Publication: El efecto de los factores institucionales en el gobierno corporativo: implicaciones para la inversión transfronteriza
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2020-03-26
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
La protección del inversor está condicionada por la estructura de propiedad de la empresa y por el marco institucional del país en que esté basada. La atomización de la propiedad en las compañías cotizadas hace general el conflicto de interés entre directivos y accionistas, pero las empresas con un accionista de control se enfrentan a un segundo conflicto: los accionistas de control pueden abusar de su posición en detrimento del inversor minorista. En los países de derecho anglosajón, la dispersión de la propiedad raramente permite representación en el consejo a los inversores, pero el sistema legal facilita una notable protección al inversor. Por contra, los países con tradición civilista tienen un sistema de protección del inversor comparativamente más débil y las empresas frecuentemente tienen uno o varios accionistas relevantes que pueden controlar al equipo directivo de una manera efectiva (La-Porta et al.,1999)...
Investor protection depends on the firm ownership structure and the institutional framework of the country where the firm is based. Diffusion of ownership in public firms extends to all companies the potential conflict between managers and shareholders, but firms with a controlling shareholder face a second conflict: controlling shareholders may abuse their position in detriment to minority investors. In common law countries, dispersed ownership seldom allows investors to be represented in the board, but the legal system provides remarkable investor protection. In contrast, Civil Law countries have a relatively weak legal system of investor protection and firms usually have one or several relevant shareholders that can effectively control management (La-Porta et al., 1999).In this thesis we identify corporate governance mechanisms relevant to attract foreign investment, paying attention to the contribution of foreign directors to the overcoming of the home bias effect. We compare the effectiveness of board of director composition across countries to attract investors and increase firm value, considering the relative power of the main shareholders at each firm. Lastly we investigate the impact of ownership structure on firm value, and its relationship with the most widely used corporate governance mechanism: the presence of independent directors...
Investor protection depends on the firm ownership structure and the institutional framework of the country where the firm is based. Diffusion of ownership in public firms extends to all companies the potential conflict between managers and shareholders, but firms with a controlling shareholder face a second conflict: controlling shareholders may abuse their position in detriment to minority investors. In common law countries, dispersed ownership seldom allows investors to be represented in the board, but the legal system provides remarkable investor protection. In contrast, Civil Law countries have a relatively weak legal system of investor protection and firms usually have one or several relevant shareholders that can effectively control management (La-Porta et al., 1999).In this thesis we identify corporate governance mechanisms relevant to attract foreign investment, paying attention to the contribution of foreign directors to the overcoming of the home bias effect. We compare the effectiveness of board of director composition across countries to attract investors and increase firm value, considering the relative power of the main shareholders at each firm. Lastly we investigate the impact of ownership structure on firm value, and its relationship with the most widely used corporate governance mechanism: the presence of independent directors...
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, leída el 31-10-2019