Publication: El constructivismo social en la ciencia y la tecnología: las consecuencias no previstas de la ambivalencia epistemológica
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2009
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Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
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Abstract
El artículo presenta las principales corrientes y aportaciones del constructivismo social en la ciencia y la tecnología. Reconoce su contribución al ofrecer una imagen de la ciencia como una empresa colectiva y reivindicar una mayor flexibilidad de las interpretaciones y evidencias científico-tecnológicas. Para ello, señala que lo que caracteriza a estas corrientes es un ateísmo o agnosticismo epistemológico. Indica que, paradójicamente, para aprovechar las aportaciones del constructivismo a la ciencia, y también a la ciencia social, es necesario adoptar un compromiso epistemológico que conlleva implicarse en un proceso en el que es preciso ofrecer criterios con los que sea posible reconocer qué evidencia es más robusta o qué métodos y teorías resultan más potentes.
The article summarises the main currents and contributions of constructivist approach in Science and Technology Studies. This approach portrays science as a collective enterprise. It shows that competing claims about nature indicate that techno-scientific evidence is flexible. The paper considers that epistemological agnosticism or atheism of the sociology of science to be a limitation in the constructivist approach. The paper notes that, paradoxically, in order to benefit from the insights of the constructivist approach an epistemological commitment is needed. This commitment requires admitting that it is possible and necessary to know what evidence is more robust, and what methodologies and theories are more powerful.
The article summarises the main currents and contributions of constructivist approach in Science and Technology Studies. This approach portrays science as a collective enterprise. It shows that competing claims about nature indicate that techno-scientific evidence is flexible. The paper considers that epistemological agnosticism or atheism of the sociology of science to be a limitation in the constructivist approach. The paper notes that, paradoxically, in order to benefit from the insights of the constructivist approach an epistemological commitment is needed. This commitment requires admitting that it is possible and necessary to know what evidence is more robust, and what methodologies and theories are more powerful.