Publication: Monetary policy with private information: a role for monetary targets
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1993
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Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
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Abstract
This paper examines the optimal design of a set of legislative rules which balances credibility in monetary policy when the central banker has some private information. The main result is that the best legislative package should include a monetary target set by Congress, a targeting horizon consisting of one period of time and a small punishment on the central banker if it deviates
from the target. Moreover, it is shown that both the discretionary and the average targeting approaches to monetary policy are nested into our more comprehensive approach.
Este artículo examina el diseño óptimo de un paquete legislativo que equilibre credibilidad y flexibilidad en la política monetaria cuando el banco central dispone de información privada. El principal resultado es que tal paquete debería incluir un objetivo monetario fijado por el poder legislativo, un anuncio del objetivo para un único periodo de tiempo y una pequeña penalización sobre el banco central si se desvía del objetivo. Además, se muestra que nuestro enfoque engloba tanto políticas monetarias discrecionales como políticas basadas en objetivos medios.
Este artículo examina el diseño óptimo de un paquete legislativo que equilibre credibilidad y flexibilidad en la política monetaria cuando el banco central dispone de información privada. El principal resultado es que tal paquete debería incluir un objetivo monetario fijado por el poder legislativo, un anuncio del objetivo para un único periodo de tiempo y una pequeña penalización sobre el banco central si se desvía del objetivo. Además, se muestra que nuestro enfoque engloba tanto políticas monetarias discrecionales como políticas basadas en objetivos medios.
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