Publication: Explaining stocks and export subsidies in agriculture : the case of wheat
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1996
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Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Decanato
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Este artículo desarrolla un modelo de oligopolio de gobiernos para un mercado mundial de un producto homogéneo. Los mercados nacionales están intervenidos según un patrón inspirado en la PAC: el Gobierno garantiza la compra de todos los excesos de oferta creados a un precio dado y puede subsidiar las exportaciones y almacenar stocks. Se trata de un juego no cooperativo en dos etapas en el que el Gobierno maximiza su Función de Preferencias Políticas, decidiendo primero el precio interno y después el volumen de exportaciones que subsidia. Se demuestra que la decisión de conceder subsidios a la exportación sólo puede ser óptima si el Gobierno tiene preferencias sesgadas en favor de los productores; la decisión de almacenar stocks requiere adicionalmente que el Gobierno disponga de poder de mercado. El modelo puede ayudar a entender el alcance de la reforma de la PAC y de los acuerdos agrícolas del GATT.
A model of Governments Oligopoly in a world market of an homogenous commodity is built. National markets are intervened in a way inspired by the Common Agricultural Policy: Government guarantees the purchase of any excess supply at a given price and it may subsidize exports and store part or all the excess supply. The model develops a non-cooperative two stages game in which Governments maximize their Political Preference Function, deciding first the internal price and then the volume of subsidized exports. It is proof that the decision of subsidizing exports can only be optimal if Government preferences are biased for producers' welfare rather than consumers' and tax-payers'; the storing decision requires in addition the existence of world market power by the Government. The model may help to understand the scope of CAP reform and GATT's agricultural agreement.
A model of Governments Oligopoly in a world market of an homogenous commodity is built. National markets are intervened in a way inspired by the Common Agricultural Policy: Government guarantees the purchase of any excess supply at a given price and it may subsidize exports and store part or all the excess supply. The model develops a non-cooperative two stages game in which Governments maximize their Political Preference Function, deciding first the internal price and then the volume of subsidized exports. It is proof that the decision of subsidizing exports can only be optimal if Government preferences are biased for producers' welfare rather than consumers' and tax-payers'; the storing decision requires in addition the existence of world market power by the Government. The model may help to understand the scope of CAP reform and GATT's agricultural agreement.
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