Publication: ¿Cómo mide el riesgo el observador imparcial?
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2015-04
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Teira, David
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
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Abstract
Exploramos aquí la conexión entre los conceptos de riesgo e igualdad en el argumento del observador imparcial. La concepción de la justicia que elegiría un observador imparcial se justifica por la pureza del procedimiento de elección. Sin embargo, si modelizamos esta decisión utilizando medidas del riesgo habituales en matemática financiera, veremos cómo el criterio de elección del observador bajo el velo de la ignorancia contiene una preferencia implícita por el grado de desigualdad resultante. Esto nos obliga a reconsiderar la pureza procedimental de la elección.
We study the link between the concepts of risk and equality in the argument of the impartial observer. The conception of justice that this latter would choose is grounded on the purity of the choice procedure. However, if we model this choice using the standard risk measurements in mathematical finance, there is an implicit preference for the degree of inequality that the chosen outcome will yield. This should make us reconsider the neutrality of the impartial observer's proceduralism.
We study the link between the concepts of risk and equality in the argument of the impartial observer. The conception of justice that this latter would choose is grounded on the purity of the choice procedure. However, if we model this choice using the standard risk measurements in mathematical finance, there is an implicit preference for the degree of inequality that the chosen outcome will yield. This should make us reconsider the neutrality of the impartial observer's proceduralism.
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Los autores quieren agradecer los comentarios de A. Faik Kurtulmus, P.-Ch. Pradier y dos evaluadores anónimos.
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