

***On, Off or Stand By? The EU, its policies and domestic
political competition in Italy and Spain (1983-2006)***

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FIRST DRAFT

Introduction

The organisational, institutional and political development of the European Union (EU) has implied a major change in domestic politics. While the Union objectives were just the long-term development of a common market but with just few policy competences, the EU arena was not so relevant for domestic policies and parties. But since the 1980s with the Single European Act and especially the Maastricht treaty and the development of the political Union, the growing relevance of the EU, conceptualised as a new polity, has an important effect on national political systems. This change is fairly shown by the new specific subfield on the research agenda regarding EU studies, that is, the analysis of the effects of European integration on member states' actors and institutions. That is what it has been labelled as Europeanisation, the reaction and adaptation of Member states to the process of European integration. Nowadays the EU has many policy competences in very different domains. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse how political parties react to these European policies. Because the EU is a general project of economic and political integration, but is also a new polity with certain outputs and policy outcomes.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the saliency of Europe in electoral and parliamentary competition in 11 parties/coalitions in Italy and Spain in three broad policy domains, Foreign, Economic and Social policies. Thus, what is the importance parties give to Europe? Does it vary from electoral to parliamentary competition? Why do parties enact or downplay the European issue in political competition? For answering these questions, this paper is structured as follows. In the first part, a necessarily brief a review of the current debate on Europeanisation and political parties will be done. Then the main theories, hypotheses and research design will be explained. The second part is the empirical analysis of Europeanisation and political conflict focusing on the evolution in time, the different policies analysed and on individual parties. Finally, different conclusions of the empirical analysis will be assessed.

Europeanisation: A contested concept

The growing competences of the European Union not just in the economic domain but also, especially after the Maastricht Treaty, on political issues, has changed scholars' attention from the creation of the EU, that is, why Member States lose competences to the EU and how European integration is created; to the effects of the EU in the Member States. The growing literature on Europeanisation shows this change in the research agenda. Now, the focus is not just in explaining why the EU as a polity has more competences, which is still the most studied aspect in EU studies; but the effects, impact and uses of the EU at the domestic level. In this last case, the research questions have changed, focusing mainly at the domestic level and trying to track down the possible consequences of the process of European integration. Does Europe matter? What are its effects? Does it produce convergence and harmonisation? What domains are Europeanised and to what extend? One special characteristic of the EU is the widespread policy competences and the advanced political aspects of this process of regional

integration (Hix 2005: 21-22). The presence of the European Commission and of the EP, the creation of the European Court of Justice or the European Central Bank, which imply an important loss in policy instruments by Member States are a clear example of the qualitative step forward undertaken by the EU. Therefore, the concept of Europeanisation is very interesting to analyse what are the influences of the EU on its Members.

Although the concept and meanings of Europeanisation are still the object of a lively debate (Cowles et al 2001; Hix and Goetz 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Vink and Graziano 2006), one can submit that Member States adapt their political structures in response to the set of constraints and opportunities posed by European integration. The definition of what Europeanisation is; how does it works; or its effects and consequences, vary according to different frameworks and research designs. The study of Europeanisation has been characterised by a primacy on the analysis of public policy (see Featherstone 2003) that has influenced the research designs and the subjects covered by the different researches. However, with the growing 'political' competences of the EU, the scope of the analysis has shifted (see Goetz 2002, Radaelli 2004), with studies that cover other aspects, such as governments, parliaments, political parties and other political actors and institutions.

The lack of a common understanding of what Europeanisation is can be fairly showed in the different definitions proposed by scholars (Andersen and Eliassen 1993, Börzel 2001; Kohler-Koch 1999; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001; Ladrech 1994, 2002; Radaelli 2000; Bache and Marshall 2004; Dyson and Goetz 2003; Graziano and Vink 2006). These definitions show how the concept is used in different terms and with reference to different processes.

Thus, there is not a clear definition of what Europeanisation means, to whom it applies and there is not a common understanding of its mechanisms. However, there is an agreement on what Europeanisation is not, which is a first step. Europeanisation is not a theory but a process because Europeanisation is an *explanandum* rather than an *explanans* (Gualini 2003) or in Radaelli's (2004: 2) words, Europeanisation is a problem, something to be explained, rather than a solution, something that explains. Second, Europeanisation is normally seen as the impact of the EU on Member States (EU-isation), but, with the growing competences of the EU, its exact role (as source or facilitator of change) is being questioned (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005). This is also a matter of dissent. According to certain scholars, the EU is not necessary for Europeanisation and therefore is not equivalent to EU-isation (Irondelle 2003; Graziano and Vink 2006). Consequently, non-EU members can be affected by this process. Even though, I understand that Europeanisation is strictly related to the European Union. Being an EU member (or a prospective one) implies that European laws and regulations are legally binding and policy options much more reduced than in countries where there is a 'voluntary' adaptation, for whatever reason, to the EU. Third, Europeanisation is not European Integration. Indeed, the former implies the latter. Finally, unless actors are entirely passive in their response to Europeanisation, they are likely to respond through inputs into integration and policy process.

The relation between the EU and domestic political dimension is sometimes difficult to assess even if scholars have highlighted the increasing effects and constraints posed by the

increasing EU's competences and the problem that domestic parties and leadership face (Hix and Goetz 2001; Cotta 2005; Ladrech 2005). Different lines of research have been pursued stressing the EU's direct impacts on domestic political competition (Mair 2001). One of the main lines deals with parties' position towards European integration and the growing feeling of Euroscepticism (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003; Sitter 2002). Another direct impact can be the level of contestation of European matters in national elections and how policy entrepreneurs can seize the opportunity to differentiate themselves in EU terms (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004:47). In this sense, the literature on salience of Europe seems rather interesting (see the special issue of *Electoral Studies* 2007 for some analysis and methodological pitfalls). For the analysis of saliency, different approaches have been used like expert surveys' data (Ray 1999; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002¹), newspaper coverage (Hobolt 2004; Kriesi 2007) or electoral manifestos (Pennings 2006). However, further analysis should be carried out on other types of documents (like parliamentary speeches or party congress interventions) and more explicative rather than descriptive accounts could be done. Finally, scholars also recognise indirect effects such as the growing constraints on policy manoeuvrability, the disempowerment of elections and voters and the existence of a mainstream consensus that reduces the level of choice for the electorate. Both characteristics can reinforce the aspect of the irrelevance of conventional politics (Mair 2001, Bartolini 2005). Bartolini distinguishes four main models for analysing national parties' attitudes towards the EU: a) The Geopolitical Model²; b) The Institutional Model³; c) The Partisan Model⁴; and d) The Genetic Model⁵. As he argues, all these models have some truth even if the partisan and genetic approaches are the ones more used to explain the difficult relation between national parties and European integration.

Salience Theory, Domestic Political Competition and European Integration

Salience theory is probably the most suitable theory to study and analyse the importance parties give to European integration on domestic political competition. Salience theory differs from the more classical idea of 'great debate', or confrontational theory, where parties and leaders oppose and debate on a whole range of issues (Budge and Farlie 1987, Budge 1994, Budge et al 2001; Klingemann et al 2006). However, this intuitive confrontational theory does not reflect the actual manner in which parties position themselves. As Budge

¹ They use the Chapel Hill Data Set on Parties and Europe, that contains experts' evaluations on party positions on European integration from 1994 to 2002 for 23 European countries (in 2002).

² Where difference into support/opposition among national parties should be less significant than the differences across nations.

³ Suggests that parties in government are generally more supportive to European integration than those in opposition, and that those parties- whether in government or opposition, that belong to the EU-level coalition tend to be more supportive.

⁴ Where variation within European party family should be reduced, while variation among national parties should be much higher

⁵ Starts from an objective definition of the main EU features (Centralisation, bureaucratisation, economicism/national-regional independence, resistance to market economy and globalisation) and then relates it with domestic cleavages

(1987) correctly argues in his preliminary analysis of party manifestos, other parties or other policies in each party platform are not directly mentioned (or they are marginal). Equally, parties differ sharply in their emphasis according to the policy issue, where he identifies some 'proprietary topics' for parties. Therefore, following Salience theory, parties and leaders normally do not oppose a certain issue, rather they emphasise some issues while neglecting others. As Budge argues "the taking up of positions is done through emphasizing the importance of certain policy areas compared to others. Policy change consists in de-emphasizing previous priorities and taking up new ones" (Budge 1994: 45). Therefore, we can argue that issue salience is strictly related to importance; the more an issue is salient the more it is important for both parties and the electorate.

We can define salience "as the extent to which the party leadership considers an issue as vital for its electoral appeal" (Netjes and Binnema 2007: 40). The concept is important because it can be used to explain how parties compete with each other and for understanding the relationship between party position and voter preferences. The above definition may have a top-down bias, because the relationship between party-voters preferences is difficult to assess. Indeed, voters could have a strong position on certain issues and political parties may be forced to adopt a clearer opinion on that specific issue. Furthermore, the definition is just centred on electoral competition even though it can be equally applied to parliamentary competition. Hence, for our main interests, the definition is suitable, especially if we are dealing with European integration. This specific aspect of the relationship of party salience in an issue and the relationship with voters, the median voter and other parties, brings up the concept of systemic salience. As parties compete with other parties in a political system, and aim to elaborate policies that their possible voters may support, their salience in a precise issue is correlated in many cases with public opinion and other parties' position on that issue.

We can distinguish between two analytically different, although interrelated, aspects of salience: systemic salience and individual party salience. We can define systemic salience as the overall salience of a single issue in a specific political system. According to this, and following Steenbergen and Scott (2004), the saliency of European integration in a party is higher when it is higher in the other parties within the system. Systemic salience can be measured by using some kind of public opinion data to infer the importance voters give to a certain issue, in our case, European integration, or by measuring the salience score in that specific issue of all the parties in the political system (Steenbergen and Scott 2004: 173, using expert data surveys), or by analysing newspapers coverage (Hobolt 2004; Kriesi 2007). Salience is an important concept and is central to our analysis, because lack of saliency implies that parties do not compete or do not position themselves in that specific issue. For competing in a given issue, parties need to have some incentives, whether they consider that issue as a winning issue or not, if other competing parties have a different position on it, and if the electorate and the media consider it an important and decisive issue for voting.

Salience is related with the specific political context, but is also dependent on the different strategies parties may adopt. Issues that are considered irrelevant are not salient in

political (electoral or parliamentary) competition; however, a lack of salience does not directly imply that the issue is not at all important to parties or to the electorate. Indeed, according to salience theory, parties will emphasise those issues where they consider have an added value and will de-emphasise those that do not, or have roughly the same position as their rival parties⁶. Therefore, lack of saliency can imply a collusion of opposing parties on that specific issue. As there is not a distinct position, parties will try to de-emphasise that issue. This can be particularly relevant in the case of European integration such that, as in many European countries, the general process of European integration is widely accepted by voters and mainstream political parties tend to support it, more or less enthusiastically. Therefore, parties do not have the incentive to stress an issue when they have the same position as their rival parties, especially during election periods. Then, even if the issue can be of great importance, parties will downplay that issue. Another possible explanation of lack of salience can be attributed to intra-party disagreement (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). This aspect is especially relevant, again in election time, because parties prefer to display an image of unity rather than an image of division. Consequently, polemic and not consensual issues within the party are normally de-emphasised independently of their importance. Finally, salience is dependent on the specific and short-term context. Some issues, both in the electoral and parliamentary arena, can be pre-eminent and predominant while others may be downplayed. In this sense, political stability is an important factor. If some issues, such as the legitimization of the incumbent government or the functioning of the entire political system, are at stake, those special issues will be the most salient and will overshadow other important themes and policies.

Therefore, salience is very important for the analysis of certain direct impacts of European integration on domestic party systems and political competition as well as the creation of a new cleavage or dimension of competition (Tsebelis and Garret 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Hix and Lord 1997; Steenbergen and Marks 2004 for discussion). If European integration is not salient, it is difficult to assume the creation of a European dimension or cleavage (Ray 2006, Conti 2007). However, it is not clear or assumed that European integration implies a new cleavage for domestic politics. Rather, integration can imply new opportunities and constraints that parties may adapt to their pre-existing ideologies or strategies in a given period. Indeed, the recent interest in this direct impact is due to the growing EU competences and the development of a supranational polity with many important policy competences that force parties to take clearer positions. However, even if this claim is stated by many scholars, there is little empirical research to support it (Hobolt 2004; Netjes and Binnema 2006). Salience has been studied using mostly electoral programmes, expert surveys, opinion polls (such as the European Electoral Survey or Eurobarometers), media coverage (mainly newspapers), and focusing on election periods (especially, for obvious reasons, those using electoral programmes).

⁶ As Bartolini (2002) argues, policy decidability, that is, the presentation of a different political programme, clearly distinguished by the electorate is crucial for political competition.

Scholarly attention on salience and European integration has been growing but some issues have not been addressed. First of all, the saliency of European integration has been analysed, with few exceptions (Pennings 2006), referring to the whole process of European integration. That is, the attention has been exclusively centred on how important the issue was perceived by parties, party leaders or voters. Indeed, one of the hypotheses is that European integration as such, should be more salient because it is objectively more important, especially after the Maastricht treaty. Even though it is a very interesting and crucial aspect, we should take into account that, as the European policy competences grow and the subsequent saliency of European integration is predicted to increase, that salience should vary according to the policy issue. Hence, we could expect increasing European salience in some specific policy domains (such as the economic one), due to the increasing and sometimes predominant European competences. A second aspect is related to electoral competition. Scholars have pointed out the importance of issue saliency to understand the relation between parties and voters and the strategic uses that parties and leaders have of specific issues to pursue their strategic goals. However, parties do not just compete in the electoral arena but in the parliamentary arena as well. The analysis of parliamentary debates can be very fruitful, because it can complement some of the weaker points that the electoral manifesto analyses produce. As Marks et al. (2007) argued electoral programmes have some weaknesses such as declared salience, timing and dissent. Declared salience implies that electoral programmes “are strategic documents designed to put a party in a positive light during electoral campaigns” (Marks et al. 2007: 27) and therefore just positive issues (and not negatives ones) will be addressed. Equally, electoral timing can be a problem, taking into account that elections are scheduled in different periods across countries and may pose a problem on time-sensitive issue such as European integration. Finally, programmes do not provide for intra-party dissent because they are consensually adopted by the party. Then, as Ladrech claims, manifesto and programme development are almost useless as “realistic indicators of actual future government action (particularly where EU competences are involved)” (Ladrech 2007: 226). Without being so negative regarding party platforms, it is true that they may not reflect the real party action in a variety of issues, that time may be a problem and that the consensual nature of electoral programmes may not reflect internal dissent. In this sense, parliamentary interventions seem to be the most appropriate way to try to solve these problems. Debates in the Parliament imply that parties and leaders have to take part and specify their position on a specific issue, defend their action or proposals in a clear way and, as they are held regularly, the time allowed for debate needs to be corrected. These are the main reasons why this paper aims to analyse salience in parliamentary interventions as well.

From the overall discussion we can derive some hypotheses related with the saliency of Europe in the domestic party and party system:

H1 General Hypothesis. The saliency of Europe increases with time. The more Europe has political and policy competences, the more it is salient in the domestic political debate.

As I previously stated, scholars argue that the saliency of Europe should increase once Europe has more importance and policy competences and, consequently, Europe has more direct consequences in the domestic political system. However, different facts can influence this general statement. Therefore:

H1.2 The saliency of Europe is related with the party's position on European integration. Saliency in parties with a unitary and positive attitude towards integration will be higher than parties that are internally divided or against integration.

H1.3 Differential Impact. According to the degree of communitarisation of the European policy, Europe will be more or less salient. As it was stated, Europe plays a differential policy role and, therefore, the salience of the European issue should vary according to the policy domain. In this paper three broad policy areas will be studied: foreign, economic and social policy.

H1.4 The saliency of Europe is different according to the arena of competition. Saliency in electoral programmes is more incremental while salience in parliamentary interventions is more discontinuous.

To test these hypotheses, I will use a historical-comparative research design (Gerring 2007). This specific type of research design allows both spatial and temporal and cross-case and within-case analysis. While the main units of analysis are fairly clear, that is, political parties, the temporal boundaries are assumed, deriving from the 'critical juncture' that the Maastricht treaty represented, both in terms of increasing EU competences and the creation of the Political Union, to the Constitutional treaty, another relevant moment, even if failed, on the process of European integration. This method also allows for diachronic analysis, the variation of a single party over time; and synchronic analysis, within case variation at a single point in time (Gerring 2007: 27). These two aspects are fundamental if we conceptualise Europeanisation as a process. Thus, we can compare the relevance and saliency of Europe in different parties in the same period and, equally, to observe that saliency of Europe for each party during time.

An Index for Measuring Saliency in Electoral and Parliamentary Competition

In this paper, a specific indicator to analyse saliency will be used by applying an easy procedure present in the content analysis software, Hamlet II. This software allows counting word co-occurrences within the text, permitting the elaboration of a specific indicator for saliency (Brier and Hopp 2006). The first step to analyse the documents using Hamlet II, is the creation of a meaningful and coherent dictionary. This is the most important part for the analysis of documents using a dictionary-based software, because not only the dictionary is the central component for the analysis, but it is the only moment (albeit crucial) where the researcher can influence the results. Hence, a meaningful, comprehensive and operative dictionary has to be created. For the analysis of saliency, a specific dictionary has been created that takes into

account all of the possible EU-related words that can appear in the text, a single category has been created for this purpose. Utilizing this dictionary, the analysis gives us three types of data: the total number of EU-related words in the text, the percentage of EU-related words compared with the overall number of words in the text and the number of context-units (sentences) with EU-related words over the total number of context units. This last data is the most relevant for our purposes and the Saliency indicator that will be used throughout the entire project is quite simple:

$$S = \text{ECU} / \text{TCU} \times 100$$

Where S is Saliency, ECU is the number of context-units with at least one EU-related word, TCU is the total number of context units present in the text. Hence, the indicator goes from zero (no EU-related word in the whole text) to one-hundred (all sentences in the text have at least one EU-related word). This indicator allows for a fast analysis of the documents and permits applying it to different documents, such as parliamentary interventions, which consents the comparison between different documents in different arenas of competition.

On the Cases and Document Selection

In this paper two countries, Italy and Spain, and eleven parties have been selected. This selection is made for a variety of reasons. In first place, Italy and Spain joined the EU in different periods; Italy was a founding member while Spain entered in the third enlargement, and some scholars agree that the longer a country is a EU member, the more 'europeanised' it should be (Pennings 2006). Secondly, their party systems are different, with diverse institutional settings, party system dynamics, effective number of parties or the degree of polarisation (Bruneau et al. 2001). Equally interesting, both countries experienced a reconstruction of the party system. Spain reconstructed and consolidated its party system after almost 40 years of authoritarian rule, while Italy suffered a major party system change in the beginning of the 1990s. In both cases, the European Union was already a developed political entity, and could have played a role in the redefinition of policy priorities of the new parties. Thirdly, Spain and Italy are the two biggest Southern European countries, with similar European interests, where Europe has been traditionally conceptualised as an opportunity for modernisation to overcome internal traditional constraints but the picture may be changing in the last years with the growing effects of European policies. Therefore, change in the conceptualisation of the EU seems to be taking place. Finally, specifically regarding economic performance, both countries are opposite one another. Even though Italy and Spain faced serious constraints and pressures to adapt their economy to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, Spain did it successfully, and benefited for a long time of the new opportunities offered by the Single Market, while Italy seems to be struggling with its adaptation, as statistics in economic growth and public debt control demonstrate. This differential success in adaptation to European policies is also interesting for analysing the saliency and usage of Europe in national political parties and competition.

Within the Spanish and Italian cases, different parties have been selected. In the Spanish case, both majoritarian and governmental parties, the Popular Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) have been chosen. They represent two different ideologies (conservatism and social democracy) and two different organisational paths. Two other minor parties have been selected: United Left (IU) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). These parties represent two different ideologies. IU is a federation of different parties led by the Communist party, while the PNV is an ethno-regionalist party with strong regional support. IU has evolved in its position towards European integration to a more critical stance, due to the market-oriented and lack of social policy of the current process of integration. Meanwhile, the PNV was one of the most Euro-enthusiastic parties, and was considered as a way to 'overcome', in a certain way, the Spanish central state. In the case of parliamentary debates, the Catalans of *Convergència i Unió* (CIU) will be also analysed, as they played a crucial role as external supporters of both socialist and conservative governments during the mid 1990's.

In the Italian case, the two most important and most voted parties have been selected, the Democrats of the Left (DS) and Forza Italia (FI). They also represent social democracy and conservatism respectively, ascribing to the European Socialist and European Popular Party families, even though they come from different paths than the Spanish equivalent parties. Furthermore, taking into account the specificities of the Italian party system, four other parties have been selected. First, two parties have been chosen that reflect, as in the Spanish case, two different ideologies: communism (Rifondazione Comunista, RC) and ethno-regionalism (Lega Nord, LN). Finally, we have to consider that, due to the change in electoral law, Italy is starting to develop bipolar competition, with the Olive Tree Coalition (Ulivo, then *Unione* with RC) formed by DS, Margherita, UDEUR, PDCI, the Greens, and other minor parties and the Freedom House (CDL) a coalition with FI, AN, UDC and LN.

Regarding the time period under analysis, in this paper I consider the Maastricht Treaty as a critical juncture. Hence, the time span covers the period prior to the negotiation and implementation of this Treaty and goes until the failed European Constitution.

Finally, two types of documents have been selected, Electoral Programmes and Parliamentary Interventions in Investiture and Budget Debates. On the one hand, electoral programmes represent a set of key central statements of party positions' (Budge, Robertson, Hearl 1987:18), usually ratified in party conventions, representative for the whole party and allow for diachronic analysis of changing policy positions (see also Appendix II 'Manifesto Coding Instructions in Klingemann et al 2006). In our case, these electoral programmes permit us to analyse how parties use Europe in the policy statements during general elections. They allow both synchronic and diachronic analysis in the electoral arena. The analysis of salience in electoral programmes will be done in two steps. First, the analysis of salience in the overall electoral programme will be done. Then the same electoral programme will be divided into three main issue areas: economic, foreign and social policy. In some cases, the distinction of each issue is quite simple, especially regarding foreign policy. It is more difficult in economic policy, where strictly economic aspects have been included, but not issues referring to industrial and

energy policies. Equally, social policy is addressed differently by each party, and issues regarding employment, immigration, welfare, health, family policies and housing policies have been included. This dictionary (in both Spanish and Italian) allows for the comparison of salience in the electoral programmes.

While the analysis of Electoral Manifestos deals with policy positions that parties advocate in the electoral arena, parliamentary speeches refer to another face of the party, the party in public office. Two different parliamentary debates will be analysed. On the one hand, mainly general domestic political debates, such as government investiture debates. In these debates, the Prime Minister/President of the Government explains the general policy program that his government will apply. On the other hand, a more specific debate, such as Budget debates. This debate and the Budget Law (*Presupuestos Generales del Estado* in Spain and *Legge Finanziaria* in Italy) sanctions probably the most important law approved by the government each year. In every case, just plenary sessions debates will be analysed. This is done for a variety of reasons: a) the more general and less technical nature of these debates, b) the higher profile of the speakers (normally party leaders), c) following the concept of Europeanisation, the importance that Europe and its policies have in the domestic political debate at large, rather than in the more specific European-issues context and d) the higher relevance of these debates in public opinion.

SWITCHING ON, OFF, OR STAND BY: EVIDENCES FROM ITALY AND SPAIN

The importance parties give to Europe in the electoral and parliamentary arena is crucial for understanding if parties consider Europe as an important issue for their electoral appeal or in parliamentary competition. If Europe is not salient at all, and parties consistently neglect the issue, the politicization of Europe and the possible creation of a new dimension of contestation will be very low. Therefore, the analysis of salience is a fundamental first step for analysing how parties interiorise Europe and the possible consequences of the new European polity in national party systems. In this section, I will compare saliency of Europe in Spanish and Italian parties in both electoral and parliamentary competition. Following the hypotheses mentioned above, the analysis will be centred in different aspects such as time, policies, and parties in the two distinct political arenas.

Saliency in Time and Policies

The first and more general hypothesis, claimed by different scholars and logically intuitive but not always empirically proved relates the increasing European competences during all treaty negotiations with a higher domestic importance of Europe. Consequently, as it was stated in Hypothesis 1, the saliency of Europe in political competition should increase with time. The following tables provide us with the mean the saliency of Europe for all Italian and Spanish political parties in the overall electoral programmes, foreign, economic and social policy proposals within the manifesto, and investiture and budget debates by year of election or debate in Italy and Spain. This mean score could be considered as the systemic saliency of Europe in each party system, as it is formed by the salience score of each party under analysis.

According to our main hypothesis, salience should increase in electoral programmes and parliamentary debates due to the growing European competences, as parties react to the new European polity. Different aspects should be highlighted.

[Table 1 to 4 around here]

Firstly, as a general trend, Europe seems to gain importance with time. If we compare the salience in the first and last years of the parties' documents analysed, we can observe that salience is always higher in the 2000s than at the end of the 1980s (see Tables 1 and 2 for electoral programmes in Italy and Spain and Tables 3 and 4 for parliamentary debates). However, the data are also very clear: Europe was more salient in the mid 1990s, and especially in 1996. Regarding the overall electoral programme, which includes all the policy domains, the higher mean salience was in 1996 for both Italy and Spain⁷. This is also true as regards budget policy debates, where the mid 1990s were those with a higher systemic salience (15, 29 in 1996 for Italy and 9, 50 and 10, 60 for the 1996-1997 debates in Spain). In the case of the Investiture Debates, this trend is also confirmed in Italy, where the first Prodi investiture in 1996 was among the most salient in Italy with a mean salience of 7, 67, just below the 1998 D'Alema's investiture (7, 71). In the Spanish case, however, it is the 1989 debate the most salient (16, 00) which can be understandable as they were the first years of Spanish European membership while 1996 sanctioned the first government alternation since 1982. Secondly, in the case of the specific policy proposals within the electoral programmes, we can find two interesting features that match with our second hypothesis regarding salience: the differential salience according to the policy issue and their different pattern during time.

The mean saliency of Europe clearly shows that it is in foreign policy proposals where the saliency of Europe is the highest ranging from the lowest 25, 50 and the highest 52, 25 in Italy (for the 1983 and 1996 elections respectively) and 32, 25 and 42, 25 for Spain (in the 1993 and 2004 elections). In both countries we can observe that Europe has been increasingly gaining importance during the years, confirming that Europe is a key component of each country's foreign policy and that, following the growing European importance, salience raises. In second place, as expected, salience is higher in economic proposals than in social ones. Differently from foreign policy proposals, salience in the economic part of the electoral programmes is very dependent on the crucial moment of the Economic and Monetary Union's implementation. The mid 1990s was the period where those countries aspiring to join the Euro reformed their economies to fulfil the economic criteria established in Maastricht. Hence, Europe gained salience in economic proposals (and in budget parliamentary interventions) due to the clear objectives imposed by the EMU, the fixed term to fulfil them, by 1999, and the clear purpose and goals of that reforms, to join the Euro. Thus, while European salience in foreign policy seems to follow an increasing trend matching the growing European competences, as

⁷ Except in Spain for the overall electoral programme's mean in 1989 was 12, 00 compared with the 11, 25 of the 1996 ones.

stated by our general hypothesis, in the case of economic policy its salience is much more dependent on relevant moments of integration, such as the EMU. Therefore, 1996 electoral programmes and the 1996-1998 budget debates are those with a higher European salience. Finally, Social policy proposals are those with a lower European salience. As it was argued, Europe lacks of a clear and comprehensive set of social policies, as many of the EU detractors claim. Hence, following salience theory, European importance should be the lowest, as it is the case. Furthermore, the saliency in social issues is stable through the years, even if with a small increase in European salience with time. In a policy domain where Europe has no clear policy competences, political parties do not stress the European issue, while in policies where the EU has real competences, it plays a more important role.

A Tale of Two Countries and Two Arenas

Another two relevant aspects have to be considered when analysing European salience at the country level: the comparison between Spanish and Italian salience, and, the saliency of Europe in electoral and parliamentary arenas. Regarding the first aspect, some scholars, notably Pennings (2006) suggested that those countries with a longer membership should have a higher European salience than new members because they have had more time to adapt to the new polity, they were part of the negotiations since the beginning of the European process and consequently they should be more Europeanised. In Table 5, we can observe the mean salience in Spain and Italy in each arena of competition.

[Table 5 around here]

As the data indicate, the mean the saliency of Europe varies according to the specific arena and the type of document or intervention. On the overall electoral programmes, salience is higher in Spain than in Italy (9, 46 and 8, 42 respectively). However, in specific policy domains within the electoral programme the picture somehow changes. In economic proposals in general election programmes salience is also higher in Spain but in foreign policy proposals is consistently higher in Italy than in Spain, while in social policy the mean is almost the same for both countries. If we compare the salience of each policy domain with the general mean of the overall electoral programme, we can observe that Foreign policy is by far, well above the mean salience, showing the high importance of Europe in this specific policy. In the economic field, Spanish parties mean salience is just above the mean salience of the overall electoral programme while in Italy is just below. Finally, social policy mean is much lower than in the rest of the manifesto.

In parliamentary competition, we can observe two interesting aspects: in Investiture debates, Europe is much more salient in Spain than in Italy, almost doubling it and, opposite, salience is higher in budget debates in the Italian case than in the Spanish one. Regarding Investiture Debates and the differential salience in both countries, we have to take into account some contextual and institutional factors that may explain such variation. In institutional terms, we can observe some important differences in the debates' procedures. In the Spanish case,

there is a monopolisation of those crucial debates by party leaders. Consequently, in the debates in plenary sessions just the leader or speaker of the parliamentary group intervenes, with a longer, more comprehensive and structured intervention than in the Italian case. In Italy, there is a much prominent role of the two Chambers of the Parliament, the *Camera dei Deputati* and the *Senato*, which is coherent with a perfect bicameralism system. This institutional setting can account for longer legislative processes, as every law needs the approval of each chamber and there is a more prominent role of the single Member of Parliament than in Spain. While in Spain just the leader of the parliamentary group intervenes, with longer exposition of its political project and the reasons for supporting or rejecting the candidate's investiture; in Italy the debate is much more fragmented, a trend followed also in budget parliamentary debates, diffculting a clear and comprehensive exposition of the political arguments used by each party. Consequently, Spanish interventions are more structured and allow a clearer and more comprehensive debate with longer interventions where Europe can play a more prominent role than in the Italian case that, due to higher number of interventions, the vote declaration is necessarily shorter and more centred in the most prominent political issues than in Spain.

Whether this institutional setting is common in all parliamentary debates, such as budget policy, there is a second important aspect that can account for the much lower European salience in Investiture Debates in Italy than in Spain: contextual factors and notably governmental stability. In this case, Spain and Italy represent to extreme cases, where Spain is a clear example of stability, even with minoritarian governments, while Italy is a paradigmatic case of governmental instability, with 14 governments in the 19 years under analysis (1987-2006). In those investiture debates that followed general elections in Italy, European salience was higher than in those debates held in the middle of the legislature. This fact can be explained by the legitimacy of the incumbent government derived from elections, opposite of the one emerged from a political crisis. In this last case, the saliency of Europe in the Prime Minister's declaration can be higher, as Europe is used to legitimise his incumbency. On the other hand, opposition leaders focus more on the reasons for the political crisis, the coherence of the majority supporting the new government, and on legitimacy issues of a government that does not derive from general elections. Therefore, some more prominent issues can downplay the importance of Europe. The XIII Legislature (1996-2001) investiture debates, with four governments, offer a clear example of the importance of governmental stability on the saliency of Europe. Those debates were held in the crucial period of the EMU implementation. While in Prodi's I investiture (the only one held after the elections), but also in D'Alema's I in 1998, their European salience was very high, especially in their Programmatic Declaration, the opposition leaders' saliency of Europe was very low or even nonexistent, due to the higher importance of more institutional and systemic issues in those debates, rather than policy-substantive ones. These two factors, institutional and contextual, can account for much of the difference on the saliency of Europe in investiture debates.

A second interesting result is showed by the saliency of Europe in Budget Parliamentary Debates that is higher in Italy than in Spain. In this case, the difference can be explained by the

different success in adapting to the Single European Market. Spain successfully reduced government debt well below 60%, and controlled the annual government deficit under 3%. The only indicator where Spain did not perform as expected was inflation. However, the EMU's process was done in a moment of continuous economic growth that started in 1994 and continued until 2007 in very positive levels. In Italy, the situation was the opposite. The Maastricht criteria were somehow achieved, but government debt ranked among the highest in Europe and the EMU adaptation was done in a period of low economic growth and even recession. Therefore, once the Euro was adopted and the Single European Market was established, the economic situation in both countries was different. Consequently, Italy suffered more by the policy limits of the new Monetary Union, with the European Central Bank focusing more on inflation control, which suited Spanish interests, and not in economic growth, as it was necessary for Italian economy. Furthermore, Italian economy, characterised by the high number of small and medium enterprises were affected by the new European competition, and they did not perform well. Thus, while in Spain Europe was very salient, as in Italy, during the mid 1990s, the importance of the EMU and the European arena declined in parliamentary debates after the Euro's accession. Meanwhile in Italy, due to the perceived negative consequences of the single currency, the issue was more politicised and European salience kept its importance, and even rose, in the first years of the XXI century. Therefore, economic performance and successful economic adaptation can account for the differential role of Europe in budget parliamentary debates. A second aspect that I will address below is the position of Spanish and Italian political parties towards European integration and the Euro.

The idea that countries with longer European membership should have a higher European salience is not totally supported by our data. Different factors can account for the differential importance of Europe. Whether the analysis is limited in time, the last 20 years, the data show how European importance varies according to the policy issue and the arena of competition. However, Spain shows a higher salience in the overall electoral programme, in the crucial economic policy and in investiture debates, while in the Italian case, Europe is more important in foreign policy and in budget parliamentary debates. Some institutional and contextual factors play an important role in explaining these differences but the specificities of the Spanish and Italian parties and party systems play also an important role, as I will argue below.

Table 6 offers us a final interesting result that helps to answer one specific question: Is salience stable in time and does it vary between arenas of competition? In the Hypothesis 1.4 we considered the relevance of distinguishing between the two main arenas of competition, and it was argued that salience in electoral programmes should be more incremental while salience in parliamentary competition should be more discontinuous. The logic behind this hypothesis is related to the different goals and processes of electoral and parliamentary competition. While electoral programmes are consensual written documents, normally approved by party congresses, parliamentary interventions are less structured, party leaders have to position in different issues, where downplaying some of them may be impossible, and the speakers are

less constrained by their party. Consequently, European salience in electoral programmes should be more incremental and continuous in time, with no great differences from one election to another⁸, while in the Parliamentary arena, European salience is more dependent on the context and on political strategies, being therefore much more discontinuous. Table 6 provides with the coefficient of variation (CV) that allows comparing data with significantly different mean values. The CV is simply the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, that is, $CV = \delta/\mu$:

[Table 6 around here]

As we can observe, the coefficient of variation is higher in parliamentary debates than in electoral programmes, supporting the idea that salience is more continuous in electoral competition than in parliamentary debates, where it is more context dependent and more subject to variation. In the Italian case, we can observe a higher deviation than in the Spanish one, especially in parliamentary interventions. These differences are also due, as I argued above, to the different institutional settings and the diverse political and economic context in both countries. Not surprisingly, the higher CV is present in investiture debates closely followed by budget policy ones. However, we can observe a higher difference in Italian electoral and parliamentary competition rather than in the Spanish one, showing a different party behaviour in the electoral and parliamentary arenas, as noticed by Bardi (2006), when he argued that, in fact, Italy has two clearly distinguishable party systems, the electoral and the parliamentary one⁹.

When Europe suites my Interests: European Saliency and Parties

The previous hypotheses dealt with three of the dimensions under analysis, countries, time, and policies. However, the party level dimension is crucial for understanding how individual parties emphasise or not Europe in the electoral and parliamentary competition. As I hypothesised, the saliency of Europe is related to the party's position towards European integration, and hence, parties with a unitary and positive attitude towards integration should have a higher saliency. Equally, two main features can influence the individual parties' the saliency of Europe, government/opposition status and majoritarian/non-majoritarian position.

One of the main assumptions of this paper is that the environment where parties act is also endogenous, not just external to the party. Therefore, it is not coherent with this assumption to consider that the EU provides the same opportunities, incentives or constraints for all parties (and all countries) in the same way. Parties, according to their ideology, their strategies and government position, may find different incentives in highlighting or not the European issue and policies. If we consider the Chapel Hill expert survey as an external measure of party positioning towards the EU, we can observe that Spanish parties have an overall positive position towards European integration, as the majoritarian PSOE and PP, and

⁸ Except in periods of party change, as we will see when dealing with single Spanish and Italian parties.

⁹ Indeed, parties have their own parliamentary group even if they competed in elections under a coalition label. Furthermore, all the governments that followed a governmental crisis were supported by a different majority in the Parliament.

the ethno-regionalist of the PNV and CIU while just IU has a more neutral perception. In the Italian case, Christian democrats (DC, PPI, CCD-CDU-UDC) and centre-left parties (DS and Democratici, then Margherita) have an undoubtedly pro-European position, while centre-right parties have a more neutral stance (FI and AN) and the ethno-regionalist LN and the left party RC have a more negative position¹⁰.

Regarding electoral programmes in Spain, the PNV is the party with a higher mean salience in the period under analysis with an important difference with the rest of parties. The PNV highlights Europe as an important issue for its electoral appeal, party identity and strategy. In the case of the two majoritarian parties, the PP and the PSOE, they have quite similar salience in electoral competition, with minor differences in their scores in the total electoral programme and the selected policy domains. As expected, IU has the lower European salience in electoral competition and, noteworthy, much lower in foreign policy. The picture changes regarding parliamentary competition. In this case, we can observe that the PNV has a very high salience in investiture debates, but with an equally high standard deviation. Since 2000, the PNV strategically decided to focus their investiture debates, after the end of the party's external support to the Aznar government, to the Basque problem, neglecting other issues, as the standard deviation shows. Noteworthy, it is IU the second party with a higher European salience on these debates, followed by the PSOE and the PP. Opposite of what it was hypothesised, Europe plays a more important role in these debates for the Spanish communists, because they contested the process of European integration and they had the incentive to make Europe another dimension of competition. Finally, in budget parliamentary debates, the two majoritarian parties have the higher salience, which reflect their governmental status in different moments of the EMU process and hence, highlight the issue. Other parties, such as the PNV and CIU have also a quite high mean salience while IU is the lowest one, even if with a higher standard deviation.

[Table 7 and 8 around here]

In the Italian case, we can observe a different trend. In electoral competition, we find that the Ulivo has the higher European salience in all domains except economic policy proposals, where RC's mean salience is higher. Some characteristics make Italy different from the Spanish case. In first place, while in the two Spanish majoritarian parties their mean salience was quite close, in Italy we can observe a great difference between the two leading coalitions, Ulivo and CDL. Except in foreign policy proposals, where both coalitions have a

¹⁰ See the expert survey 'Chapel Hill Party Dataset' to map the position of parties in the pro-anti integration continuum and towards specific European policies. In this expert survey all Spanish parties rank over 6, that is, they have a favourable position on European integration (Psoe 6, 69, Pp 6, 23, Ciu 6, 18, Pnv 6, 08) while IU (4, 38) is the only one with a more neutral position. In the Italian case DS 6, 46), Democratici (6, 45), UDC and Ccd-Cdu (6, 23) have a favourable position towards European integration. Forza Italian and National Alliance have a more neutral position (ranking 4,30 and 4,31 respectively) and, with a more critical position Rc, that somehow opposes to European integration and the Ln, that after their U-turn on European integration, are opposed to European integration ranking 2, 31.

similar salience (54, 67 and 53, 00 respectively), on the overall electoral programme and in economic and social proposals Europe is much more salient in the Ulivo coalition. This can be due to the different parties that form each coalition. In the case of the Ulivo, they had the incentive to emphasise Europe because the two leading parties (DS and Democratici-Margherita) had a positive position towards Europe and they were in government when Italy successfully joined the Euro, claiming it as a great political achievement.

On the other hand, the CDL coalition is formed by four main parties, each of them with a different European position. While the CCD-UDC, following the Christian democratic tradition has a positive attitude towards the EU, FI and AN have a more neutral position and the LN since 1998 is clearly opposed to it. Furthermore, once the Euro was adopted, they faced in government the negative consequences for Italian economy of the Euro and the loss of monetarian policies. Thus, while in the Ulivo Europe is seen as a cohesive issue in an otherwise eclectic coalition, in the CDL Europe is much more controversial and consequently downplayed it. Interestingly, the CDL had a higher mean salience than the different allied parties just in foreign policy proposals, while in the overall electoral programme and in economic policy is equal or lower than in the single member parties.

Another difference between Italy and Spain is RC's European salience, with a high European mean salience in the total electoral programme and, noteworthy, in economic policy proposals. Contradicting our hypothesis, RC, with a negative European position, emphasised Europe because, strategically, they had the incentive to stress and politicise the issue as another dimension of contestation. While in Spain IU prefers to highlight Europe in the parliamentary arena, RC does it in the electoral one but both parties are starting to perceive the EU, especially on the economic domain, as another dimension of competition, criticising it on very similar grounds, showing the importance of the Partisan model. Finally, in parliamentary competition, we can observe a different trend in Italy, compared with the electoral arena. In Investiture Debates, the Ulivo stressed Europe to legitimise their incumbency and as an incentive for action, in the crucial period of the EMU implementation. In second place, FI had also a quite high European salience followed by the DS and then the rest of parties. Finally, in budget debates the two majoritarian coalitions had the higher mean salience, closely followed by the LN and then the rest of parties, including AN, DS and RC. Noteworthy, the LN, even with a high mean, had also a very high standard deviation, which implies a very discontinuous trend in their European importance.

A final point concerning individual parties has to be analysed. The comparison between Italian and Spanish political parties offer us some interesting features as the higher importance of Europe when a party aims to make a mainstream evolution, such as AN and the PP, the importance of party stability (PSOE), intra-coalition consensus (Ulivo and CDL) and the importance of minoritarian and opposition status on certain policies.

One of the shared features of Italian and Spanish individual party's European salience is the increasing importance of Europe when a party evolved to more mainstream positions. Our analysis offered us two interesting cases: Alleanza Nazionale and Partido Popular. AN

evolved from neo-fascists and anti-system positions of the former Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) to more mainstream and conservative positions that, after the breakdown of the First Republic, allowed them to overcome their marginalisation in the party system. Led by Gianfranco Fini, in 1995 AN sanctioned this mainstream evolution. The analysis of salience shows an increasing European importance in the 1994 and 1996 electoral programmes, which can show how Europe was gaining importance to legitimise this mainstream turn. In similar ways, Alianza Popular, formed by former Franco's Minister Manuel Fraga, and second most voted Spanish party but very distant from the ruling PSOE, evolved to more European-like conservative positions under the rule of José María Aznar. In 1989 they changed their name, to the current Partido Popular, and a more mainstream position, with less connotations of the old regime, that helped to find the support of the Spanish electorate in the 1996 election. The analysis of salience, as in the AN's case, showed the increasing European importance in the party's electoral programme since 1989, after neglecting and criticising some European features of the Spanish negotiation led by the PSOE.

A second interesting aspect is the importance of party stability and coalition cohesion. In the case of the Spanish Socialist Party, its lower historical European salience was in the 2000 elections. The VI Legislature (1996-2000) was very difficult for the party as they lost government after 14 years of incumbency, changed its historical leader, Felipe González, and the new leadership had problems to obtain the party's and voters' legitimacy. Hence, the Secretary General Joaquín Almunia, elected after González's resignation, decided to celebrate primaries to elect the PSOE's candidate for the 2000 elections. Unexpectedly, José Borrell defeated Almunia, opening a difficult period of bicephalous leadership. After some corruptions scandals and observing the lack of support of the party leadership, Borrell resigned and Almunia competed in the elections where the PSOE obtained very poor results and the PP won an absolute majority of seats. This difficult period for the PSOE highlighted the divisions within the party and, noteworthy, European salience was the lower of all the electoral programmes. Once the party gained stability after selecting Rodríguez Zapatero as their leader, European salience raised to its mean levels in the 2004 elections. In periods of internal conflicts, other issues gain importance and the EU is left in stand-by.

The case of Italian coalitions shows the importance of internal cohesion and individual party positioning to understand the importance of Europe in their common political programmes. As the data has shown, the Ulivo-Unione coalition had more incentives to emphasise Europe in a very broad ideological coalition that includes among others different ideologies ranging from Christian democrats such as the UDEUR and some Margherita's members, social democrats in the DS, communists (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani and RC in 2006), and new left parties such as the Greens (I Verdi). However, the two most important parties in the coalition had a clear positive attitude towards the EU and, after their incumbency period where they lead the country to the Euro, Europe became a political asset. On the other hand, the CDL coalition, even though somehow more cohesive in ideological terms, had a clear Eurosceptic party (the LN) and two more neutral ones (FI and AN). Furthermore, while the centre-left coalition could use

Europe as an example of their political performance, the CDL in government since 2001, suffered some negative and unexpected consequences for Italian economy of the newly adopted common currency. These diverse incentives and individual party's position can explain the different the saliency of Europe in both coalitions and offer higher possibility for politization of Europe in Italy rather than in Spain, where the two majoritarian parties (and the ethnoregionalist) have almost the same favourable position.

A final point of the analysis of European salience is the growing importance of Europe in left parties, especially the communist IU and RC. The data show an increasing politicization of Europe in these two parties, which oppose to the current process of integration in similar terms, showing their ideological opposition to different EU features and, notably, the Euro. Therefore, while in Spain almost all parties have a positive attitude and, since the adoption of the Euro the issue has been de-emphasised, and in Italy the Ulivo has a more clear position and the CDL a controversial one, downplaying the issue, both communist parties lead the opposition towards the EU, with a more critical vision and a higher politicization of the issue, making Europe another dimension of competition and exemplifying the idea of Europe as the politics of opposition (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003, Sitter 2002).

CONCLUSIONS

The empirical analysis has showed some interesting conclusions and the relevance of certain domestic, institutional and contextual factors for understanding the salience attributed to Europe on domestic political competition and the importance of distinguishing between countries, policies, arenas and a specific time period. The analysis has helped to prove and sometimes reject certain hypotheses and provides also with some hints of indirect impacts and usages of Europe on domestic political competition. Hence, why do parties enact, downplay or neglect the European issue?

Parties and leaders may stress the EU and its policies for a variety of reasons. Incumbent parties and leaders switch on the European issue and its policies for legitimising their governmental programme and policy decisions or even for legitimising their own incumbency, as the Italian case and the successive governmental crisis has showed, demonstrating the importance of Bartolini's Institutional model. Other parties, which have successfully adapted to the new European arena find the EU and some of its policies as a perfect complement for their ideology and political programme, as is the case in some ethnoregionalist parties (PNV, CIU and LN until 1998) where the EU helped to overcome some national constraints. Another interesting aspect is the role played by the EU for sanctioning a mainstream turn and a vote-maximising strategy in the party ideology as it was the case of the PP and AN or even for providing a common political ground on eclectic electoral coalitions, as in the Ulivo case, showing the role of the EU in cohesion-seeking strategies.

Parties and leaders switch off the issue by consciously neglecting it according to their interests. Opposition parties tend to place less emphasis on the effects, opportunities and constraints of European integration of domestic political action. While the government is part of the European consensus, participating on the European Council and negotiating European

policies, opposition parties have less information and access to these debates. Consequently, while governmental parties stress it, they downplay it focusing on other domestic issues, fostering the depolitization of the EU. However, with the current economic situation some opposition parties (or even governmental ones) can start to stress the policy limitations and domestic consequences of European policies. Another interesting explanation is related to parties and coalitions internal dissent. In the PSOE's case, a period of party change implied that the European issue was less important and, according to salience theory, it was downplayed. In the CDL's case, the parties that formed the coalition had different position and they switched off the issue, neglecting it in their electoral platforms.

An interesting aspect is why parties downplay and put the European issue on stand-by. The two majoritarian Spanish parties offer a good example. The European issue was very important during the EMU's implementation process, in the mid 1990s. Then, when Spain successfully joined the Euro, the issue lost its relevance showing their consensus and an indirect side-effect, the EU's depolitization due to the policy collusion of the two majoritarian parties. This fact has different consequences. In first place, some parties found incentives to stress the issue and make it as another issue for political competition, as the case of IU, with a high saliency of Europe on budget debates and the Italian RC in electoral competition. In the current times of economic crisis and the evident policy limitations of the Euro for national governments and their policies to overcome the crisis, it will be interesting to observe if some parties start to politicise the issue again, in what terms and with what consequences. Another example is offered by Italy and its governmental instability. In those cases (14 governments in 19 years) just the government stressed the issue, for legitimising their incumbency while opposition parties emphasised other issues, depoliticising *de facto* the European issue.

To sum up, there are a variety of reasons for which parties switch on, off or put in stand-by the European issue and its policies. Contextual and institutional factors, party ideology, party position on integration, the arena of competition and the specific policy domain shows the multiples ways in which Europeanisation can have an effect on domestic political competition and its consequences.

The analysis of the salience of Europe in electoral and parliamentary competition in Italian and Spanish parties has provided with different empirical evidence of the importance of these factors for understanding when parties emphasise the European issue on domestic political competition and the possibility for politicization of the Europe at the domestic level. Furthermore, the analysis of Europeanisation can tell us different things about domestic political competition and, on the other hand, domestic political competition can tell us different things about European integration itself. The analysis of Europeanisation of domestic political competition and parties' interiorisation of the EU and its policies seems necessary. The current economic and social situation and the new EU's competences make this type of analysis even more relevant.

ANNEX – TABLES

Table 1

Mean Salience of Europe in Italian Electoral Programmes ^a

YEAR		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
1983	Total Electoral Programme	2	5,00	1,414
	Foreign Policy	2	24,50	6,364
	Economic Policy	2	,50	,707
	Social Policy	1	5,00	.
1987	Total Electoral Programme	2	4,50	2,121
	Foreign Policy	2	30,00	42,426
	Economic Policy	1	7,00	.
	Social Policy	1	1,00	.
1992	Total Electoral Programme	5	5,40	4,450
	Foreign Policy	2	48,00	9,899
	Economic Policy	4	7,25	5,188
	Social Policy	4	4,50	2,646
1994	Total Electoral Programme	6	10,00	4,099
	Foreign Policy	6	46,17	17,417
	Economic Policy	6	7,00	4,195
	Social Policy	6	4,17	2,137
1996	Total Electoral Programme	4	11,50	1,732
	Foreign Policy	4	52,25	13,598
	Economic Policy	4	13,00	4,243
	Social Policy	4	5,25	,500
2001	Total Electoral Programme	3	10,00	2,646
	Foreign Policy	3	52,00	26,514
	Economic Policy	3	11,33	8,505
	Social Policy	3	6,00	1,000
2006	Total Electoral Programme	2	10,00	2,828
	Foreign Policy	2	41,00	22,627
	Economic Policy	2	7,00	7,071
	Social Policy	2	5,00	4,243

a.

Table 2**Salience of Europe in Electoral Programmes in Spain**

YEAR		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
1986	Total Electoral Programme	4	7,50	3,512
	Foreign Policy	4	35,50	27,934
	Economic Policy	4	6,00	4,397
	Social Policy	4	4,25	2,062
1989	Total Electoral Programme	4	12,00	8,124
	Foreign Policy	4	33,75	17,056
	Economic Policy	4	9,50	4,509
	Social Policy	4	5,50	1,291
1993	Total Electoral Programme	4	8,50	4,655
	Foreign Policy	4	32,25	13,048
	Economic Policy	4	11,50	5,686
	Social Policy	4	2,50	1,000
1996	Total Electoral Programme	4	11,25	5,123
	Foreign Policy	4	38,25	12,447
	Economic Policy	4	11,75	3,202
	Social Policy	4	4,50	2,380
2000	Total Electoral Programme	4	8,25	3,775
	Foreign Policy	4	39,00	37,148
	Economic Policy	4	8,75	4,646
	Social Policy	4	4,25	,957
2004	Total Electoral Programme	4	9,25	1,258
	Foreign Policy	4	42,25	11,147
	Economic Policy	3	10,67	8,963
	Social Policy	4	6,25	4,787

a.

Table 3**Mean Saliency in Parliamentary Debates in Italy ^a**

YEAR		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
1987	Investiture Debates	3	5,67	6,028
1988	Investiture Debates	3	,67	1,155
1989	Investiture Debates	3	3,33	3,055
1990	Budget Debates	2	7,00	7,071
1991	Investiture Debates	4	1,75	3,500
	Budget Debates	2	,00	,000
1996	Investiture Debates	6	7,67	8,710
	Budget Debates	7	15,29	14,115
1997	Budget Debates	6	4,17	1,835
1998	Investiture Debates	6	4,83	4,665
	Budget Debates	7	7,71	6,993
1999	Investiture Debates	6	1,83	1,941
	Budget Debates	7	7,00	4,690
2000	Investiture Debates	6	4,17	4,215
	Budget Debates	7	4,43	3,505
2001	Investiture Debates	6	7,50	4,593
	Budget Debates	7	4,57	6,528
2002	Budget Debates	7	9,43	5,533
2003	Budget Debates	7	11,14	10,238
2004	Budget Debates	6	4,00	2,757
2005	Budget Debates	7	6,00	4,619
2006	Investiture Debates	6	6,33	4,719

a.

Table 4**Saliency of Europe in Parliamentary Debates in Spain ^a**

YEAR		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
1989	Investiture Debates	4	16,00	10,677
1990	Budget Debates	5	11,20	8,556
1991	Budget Debates	5	5,40	4,336
1992	Budget Debates	5	6,40	4,980
1993	Investiture Debates	4	10,75	6,752
	Budget Debates	5	4,40	2,074
1994	Budget Debates	5	6,00	3,464
1995	Budget Debates	5	4,60	3,209
1996	Investiture Debates	4	9,50	5,196
	Budget Debates	5	9,40	4,159
1997	Budget Debates	5	10,60	2,408
1998	Budget Debates	5	7,00	3,674
1999	Budget Debates	5	7,00	2,915
2000	Investiture Debates	4	3,25	2,062
	Budget Debates	5	4,40	1,140
2001	Budget Debates	5	6,00	1,414
2002	Budget Debates	5	6,80	3,271
2003	Budget Debates	5	5,00	1,225
2004	Investiture Debates	4	6,25	3,775
	Budget Debates	5	2,60	1,140
2005	Budget Debates	5	4,20	2,683

a.

Table 5

Mean Salience in Italy and Spain

COUNTRY		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
ITALY	Total Electoral Programme	24	8,42	3,988
	Foreign Policy	21	44,24	19,522
	Economic Policy	22	8,14	5,668
	Social Policy	21	4,67	2,082
	Investiture Debates	49	4,69	5,005
	Budget Debates	72	7,25	7,441
SPAIN	Total Electoral Programme	24	9,46	4,615
	Foreign Policy	24	36,83	19,754
	Economic Policy	23	9,65	5,060
	Social Policy	24	4,54	2,484
	Investiture Debates	20	9,15	7,206
	Budget Debates	80	6,31	4,011

Table 6

Coefficient of Variation in Italian and Spanish European Salience

DOCUMENT/INTERVENTION	ITALY	SPAIN
Total Electoral Programme	0, 47	0, 48
Foreign Policy	0, 44	0, 53
Economic Policy	0, 69	0, 52
Social Policy	0, 44	0, 54
Investiture Debates	1, 06	0, 78
Budget Policy	1, 02	0, 63

Table 7

Mean Salience of Europe in Spanish Parties

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
IU	Total Electoral Programme	6	6,00	1,897
	Foreign Policy	6	21,50	12,787
	Economic Policy	6	8,50	6,979
	Social Policy	6	3,67	1,366
	Investiture Debates	5	8,80	4,147
	Budget Debates	16	5,69	3,092
PSOE	Total Electoral Programme	6	8,00	2,366
	Foreign Policy	6	31,67	7,554
	Economic Policy	6	9,33	4,131
	Social Policy	6	4,83	1,722
	Investiture Debates	5	8,40	6,656
	Budget Debates	16	7,38	5,875
PP	Total Electoral Programme	6	8,67	2,251
	Foreign Policy	6	32,33	12,372
	Economic Policy	6	7,83	2,787
	Social Policy	6	3,33	1,633
	Investiture Debates	5	6,80	1,789
	Budget Debates	16	6,50	3,540
PNV	Total Electoral Programme	6	15,17	5,193
	Foreign Policy	6	61,83	18,247
	Economic Policy	5	13,60	4,722
	Social Policy	6	6,33	3,777
	Investiture Debates	5	12,60	12,621
	Budget Debates	16	5,25	3,474
CIU	Total Electoral Programme	0		
	Foreign Policy	0		
	Economic Policy	0		
	Social Policy	0		
	Investiture Debates	0		
	Budget Debates	16	6,75	3,606

TABLE 8

Mean Saliency of Europe in Italian Parties

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
RC	Total Electoral Programmes	4	9,75	1,258
	Foreign Policy	4	31,75	6,801
	Economic Policy	4	15,00	4,546
	Social Policy	4	4,00	2,160
	Investiture Debates	7	2,43	2,299
	Budget Debates	10	5,80	8,135
DS	Total Electoral Programmes	2	6,00	5,657
	Foreign Policy	1	55,00	.
	Economic Policy	2	7,00	,000
	Social Policy	2	7,00	1,414
	Investiture Debates	10	4,60	2,503
	Budget Debates	11	5,82	5,510
ULIVO	Total Electoral Programmes	3	12,33	,577
	Foreign Policy	3	54,67	7,767
	Economic Policy	3	10,00	4,359
	Social Policy	3	6,67	1,528
	Investiture Debates	5	11,80	9,338
	Budget Debates	5	9,80	3,834
DC	Total Electoral Programmes	4	8,00	3,559
	Foreign Policy	4	46,50	18,046
	Economic Policy	4	7,25	4,500
	Social Policy	4	3,00	1,826
	Investiture Debates	0		
	Budget Debates	0		
FI	Total Electoral Programmes	1	7,00	.
	Foreign Policy	1	42,00	.
	Economic Policy	1	,00	.
	Social Policy	1	5,00	.
	Investiture Debates	6	7,00	2,098
	Budget Debates	10	6,10	4,954
AN	Total Electoral Programmes	5	7,20	6,611
	Foreign Policy	4	40,25	32,510
	Economic Policy	3	8,00	8,000
	Social Policy	2	4,00	1,414
	Investiture Debates	10	3,90	4,358
	Budget Debates	12	6,08	6,529
LN	Total Electoral Programmes	3	8,00	4,359
	Foreign Policy	2	44,00	18,385
	Economic Policy	3	4,00	3,606
	Social Policy	3	5,00	2,000
	Investiture Debates	10	2,50	4,601
	Budget Debates	9	10,33	14,283
CDL	Total Electoral Programmes	2	7,50	,707
	Foreign Policy	2	53,00	39,598
	Economic Policy	2	5,00	4,243
	Social Policy	2	4,00	2,828
	Investiture Debates	1	2,00	.
	Budget Debates	5	12,60	6,465
UDC	Total Electoral Programmes	0		
	Foreign Policy	0		
	Economic Policy	0		
	Social Policy	0		
	Investiture Debates	0		
	Budget Debates	10	6,10	3,900

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