Publication: Parlamento, norma jurídica y jurisdicción constitucional en el pensamiento de Kelsen desde el punto de vista de la neutralidad
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2016-08-16
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
El presente trabajo estudia la obra de Kelsen respecto al parlamento, la norma jurídica y, la jurisdicción constitucional. El análisis del objeto de investigación se realiza destacando la neutralidad en el pensamiento de Kelsen, lo cual es propio de una teoría científica del derecho, que no de la moral, la política o, la ética. Se sostiene que Kelsen asume la defensa de la democracia en base a los valores de libertad e igualdad, aunque no con el objeto de instaurar un modelo político o, desde la defensa de un poder político. Del mismo modo, la teoría normativa de Kelsen ha sido desarrollada desde una perspectiva general, no busca adecuarse a un sistema legal, ni dice lo que es el derecho o, cuál debe ser el contenido material del derecho. No prescribe, sólo describe. En igual sentido, la doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional como legislador negativo se sintetiza en verificar la conformidad de la norma con la Constitución, y no en evaluar el contenido material de la norma general. Antes de abordar los postulados antes mencionados se ha considerado conveniente estudiar de modo preliminar la valoración y la neutralidad en Kelsen para entender en qué grado la teoría pura del derecho es neutral destacando dicho componente en los apartados propuestos con el objeto de responder a otra pregunta mayor referida a la utilidad de una teoría neutral y relativista en una sociedad diversa y cambiante. Kelsen admite la inevitabilidad de la valoración en el derecho y en la política en contraposición al valor neutro desarrollado en la teoría pura del derecho y en toda su doctrina. Ciertamente, la teoría pura del derecho prescinde de toda ideología; es decir, de aprobar o desaprobar su objeto de estudio o, de evaluar o justificar por medio de la ciencia del derecho una determinada idea de justicia, moral, política, etc. Sin embargo, considero que a través de toda su doctrina persigue valores comunes como la paz, la libertad, la igualdad, la justicia y la felicidad colectiva.
The general aim of this work is to study Kelsen’s doctrine on parliament, legal norms and constitutional jurisdiction. The analysis of the object of research is made by emphasizing the neutrality in Kelsen, which is usual for a scientific theory of law but not in the field of morality, politics or ethics. I argue that Kelsen assumes the defense of democracy based on the values of freedom and equality but not with the object of establishing a political model or from a defense of a political power. Similarly, Kelsen’s normative theory has been developed from a general perspective. It does not seek to conform to a determinate legal system and neither does it state what law is or what should be the material content of the law. The pure theory does not prescribe but only describes the law. In the same way, the doctrine of the constitutional court as a negative legislator responds to the need to maintain the supremacy of the constitution when it might be affected by the irregular action of the parliament, that is, to verify conformity of the norm with the constitution but not to evaluate the material content of the norm. Before tackling the postulates above mentioned, it was considered advisable to study the value and the neutrality in Kelsen’s doctrine in order to understand to what extent the pure theory of law is neutral, emphasizing the neutral component in the subjects cited above in order to address another major question about the usefulness of a neutral and relativistic theory in a diverse and changing society. Kelsen admits the inevitability of evaluation in law and in politics in contrast to the neutral value developed in pure law theory and in his theory. Certainly, the pure theory of law avoids ideology in general, that is, it does not approve or disapprove its subject matter or evaluating or justifying through the science of law a certain idea of justice, morality, politics, etc. However, I think that his whole doctrine pursues common values such as peace, freedom, equality, justice and collective happiness.
The general aim of this work is to study Kelsen’s doctrine on parliament, legal norms and constitutional jurisdiction. The analysis of the object of research is made by emphasizing the neutrality in Kelsen, which is usual for a scientific theory of law but not in the field of morality, politics or ethics. I argue that Kelsen assumes the defense of democracy based on the values of freedom and equality but not with the object of establishing a political model or from a defense of a political power. Similarly, Kelsen’s normative theory has been developed from a general perspective. It does not seek to conform to a determinate legal system and neither does it state what law is or what should be the material content of the law. The pure theory does not prescribe but only describes the law. In the same way, the doctrine of the constitutional court as a negative legislator responds to the need to maintain the supremacy of the constitution when it might be affected by the irregular action of the parliament, that is, to verify conformity of the norm with the constitution but not to evaluate the material content of the norm. Before tackling the postulates above mentioned, it was considered advisable to study the value and the neutrality in Kelsen’s doctrine in order to understand to what extent the pure theory of law is neutral, emphasizing the neutral component in the subjects cited above in order to address another major question about the usefulness of a neutral and relativistic theory in a diverse and changing society. Kelsen admits the inevitability of evaluation in law and in politics in contrast to the neutral value developed in pure law theory and in his theory. Certainly, the pure theory of law avoids ideology in general, that is, it does not approve or disapprove its subject matter or evaluating or justifying through the science of law a certain idea of justice, morality, politics, etc. However, I think that his whole doctrine pursues common values such as peace, freedom, equality, justice and collective happiness.
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Derecho, Departamento de Derecho Constitucional, leída el 28-01-2016