Publication: Reglas, actores, potestades y equilibrios. ¿De qué hablamos cuando abordamos la propiedad como institución?
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2021
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El objetivo de este texto es clarificar conceptualmente el contenido y alcance de la noción de propiedad como institución con el fin de disponerlo para su empleo en el análisis histórico. A tal fin, se repasa inicialmente el significado del concepto de instituciones desde las perspectivas que las entienden como reglas regulativas (North), como reglas constitutivas (Searle) o como equilibrios (Greif). A continuación, se examinan las tradiciones que entienden la propiedad ya sea como un vínculo binario entre un sujeto y un objeto, ya como una relación social entre sujetos en torno a un objeto en contextos específicos. Tras una caracterización de los modos de entender la dinámica de cambio institucional en términos de elección racional o de economía evolutiva, se concluye presentando una propuesta tentativa para articular el análisis bajo la forma de ‘reglas en equilibrios anidados’.
The aim of this text is to clarify the content and scope of the concept of property as an institution, in order to facilitate its precise use in historical analysis. To do this, first, the meaning of the concept of institution is examined, confronting its definition as regulative-rules (North), as constitutive-rules (Searle), and as equilibria (Greif). Then, two approaches to the concept of property are presented: the one that understands it as a binary link between a subject and an object, and the other one that interprets it as a relation between subjects in relation to an object in specific contexts. After a characterization of the different ways to approach the dynamics of institutional change, from the points of view of rational choice and evolutionary economics, a tentative analytical proposal is offered, centered on the formula ‘rules in nested equilibria’.
The aim of this text is to clarify the content and scope of the concept of property as an institution, in order to facilitate its precise use in historical analysis. To do this, first, the meaning of the concept of institution is examined, confronting its definition as regulative-rules (North), as constitutive-rules (Searle), and as equilibria (Greif). Then, two approaches to the concept of property are presented: the one that understands it as a binary link between a subject and an object, and the other one that interprets it as a relation between subjects in relation to an object in specific contexts. After a characterization of the different ways to approach the dynamics of institutional change, from the points of view of rational choice and evolutionary economics, a tentative analytical proposal is offered, centered on the formula ‘rules in nested equilibria’.
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