Publication: Análisis económico del control anticorrupción a partir del caso ecuatoriano
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2017-01-18
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Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Abstract
El control anticorrupción, como parte de la política criminal de un Estado, es parte del proceso de distribución de los recursos públicos y requiere la racionalización y evaluación de los instrumentos, medidas y políticas que se aplican. Las políticas de control deben cumplir dos objetivos básicos: por una parte, que los sistemas de control generen incentivos adecuados en los agentes públicos y privados, que disuadan los comportamientos ilícitos; y por otra, la necesidad de mejorar la eficiencia y distribución de recursos en su aplicación. La teoría económica del comportamiento criminal, formulada por Gary Becker (1968) propone el abordaje de esta clase de comportamiento humano, a partir de criterios de elección racional basados en las preferencias de los agentes y sus incentivos, donde el derecho penal y la política criminal deben orientarse a minimizar el costo social del delito, el que es igual a la suma del daño que causa y el costo de perseguirlo. El modelo de disuasión criminal planteado por Becker, orienta el análisis del control anticorrupción, a considerar los criterios racionales de un agente que elige incurrir en actos ilícitos, sin consideraciones de categoría moral, sino a partir del análisis de las preferencias estables, en aplicación de la teoría microeconómica. Este abordaje permite continuar con un análisis de incentivos en un contexto racional de elección y realizar predicciones sobre posibles comportamientos estratégicos de los agentes, frente a los instrumentos de disuasión que aplica el Estado, para incrementar la probabilidad de sanción. Desde este planteamiento teórico se analiza el caso de Ecuador, cuyo punto de partida es el levantamiento de información sobre el proceso de aplicación de instrumentos de política criminal y social, orientados al control de la corrupción pública, en los períodos constitucionales de 1998 - 2008, información a partir de la cual, se aplica el modelo de disuasión criminal a la actividad de control anticorrupción, ejercicio que permite evaluar algunos comportamientos estratégicos posibles, así como la racionalidad económica y la eficacia de las políticas de control de la corrupción pública y sus instrumentos. La investigación propone el análisis de la actividad de control en el caso de Ecuador, a partir de un “Modelo de Disuasión de la Corrupción Pública”, que permite identificar la función de utilidad individual de los agentes públicos y privados, considerando los incentivos y restricciones que generan los instrumentos de control, juzgamiento y sanción; y, su capacidad de influencia en la maximización de la función de utilidad individual de los agentes y su decisión de incurrir o no en comportamientos ilícitos.
Anti-corruption control, as part of State Policy against crime, is pivotal when addressing the distribution of public resources. The instruments, measures and policies applied to rationalize and evaluate are base don two basic objetives: 1. Control systems, to generate appropriate incentives for the public and private agents, to deter unlawful conduct; and 2. The need to improve efficiency and distribution of resources in Policy implementation. The economic theory of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968) proposes addressing this kind of human behavior, based on criteria of rational choice, according to agents' preferences and incentives, where criminal law and criminal policy should aim towards minimization of the social cost of crime, which is equal to the sum of the damage caused, and the cost of pursuit. The criminal deterrence model proposed by Becker, is aimed at controlling corruption activity, to consider criteria for a rational agent chooses commit unlawful acts, without regard to moral category, based on the analysis of stable preferences. Incentives analysis can continue in a rational context of choice and make predictions about potential strategic behavior of agents versus control policies that can apply the rule. A theoretical approach was applied to the case of Ecuador, taking as its starting point the process of implementing instruments of criminal and social policy, aimed at controlling public corruption, constitutional periods of 1998 - 2008. Readily available information from the criminal deterrence model was applied to the process of prosecuting and punishing acts of public corruption. The thesis apply the “Model of Deterrence of Public Corruption” to identifies the individual utility function of the agents and the variables that make up the subjective probability of punishment, elements that allow an approach to incentives and restrictions contained in the instruments of control, prosecution and punishment in the case of Ecuador; and their influence on the maximization of individual utility function of the agents, as well as their decision to engage in unlawful behavior. Its application allows to assess the economic rationality and effectiveness of control policies and instruments of public corruption.
Anti-corruption control, as part of State Policy against crime, is pivotal when addressing the distribution of public resources. The instruments, measures and policies applied to rationalize and evaluate are base don two basic objetives: 1. Control systems, to generate appropriate incentives for the public and private agents, to deter unlawful conduct; and 2. The need to improve efficiency and distribution of resources in Policy implementation. The economic theory of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968) proposes addressing this kind of human behavior, based on criteria of rational choice, according to agents' preferences and incentives, where criminal law and criminal policy should aim towards minimization of the social cost of crime, which is equal to the sum of the damage caused, and the cost of pursuit. The criminal deterrence model proposed by Becker, is aimed at controlling corruption activity, to consider criteria for a rational agent chooses commit unlawful acts, without regard to moral category, based on the analysis of stable preferences. Incentives analysis can continue in a rational context of choice and make predictions about potential strategic behavior of agents versus control policies that can apply the rule. A theoretical approach was applied to the case of Ecuador, taking as its starting point the process of implementing instruments of criminal and social policy, aimed at controlling public corruption, constitutional periods of 1998 - 2008. Readily available information from the criminal deterrence model was applied to the process of prosecuting and punishing acts of public corruption. The thesis apply the “Model of Deterrence of Public Corruption” to identifies the individual utility function of the agents and the variables that make up the subjective probability of punishment, elements that allow an approach to incentives and restrictions contained in the instruments of control, prosecution and punishment in the case of Ecuador; and their influence on the maximization of individual utility function of the agents, as well as their decision to engage in unlawful behavior. Its application allows to assess the economic rationality and effectiveness of control policies and instruments of public corruption.
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Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Derecho, Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV, leída el 15/01/2016