Publication: Coase sobre China: otra vuelta a los derechos de propiedad y los costes de transacción
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2014
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Generalmente se presenta el teorema de Coase en su forma reducida, que parte del cuestionable supuesto de que los costes de transacción pueden ser nulos y que la distribución del beneficio de los acuerdos no afecta al resultado. Pero la evolución de China después de Mao parece haberse ajustado a lo predicho por el teorema de Coase pese a que los derechos de propiedad no estaban definidos previamente y a que los efectos distributivos de las reformas hayan sido cuantiosos. La experiencia del capitalismo chino exige una redefinición del teorema de Coase sobre la base de un modelo estructural formulado en términos dinámicos.
The Coase theorem is usually presented in a reduced form that makes the questionable assumption that transaction costs can be zero. It also overlooks the effects of sharing the benefit obtained by cooperative agreements. Actually, in post-Mao China Coase’s theorem unexpectedly worked in the most fluid of situation although property rights were in the making and benefits accrued were large. The experience of Chinese capitalism demands a recasting of the Coase theorem to make it less static and more powerful than it appears in the usual static reduce form.
The Coase theorem is usually presented in a reduced form that makes the questionable assumption that transaction costs can be zero. It also overlooks the effects of sharing the benefit obtained by cooperative agreements. Actually, in post-Mao China Coase’s theorem unexpectedly worked in the most fluid of situation although property rights were in the making and benefits accrued were large. The experience of Chinese capitalism demands a recasting of the Coase theorem to make it less static and more powerful than it appears in the usual static reduce form.
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