Publication: Modelos de duopolio con variaciones conjeturales : un análisis gráfico de la asimetría
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1996
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Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Decanato
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Abstract
Se estudia un mercado oligopolístico de un producto homogéneo desde la perspectiva de la distribución de las cuotas dentro del ámbito de la literatura sobre el oligopolio con variaciones conjeturales. La Proposición 1 defiende esta representación al demostrar, para el caso lineal, la equivalencia entre cualquier equilibrio con variaciones conjeturales no nulas y un equilibrio de Nash en variables estratégicas lineales.
Un sencillo cambio de variable define una nueva variable conjetural o "cuota percibida", que simplifica las expresiones de la solución y permite una sugerente representación gráfica de las conjeturas asimétricas. La cuota de mercado ya no depende sólo del coste marginal ("eficiencia"), sino también de las conjeturas ("competencia"). Analizando los efectos de varios shocks estratégicos demuestro gráficamente que el aumento del "grado de competencia" de una empresa puede originar aumentos de cuota ligados a reducciones en el beneficio, lo que no sucede con los aumentos de eficiencia.
This paper deals with an oligopoly with homogenous product from the point of view of market shares. It is centered in the framework of the literature of conjectural variations oligopoly. Proposition 1 proves, in the case of lineal oligopoly, the equivalence between any non-zero conjectural variations equilibrium, and a Nash equilibrium with lineal strategic variables. A simple change of variables defines a new conjectural variable which I call "perceived share". This new variable makes the mathematical solutions of oligopoly much simpler and allows for a very intuitive graphical representation of asymmetric conjectures. Market shares do not depend only on marginal costs ("efficiency"), but also on conjectures ("competitiveness"). I study the effects of four different strategic shocks. I prove graphically that an increase on the "degree of competitiveness" of a firm may increase the market share while it reduces profits; this cannot happen when efficiency increases.
This paper deals with an oligopoly with homogenous product from the point of view of market shares. It is centered in the framework of the literature of conjectural variations oligopoly. Proposition 1 proves, in the case of lineal oligopoly, the equivalence between any non-zero conjectural variations equilibrium, and a Nash equilibrium with lineal strategic variables. A simple change of variables defines a new conjectural variable which I call "perceived share". This new variable makes the mathematical solutions of oligopoly much simpler and allows for a very intuitive graphical representation of asymmetric conjectures. Market shares do not depend only on marginal costs ("efficiency"), but also on conjectures ("competitiveness"). I study the effects of four different strategic shocks. I prove graphically that an increase on the "degree of competitiveness" of a firm may increase the market share while it reduces profits; this cannot happen when efficiency increases.
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