Publication: Tribunal Constitucional y sentencias de los tribunales internacionales de derechos humanos
Loading...
Official URL
Full text at PDC
Publication Date
2020
Authors
Advisors (or tutors)
Editors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
UNIR Editorial
Citations
Exportar
Abstract
En el ámbito del Consejo de Europa, se puede hablar de dos corrientes doctrinales. Por una parte, quienes consideran que las sentencias del TEDH contienen únicamente criterios interpretativos que deben ser tenidos en cuenta al aplicar los derechos fundamentales que garantiza la CE , y por otra, quienes estiman que la jurisprudencia del TEDH tiene mucha más relevancia que la mera orientación a los intérpretes del Derecho. A juicio de esta segunda corriente, puesto que los textos constitucionales en realidad están hoy fragmentados (o dicho de otro modo, hay una comunión de textos constitucionales), hay también una simultaneidad de jurisprudencia de rango constitucional en materia de derechos fundamentales, sin que quede muy claro qué jurisdicción tiene la última palabra. La primera posición ofrece mayor seguridad jurídica, al atenerse más a las categorías dogmáticas con las que el Derecho se ha venido interpretando y aplicando hasta ahora; sin embargo, la segunda parece reflejar mejor el estado real de la cuestión en la práctica, que es inevitablemente “eurocéntrica”.
Por lo que se refiere al Derecho de la Unión Europea (y por tanto a la CDFUE), también podemos observar quienes consideran que la primacía del Derecho de la UE se refiere sólo al ámbito de la legalidad, y no al de la constitucionalidad, y quienes estiman que la primacía del Derecho de la UE sólo puede sostenerse en la práctica, cuando los Estados miembros ceden ante las decisiones del TJUE, y las acatan. Si consideramos las situación de los Estados que pertenecen simultáneamente a la Unión Europea y al Consejo de Europa (España, p. ej.), hay que ponderar además la posibilidad de que sobre la interpretación de un derecho fundamental recaigan sentencias en el TJUE que contradigan la doctrina del TEDH.
Within the scope of the Council of Europe, one can speak of two doctrinal currents. On the one hand, those who consider that the judgments of the ECHR contain only interpretive criteria that must be taken into account when applying the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EC, and on the other hand, those who consider that the jurisprudence of the ECHR has much more relevance than mere guidance to legal interpreters. In the opinion of this second current, since the constitutional texts are actually fragmented today (or in other words, there is a communion of constitutional texts), there is also a simultaneity of jurisprudence of constitutional rank in matters of fundamental rights, without very clear which jurisdiction has the last word. The first position offers greater legal certainty, as it adheres more closely to the dogmatic categories with which the Law has been interpreted and applied until now; however, the second seems to better reflect the real state of affairs in practice, which is inevitably “Eurocentric”. As regards European Union Law (and therefore the CFREU), we can also observe those who consider that the primacy of EU Law refers only to the field of legality, and not to that of constitutionality, and who consider that the primacy of EU law can only be sustained in practice, when the Member States give in to the decisions of the CJEU, and abide by them. If we consider the situation of the States that belong simultaneously to the European Union and to the Council of Europe (Spain, for example), we must also consider the possibility that the CJEU contradicts the interpretation of a fundamental right. the doctrine of the ECHR.
Within the scope of the Council of Europe, one can speak of two doctrinal currents. On the one hand, those who consider that the judgments of the ECHR contain only interpretive criteria that must be taken into account when applying the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EC, and on the other hand, those who consider that the jurisprudence of the ECHR has much more relevance than mere guidance to legal interpreters. In the opinion of this second current, since the constitutional texts are actually fragmented today (or in other words, there is a communion of constitutional texts), there is also a simultaneity of jurisprudence of constitutional rank in matters of fundamental rights, without very clear which jurisdiction has the last word. The first position offers greater legal certainty, as it adheres more closely to the dogmatic categories with which the Law has been interpreted and applied until now; however, the second seems to better reflect the real state of affairs in practice, which is inevitably “Eurocentric”. As regards European Union Law (and therefore the CFREU), we can also observe those who consider that the primacy of EU Law refers only to the field of legality, and not to that of constitutionality, and who consider that the primacy of EU law can only be sustained in practice, when the Member States give in to the decisions of the CJEU, and abide by them. If we consider the situation of the States that belong simultaneously to the European Union and to the Council of Europe (Spain, for example), we must also consider the possibility that the CJEU contradicts the interpretation of a fundamental right. the doctrine of the ECHR.