Publication: Análisis jurisprudencial del art. 400 LEC: interpretación de la regla de preclusión en relación con la institución de la cosa juzgada
Loading...
Official URL
Full text at PDC
Publication Date
2020-01-22
Authors
Advisors (or tutors)
Editors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Citations
Exportar
Abstract
El presente trabajo analiza cómo ha ido evolucionando la interpretación jurisprudencial del artículo 400 LEC, relativo a la preclusión de la alegación de hechos y fundamentos jurídicos, en relación con la cosa juzgada. Los problemas en la interpretación del alcance del principio de preclusión han dado lugar a dos corrientes interpretativas: restrictiva y extensiva. La primera entiende que la preclusión se refiere a las diversas causas de pedir en que pudo fundarse el petitum y la segunda sostiene que, además, comprende aquello que pudiendo ser pedido o pretendido no lo fue.
This work analyzes how it has evolved the jurisprudential interpretation of the article 400 LEC, on the preclusion of the allegation of facts and legal grounds, in relation to the res judicata. Problems in the interpretation of the scope of the preclusion principle have given rise to two interpretative currents: restrictive and extensive. The first understands that the preclusion refers to the various causes of action on which the petitum could be based and the second argues that, in addition, it comprises what could be requested or intended was not.
This work analyzes how it has evolved the jurisprudential interpretation of the article 400 LEC, on the preclusion of the allegation of facts and legal grounds, in relation to the res judicata. Problems in the interpretation of the scope of the preclusion principle have given rise to two interpretative currents: restrictive and extensive. The first understands that the preclusion refers to the various causes of action on which the petitum could be based and the second argues that, in addition, it comprises what could be requested or intended was not.