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Keynes´s Approach to Macroeconomic Modelling: a Popperian Reconstruction

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2015-11
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We review Keynes´s attempt to deal with the `problem of induction´ since his Treatise on Probability and then argue that Popper´s `solution´ to the former, known as Popper´s evolutionary of knowledge and learning, is compatible with Keynes´s adoption of a conventional theory of knowledge in his later economic writings. We also argue that Keynes´s macro-theory as it appears in both his General Theory and his 1937 QJE paper can be (re)interpreted as an instance of a reformulated version of the `subjectivist´ version of Popper´s `Rationality Principle´ (RPs) according to which agents´ behaviour is appropriate or adequate to the problem-situation as the theorist believes that agents believe the former is. A number of further results follow from the previous arguments.
Repasamos el intento de Keynes de abordar el "problema de la inducción" en su Treatise on Probability y señalamos que la solución propuesta por Popper al mismo, conocido como la teoría popperiana del conocimiento y el aprendizaje es compatible con la adopción por parte de Keynes de una teoría convencionalista del conocimiento en su última etapa. También señalamos que la Teoría General y su artículo del año 1937 en el QJE pueden ser interpretados como un caso concreto de la versión `subjetivista´ del "Principio de Racionalidad" Popperiano, de acuerdo con el cual el comportamiento de los agentes económicos es adecuado al problema-situación tal y como el modelizador cree que los agentes perciben este último. De esta interpretación obtenemos una serie de resultados adicionales.
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