Publication: Federalismo fiscal y redistribución regional óptima
Loading...
Files
Official URL
Full text at PDC
Publication Date
1997
Authors
Advisors (or tutors)
Editors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
Citations
Exportar
Abstract
La pérdida de la política monetaria como instrumento de estabilización en el seno de la Unión Monetaria Europea, unida a la existencia de cierta disciplina fiscal, hace necesaria la aparición de algún mecanismo de compensación entre países, como puede ser un sistema de impuestos y tranferencias. En este trabajo se analizan dos mecanismos compensadores diferentes: la aplicación de transferencias intergubernamentales y la aplicación de transferencias interpersonales. El principal resultado obtenido es que la magnitud de las transferencias no dependen del mecanismo aplicado, ni del grado de descentralización. Una simulación para las economías alemana y española, nos permitirá comprobar hasta que punto el establecer una regla de reparto de impuestos entre los distintos niveles de gobierno, es importante a la hora de elegir un mecanismo de compensación y un grado de centralización. Realizaremos el estudio comparando los niveles de bienestar alcanzados en cada escenario.
The treaty for European Monetary Unification entails a complete 1088 of monetary paliey autonorny for individual couotdes. Therefore, it is c1aimed that centralization of some government tasks requires sorne risk-sharing scheme among European states, such as a federal tax-transfer. In this paper we anaIyse two different mechanisrns: a system of intergovernmental transfers versus a system which redistributes to and from individual citizens. We found that transfers do not depend on the mechanism employed nor on the degree of centralizatian. We present sirnulation results for the Spanish and German economies where we find out that the ex-ante distribution rule of taxes is important for choosing the compensatían mechanism and degree of centralization, when this decision is based on the comparison of different welfare levels attainable in each scenario.
The treaty for European Monetary Unification entails a complete 1088 of monetary paliey autonorny for individual couotdes. Therefore, it is c1aimed that centralization of some government tasks requires sorne risk-sharing scheme among European states, such as a federal tax-transfer. In this paper we anaIyse two different mechanisrns: a system of intergovernmental transfers versus a system which redistributes to and from individual citizens. We found that transfers do not depend on the mechanism employed nor on the degree of centralizatian. We present sirnulation results for the Spanish and German economies where we find out that the ex-ante distribution rule of taxes is important for choosing the compensatían mechanism and degree of centralization, when this decision is based on the comparison of different welfare levels attainable in each scenario.
Description
UCM subjects
Unesco subjects
Keywords
Citation
-Bajo, O. y Vegara, D. (1996): "Federalismo fiscal y unión monetaria en Europa". mimeo.
-Bordignon, T., Manasse, P. y Tabellini, G. (1996): "Optimal regional redistribution under asyrnmetric information", Discussion paper series, nº 7/96, CEPR.
-Bradley, J., Herce, J. A. Y Modesto, L. (1995): "The macroeconomic effects ofthe CSF 1994-99 in the EU periphery. An analysis based in the HERMIN model" Economic Modelling voL 12, nº 3, pp, 323-333.
-de Miguel, C. y Sosvilla-Rivero, S. (1996): Efectos de políticas macroeconómicas en una unión monetaria con distintos grados de rigidez salarial", Documento de trabajo 96-07, FEDEA.
-Sala-i-Martin, X. y Sachs, J. (1992): "Fiscal federalism and optimum currency areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States", en M. Canzoneri, V. Grilli y P. Masson (eds): "Establishing a central bank: Issues in Enrone and lessons from the US" , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 195-219.
-Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (1996a): "Federal fiscal constitutions: Risk sharing and moral hazard", Econométrica, vol 64 nº 3 (Mayo 1996), 623-646.
-Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (1996b): "Federal fiscal constitutions: Risk sharing and redistribution", Journal of Political Economy, vol 104 n05, 979-1009.
-Von Hagen, J. (1992): "Fiscal arrangements in a monetary union: Evidence from the US" en D. Fair y C. de Boissieu (eds): Fiscal policy, taxation and the financial system in an increasingly integrated Europe, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 337-359.