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Lies and layoffs. Asymmetric information and unemployment equilibrium



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Malowny, John (1987) Lies and layoffs. Asymmetric information and unemployment equilibrium. [ Documentos de Trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales; nº 26, 1987, ISSN: 2255-5471 ]

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Implicit contracts were initially seen as a form of insurance. Workers bought a less variable wage at the expense of a slightly lower average wage. But as long as this idea of implicit contracts persisted, they could do little to explain unemployment. A risk-averse worker is unlikely to buy a steadier wage if it is at the increased risk of losing his job. He might do so if the disutility of labour or the level of unemployment benefit were high enough, but in such cases we are effectively back with the classical version of unemployment.

Item Type:Working Paper or Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:Contratos implícitos, Salario, Desempleo
Subjects:Social sciences > Economics > Labor
Series Name:Documentos de Trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
ID Code:21542
Deposited On:27 May 2013 11:45
Last Modified:21 Apr 2015 09:53

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