young.

Unemployment has been the greatest problem in Spanish society since the mid-1970s. It continues to be so at present with over three million unemployed (that is, over 18% of the active population). The Spanish unemployment rate has typically been twice as high as the European Union’s.

The effects the above-mentioned changes have had on the labor market structure are highly significant: decrease in agricultural employment; increase in the active population and women’s employment; increase in temporary hiring; tertiarization of the economy; black economy; increase in unemployment and especially long-term unemployment; a more skilled labor force entering the market; transformations in labor management policies; end of emigration flows and the beginning of a cycle of net immigration. All these elements have contributed to shaping a labor market radically different from that of two decades ago.

All these changes are closely interrelated and if we had to simplify them in triangular form, we would say that the three vertices of the phenomenon are tertiarization (both sectoral and occupational), increased precariousness (of working conditions in general) and increased fragility (growth of the most fragile labor force, be it young people, women or immigrants).

In this context, an important shift in the “social power of negotiation” and the “level of job acceptability” by national workers has taken place. In the past two decades, and especially the last one, at least five interrelated factors have contributed to considerably changing the “career at work”, the views on accomplishment and disgrace, the level of what’s acceptable and the social power of negotiation of Spanish workers:
- The increased general welfare level and the development of Spanish society.
- The rapid development of the Keynesian welfare State (KWS) brought about by democracy: guaranteed free education; guaranteed national health system; guaranteed minimum pensions (non-contributory, etc.); unemployment benefits, etc. Esping-Andersen (1990) has emphasized the interdependence between welfare State and labor market and, in Polanyi’s wake, has called attention to the “decommodification” effects the development of the welfare State may have on the labor force.
- The transformation of the national labor force, reflected in the increased educational level (we will return to this argument later).
- The maintenance of family networks, which are very important especially if, as occurs in Spain, their effects are added to those of the KWS.
- The expectations the previous elements have generated in the different social strata and national labor segments and how these expectations are transferred from parents to children. Expectations grow considerably in periods of accelerated change.

If, as a result of these transformations, there are significant changes in the “level of acceptability”, in the perception of what is “accomplishment or disgrace” by an important part of the labor force, this can lead to a shift of active population between two market segments, from the secondary to the primary (to use a well-established, albeit simplistic, terminology), which in turn can produce labor shortages in certain sectors/segments/geographic areas of the market that, despite not reaching the point of depletion, cause operational problems in these markets. The fact that these transformations don’t affect all of Spanish society in a homogeneous manner does not invalidate the argument. It indicates, instead, that social dualization has effects on (and is a consequence of) the labor market. This, in our opinion, is the process that has taken place in Spain during the last decade and is therefore one of the keys to understanding the recent (and still limited) role Spain has as immigration country.

Unemployment, especially long-term, and increased job precariousness have an opposite effect, leading to a drop in expectations and “level of acceptability”. But their most negative effects are very concentrated in certain groups6.

6 The relation between the national workers worst positioned in the labor market, and immigration and immigrants is a question of extraordinary relevance, both economic (because this is where the field of
The transformation of the national labor force effected by the increased educational level has in turn produced changes in the level of what is considered socially acceptable. In 1991, in a homage-book to Carlos Lerena, we set forth the hypothesis that education below middle-school prepares for a secondary market, and secondary and higher education prepare for a primary market. If this were so, the structure of occupational and unemployment rates (by gender and age groups) would be understandable, whereas otherwise their behavior could be considered “anomalous” (Cachón, 1991). And if this hypothesis is right, one may expect that a change in the educational structure of the active population will lead to changes in the “acceptability” of secondary-sector jobs by national workers with higher or secondary schooling.

Table 5 (see Appendix) records the structure of the active population by (completed) educational level for 1985 and 1997. In 1985, 61% of the active population had primary schooling or less, whereas only 39% had secondary or higher education. In 1997, the distribution was the reverse: only 31% had primary schooling or less, whereas 69% had secondary or higher education. The most significant change has taken place, moreover, in higher education: from less than 600,000 higher-degree holders in the Spanish labor market in 1985, the figure rose to 3,846,000 in 1995, which represents an absolute increase of 548% and an increase in the segment’s relative weight from 4% of the total active population in 1985, to 24% twelve years later.

Such deep transformations in the educational structure have led to a decrease in the number of people “willing” to enter the secondary labor market. This seems to be the case in occupations like domestic service, agriculture or construction. This does not mean that there are no Spaniards in these fields: we have already emphasized that even in domestic service, where the presence of immigrants is greatest, over 85% of jobs are held by national workers. What it means is that shortages in the national labor force may occur, and indeed do occur (without reaching the point of depletion), in various local labor markets, and that this labor is required by the productive system such that, once the flow has acquired certain dimensions, the functioning of social

competition between nationals and immigrants is located, at least in part) and political (because it is in this “natural sphere” that Le Pen-style racist demagoguery feeds).

7 ‘Primary’ and ‘secondary’ are used in the simplest sense of the dual labor market theory. It is not that we think this distinction supplies all the tools to understand labor market segmentation, but we do believe it is a key (albeit insufficient) distinction.
networks may produce, and indeed does produce, its own dynamics, which is however not independent from the change in the level of acceptability by the national labor force.

6. Conclusions

In order to explain the fact that Spain has become an immigration country after the mid-1980s, we have to understand some fundamental changes taking place in the country: increased standard of living; consolidation of welfare state institutions that contribute to the “decommodification” of the labor force; transformations in the national labor force (especially regarding educational level); maintenance of solid family networks; and rising social expectations especially during expansive social cycles. All this has raised the “level of acceptability” of the types of jobs national workers seem willing to take. At the same time, unemployment and increased job precariousness tend to lower the level of “what’s acceptable”. But, while the former trend has a general and structural (albeit not irreversible) character, the latter concentrates upon certain specific (albeit not small) groups within the active population. As a consequence of these processes, a partial depletion seems to have occurred in some local markets within five of the branches of activity that are considered less “desirable” because they exhibit the worst working conditions: domestic service, agriculture, hotel trade, retail trade and construction. The gaps have been filled since the mid-1980s by immigrant workers. This has produced a change not only in the direction of migratory movements in Spain, but also the immigrants’ characteristics. It is for this reason that we may speak of a “new immigration”.

7. Annex: The Study of Immigration in Spain

As corresponds to the newness of the immigratory phenomenon in southern European countries, research works on the immigratory phenomenon in Spain are recent, but start to be numerous. Since the pioneering studies by the Colectivo IOE and A. Izquierdo in the late 1980s, studies on immigration in Spain have multiplied. Several scientific journals have dedicated monographic issues to the immigratory phenomenon in Spain: Economía y Sociología del Trabajo in 1991, Alfoz in 1992, Política y Sociedad in 1993, Papers in 1994, and Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales in 1997. The first Spanish journal specializing in this issue, Migraciones, published by the Universidad Pública de Comillas, appeared in 1996.
Among the works published in this decade (note that the majority have appeared since 1995), we can highlight, among others, the following:


- **Studies on immigrant women**: Gregorio (1996), Marrodán et al. (1991) and Solé (1994).


- **Guides or general orientation works**: Aparicio (1999) and Malgesini and Giménez (1997).

The growing scientific interest in immigration is manifested in numerous events. The number of doctoral dissertations from various theoretical perspectives in sociology, anthropology, demography, law, geography, or economic science, is growing. Only between 1996 and 1998 seven doctoral dissertations were defended in Madrid public universities: Carrasco (1998), Gregorio (1996), Herranz (1996), Moldes (1997), Pérez (1997), Ramírez (1998) and Veredas (1998). In 1993 the first PhD course on immigration and the labor market was inaugurated at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Several summer courses (at the Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo and the Universidad Complutense de Madrid) have facilitated discussions on immigration, employment, integration and migratory policy with some of the most renowned international specialists. Another important event was the creation of the first University Institute on Migration Studies at the Universidad de
Comillas and, with it, the first Master’s degree on Immigration, followed since then by some others in Universidad Autónoma and Universidad Complutense, both in Madrid. The Spanish Federation of Sociology has established a special study group on "Sociology of Migrations". The Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset organized the First Spanish Congress on Immigration, which took place in Madrid in 1998. The growing number of translations into Spanish of some very important texts in the field’s scientific literature points in the same direction.

WORKS CITED


### Table 1. Branches of Activities with the Highest Number of Foreign Workers with Working Permit (for Late 1990 and 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number Immigrant Workers</th>
<th>Difference 1990-1997</th>
<th>Percentage Distribution</th>
<th>Proportion Foreign Workers to Total Employed</th>
<th>Ranking According to Number of Immigrants</th>
<th>Tasa de feminización inmigrantes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85,372</td>
<td>178,747</td>
<td>93,375</td>
<td>109.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Service</td>
<td>7,335</td>
<td>48,997</td>
<td>41,662</td>
<td>568.0</td>
<td>8,6</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>30,701</td>
<td>28,852</td>
<td>1,560.4</td>
<td>12,4</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel Trade</td>
<td>10,601</td>
<td>22,148</td>
<td>11,547</td>
<td>108.9</td>
<td>12,4</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>6,054</td>
<td>15,839</td>
<td>9,785</td>
<td>161.6</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>10,006</td>
<td>15,143</td>
<td>5,137</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>11,7</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total five branches</td>
<td>35,845</td>
<td>132,828</td>
<td>96,983</td>
<td>270.6</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2. Selected Indicators on the Quality-of-Work Conditions for Various Types of Economic Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital</td>
<td>% Higher degree/total employed</td>
<td>Structure of qualifications</td>
<td>INE, Encuesta Población Activa, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Illiterate and no studies/total employed</td>
<td>Possibilities for promotion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atypical Work</td>
<td>% Temporary workers/total employed on salary</td>
<td>Presence of diverse kinds of atypical occupations</td>
<td>INE, Encuesta Población Activa, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Occupational stability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The logic of internal/external administration of labor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Relations</td>
<td>% Participation in Union Elections</td>
<td>Union presence and strength</td>
<td>Min. Trabajo, Elecciones sindicales 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Conditions</td>
<td>Negotiated number of hours/year</td>
<td>Duration of the workday</td>
<td>Min. Trabajo, Convenios colectivos, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index of incidence of fatal accidents (per 100 employees)</td>
<td>Security on the job</td>
<td>Min. Trabajo, Accidentes de trabajo, 1995-1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>Average annual earnings per worker (in 1000s of Pesetas)</td>
<td>Salary earnings</td>
<td>INE, Distribución salarial en España 1995 (1997)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

334
Table 3. Quality Characteristics of the Five Types of Activities with the Highest Number of Foreign Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Service</td>
<td>14,2</td>
<td>48,997</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>14,6</td>
<td>26,8</td>
<td>73,6</td>
<td>1.767</td>
<td>30,9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3,1</td>
<td>30,701</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>23,6</td>
<td>62,8</td>
<td>72,6</td>
<td>1.782</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel Trade</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>22,148</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>48,2</td>
<td>75,4</td>
<td>1.807</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>2,001,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>15,839</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>62,0</td>
<td>79,1</td>
<td>1.765</td>
<td>30,4</td>
<td>2,287,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>15,143</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>80,5</td>
<td>1.807</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>2,624,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Employed</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>178,747</td>
<td>17,0</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>33,6</td>
<td>77,2</td>
<td>1.773</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>3.032,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4. Deviations from the Average of Quality Indicators for the Five Types of Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Service</td>
<td>-15,4</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>-6,8</td>
<td>-3,6</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>20,9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>-14,8</td>
<td>17,8</td>
<td>29,2</td>
<td>-4,6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-4,5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel Trade</td>
<td>13,2</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>14,6</td>
<td>-1,8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>-1,030,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>-12,2</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>28,4</td>
<td>1,9</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>20,4</td>
<td>-744,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>-10,1</td>
<td>-1,6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-4,7</td>
<td>-408,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Total Employed Population</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5,8%</td>
<td>33,6%</td>
<td>77,2%</td>
<td>1773</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>3.032,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Educational Structure of the Active Population in Spain (1985 and 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Of the Absolute Figures</td>
<td>From the Relative Weight of Each Educational Level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N  %</td>
<td>N  %</td>
<td>N  %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>307.500 2,3</td>
<td>100.300 0,6</td>
<td>-207.200 -67,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Studies</td>
<td>1.373.000 10,2</td>
<td>819.700 5,1</td>
<td>-553.300 -40,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Studies</td>
<td>6.567.100 48,7</td>
<td>4.162.300 25,6</td>
<td>-2.404.800 -36,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Studies</td>
<td>4.626.700 34,4</td>
<td>7.274.000 44,8</td>
<td>2.647.300 57,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With a Higher Degree</td>
<td>593.300 4,4</td>
<td>3.846.000 23,7</td>
<td>3.252.700 548,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>28.300 0,2</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13.467.600 100,0</td>
<td>16.230.600 100,0</td>
<td>2.763.000 20,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa (second trimesters) and preparation by the author
CHAPTER 15

Emigrants in 20th Century Spanish Politics and Culture

José E. Rodríguez-Ibáñez

The 20th century has been a century of accelerated social change in Spain. Some striking examples: in 1900, the illiteracy rate exceeded 50%, whereas in the year 2000 illiteracy has been virtually eradicated; at the turn of the century, agriculture was by far the dominant sector, with the industrial and service sectors comprising altogether less than 30% of production activity, whereas presently agriculture is residual and the service sector is unquestionably dominant; finally, Spain saw the 19th century off with a humiliating defeat at the hands of the United States that was settled with the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, whereas nowadays the United States and Spain are allies and partners in NATO, and Spain is a member of the European Union since 1985. In the political arena, Spain has also undergone spectacular changes in the 20th century. The first third of the century was ruled by a caciquista and oligarchic regime. After the democratic and progressive parenthesis of the Second Republic (1931-1936), the country experienced a bloody civil war that gave way to a long-lasting pro-Fascist dictatorship, whose last stretch (1965-1975) witnessed a process of economic modernization that set the foundation for the establishment of a mature democracy upon the dictator’s death in the mid-1970s.

But if we had to choose an indicator par excellence of Spain’s rate of change throughout the 20th century, the most representative would undoubtedly be emigration. Indeed, at the beginning of the century there was a strong migratory current towards Latin-America, which after the late 1950s turned predominantly towards Western Europe (especially Germany). The development of Spanish society and the stagnation of the European economies during the final quarter of the century have caused an inversion in this trend and Spain is now a host country to foreign immigrants –primarily Northern-Africans and Latin-Americans–, many of whom enter illegally and create problems of admission and integration. In sum, Spain has
gone from being a country “of emigrants” or a significant “migration exporter”, to increasingly becoming one “of immigrants” or “migration importer”.

All this has taken place in several stages that could be summarized as follows:
1. First third of the century, up to the civil war: 1900-1936.

The first stage corresponds to a backward and oligarchic Spain, whose poorest regions –Galicia, the Canary Islands, Castile, Andalusia, Extremadura– generated two migratory currents: one external, towards Latin America –mainly Argentina and Cuba–, and one internal, towards the Basque Country and Catalonia, which were then in the heyday of industrial take-off. In order to give an idea of the magnitude of this phenomenon, I will recall that in 1912, 245,219 Spaniards crossed the Atlantic in search of a better life (Martín Moreno, 1981: 183).

The civil war and ensuing international isolation entailed a tragic stoppage in Spanish life, emigration included. There was a sizeable political exodus of supporters of the Republic (it is estimated that in 1939 France received a total of 800,000 political refugees, among whom were illustrious personalities such as the former President of the Republic, Manuel Azaña, and the great poet Antonio Machado). Many of these refugees would later end up in Latin America –especially Mexico–, where the intellectuals among them contributed to the enrichment of the academic and literary scenes. In order to give an idea of the phenomenon, I will mention that the Colegio de México was originally founded by Spanish exiles. One may also recall the “Spanish-Americanization” of world-stature figures such as film-maker Luis Buñuel, writer and sociologist Francisco Ayala, writer Max Aub, and Nobel Prize Juan Ramón Jiménez.

The third stage saw the resumption of the emigratory current, which throughout the 1960s gradually changed direction from Latin America to Europe, primarily Germany, France and Switzerland. During this decade, transoceanic emigration became residual and emigration to Europe soared, reaching about one million emigrants by the early 1970s. Of these, 377,415 lived in Germany in 1974, while 376,551 lived in Switzerland and 222,319 in France (Martín Moreno, 1981: 186).
The fourth stage was a period of returning emigration, due to the host countries’ economic difficulties following the 1973 oil world crisis and, at the same time, Spain’s increased development, which curbed the need to emigrate and fostered returning. As a result, whereas in 1984 there was still a Spanish emigrant population of 87,840 in Europe, by 1994 this figure had fallen to only 6,602 (Izquierdo, 1996: 98).

Finally, the fifth stage has entailed a trend reversion. Spain has gone on to host immigrants, primarily from Northern African and sub-Saharan countries, as well as from Latin America, particularly the Dominican Republic and Peru. The influx from Africa is usually made up of unskilled males, whereas Latin America generally “sends” women eager to work in domestic service. There is also a growing presence of migrant workers from Eastern Europe (mainly Poland), with a heterogeneous profile as highly skilled individuals who find underemployment positions yielding a higher remuneration than they would receive in Poland for jobs more in accordance with their qualifications. Legal and undocumented immigrants did not exceed 2% of the population and, in any case, as of December 31, 1997, the total legal resident population was only 609,813 (Pajares, 1998: 344). If we subtract European Union residents (who add up to 260,599), the genuine legal immigrants comprised a total of around 350,000 people, which isn’t a very sizeable figure, but they concentrate in big cities and are quite deep-rooted in public opinion perceptions. To them we must add a changing and hard-to-determine number of clandestine immigrants.

The last quarter-century has likewise witnessed the arrival in Spain of political refugees fleeing the 1970s and 1980s military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina. Cuba also “exports” political refugees and, as of late, economic emigrants.

In political terms, we could say that emigration reinforced the conservative regime prevailing in Spain until the Second Republic, since emigrants who came back wealthy (the famous indianos, that is, returning from “the Indies”) would settle in their place of origin and generally support the local elites’ power. The indianos (who enjoyed building pretentious mansions in over-elaborate architectural styles) left a notable imprint in Northern Spain (Asturias, Galicia, and Cantabria), as their example often induced younger men to emigrate.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s emigrants seldom returned and posed no problems for Franco’s dictatorship.
It was in the 1960s that the return of emigrants and the greater ease they had traveling back and forth to Spain on vacation brought along new political and syndicalist conceptions and demands, and contributed to the consolidation of new middle-low and middle-middle social classes which, together with the middle-upper classes emerging in big cities thanks to the period’s economic boom, supplied the social base that would put an end to Francoism upon the dictator’s death in 1975.

The last stages witnessed the virtual end of the emigratory phenomenon, which gave way to an inverse immigratory phenomenon. The increasing number of Third World immigrants started to create problems of racist rejection and xenophobic violence (we can mention the case of Lucrecia, a young Dominican woman murdered in the periphery of Madrid in 1991 solely on account of her immigrant condition).

Emigration has generated in Spain an entire culture, as rich and varied as the wide fluctuations in the phenomenon that we’ve examined thus far. If one had to characterize it from a primarily cultural point of view, the shift from migration towards America to migration towards Europe, and its subsequent transformation into immigration from the Third World, could be translated into a series of predominant literary and cinematographic stereotypes of the migrant. I will classify them into four periods.

Period 1900-1936

In this period, it is not inappropriate to speak generically about the “optimistic and nostalgic emigrant”. The American adventure was risky but also promising, and could end up allowing prosperous retirement as an indiano. In any case, the memory of Spain and projects to go back prevailed in the emigrants.

In literature, this stereotype has been superbly recreated by Eduardo Blanco Amor, one of the great Galician writers of the 20th century, who was an emigrant in Argentina and Chile from 1919 until well beyond the civil war. In his novel Aquella gente [Those People], published in Galician in 1972 and in Spanish in 1976, Blanco Amor narrates the commotion produced in a Galician town –Orense– by the 1917 nationwide revolutionary strike organized by the Socialist Party. The provincial micro cosmos, splendidly reconstructed by the author, has as one of its narrative axes the figures of two brothers –los Maricones [the Faggots]–, owners of a well-known tavern the other characters periodically meet in. The brothers are emigrants who have returned from Cuba. While they were on the island, they nourished an invincible
nostalgia for Galicia. Now, upon their definitive return, what they intensely miss is the Caribbean land they will never be able to see again. I think it worth reproducing the following beautiful passage from Blanco Amor’s prose:

“The two ‘Maricones’ (I always assumed they were so called because they were both chubby, reddish and somewhat effeminate, not much; more so Isidoro, who had no hair on his chin, for the real name of the tavern and inn was Los Habaneros [The Ones from Havana], due to them having spent a long time in the Island of Cuba) wouldn’t stop lavishing us with the best there was. They fried some trout, they brought out the best wine, they ate with us, and they told some stories (very poorly told) that weren’t new at all but turned out to be funny in the syrupy and boneless dialect of those countries they were in for so long. And they danced the danzón so we could see how it was, though they could barely grab each other because of their big bellies. And Isidoro, who was the youngest, about forty-five (he said thirty-eight, without anyone asking), wanted to also show us the mulattoes’ rumba, so he threw a tablecloth over his back and held it by the ends, and he danced to the beat Juan Manuel (that is, the oldest, about sixty) created with spoons, moving his buttocks and shoulders as if he were itching, his whole forehead sweating. Suddenly, he stopped dancing and sat on a bench, towards the dim part of the shop, and started crying, as one could easily see, with great emotion. Pedro went to fetch him and brought him back with his face against his breast, as if hauling a young lady about to faint. (I assumed that what was happening was that he’d been overcome by memories. I had seen it often happen to ‘Americans’ who had spent the greater and better part of their lives overseas in order to raise money and return to their land forever; and once in the ‘Homeland’ (that for so long they had pronounced in capital letters) they perished with sorrow upon seeing themselves here, considered little nobodies, exposed to mockery; or, when applicable, since ‘so much you have, so much you’re worth’, flattered in order to be ripped off; not being from here or anywhere, outsiders forever and ever, and finding themselves too old to return ‘there’.

– Oh, my precious little Cuba...! (Blanco Amor, 1976: 333-34)

Period 1950-1965

Here we could refer par excellence to the “pessimistic and nostalgic emigrant”. Emigration continued to be promising, albeit more forced and with less alluring possibilities for returning. In the artistic field, the stereotype is very well-represented in the 1958 film El emigrante [The Emigrant], directed by Sebastián Almeida and starring the renowned ballad singer Juanito Valderrama. The film, shot in bright black-and-white and full of shades, was made for the singer to shine, and in it he sang a very well-known refrain, which has since become rooted in Spanish popular song: “Good-bye, dear Spain / deep within my soul / I have you ingrained”
[Adiós España quería / muy dentro del alma / te llevo metía]. The ballad, sung as the ship was leaving the homeland’s coast, expressed the patriotic exaltation common in those Francoist years, while simultaneously granting artistic acknowledgment to the already long-lasting phenomenon of overseas emigration.

Likewise illustrative of this stereotype, albeit with a different type of focus, is the life story Hacer la América [Getting Rich in America], published by sociologist Juan Marsal in 1972, which self-portrays the miserable life of a “loser” – a Catalan traveling photographer who survived with great difficulty in Argentina and Paraguay during the 1950s. This character returned to Spain around 1960 and drafted his own story at the sociologist’s request between 1962 and 1964. In his prologue, Marsal details the particulars of the book’s composition in the following terms:

“Two letters referring to J.S. immediately stood out. One was his, where he asked me to notify him of my visit to the town so that he could meet me at the station or, if I arrived at his house first, to keep it in the strictest confidence. Another, longer letter, was from his brother, his ‘dear and wretched brother’, who, according to him, had been forced to emigrate from Spain by his wife and mother-in-law and was now being punished for the ‘crime of coming back from America sick and penniless’.

I arrived without notice. His daughter received us but disappeared right away. She left me alone with her father in the neat dining-room, which also served as drawing-room. In my footnotes to the interview I noted some characteristics that caught my attention. ‘He is somewhat frightened and exudes great sadness. He speaks as if afraid of being heard’. It was not an idle fancy. In a letter he sent to me in Rosario, he said he hadn’t been able to speak at great length because ‘they’ were listening. He also took the opportunity to say it is a mistake to come back poor.

Through my support he was seeking the social influence that his condition as uprooted loner deprived him of. And there is something even simpler: the human need, as he put it, of ‘communicating with a friendly person’. No one better than him to express it – nor more powerfully –, as he does in a paragraph from one of his early letters, dated around February, 1963: «When I write – he says – it’s as if I were in confidence with someone I trust and I open up completely; it seems to me that thereby I expel the venom that poisons me. So I write and will continue to write what has happened to me, what I felt and what I feel, what I thought and what I think about certain people».

It isn’t hard to imagine the catharsis, the psychological discharge, that writing his troubles meant for this sensitive old man, isolated by his deafness and left out in the cold of his bedroom by his relatives’ disaffection and lack of understanding. And, naturally, the inevitable self-centeredness, one of the characteristics common to all personal documents, also makes his life story, at one and the same time, a naive homage to himself and his idols” (Marsal, 1972: 10-16).
**Period 1965-1975**

We would now be facing the “optimistic emigrant”. As I already mentioned, conditions fostered returning and, moreover, Western Europe’s developed and democratic framework made the migratory juncture less uncertain and more appealing. Before the mid-1970s energy crisis that hit the entire industrialized world, the prospect of saving money and improving one’s life in “Germany” (the emigratory land *par excellence*) prevailed over any other generic image. Of course, no one ignored the harshness of factory jobs, but the ensuing benefits for savings and qualifications were also evident.

Two films stand out in this respect, both starring Alfredo Landa, a very popular actor who throughout the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and even 1990s, has embodied the prototypical Spaniard: from the apoliticism, sexual repression and consumer longings of the 1960s, to the recovery of political awareness in the 1970s, and the normalization and maturing of behavioral standards in the last fifteen years.

The first of these films is *Vente a Alemania, Pepe* [Come to Germany, Pepe], directed by Pedro Lazaga in 1970. This is a conventional farce that creates a caricature-like view of emigration, thus contributing to consolidate the stereotype of the emigrant’s success and loosening of morals. By contrast, the other film is told in “serious” mode. It is the story of a mechanic’s summer weekend trip to Southern Spain, alone on an old motorcycle. We are speaking of Juan Antonio Bardem’s *El puente* [The Bridge], released in 1977. The director, one of the best-known names in Spanish cinematographic critical realism, narrates, in road-movie tone, how the trip’s adventures induce the anonymous anti-hero to gain political awareness and join a labor union (the film was shot in the early days of the democratic transition) upon returning to his Madrid garage. One of the triggers for his transformation is precisely the encounter with an old youth friend who is back in the country on vacation after many years and is now a resident in Germany, a holder of democratic rights and the owner of a brand-new Mercedes. Also present in the film is the incipient Northern-African immigration in Spain: there is a sequence in which a humble family of Moroccan workers crossing Spain on the way to their country is humiliated by a miserable, racist gas-station employee.
Period 1975-2000

This is the quarter-century that has witnessed the change from emigration to immigration. Stereotypes now affect those who come looking for work, often risking their lives by clandestinely crossing the Straits of Gibraltar. They are generally people with little or no qualifications. In the case of Latin American immigrants (who normally arrive by plane, not without difficulty and risking deportation from the very airport), a customary component are women who intend to find employment in domestic service and sometimes end up, often compulsorily, resorting to prostitution. The more or less veiled rejection by a fraction of Spanish society is undeniable and this is why the stereotypes of the *moro* [Moor], the *moreno* [brown], the *negro* [black], or the *puta* [whore] have been created, in order to designate the new settlers in the most vulgar imagery possible.

To continue with cinematographic examples, director Montxo Armendáriz’s film *Las cartas de Alou* [Alou’s Letters] (winner of the First Prize in the San Sebastián International Film Festival the year of its release, 1990), is the one that best portrays the ambivalence generated in contemporary Spanish society by the immigratory phenomenon. The protagonist, an irregular Northern African immigrant played by non-professional actor Mulie Jarju, starts his Spanish adventure in the midst of rejection and contempt. Once in Madrid, he manages to find understanding and even affection in some people who support his being admitted and put him in contact with immigrants’ rights organizations. In the end, Alou is deported to the other side of the Straits, but it is clear that the bonds that now tie him to Spain will make him once again undertake the clandestine passage adventure.

In Spain immigration still doesn’t have the same demographic and political importance as in Germany, France, or the United Kingdom, although its growing weight in public opinion makes it an essential factor when trying to understand the profile of Spain as it crosses to the 21st century.

Between the farewells to emigrants, so often final, by family and friends in the ports of Vigo, Cádiz or Barcelona, and the familiarity with which Spanish city dwellers mingle with people from the five continents in the streets, one hundred critical and definitive years in Spanish history have elapsed. And the leap that goes

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1 There is a variety of such organizations with a religious or political affiliation; others, like SOS Racismo, have European scope and are independent from churches, parties or governments.
from emigration to immigration is certainly one of the most spectacular and striking connecting themes in a process of social change that still remains open to the future.

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