Publication: La paradoja institucional china: ¿desarrollo con instituciones heterodoxas? : propuesta metodológica para un análisis de arraigamiento "Northiano" del desarrollo
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2018-01-24
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
China, desde que inicia sus reformas en 1978, sostiene elevadas tasas de crecimiento en ausencia de las instituciones que según la corriente principal de la Teoría Económica del Desarrollo (TED) son necesarias para ello. Esto es, en ausencia de una gobernanza política que está regulada por un Estado de derecho, se orienta al bienestar general y protege de modo creíble los derechos de propiedad. El objetivo principal de investigación aplicada de esta tesis —titulada la Paradoja Institucional China. ¿Desarrollo con instituciones heterodoxas? Propuesta metodológica para un análisis de arraigamiento northiano del desarrollo— es, por tanto, esclarecer la Paradoja Institucional China (PIC), esto es, cómo China logra ese alto crecimiento con unas instituciones aparentemente inadecuadas. El tratamiento de ese objetivo de investigación aplicada obliga a abordar dos objetivos teóricometodológicos. Primero, una cuestión central para la TED: ¿de qué modo se genera un compromiso reformista que, resultando creíble a los agentes institucionales, induce altas tasas de inversión privada y de crecimiento inclusivo? Segundo, puesto que China lo logra siendo una autocracia en la que la élite del Partido-Estado dispone de un poder excepcional que no está sujeto a contrapesos externos, su éxito desarrollista es evidencia de que hay algo fundamental en las instituciones chinas que nuestra mirada occidental no ve, como pone de relieve la penalización que sufre China en los principales índices de calidad institucional. Esto sitúa a la Nueva Economía Institucional (NEI) delante de su principal limitación teórica: ¿cómo superar el simplismo del monocultivo institucional para arrojar luz respecto de la equifinalidad institucional? O lo que es lo mismo: ¿qué relación causal existe entre las formas institucionales culturalmente arraigadas y los resultados universales que se requieren para alcanzar un determinado estadio de desarrollo?...
Since the beginning of the reforms in 1978, China has sustained high rates of economic growth in the absence of the institutions that are deemed necessary for it according to mainstream Development Economics. That is, without a governance that, subject to the rule of law, is oriented towards the general welfare and offers credible protection of property rights. The main objective of applied research of this thesis —titled China's Institutional Paradox. Development with heterodox institutions? A methodological approach for an Northian embeddedness analysis of development— is to solve this apparent paradox. To solve this paradox, two theoretical-methodological issues need to be addressed. First, a central issue related to the crux of the Theory of Economics Development (TED): how does it a commitment to reforms emerge that, being credible to institutional agents, can induce high rates of private investment and inclusive growth? Second, as China is an autocratic regime with a Party- State that exercises an exceptional power not subject to external checks and balances, its developmental success shows that there is something fundamental that gets lost in the way that most Western analysts regard Chinese institutions, as evidenced by the poor scores that China obtains in the most widely used institutional quality indices. This places the New Institutional Economy (NIE) in front of its main theoretical limitation: how to overcome the reduccionist view implicit in institutional monocropping in order to shed light on the question of institutional equifinality? In other words: what is the causal relationship between culturally embedded, and thus idiosyncratic, institutional forms and the universal results required to reach a certain stage of development?...
Since the beginning of the reforms in 1978, China has sustained high rates of economic growth in the absence of the institutions that are deemed necessary for it according to mainstream Development Economics. That is, without a governance that, subject to the rule of law, is oriented towards the general welfare and offers credible protection of property rights. The main objective of applied research of this thesis —titled China's Institutional Paradox. Development with heterodox institutions? A methodological approach for an Northian embeddedness analysis of development— is to solve this apparent paradox. To solve this paradox, two theoretical-methodological issues need to be addressed. First, a central issue related to the crux of the Theory of Economics Development (TED): how does it a commitment to reforms emerge that, being credible to institutional agents, can induce high rates of private investment and inclusive growth? Second, as China is an autocratic regime with a Party- State that exercises an exceptional power not subject to external checks and balances, its developmental success shows that there is something fundamental that gets lost in the way that most Western analysts regard Chinese institutions, as evidenced by the poor scores that China obtains in the most widely used institutional quality indices. This places the New Institutional Economy (NIE) in front of its main theoretical limitation: how to overcome the reduccionist view implicit in institutional monocropping in order to shed light on the question of institutional equifinality? In other words: what is the causal relationship between culturally embedded, and thus idiosyncratic, institutional forms and the universal results required to reach a certain stage of development?...
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Departamento de Economía Aplicada I (Economía Internacional y Desarrollo), leída el 15-09-2017