Publication: Entrada y competencia en los servicios de telecomunicaciones
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2004
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Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico. Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
Este trabajo analiza la entrada y la competencia en servicios de telecomunicaciones, en los que las empresas se diferencian por sus costes hundidos y por la valoración que reciben de los consumidores. En este marco de análisis desaparece el problema de coordinación presente en la literatura sobre entrada con costes hundidos, debido a que ahora la competencia en precios se ve modificada por el parámetro de valoración. Cuando se introduce heterogeneidad en los consumidores, la entrada queda definida por la combinación de costes y valoración, mientras los consumidores dirigen su demanda hacia la empresa que mejor se adapta a su tipo.
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Clasificación JEL: L1, L11, L96
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