Agency theory: Forecasting agent remuneration at insurance companies



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Turrado García, Fernando and Sandoval Orozco, Ana Lucila and García Pineda, M. Pilar and García Villalba, Luis Javier (2022) Agency theory: Forecasting agent remuneration at insurance companies. Expert Systems with Applications, 215 . p. 119340. ISSN 0957-4174

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The principal–agent problem occurs when one entity (the ‘‘agent’’), is able to make decisions and/or take actions on behalf of another person or entity (the ‘‘principal’’). The agent earnings are regulated under a contract designed by the principal. Under the principal’s point of view, the main goal while designing said contract (and the payment rules incorporated on it) is to align the actions made by the agent to the principal’s own goals. So, in this paper we will define a method that will allow the principal to forecast the remuneration obtained by the agent under an established contract in the insurance sector.

Item Type:Article
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CRUE-CSIC (Acuerdos Transformativos 2022)

Uncontrolled Keywords:Agent theory, Optimal contract, Supervised learning, Support vector machines, Montecarlo methods
Subjects:Sciences > Computer science > Artificial intelligence
ID Code:76052
Deposited On:20 Dec 2022 15:45
Last Modified:20 Dec 2022 15:50

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