Publication: Fundamentación crítica -desde Zubiri- de la aproximación ecológica de J.J. Gibson a la psicología de la percepción
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2019-07-31
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Se trata de un nuevo enfoque o aproximación, no sólo a la percepción, sino a la psicología. Como dice Edward Reed, científico y filósofo, Gibson supone una revolución en la ciencia. Fodor y Pylyshyn negaron en los 80 que fuera a haber un cambio de paradigma gibsoniano en ciencias cognitivas. Gibson dijo que la psicología experimental estaba llena de contradicciones, y que la mayoría de sus autores sólo manejan una pequeña parte de las evidencias, y renuncian a teorizar. Él, sin embargo, cree que la filosofía es buena para el debate teórico. Como Galileo, Darwin, y otros antes que él, no dialoga hacia su nueva posición, sino desde ella. En esta revolución la articulación filosofía-ciencia es decisiva. Si Gibson quizás no fue del todo consciente que lo nuclear de sus nuevas posiciones era filosófico, aunque dentro de un contexto científico, sí dijo explícitamente que su teoría no descansaba sobre sí misma, sino que necesitaba apoyarse en una teoría de la cognición en general. Como instrumentos del destino -permítasenos la licencia estilística- traemos aquí a Zubiri para prestar la ayuda que Gibson sabía que necesitaba. Lo básico de la revolución gibsoniana consiste en la superación del modelo gestáltico-cognitivo, de raíces kantianas, hoy incuestionado en percepción y en ciencia, en general. Para Gibson la percepción es directa, no mediada por ningún tipo de imágenes o representaciones mentales. En “The Perception of the Visual World” Gibson, que trabajó como psicólogo de la fuerza aérea estadounidense, supo que el espacio del piloto no se determina por el aire por el que vuela, sino por el terreno y el horizonte: fue la revolución en percepción espacial. En “The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems” Gibson critica las teorías de la percepción basadas en la sensación, o “las operaciones de la mente sobre las entregas de los sentidos”, e inicia su enfoque ecológico, definido como “el nivel del animal”. “The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception” es su obra madura y definitiva. Destaca su concepto de “affordances”, restricciones o posibilidades físicas para la acción, presentes en la estimulación, pero con referencia al animal. Los sentidos “salen afuera” y captan directamente los “invariantes de estructura óptica” presentes en los affordances. Nuestros centros nerviosos superiores simplemente resuenan al captar la información.Gibson supera la lógica “proyectiva-transmitente” y conceptúa según una lógica de la “simultaneidad de campo”1. En “la mutualidad entre el animal y su ambiente” se supera el sentido especial propioceptivo porque toda percepción se co-percibe a sí misma: se superan los problemas de la percepción del yo, y las percepciones de los affordances son el fundamento de la motivación...
It is a new approach, not only to perception, but to psychology. As scientist and philosopher Edward Reed says, Gibson involves a revolution in science. Fodor and Pylyshyn denied in the 1980s that there would be a Gibsonian change of paradigm in cognitive science. Gibson said that experimental psychology was full of contradictions, and that most of its authors only handle a small part of the evidence, and renounce theorizing. He, however, believes that philosophy is good for theoretical debate. “Like Galileo, Darwin, and others before him, assumes his new standpoint and argues from the new position, not towards it”1. In this revolution, the philosophy-science articulation is decisive. If Gibson perhaps was not fully aware that the nuclear of his new positions was philosophical, although within a scientific context, he did say explicitly that his theory did not rest on itself, but needed to rely on a theory of cognition in general. As instruments of destiny-allow us the stylistic license-we bring Zubiri here to lend the help that Gibson knew he needed. The basics of the Gibsonian revolution consist of the overcoming of the gestalt-cognitive model, of Kantian roots, today unquestioned in perception, and in science in general. For Gibson, the perception is direct, not mediated by any type of images or mental representations. In “The Perception of the Visual World” Gibson, who worked as a psychologist for the US Air Force, knew that the space of the pilot is not determined by the air he flies, but by the terrain and the horizon: it was the revolution in spatial perception. In “The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems” Gibson criticizes theories of perception based on sensation, or “the operations of the mind on the deliveries of the senses”, and initiates its ecological approach, defined as “the level of the animal”. “The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception” is his mature and definitive work. Highlights its concept of “affordances”, restrictions or physical possibilities for action, present in the stimulation, but with reference to the animal. The senses “come out” and directly capture the “invariants of optical structure” present in the affordances. Our higher nerve centers simply resonate when they capture information. Gibson surmounts the “projective-transmitting” logic and conceptualizes according to a logic of “field simultaneity”. In “the mutuality between the animal and its environment” the special proprioceptive sense is surmounted, because all perception is co-perceived by itself: the problems of the perception of the self are overcome, and the perceptions of the affordances become the foundation of motivation...
It is a new approach, not only to perception, but to psychology. As scientist and philosopher Edward Reed says, Gibson involves a revolution in science. Fodor and Pylyshyn denied in the 1980s that there would be a Gibsonian change of paradigm in cognitive science. Gibson said that experimental psychology was full of contradictions, and that most of its authors only handle a small part of the evidence, and renounce theorizing. He, however, believes that philosophy is good for theoretical debate. “Like Galileo, Darwin, and others before him, assumes his new standpoint and argues from the new position, not towards it”1. In this revolution, the philosophy-science articulation is decisive. If Gibson perhaps was not fully aware that the nuclear of his new positions was philosophical, although within a scientific context, he did say explicitly that his theory did not rest on itself, but needed to rely on a theory of cognition in general. As instruments of destiny-allow us the stylistic license-we bring Zubiri here to lend the help that Gibson knew he needed. The basics of the Gibsonian revolution consist of the overcoming of the gestalt-cognitive model, of Kantian roots, today unquestioned in perception, and in science in general. For Gibson, the perception is direct, not mediated by any type of images or mental representations. In “The Perception of the Visual World” Gibson, who worked as a psychologist for the US Air Force, knew that the space of the pilot is not determined by the air he flies, but by the terrain and the horizon: it was the revolution in spatial perception. In “The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems” Gibson criticizes theories of perception based on sensation, or “the operations of the mind on the deliveries of the senses”, and initiates its ecological approach, defined as “the level of the animal”. “The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception” is his mature and definitive work. Highlights its concept of “affordances”, restrictions or physical possibilities for action, present in the stimulation, but with reference to the animal. The senses “come out” and directly capture the “invariants of optical structure” present in the affordances. Our higher nerve centers simply resonate when they capture information. Gibson surmounts the “projective-transmitting” logic and conceptualizes according to a logic of “field simultaneity”. In “the mutuality between the animal and its environment” the special proprioceptive sense is surmounted, because all perception is co-perceived by itself: the problems of the perception of the self are overcome, and the perceptions of the affordances become the foundation of motivation...
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Tesis de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Filosofía, leída el 04/04/2019