Publication: El control sobre las Fuerzas Armadas: un estudio de la rendición de cuentas en las democracias (1960-2006)
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2016-05-03
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
Democracia y Fuerzas Armadas han formado parte de las reflexiones fundamentales de la Ciencia Política desde sus comienzos. Desde Platón hasta Tocqueville y llegando hasta autores contemporáneos, las reflexiones sobre la democracia le dedican una atención especial a cómo evitar que aquéllos que la sociedad arma para defenderla no sean quienes la esclavicen aprovechándose de su monopolio de las armas. Desde las experiencias totalitarias hasta las dictaduras militares de los años sesenta, democracia y Fuerzas Armadas son presentadas como dos términos antagónicos por naturaleza, en el que el segundo es una sospechosa espada de Damocles que oscila sobre el primero. Así, la imagen arquetípica nos presenta a las Fuerzas Armadas como las garantes de unas autocracias fuertes opuestas a unas democracias débiles y tambaleantes, incapaces de oponerse a los militares. Frente a esta imagen, en este estudio nos cuestionamos en qué medida esto es así. Por ello, nos preguntamos qué sistema político controla mejor a las Fuerzas Armadas y cómo lo consigue. Partimos de la hipótesis de que las democracias son el sistema político que mejor controla a sus Fuerzas Armadas y realizan dicho control de una manera no sólo más eficaz sino más eficiente. Lo consiguen estableciendo mecanismos de rendición de cuentas que inducen no sólo al control objetivo de las Fuerzas Armadas, sino a que éstas mismas asuman su papel de servir como una parte más de la Administración pública, de manera que dicha intervención no sea concebible. De este modo, nos planteamos como objetivo principal de esta investigación intentar validar o falsear esta hipótesis así como intentar averiguar cómo las democracias logran este control sobre las Fuerzas Armadas. Hemos optado por una estrategia investigadora que nos permita dar una respuesta a global a nuestra pregunta. Se ha elegido el enfoque sistémico, pues se adecúa por su abstracción, generalidad y capacidad explicativa para fijar unos ejes que permitan la comparación dado un marco de casos tan amplio. Asimismo hemos optado por combinar el método estadístico y el método comparado. Hemos diseñado un marco metodológico basado en una concepción en tres círculos concéntricos de la comparación. En el primer círculo, de carácter general, empleamos nuestros análisis estadísticos para poder dar una respuesta general. Para explorar sus múltiples variantes y dar respuestas más concretas, recurrimos a los otros dos círculos de la comparación. En el segundo círculo de la comparación empleamos el método comparado incorporando un grupo elegido de casos de países occidentales pero más variables tratadas con un análisis en mayor profundidad. En el tercer círculo de la comparación realizamos un estudio de caso longitudinal sobre el caso español, donde éste es comparado consigo mismo a lo largo del tiempo...
Democracy and Armed Forces have been part of the fundamental debates of Political Science from Plato to Tocqueville, and reaching contemporary authors. Debates on democracy have devoted a special attention to how to keep those who are entitled to bear arms to defend society away from enslaving those who were supposed to defend. From the totalitarian experiences to the military dictatorships of the sixties, democracy and Armed Forces are presented as two antagonistic terms by nature, in which the second is a sword of Damocles suspicious ranging over the former. Thus, the archetypal image introduces us to the Armed Forces as guarantors of strong military autocracies opposing to a weak and shaky, unable to resist the military, democracies. Faced with this picture, in this study we question to what extent this is so. Therefore, we wonder which political system controls better the Armed Forces and how they achieve that. We hypothesized that democracies are the political system that best controls its Armed Forces and perform such a control not only in a more effective but also in a more efficient way. They do this by establishing accountability mechanisms that lead not only to target military control, but also to make the military to assume their role as a part of the public administration, so that such interventions are not conceivable. Thus, we consider that the main objective of this research is to validate or falsify this hypothesis and try to figure out how democracies achieve this control over the Armed Forces. We opted for a research strategy that allows us to respond globally to our question. We have chosen the systemic approach, because it is consistent for its abstraction, generality and explanatory power to allow comparisons given our broad framework of cases. We have also chosen to combine the statistical method and the comparative method. We have designed a methodological framework based on a conception in three concentric circles of comparison. In the first circle, a census of all countries in the world, we use our statistical analysis to give a general answer to our research question. To explore its many variants and give more concrete answers, we turned to the other two circles of comparison. In the second circle of comparison we used the comparative method incorporating a selected group of cases, notably Western democratic countries. In the third circle of the comparison we performed a longitudinal case study on Sapin, where it is compared with itself over time...
Democracy and Armed Forces have been part of the fundamental debates of Political Science from Plato to Tocqueville, and reaching contemporary authors. Debates on democracy have devoted a special attention to how to keep those who are entitled to bear arms to defend society away from enslaving those who were supposed to defend. From the totalitarian experiences to the military dictatorships of the sixties, democracy and Armed Forces are presented as two antagonistic terms by nature, in which the second is a sword of Damocles suspicious ranging over the former. Thus, the archetypal image introduces us to the Armed Forces as guarantors of strong military autocracies opposing to a weak and shaky, unable to resist the military, democracies. Faced with this picture, in this study we question to what extent this is so. Therefore, we wonder which political system controls better the Armed Forces and how they achieve that. We hypothesized that democracies are the political system that best controls its Armed Forces and perform such a control not only in a more effective but also in a more efficient way. They do this by establishing accountability mechanisms that lead not only to target military control, but also to make the military to assume their role as a part of the public administration, so that such interventions are not conceivable. Thus, we consider that the main objective of this research is to validate or falsify this hypothesis and try to figure out how democracies achieve this control over the Armed Forces. We opted for a research strategy that allows us to respond globally to our question. We have chosen the systemic approach, because it is consistent for its abstraction, generality and explanatory power to allow comparisons given our broad framework of cases. We have also chosen to combine the statistical method and the comparative method. We have designed a methodological framework based on a conception in three concentric circles of comparison. In the first circle, a census of all countries in the world, we use our statistical analysis to give a general answer to our research question. To explore its many variants and give more concrete answers, we turned to the other two circles of comparison. In the second circle of comparison we used the comparative method incorporating a selected group of cases, notably Western democratic countries. In the third circle of the comparison we performed a longitudinal case study on Sapin, where it is compared with itself over time...
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología, leída el 19-11-2015