Publication: De Husserl a Wittgenstein: una crítica filosófico-gramatical del método fenomenológico
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2019-06-07
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
1. Introducción. Esta investigación tiene como objetivo principal exponer y criticar los presupuestos fundamentales que subyacen al método fenomenológico, tal y como es concebido por Husserl. Para ello nos serviremos del método filosófico-gramatical que Wittgenstein propone en sus Investigaciones filosóficas. Nuestro propósito, por tanto, no es comparar el pensamiento de estos dos grandes filósofos del siglo XX, sino hacer uso de los logros filosóficos de Wittgenstein para criticar los presupuestos del método fenomenológico de Husserl. 2. Objetivos y resultados. En la primera parte de este trabajo introduciremos los elementos centrales y los presupuestos principales del método fenomenológico. Nuestro punto de partida será la presentación que de este método hace Husserl en sus Investigaciones lógicas. Antes de nada, estudiaremos cómo llegó a adoptar y adaptar el método psicológico-descriptivo de Brentano con el objetivo de aclarar la naturaleza de nuestro conocimiento lógico. Nuestro siguiente paso será examinar los elementos fundamentales del método que propone Husserl en la introducción a sus seis investigaciones lógicas. El resto de la primera parte estará dedicada al estudio de estos elementos y de sus presupuestos filosóficos...
1. Introduction. This investigation has as its main goal to expose and critically discuss the fundamental assumptions of the phenomenological method, as conceived by Husserl. As a means to this end, we will make use of the philosophico-grammatical method outlined by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. Our aim is not, however, to compare the thought of these two central figures of twentieth century philosophy, but to make use of Wittgenstein’s philosophical insights to offer a critique of the presuppositions of Husserl’s phenomenological method. 2. Objectives and results. In the first part of this investigation, we will introduce the central elements of the phenomenological method and the main assumptions that underpin it. Our point of departure will be Husserl’s presentation of the phenomenological method in his Logical Investigations. Firstly, we will investigate how he adapted Brentano’s psychological descriptive method to clarify the nature of our logical knowledge. Our next step will be to examine the phenomenological method as it is first presented in the introduction of the six logical investigations in order to identify its core elements. The rest of this part will be devoted to study each of these elements...
1. Introduction. This investigation has as its main goal to expose and critically discuss the fundamental assumptions of the phenomenological method, as conceived by Husserl. As a means to this end, we will make use of the philosophico-grammatical method outlined by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. Our aim is not, however, to compare the thought of these two central figures of twentieth century philosophy, but to make use of Wittgenstein’s philosophical insights to offer a critique of the presuppositions of Husserl’s phenomenological method. 2. Objectives and results. In the first part of this investigation, we will introduce the central elements of the phenomenological method and the main assumptions that underpin it. Our point of departure will be Husserl’s presentation of the phenomenological method in his Logical Investigations. Firstly, we will investigate how he adapted Brentano’s psychological descriptive method to clarify the nature of our logical knowledge. Our next step will be to examine the phenomenological method as it is first presented in the introduction of the six logical investigations in order to identify its core elements. The rest of this part will be devoted to study each of these elements...
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Tesis de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Filosofía, leída el 14-12-2018