Publication: Entre iusnaturalismo y positivismo: John Finnis
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2016-10-24
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
John Finnis, de origen australiano; culminó su formación académica y se desempeñó como profesor en Oxford. Absorbió la filosofía analítica, vigente en el ambiente intelectual y universitario del mundo anglosajón en la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Ante la inquietud de encontrar un fundamento más sólido a los derechos naturales, dentro de la concepción positivista, L.H.A Hart pidió a Finnis que escribiera sobre la ley natural y los derechos naturales. Finnis había realizado su tesis doctoral bajo la dirección de Hart. Después de diez años, en 1980, Finnis publica Natural Law and Natural Rights. Es una obra densa, dirigida principalmente a los teóricos del derecho que ya percibían la insuficiencia del iuspositivismo pero que seguían considerando que las teorías iusnaturalistas carecían de recursos para explicar válidamente el derecho. En Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis demuestra lo contrario: que la respuesta adecuada está precisamente en el iusnaturalismo, pero en un iusnaturalismo que ahonda sus raíces en la doctrina de Tomás de Aquino, y no en las concepciones e interpretaciones, a veces, arbitrarias que la escolástico hizo de él. Finnis parte, como lo hacen todos sus contemporáneos, de una perspectiva positivista. Determina a las leyes vigentes como el objeto de su estudio. Pero descubre que ni la sanción, ni la presión social, ni la costumbre u otros motivos aducidos por el positivismo son razones suficientes para que una persona cumpla y observe las disposiciones legales. Lo único que explica cabalmente el cumplimiento de una ley es la racionalidad que ésta implica en razón del bien común. En el análisis de esa racionalidad, Finnis establece: primero, que hay bienes evidentes, en el sentido de que no requieren de ninguna comprobación adicional o más fundamental; que la razón exige que sean actualizados para que la persona se realice. Esos bienes fundamentales (formas básicas en la terminología finnisiana) son: la vida, el conocimiento, el juego, la amistad, la experiencia estética, la razonabilidad práctica y la religión. Lo segundo que Finnis afirma, es que cada uno escoge, como proyecto de vida, uno de estos bienes. Por lo tanto, todas las decisiones en la vida estarán conformadas por esa opción de vida que cada uno ha escogido. No existe primacía de una forma básica sobre otra. No hay jerarquía de valores. La prioridad la da el sujeto, al optar por una de ellas...
John Finnis, who was born in Australia, culminated his studies and became a professor at Oxford. He became familiar with the analytic philosophy that was pervasive in the intellectual and academic milieu of the English speaking countries during the second half of the Twentieth Century. In the quest to find a sounder basis for natural rights within the positivist conception, L.H.A. Hart asked Finnis to write on natural law and natural rights. Finnis had written his doctoral thesis under Hart’s guidance. After ten years had gone by, Finnis published his book, Natural Law and Natural Rights in 1980. This was a dense work, directed mainly to law scholars who already perceived the insufficiency of legal positivism but who, however, still considered that jus naturalist theories lacked the resources to validly explain the law. In Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis demonstrates the opposite: that the adequate response lies precisely in jus naturalism, but in a jus naturalism that is deeply rooted in the doctrine of Saint Thomas Aquinas, and not in the sometimes arbitrary scholastic interpretations and conceptions of his doctrine. Finnis begins his analysis, as all his contemporaries did, from a positivist perspective, and makes the laws in force the object of his inquiry. However, he finds that neither sanctions, nor social pressure, nor customs nor other motives claimed by positivism constitute sufficient reasons for a person to comply with and adhere to the law. The only reason that fully explains compliance with the law is its implied rationality by reason of the common good. In analyzing this rationality, Finnis first establishes that there are goods that are evident, in the sense that these do not require any ulterior or more fundamental proof; which reason demands should materialize for personal self-realization. These basic goods (basic forms In Finnisian terminology) are: life, knowledge, play, friendship, the aesthetic experience, practical reasonableness and religion. Finnis then asserts that each individual chooses one of these basic goods as his or her life goal. Consequently, all of one’s life decisions shall be shaped by the life option each person has chosen. There is no primacy of one basic form over another. There is no value hierarchy. Priority is determined by the individual when opting for one of them...
John Finnis, who was born in Australia, culminated his studies and became a professor at Oxford. He became familiar with the analytic philosophy that was pervasive in the intellectual and academic milieu of the English speaking countries during the second half of the Twentieth Century. In the quest to find a sounder basis for natural rights within the positivist conception, L.H.A. Hart asked Finnis to write on natural law and natural rights. Finnis had written his doctoral thesis under Hart’s guidance. After ten years had gone by, Finnis published his book, Natural Law and Natural Rights in 1980. This was a dense work, directed mainly to law scholars who already perceived the insufficiency of legal positivism but who, however, still considered that jus naturalist theories lacked the resources to validly explain the law. In Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis demonstrates the opposite: that the adequate response lies precisely in jus naturalism, but in a jus naturalism that is deeply rooted in the doctrine of Saint Thomas Aquinas, and not in the sometimes arbitrary scholastic interpretations and conceptions of his doctrine. Finnis begins his analysis, as all his contemporaries did, from a positivist perspective, and makes the laws in force the object of his inquiry. However, he finds that neither sanctions, nor social pressure, nor customs nor other motives claimed by positivism constitute sufficient reasons for a person to comply with and adhere to the law. The only reason that fully explains compliance with the law is its implied rationality by reason of the common good. In analyzing this rationality, Finnis first establishes that there are goods that are evident, in the sense that these do not require any ulterior or more fundamental proof; which reason demands should materialize for personal self-realization. These basic goods (basic forms In Finnisian terminology) are: life, knowledge, play, friendship, the aesthetic experience, practical reasonableness and religion. Finnis then asserts that each individual chooses one of these basic goods as his or her life goal. Consequently, all of one’s life decisions shall be shaped by the life option each person has chosen. There is no primacy of one basic form over another. There is no value hierarchy. Priority is determined by the individual when opting for one of them...
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Derecho, Departamento de Derecho Penal, leída el 20/11/2015