Publication: The equalizer and the lexicographical solutions for cooperative fuzzy games: characterization and properties
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2002-02-01
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Elsevier Science Bv
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In this paper we analyze the lexicographical solution for fuzzy TU games, we study its properties and obtain a characterization. The lexicographical solution was introduced by Sakawa and Nishizaki (Fuzzy Sets and Systems 61 (1994) 265-275) as a solution for crisp TU games, and then extended as a value for fuzzy TU games. We approach the problem by means of the close relationship that exists between the lexicographical solution for crisp TU games and the least square nucleolus, a crisp value defined by Ruiz et al. (Internat. J. Game Theory 25 (1996) 113-134). Previously, and also based on this relationship, we axiomatically characterize the equalizer solution for fuzzy TU games. Both values, the equalizer and the lexicographical solutions, are based on the consideration of a measure of dissatisfaction of players rather than coalitions.
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